I'm stressed about having to learn a language that is only spoken by 7 million people. I don’t want to move to where the Russian government is. Fight for the linguistic rights of the Russian-speaking minority - even more so. There is one alternative - to explain to humanity that a single international language is good. But how? And what language exactly?

I am for Esperanto.

But he has a lot of problems. Although there are prospects.

“The idea of ​​introducing Esperanto as an auxiliary language is especially popular in the Esperanto community European Union]. Proponents of this solution believe that this will make interlingual communication in Europe more efficient and equal, while simultaneously solving the problem of European identification. Proposals for a more serious consideration of Esperanto at the European level have been made by some European politicians and entire parties, in particular, representatives of the Transnational Radical Party]. In addition, there are examples of the use of Esperanto in European politics (for example, the Esperanto version of Le Monde Diplomatic and information bulletin "Conspectus rerum latinus" during the Finnish Presidency of the EU]). A small political party “Europe - Democracy - Esperanto” is participating in elections at the European level, gaining 41 thousand votes in the elections to the European Parliament 2009.
Esperanto enjoys the support of a number of influential international organizations. A special place among them is occupied by UNESCO, which adopted the so-called Montevideo resolution in 1954, in which it expressed support for Esperanto, the goals of which coincide with the goals of this organization, and UN member countries called for the introduction of teaching Esperanto in secondary and higher education. educational institutions. UNESCO also adopted a resolution in support of Esperanto in 1985]. In August 2009, the President of Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, in his letter expressed support for Esperanto and the hope that over time it will be accepted by the world community as a convenient means of communication, not providing privileges to any of its participants." ©(Vika)

I also see prospects in the fact that religion has not ignored Esperanto.

“All the main holy books have been translated into Esperanto. Vatican Radio broadcasts in Esperanto, the International Catholic Esperantist Association has been active since 1910, and since 1990, with the document Norme per la celebrazione della Messa in esperanto, the Holy See has officially allowed the use of Esperanto during services - the only scheduled (artificial) language. On August 14, 1991, Pope John Paul II addressed more than a million young listeners in Esperanto for the first time. In 1993, he sent his apostolic blessing to the 78th World Esperanto Congress. Since 1994, the Pope, congratulating Catholics around the world on Easter and Christmas, among other languages, addressed his flock in Esperanto. His successor Benedict XVI continued this tradition. Exists international organization Orthodox Esperantists - Kristana ortodoksa rondo esperantista (KORE).
Ayatollah Khomeini encouraged Muslims to learn Esperanto and praised its use as a medium for better understanding between peoples of different religions. After he proposed replacing English with Esperanto as the international lingua franca, Esperanto was used in the seminary of Qom, the religious center of Iran. Soon after this, an Esperanto translation of the Koran was published. In 1981, the use of Esperanto in Iran became less popular when it became apparent that Baha'is were also interested in Esperanto and were publishing literature in it.]
Originating in Iran, the Baha'i faith calls for the use of an auxiliary international language. Some Baha'is believe that Esperanto has great potential for this role]. Lydia Zamenhof, the youngest daughter of the creator of Esperanto, was a follower of the Baha'i faith and translated the most important works of Bahá'u'lláh and 'Abdu'l-Bahá into Esperanto.
The main theses of the Japanese religious movement Oomoto-kyo is the slogan “Unu Dio, Unu Mondo, Unu Interlingvo” (“One God, One World, One Language of Communication”). The creator of Esperanto, Ludwig Zamenhof, is considered a saint-kami in Oomoto]. The Esperanto language was introduced as the official language into Oomoto by its co-creator Onisaburo Deguchi. Won Buddhism is a new direction of Buddhism that arose in South Korea, actively uses Esperanto], participates in international Esperanto sessions, the main sacred texts of Won Buddhism have been translated into Esperanto. The Christian spiritualist movement “League of Goodwill” and a number of others also actively use Esperanto.” ©(Vika).

What do you think about a single world language?

Bekasov Ivan

RAM named after Gnessins

1. Introduction

Western interlinguists, for example, Leon Bollack, E. L. Thorndike and others designate a language that they call either auxiliary international (international), then world, then general, universal (universal), first of all for businessmen and tourists: to correspond with the whole world and thus receive news without the help of a translator and circulate throughout the world and understand everyone without the need for a translator.

The roots of the idea of ​​a single international means of communication, like almost all ideas in science, go back to ancient times. Greek philosopher Plato, who lived more than 23 centuries ago, said that the gods would benefit humanity by giving it a common language. But how long can humanity live in such hope? Can't a person himself invent a language that everyone can understand, at least written at first?

René Descartes(1596-1650) confirmed the fundamental possibility of creating a reasonable language that all people need: I believe that such a language is possible... But don’t hope to ever see it, it presupposes great changes in the order of things, and the whole world must become a paradise...

The problem of the language of world civilization is reflected in the works of such great figures as Jan A. Komensky, Isaac Newton, Voltaire, Charles Louis Montesquieu, Dm. I. Mendeleev and etc.

In the second half of the 19th century. The idea of ​​creating a universal language began to conquer the minds of famous philologists and linguists. The first authoritative representative of philology who publicly recognized this idea was Max Muller(1823-1900) - the most prominent English philologist: The invention of an artificial language does not contain anything impossible for people who are accustomed to speaking a natural language... Such an artificial language can be much more correct than any of the natural languages ​​of mankind.

Active participant social movement for the international language was one of the largest linguists in Russia and Poland - Ivan Aleksandrovich Baudouin de Courtenay (1845-1929): If it is not man who exists for language, but language for man, if man has not only the right, but also the obligation to improve all his tools, then it is obvious that such an important and inevitable tool, which is language, must be subject to this improvement..

The question of the official international interstate language was considered in League of Nations V 1922 The Secretariat of the League prepared and the III Assembly of the League approved a resolution entitled " Esperanto as an international auxiliary language ". Since 1924(The Hague) international congresses of linguists take place. The issue of an auxiliary international language was raised at II such congress (Geneva, 1931).

Supported the idea of ​​an artificial international language and A. M. Peshkovsky: As for an artificial language as an auxiliary language, I believe that the adoption of some language of this kind by all mankind for international relations is quite possible and highly desirable.

The number of projects for an auxiliary international language already in the 30s numbered in the hundreds (300 or even more)... Among the countless contenders for the role of an international language, the project of Dr. L. L. Zamenhof occupies a special position. Therefore, it is worth paying special attention to it.

2. Esperanto is the universal language of the future.

Creator of Esperanto Ludovic Lazar Markovich Zamenhof was born December 15, 1859. on the western outskirts of Russia - in the town Bialystok, now part of Poland. Even as a child, he was depressingly impressed by the fact that people of different nationalities (Bialystok was inhabited by Russians, Jews, Belarusians, Poles) spoke their own languages: this isolated and alienated them from each other.

Knowing several languages, Zamenhof designed his language for international communication, guided by purely intuitive considerations and proved to be undeniably capable linguist. But he showed even more ingenuity in promoting his project: he sent it, first of all, to the editorial offices of newspapers in different countries, to scientific societies. Your work" international language"Zamenhof released under a pseudonym" Doctor Esperanto" ("hopeful"). The pseudonym became the name of the language.

In Esperanto, new word forms are formed by adding various prefixes, suffixes and endings to root words. For example, "komputi" - "to calculate", "komputado" - "calculation", "komputilo" - "computer", "komputileto" - "pocket or handheld computer" (a small computer in general) "komputila" - "computer", "komputejo" - "computer center", "komputiko" - "computer science". Esperanto alphabet- phonetic, that is, each letter is always read the same, regardless of position in the word. The grammar consists of 16 rules, no exceptions at all. The language was compiled in such a way as to make learning it as easy as possible, and its structure logical and understandable to a speaker of any natural language. It was assumed that Esperanto could be learned "jokingly". Zamenhof greatly simplified the grammar so that it could be mastered in half an hour, and the entire language in a few days. On your own tongue dr Esperanto-Zamenhof watched not as a simple means of communication between multilingual people, but as a panacea for all social ills.

However, this language was not destined to become global.

3. Projects of the language of the future (beginningXIXV. – sir.XXV.)

IN 1817. the first sketches of a very unique project for a universally understood language - a musical language - appeared Solresol. Its author is French Jean Francois Sudre(Sudre, 1787 - 1862 ), originally from Albi - composed all the words, in addition to seven monosyllables, from various combinations of seven musical notes: there are 49 two-syllable words, 336 three-syllable words, 2268 four-syllable words and 9072 five-syllable words. For example, "I" is pronounced dore; “you, you” - domi; "my" - redo; doredo - “time”, doremi - “day”, dorefa - “week”, doresol - “month”, sollasi - “raise”, silyasol - “lower”; “I love” - dore milyasi. The words of Solresol can: 1) be written in letters, 2) with the first seven Arabic numerals or 3) with notes, 4) pronounced or sung, 5) performed on any musical instrument that has a scale, 6) signaled by flags, 7) reproduced in the seven colors of the rainbow - in have seven in total various forms expressions.

Volapyuk- created in 1879. I. M. Shleyer, Litzelstetten near Konstanz (Germany); Volapyuk entered the world under the motto of “wealth” - the wealth of transmitted sounds and grammatical forms. Nouns had 2 numbers and 4 cases, verbs - 6 tenses, 4 moods, 2 aspects and 2 voices, and in all these forms the verbs were conjugated by persons and numbers. A number of forms had no analogues at all in the main European languages: for example, nouns could change according to degrees, infinitives - according to persons, numbers and cases, participles - according to persons, etc. If we add to this that special indicators distinguished parts of speech, as well as individual conceptual classes (for example, names of animals, diseases, countries, etc.), then Volapuk will appear as the most complex of all artificial languages. Active use of the language continued until approximately 1893. , when, having stated the failure of Volapuk, his academy begins to develop a new artificial language ( idiom-neutral); the last Volapyuk magazine ceases in 1910.

There were others, no less interesting projects artificial languages:

· idiom-neutral (1893-1898),

· Latin-blue-flexione,

· bolac (1899),

· ido(reformed Esperanto, 1907-1908, main differences between Ido and Esperanto: no letters with superscripts; plural ending number of nouns - i; lack of accusative case; three endings for indeterminate form verbs -ir, -ar, -or; changing pronouns to Latin; changing a lot of words to make it more "international"; the presence of new suffixes, etc.),

· occidental (1921-1922),

· novial (1928),

· interlingua (1951)

4. Forecasts of theories of the language of the future.

4.1. Ark theory.

According to the authors of this theory, the value of a language is neither its vocabulary power nor its phonetic features, since natural language has general pattern of its development. Two extreme types of language are valuable - grammatical and isolating.

It is easy to understand how humanity will abandon linguistic pluralism using an example Ark theories. Imagine that planet Earth is under threat of destruction and it is necessary to evacuate part of the planet’s population to a shelter - an underground city, a settlement on another planet, a huge spaceship.

To reduce the basis for conflicts between people, it will be necessary to reduce the number of user, working languages ​​of the Ark to a minimum - up to one. One of the tasks to ensure the reliability of the Ark and the peace of its population is reduction in the ways words form meaning, to reduce language users' verbal memories of reality outside the Ark. From this point of view, the most attractive as a user language is Chinese language as a representative of an isolating type language.

The choice of the user language of the inhabitants of the Ark (in general, future humanity) can be done by comparison and preference. So English will be preferable to Russian, and Chinese to English. Thus, English turns out to be a language of intermediate preference, and therefore unsuitable.

Russian or language can't be the working language of the population of the Ark, since, being the natural language of human thinking, it can serve to expand the reality of the inhabitants of the Ark. On the contrary, English is much more attractive.

The Russian language will always remind a person stuck in the Ark or the Matrix that there is a contradiction between language and the world: language describes a world much larger than this. That's why Neo - English-speaking, a Russian would immediately notice that he was stuck in Matrix - and from this, as one of the options, he would become sad and begin to drink too much. The awakening of his activity in the Ark is dangerous, therefore the Russian language is undesirable for the inhabitants of the Ark. There is no point in preserving other languages, since in theory they can provoke disunity, opposition and conflict. Thus, in the future there will be two languages ​​left - invariants of Russian and Chinese. All other languages ​​will be forgotten.

Professor at the University of Geneva and specialist in linguistic economics Francois Green published a detailed report in which he analyzes language policy European Union.

In his work, Green raises the question of what should be the optimal choice of working languages ​​in the European Union. As a result of the expansion of the European Union to 25 countries, the number of official languages ​​increased from 11 to 20, and then to 21 due to the adoption of the Irish language (but not Catalan).

Francois Green in this regard, considers Esperanto– a more effective and fair option. A Swiss economist offers a comparison between three possible scenarios: English as the only language, trilingualism English-German-French and choice Esperanto as working language in the bodies of the Union. The first option will further increase contributions to Anglo-Saxon countries. The second option - trilingualism - has a cost similar to the first, but with a greater degree of equality. However, the study points out that this option suffers from “some instability” and still requires huge costs. Third option - Esperanto as the only working language- it turns out, by a wide margin, the cheapest and most equal. Savings are achieved in two ways. On the one hand, the simplicity of Esperanto will allow you to spend less on teaching foreign languages– although the study assumes the study of a second foreign language in schools in all EU countries, including the United Kingdom. On the other hand, due to the fact that Esperanto is no one's language, goods and services associated with its teaching can be produced in any country and consumed by everyone else.

Professor Green Analyzing the possibilities of implementing this third option, he comes to the conclusion that it “ not feasible in the short term “, but its implementation is possible within one generation. " 85% of the population of 25 countries of united Europe have a direct and obvious interest in this, regardless of the cultural and political risks that linguistic hegemony brings", he states.

4.3. The future of the Russian language

What awaits the Russian language in the coming decades of the coming century? By setting ourselves such a limited task, we have the right to hope for more probable assumptions; moreover, linguistics has not yet accumulated sufficient data for a long-term forecast of language changes.

1) Bringing the common literary language closer to the language of science

The Russian language (as, indeed, other developed languages) has firmly and irrevocably taken the path of rapprochement with the language of science, and this trend is likely to intensify in the future: acceleration, antibiotics, biocurrents, gerontology, hydroponics, hologram, sensor, program, carcinogenic, computer and thousands of others, until recently unknown to us. But it's not even a matter of quantity. It's happening before our eyes qualitative transformation - metaphorical reinterpretation. Few people will be confused by such expressions now: mental trauma, moral vacuum, money-grubbing virus, uncertainty syndrome, inflation of conscience and so on.

2) Adaptation of borrowed vocabulary

Quite a lot of concerns have been expressed about the excessive contamination of the Russian language with foreign words: " new round of massive campaign", "moral capitulation", "constructive dialogue two systems". Will native Russian words die out? No, of course. Even if, as a result of competition, an international word wins, the native Russian one acquires a special stylistic sound. (Cf.: " architect" And " architect"). Language is not subject to either arrogant didacticism or arbitrary administration.

3) Language vocabulary: loss of growth rate.

The dictionaries of new words published by us contain approximately 20 000 neologisms. It turns out that for every year our language acquires more than a thousand new words. However Along with gains, losses are also inevitable, transition of words into passive stock and even complete extinction. Not everyone now remembers what they are equal to in the modern system of units of measurement lb.(400 g), pood(16 kg), arshin(71 cm), inch(4.4 cm), fathom(2.13 m). And townspeople often confuse brother-in-law With brother-in-law, A sister-in-law with sister-in-law.

4) The synthetic type of the Russian language will be preserved

Modern Russian belongs to the synthetic type languages. Of course, it would be wrong to deny the development of analyticism in individual links grammatical structure modern Russian language. This especially applies to compound numerals. Rarely now would a speaker risk pronouncing a five-digit number in any case other than the nominative. But talking about the transformation of the very type of our language in the coming decades is completely unfounded.

5) Increasing the internal organization of the language

The most characteristic feature of the language of the future will be an increase in its internal organization and consistency. Gradually unproductive forms in grammar will die out, excessive pronunciation options, much the number of those exceptions from general rules , which are not associated with any special meaning or stylistic function. The development of language has long been on the path unification of similar phenomena . And no matter how much I would like to preserve the pleasant-to-hear forms of verbs waves, splashes, splashes etc., they, alas, are doomed to be replaced in the future by less pleasant for modern perception, but more rational forms waves, splashes, splashes and so on. Many will say: this is a corruption of the language. Not at all. This is development according to a productive model.

4.4. The language of the future is pictograms.

Having examined a considerable number of artificial languages, we nevertheless came to the disappointing conclusion that they never took root, just as English most likely will not take root as an international language. Why? It must be because a language understandable to everyone, like any natural language, is formed " by itself". The choice of language may have objective reasons: Latin was the language of the Catholic Masses. As a result, it was known to monks all over Europe, and it was monks who did science in the dark ages... But all this happened organically and without external pressure. No one tried to specifically “implant” Latin as an international language.

American scientist Simon Garrod put forward the assumption that the language of the future will emerge spontaneously, but will not be similar to any national language, since it will... language of pictures. He conducted experiments that prove the truth of the proverb: It's better to see once than to hear a hundred times. He discovered that two people having a conversation without words using pictures very quickly find a “common language.” Over time, their drawings become simpler. And by the end of the conversation, they develop their own symbols, understandable only to them. Professor Garrod gave a presentation at a science festival at the University of Leicester, where he stated that " the language of pictures fully corresponds to all the features of communication between people"In his opinion, this explains the great popularity among mobile phone users of the service for transmitting graphic messages.

Emotions: :-) = = smile ;-) = = sly smile :-7 = crooked smile :-(= = chagrin, sadness :-? = = I don’t know how to react

Over the past decades, this trend has become increasingly evident. Instructions are included in the boxes with devices along with diagrams and drawings. And drawings have no nationality... In Hollywood, and here too, they draw cartoons that are watched by children from all over the world. Do you need to know English to watch TV? Tom and Jerry"? It’s interesting that now more and more often the text itself is perceived as a picture. Just remember our favorites" emoticons": Well, maybe something like- is this text? So perhaps Mr. Garrod is right. One small “but”: oriental languages ​​also began with drawings. However, centuries of evolution - and there is a complex system of hieroglyphs. After all, natural language is a subtle thing, words are ambiguous and can have many shades... It will be quite difficult to convey cases and moods in the language of pictures. However, these are seeds, but how to convey the nuances of the mood, where is the place for hints? Where is the place for literature? So, it seems that if a new language emerges, it will be of a purely technical nature. Although, strictly speaking, in the distant future it may develop to such an extent that it will become a native element for the poet. Then if Simon Garrod is right, then the future of the planet lies in hieroglyphs. This theory is also confirmed by the fact that communication on the Internet is becoming increasingly popular. Virtual libraries, shops, churches and marriage agencies are available to the user. With the help of the Internet, people enter into contracts, conduct business and intimate correspondence, and find clubs of like-minded people. Without leaving your home, you can communicate with people from all over the world. And it is not always possible to find the right word in the intermediary language, and often it is not there at all. Plus, communication often occurs in real time, which imposes its own characteristics: 1. The printed text becomes similar to the spoken text. We write as we speak. The printed text takes on the form of transcription: Priva. I'm here (here), now I'm on the computer for my father-in-law. Sorry. Run away. 2. the desire to save speech effort. Phrases become shorter, fragmentary, and segmented. Many abbreviations appear, for example: BCHS – Large human senks. And many more abbreviations: MCH, 4U, OK, BB, Smacks, and etc. 3. At the same time, a huge number of emoticons appear, expressing not just emotions, but human actions and situations. You can make up entire sentences with these emoticons without fear of being misunderstood. For example, the recently introduced auto-substitution function Zlango on ICQ... And if we add all sorts of avatars, icons, pictures that are widely used on the Internet, then we can safely talk about the birth of a new (and possibly future) language of humanity - the language of pictograms.

Romashov Arthur

Student research work in linguistics

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“Creation of a single language of international communication:

utopia or reality?

I.Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………2 - 3

II. Theoretical part

1. Tendency towards the prevalence of certain languages…………………………4 - 5

2.Historical excursion into the theory of the issue or possible options for a unified language of international communication…………................... ...................5-10

2.1. Strengthening positions in English in the world………………………….10-12

2.2. Global society and “Globish”…………………………………….12-13

2.3. Modern attempts to revive Latin……………………………...13-14

2.4. Constructed language – Esperanto………………………………………………………..14-15

III. Practical part

1.Creation of a single international languagecommunication is a utopia………….16- 17

1.1.Protection of national languages. The tragedy of the loss of earthly languages………16-17

1.2.The influence of politics, technology, population growth

To languages………………………………………………………17

1.3. Difficulties of the revival of Latin……………………………………….18

1.4.Problems of Esperanto in the modern world……………………………18-20

IV. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………… ……..21-23

V. List of references…………………………………………… 24

VI. List of used Internet sources……………………………24

The fate of language cannot depend on arbitrariness

one person or another.

The language has a reliable and faithful guardian:

it is his own spirit, genius.

V. G. Belinsky

1. Introduction

Let's remember the biblical story. The descendants of Noah, who spoke the same language, settled in the land of Shinar (Shinar) and decided to build a city and a tower high to heaven. According to people's plans, it was supposed to become a symbol of human unity: “let us make a sign for ourselves, so that we are not scattered across the face of the whole earth.” God, seeing the city and the tower, reasoned: “Now nothing will be impossible for them.” And he put an end to the daring act: he mixed languages ​​so that the builders could no longer understand each other, and scattered people around the world. Each people had the opportunity to speak their own language.

Nevertheless, attempts to predominate some languages ​​over others in history occurred already in the Middle Ages. In Byzantium, the ruling circles ordered that the word of God be preached only in three sacred languages ​​- Hebrew, Greek and Latin. The great enlighteners Cyril and Methodius defended the languages ​​of the Slavs: they created writing and made it possible to assimilate Christian teaching in their native languages.

The problem of the Middle Ages remains unresolved to this day. In that relevance my research. On the one hand, it is simply necessary common language international communication to understand each other. On the other hand, all languages, without exception, are of great value both for their people and for the whole world. They have different histories, degrees of influence and distribution in the world. Languages ​​develop along with the economy, culture, science, and technology. We need a language that is unified, but does not infringe on others existing on Earth.

Hypothesis is that if a single language of international communication is necessary to understand each other, then why all possible options for creating a single language (and there were many of them) failed.

Field of study: linguistics.

Subject of study: living languages ​​of the peoples of the world, dead languages ​​(Latin) and artificial languages ​​(Esperanto).

Goal of the work: show that the creation of a single language of international communication at the present stage is unlikely.

Tasks :

1. collect material from periodicals, books, Internet resources about international languages, attempts to create a single language of international communication
2. study the collected material
3. identify possible options for a single language of international communication
4. get acquainted with the grammar and word formation of Globish, Esperanto
5. conduct a survey among peers, high school students, adults on the problem

Research methods:

• studying scientific and journalistic literature and Internet resources
• analysis of scientific versions
• survey
• comparison of the obtained data

Problems of the future of our planet: political, environmental, economic and others are now being discussed in many media. The Internet is full of articles devoted to the future of languages. In my work, I tried to use materials taken from authoritative sources: “Literary Gazette”, “Science and Life” magazine, a collection of scientific articlesPractical significance: this work will be useful to me and my classmates in English and Russian lessons, as it contains interesting material on linguistics.

II. Theoretical part

1.Tendency towards the predominance of certain languages

Today there are over two and a half thousand languages ​​on earth. Over the past historical time, we have apparently lost tens of thousands of languages, dialects, dialects, and dialects. Already in our chronology, Ancient Greek, Aramaic, Latin, Sanskrit, Vedic, Assyrian, Old Russian, Old Persian and others have become “dead”.

About the many extinct languages ​​in best case scenario only fleeting mentions remained in the chronicles. The disappearance of languages ​​is not just a fact of the historical past. Nowadays we are all contemporaries and witnesses of the extinction of the languages ​​of the classical small peoples of the Caucasus and Crimea. Among the languages ​​disappearing before our eyes is the language of the Transcarpathian Rusyns, the Urum language (the language of the Greeks of the Azov region), and the language of the Gagauz. In his previous work, “Why Do Languages ​​Die?” I have proven that the language of my ancestors, Bzyb dialect Abkhaz-Adyghe group (Abkhaz-Abaza branch), V is currently on the verge of extinction.

According to some estimates, by the middle of the 21st century there may be only 500 languages ​​left on earth.

It’s a strange thing: humanity has already largely realized the need to protect the surrounding world; the fate of languages, their current situation and their future have not become a priority task for humanity. The situation in this matter is not only not improving, but has a clear tendency to worsen. Despite the abundance of laws adopted by world society to protect the languages ​​of the same national minorities, world practice demonstrates sustainableprevalence of a small group of languagesover everyone else.

The pretexts for the predominance of some languages ​​over others are the most plausible: “these languages ​​are the most developed” or “these languages ​​are the most widespread” and so on. Obviously, these languages ​​are the most convenient in political and economic terms for solving the problems of the world community. Therefore, for the effective work of the same United Nations Organization, the six most representative languages ​​were chosen: English, Russian, French, Spanish, Chinese, Arabic. But as a result of this approach, they stopped learning other languages. For example, in Russian schools they first stopped teaching German, and now classes with French is getting smaller. In one of foreign countries At the newly opened Faculty of Foreign Languages ​​at the local university, only four languages ​​are studied:English, Russian, Spanish, Chinese. The Dean says that this is enough for his country to be able, with the help of its interpreters, to communicate in the interests of business with any region of the world. If things continue like this, the threat of extinction will hang over many languages. Which will be a loss not only for one nation, but for all of humanity.

1. Historical excursion into the theory of the issue or possible options for a single language of international communication

The problem of a single language has occupied many leading minds of all times. Thinkers of the ancient world and the Middle Ages dreamed about it. The urgency of the search for an ideal means of communication became especially acute with the emergence of capitalism, with the breaking down of feudal barriers, with the development of navigation and international trade. This idea was refracted differently in the searches of scientists and the work of writers, but it did not leave anyone indifferent.

Tommaso Campanella (1568 - 1639), dreaming of a language of world civilization, outlined his views in the Philosophical Grammar.

The Czech educator and philosopher Jan Amos Comenius (1592 – 1670) developed a universal language based on the principle of letter symbols.

The language of the whole earth has become the subject of keen interest and development by such remarkable minds as Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Isaac Newton.

The sarcastic and ironic Jonathan Swift (1667 – 1745) did not ignore this subject of passions and aspirations. Just remember Gulliver’s story about the Laputian Great Academy.

“In order to keep up with enlightened Europe,” Catherine II appointed a special commission of scientists, which was tasked with starting a comparative study of a number of European and Asian languages ​​for the subsequent development of a single world language.

The need to overcome multilingualism became especially acute in the 19th century.

The heroes of “Journey to Ikaria” by Etiève Cabet (1788 – 1856) dream of the language of the whole earth.

“How bad it is not to know all languages! How much better it would be if there was one international language!” – says Jules Verne through the mouth of his character.

The bourgeoisie needed a single language. The proletariat of different countries needed it to develop a unified strategy and tactics of class struggle, to jointly defend their interests and ensure their political and economic rights. At the Second Congress of the First International (1867), a resolution was adopted that stated: “The Congress considers that a universal language and spelling reform would be a common good and would greatly contribute to the unity of peoples and the brotherhood of nations.”

As the remarkable Russian linguist I. A. Baudouin de Courtenay would later say, “The 19th century, the century of inventions that marked the enormous progress of mankind in the field of domination over nature and the use of its energy for social purposes, also had an exciting effect in the sphere of linguistic ingenuity...”

Solresol, a musical language project by the Frenchman Sudre, created a lot of noise. All words were composed of seven musical notes: do, re, mi, fa, sol, la, si. The versatility of “solresol” lay in the fact that its words could not only be written in letters, but also written with the first seven Arabic numerals, designated with notes, pronounced or sung, and also performed on any musical instrument, signaled with flags, and reproduced in seven colors of the rainbow.

The projects “universalglot”, “occidental”, “ojuvanto”, “novial”, “interlingua”, “ido ...” appeared (I will talk about Volapuk and Esperanto below).

With many of their own positive qualities these projects suffer from a significant flaw. They are aimed at people of the Western world, since they are built on the basis of either one language or several (Greek, Latin, English, French, Italian, German, etc.). The acquisition of such a language is for residents of the East, whose “Latin” is Arabic , very difficult. And the conversation is about a single language for all earthlings.

The article examines the evolution of the world order since antiquity, the main factors, principles and ideas underlying the periodization of the establishment and change of this order. It analyzes how the world order based on American hegemony was formed, developed and began to weaken; different views regarding the weakening of the US leadership position are considered; shows how globalization has become more beneficial for developing, rather than developed countries. The article characterizes the current situation in international relations as a situation of the beginning of the reconfiguration of the World System, which should mean the onset of an era of turbulence and the formation of new coalitions. This will be a kind of transitional era to a more sustainable new world order, the establishment of which will not be easy. The author expresses ideas regarding the direction and how this new order will be formed, what its principles and possible establishment mechanisms may be, in particular the development of “expertocracy” against the backdrop of the decline of democracy.

Keywords: world order, evolution of the political order, globalization, sovereignty, turbulence, new coalitions, diplomacy, hegemony, weakening of the United States, superpower, dollar diplomacy, sanctions, World System, democracy, expertocracy.

The article studies the evolution of the world order starting to form from the ancient times as well as the main factors, principles, and ideas underlying the establishment and change of this order. The author analyzes the way the world order based on the American hegemony was formed, developed and how it has started to weaken; there are also con-sidered different approaches to the fact of weakening of the US leading positions and it is also shown how globalization has become more profitable for the developing and not developed countries. The author gives the main characteristics of the contemporary international affairs and notes the situation as the starting reconfiguration of the World System which may bring the turbulent epoch of formation of new coalitions. This will be a certain transition period to a more stable world order whose establishment will be far from simple. The author argues about the directions and the ways this new world order can be formed, what will be its foundations and possible mechanisms of establishment, in particular, through the development of ‘expertocracy’ at the background of declining democracy.

Keywords: world order, evolution of political order, globalization, sovereignty, turbulence, new coalitions, diplomacy, hegemony, USA’s weakening, superpower, dollar diplomacy, sanctions, World System, democracy, expertocracy.

The concept of world order in relation to history is rather amorphous. When, shortly after the First World War, in connection with the creation of the League of Nations, American President Woodrow Wilson used the phrase “new world order,” hoping that it would finally be possible to create a system of international security and peacekeeping, the political order in the West had already been hundreds of years old. In relation to history, of course, it is more accurate to talk about international order, since the European order did not immediately become the world order. And before the European one, the beginnings of international order were in other regions of the World System (the most famous of which is the Pax Romana). Thus, as with globalization, the search for the origins of world order leads deep into antiquity. Humanity has come a long and dramatic way in terms of developing certain international rules and principles of coexistence, which makes sense to analyze from the point of view of how the experience gained can be used to explain current state and anticipation of future trans-formations. It is obvious that the development of globalization cannot but end in one or another version of the institutionalization of relations in the foreign policy sphere, although the path to this is complex and contradictory.

This article is devoted to the analysis of the world order in the past, present and future, which is fully consistent with its structure.

I. BACKGROUND OF THE FORMATION OF THE WORLD ORDER

Politics as a special sphere of relations associated with the distribution of power (Smelser 1994) may have existed since the Upper Paleolithic revolution. The political sphere began to be separated from the rest at the level of complex societies (Grinin 2011; Grinin 2009; 2012a). At the same time, foreign policy, that is, relations between independent communities, is almost older than domestic policy. But it is obvious that relations between states could arise only after some kind of system of early states was formed, and this happened only at the beginning of the 3rd millennium BC. e. At the end of the 3rd millennium BC. e. The first large and organized states appeared. From this time on, we can talk about cycles of political hegemony and a permanent struggle for leadership (Frank, Gills 1993). One after another, early empires succeed each other, the period of real hegemony of each of which does not exceed 100 years: the Akkadian kingdom of the Sargonids (XXIV-XXII centuries BC), the state of the III dynasty of the city of Ur (XXII-XX centuries BC). BC), Old Babylonian Kingdom (XIX–XVII centuries BC). At that time, this region represented the most advanced (and largest) part of the cultural ecumene. Therefore, clashes within its borders can be considered as a forerunner of the struggle for world order. The most famous episodes of this struggle in the center of the Afro-Eurasian World System were the rivalry between Egypt of the New Kingdom, Mitanni, Assyria and the Hittite Kingdom (middle and second half of the 2nd millennium BC), the rise of the New Assyrian Empire (VIII-VII centuries BC . BC), the formation of a coalition against Assyria (from Egypt, the Neo-Babylonian kingdom, the Medes), as well as the defeat of Assyria and the destruction of its capital Nineveh at the end of the 7th century. BC e. After this, first the Median kingdom (673–550 BC) and then the Persian Achaemenid Empire (550–331 BC) entered the arena. This first world power perished as a result of the victories of Alexander the Great, whose divided empire created a world of Hellenistic empires that competed with each other until they were conquered by Rome. The struggle for hegemony largely contributed to the development of statehood and its spread, as well as the creation of a new type of state (that is, developed states; see: Grinin 2016).

The rapid formation of world empires in the region of the Near and Middle East, Europe and China stopped for a while by the beginning of our era, creating two largest formations on the far borders of the Afro-Eurasian World System: the Roman Empire, which became a model of the Pax Romana, and the Chinese empires, experiencing periods rise and collapse. Then, in the first millennium AD, we see a temporary period of collapse of the existing order and the slow creation of a new one (rather on ideological foundations) both in Europe and the Middle East.

Emerging major powers and civilizations come to grips with the nomadic world. It is the nomads who are capable of uniting vast territories. Arise, saying modern language, nation-army. The struggle between settled and nomadic polities, thus, became one of the most important processes around which the contours of the political map of the World System were built (see about this: Grinin, Korotayev 2013; 2014b).

By the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Great Geographical Discoveries (when the powerful expansion of globalization began), the political picture of the emerging World System underwent multiple changes, unifications and collapses. By this time, some ideas and principles had already formed, as well as trends and patterns, which subsequently played an important role in the formation of the world political order. Firstly, one cannot help but notice long periods of fluctuation, associated either with the establishment of a certain balance of forces, or with the disruption of this balance, leading to serious changes. These fluctuations can be traced further until modern times. Henry Kissinger, the most famous American diplomat of the twentieth century, considers the concept of the balance of power extremely important and pays great attention to it (Kissinger 1997). Secondly, we can identify some factors that particularly influenced the change in balance. Above we noted the technological factor. The ideological factor also began to play an important role. For a long time, the struggle for hegemony had practically no ideological character, being only an indicator of the success and greatness of a particular ruler. Since the period of the Greco-Persian Wars, the idea of ​​contrasting Asia and Europe, as well as the ideological model of the struggle between the cultural center and the barbarian periphery, has appeared (a doctrine that found consistent ideological expression first in medieval China and then in the ideology of colonialism). Ideological struggle becomes an important part of foreign policy already at the beginning of our era, but is especially intensified as a result of the confrontation between Islam and Christianity. The ideological factor is thus included as a constant and important factor in the process of influencing the formation of the international order (see below). Even today it powerfully reminds us of itself, although it is not the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world, as the ideas of S. Huntington are often interpreted (1994; 2003). Among the political ideas, one cannot fail to note the problem of the legitimacy of the political order in the state; problems of legitimation, in turn, are closely related to the formation of internal and foreign policy. The institutionalization of ideological confrontations in modern times becomes an important basis of political order.

Great geographical discoveries identified new vectors in the process of shaping the world order. Firstly, the arena has really expanded to a global one. Secondly, the formation of a special type of colonialism began as a source of production accumulations of the metropolis, which characterized world politics over the next four and a half centuries. Thirdly, the formation of the center and periphery of the World System begins, that is, a model that has not lost its significance in foreign policy to this day.

II. FORMATION OF WORLD ORDER

International order as a certain system of relations and ideas about the principles on which relations between countries and in the world as a whole should be built, began to take shape in the 16th century, when diplomatic relations began to emerge and the contours of the system of “great powers” ​​in Europe, as well as the system of colonial empires, began to be visible. Prototype of legal principles systems international relations emerged as a result of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the devastating Thirty Years' War in Central Europe. These principles then developed over a period of more than two hundred years (on the Westphalian system, see Parker 1997; Rayner 1964; Spruyt 2000). Particularly noteworthy are the principles of sovereignty and legitimacy of the supreme power, implemented in domestic policy, primarily in the right to resolve issues of war and peace (see: Grinin 2008; 2009b). The principle of legitimacy later came to the fore during the Great french revolution.

Thirty Years' War largely continued on a pan-European scale the tradition of religious wars of the 16th century. But at the same time, she introduced two new principles into foreign policy, which were subsequently widely used: 1) maintaining the international balance of power by helping a weaker coalition against a strong one; 2) priority of national interests over others (religious, ideological, etc.). Both of these principles were formulated and implemented by Cardinal Richelieu (Kissinger 1997), who, despite the fact that France was a Catholic power, eventually entered the war on the side of a weaker coalition of Protestant states against the Habsburg Empire that threatened world hegemony (Davis 2005: 385–386 ). It was in the weakening of the Habsburgs, as well as in preventing the consolidation of the weakly integrated and confessionally divided German states, that Richelieu (like Louis XIV later) saw the national interest of France, which allowed it to effectively influence pan-European affairs. Considering that Richelieu himself was a Catholic cardinal, this was a bold step, which, however, made foreign policy even more cynical than before. Since that time, we have observed a trend when the formation of the foreign policy of European states begins to be built in line with certain strategems and principles.

About the main factors influencing the formation of the European/world order. As already mentioned, the issue of the balance of power in the international system and its violations are central to understanding both the foreign policy of certain states and the general configuration of European and world relations. In particular, the conscious foreign policy of a number of states (especially France, and later England) allowed them, through targeted actions, to form various military-political alliances, one way or another leveling this balance in their favor. Knowing this, you better understand the logic of the formation of these sometimes bizarre alliances during the 18th and 19th centuries, as well as the constant transitions of their participants from one camp to another.

Of course, this was facilitated by the peculiarities of European geopolitics of that period: many states, the absence of a clear hegemon and a system of great powers. And, for example, in China, the geopolitical alignment was associated with the fact that this state (the Middle Empire) inevitably occupied a central place in the region in all respects, which hindered the development of modern diplomacy and the formation of ideas about foreign policy as a complex system of more or less equal powers . The main ideas of Chinese political thought focused on how to protect the state, set barbarians against barbarians, ensure the success of campaigns against nomads, etc. It is not surprising that the European system later turned out to be partially transferable to the global level, but the Chinese system was not.

The balance of power between the powers could change due to a variety of phenomena, including internal rebellions, suppression of dynasties, etc. Among the long-term processes, it is necessary to note the unevenness in the growth of population, territory, wealth, industry, and trade. But all this had to be converted into military power. Gunpowder and military revolutions (Downing 1992) led to the formation of a new type of armies (McNeil 2008), which also contributed to state building and the formation of a new type of (mature) states (see: Grinin 2016; Grinin 2008). Improvements in navigation led to Dutch trade expansion, and then as a result of naval victories in the 17th century. England picked up this baton, becoming “the mistress of the seas” for a long time. We see the result of the development of military technology in the successes of the Swedish army in the 17th century. Prussian and Russian - in the 18th century. But within the framework of our study, it is especially important to note technological innovation, converted into a military advantage, as the importance of this factor grew over time. Thus, the Crimean War (1853–1856) was won by France and England from Russia precisely as a result of technological superiority.

With the formation of mass armies, as well as the complete transition to the industrial principle of production, the overall economic power of the state and its provision of resources became an extremely important factor. It was the total economic superiority that subsequently predetermined the victory of the coalitions over Germany in both world wars. IN modern conditions With the advent of more accurate economic measurement tools, comparisons of economic (and financial) power make it possible to more quickly capture trends in the balance of power.

Finally, although irregularly, but quite sharply, the balance of power could be disrupted as a result of a change in the ideological paradigm. And since it also significantly changed ideas about the legitimacy of power and the legality of its actions, this inevitably caused an aggravation of international relations and wars between ideological opponents. In the XVI–XVII centuries. we see the result of this disruption in the period of the Reformation, the religious wars and then in the orderly division of Europe into Protestant and Catholic. The Great French Revolution (in late XVIII c.), which undermined the sanctity of the monarchy and aristocracy. The result of this was almost a quarter-century of endless wars, coalitions, the triumph and fall of the Napoleonic Empire, the abolition and restoration of monarchies. A new ideological turn began after the First World War as a result of a deep crisis in the world order, and after the Second World War the ideological division (between socialism and capitalism) became the leading construct of the new world order.

Although this factor analysis of the establishment and change of the world order is clearly incomplete, nevertheless, even relying on the identified factors, one can explain a lot in the causes and results of the evolution of the world order, and also try to apply this analysis to predict the contours of the future world order.

From the “Great Powers Concert” to a unipolar world. The system of “great powers” ​​has been in effect since the 17th century. until the middle of the twentieth century. Naturally, the composition of these states changed, and each such change was associated with a noticeable change in the established order. In the 17th century Sweden periodically claimed a place among such powers, but as a result Northern War with Russia it lost its significance, and Russia, on the contrary, became part of the “great powers”. Various European states, especially France, also actively tried to use Turkey to maintain or change the balance of power, but it did not fully enter the system of the European world. In the 18th century under Frederick II, Prussia entered this “club”. After this, the pool of great European powers stabilized for almost a century (France, England, Prussia, Austria, Russia).

Current shifts in the balance of power in Europe in the 18th century. occurred mainly in connection with: a) successful reforms government controlled and the reorganization of armies (of which Russia and Prussia are examples); b) growth of trade and wealth; c) techno-economic rise (it was demonstrated by England as a result of the so-called agrarian revolution and the final phase of the industrial revolution). As a result, it was England in the second half of the 18th century. began to manage the balance of power in Europe, uniting first with one state, then with another, creating and destroying coalitions. As a result, this led to the disappearance of Poland from the map of Europe, the former leading powers Spain and Portugal came into complete decline, and the same reason practically eliminated the role of Genoa and Venice. And the technological lag of Holland, which was the leader in the 17th century. (Arrighi 1994), led to a series of defeats in wars and a loss of political role.

There were no major ideological changes in this century, but the idea of ​​the nation state and national interests became increasingly stronger, although it still had to fight its way to full recognition for a long time.

A significant milestone on the path to the formation of principles and forms of control over international relations was the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the Holy Alliance of Monarchs that emerged as a result of its work. The latter sought to maintain the status quo in Europe and jointly fight revolutions. This new ideological turn marked a return to the principle of the legitimacy of royal power. At the same time, the concept and fairly effective system of the Concert of Europe (mainly from the five great powers listed above) arose, designed to maintain balance and balance of power and not lead problems to war. It provided for multilateral diplomacy and the possibility of regular international conferences. The system lasted until the Crimean War of 1853 (but in some aspects until 1914). According to Kissinger, this Concert of Europe, which drew its inspiration from the principles of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and was based on the idea of ​​a balance of power, is to some extent a model for the model of world order today (Kissinger 1997; Kissinger 2014). Indeed, since the modern world is moving away from unipolarity, it is possible that the future world system will form something like such a “concert”, for example, several leading unions of states (see below).

Due to the growth of colonial activity from the first half of the 19th century. Asian countries (China, Japan, Siam, etc.) are being drawn into the sphere of world politics, and at the same time many new states are being formed in Latin America. Thus, literally begins to form world order; but the main events still take place in Europe.

The desire to form a renewed legitimation of power was a significant factor in European politics during 1815–1948, sometimes running counter to the national interests of countries. However, the revolutionary wave of 1848–1849, the industrialization of Europe and the change of power in France ultimately undermined this ideology, replacing it with a more outspoken and cynical one. The latter was associated with political maneuvering in search of new combinations of alliances that would make it possible to acquire certain benefits regardless of the ideological proximity of the regimes or their mutual antipathy. Later, such a policy in Germany under Bismarck was dubbed Realpolitik. This de-ideologization goes some way to explaining the succession of different alliances and coalitions between the “great powers” ​​since the 1870s. until the beginning of the 20th century, which were, however, not very stable. The main initiator of such unions was the German Chancellor O. Bismarck, who is generally recognized as an unsurpassed master of combinations and compromises.

During the Congress of Vienna, the German Confederation was created (instead of the German nation abolished by Napoleon's Holy Roman Empire). Although the number of German states decreased from three hundred to four dozen, overall Central Europe remained divided. But this was precisely what was considered the most important component of the balance of power, and maintaining this state of Germany was the most important goal of the national policy of France, England, as well as all other powers. The rivalry for influence in this part of Germany determined the policies of the two largest German states: Prussia and Austria.

This is why the main change in Europe in the early 1870s. was the unification of Germany under Prussian rule, which occurred as a result of several wars victorious for Prussia (thanks to the skillful policies of Bismarck and the mistakes of Austria and France). This immediately dramatically changed the balance of power, as a state was formed in the center of Europe that was superior in strength to any other power. Accordingly, an urgent need arose for France to find an ally, since after the defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871. Germany continued to be a threat to this country, and the French dreamed of revenge. Bismarck, in turn, feared a war for Germany on two fronts, so he sought to secure an alliance with Russia. But after his resignation (1890), the contradictions between Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Balkans led to Russia and France entering into an alliance against Germany (1892), and then an agreement between France and England appeared (Entente, 1904 .) . The military and economic strengthening of Germany forced England, in accordance with its favorite strategy, to join a less powerful group in order to weaken the leading continental power that united Germany had become. The rapid industrial development of the European powers, the explosion of technological innovation, and major changes in the means of war - all this pushed rivals (especially Germany) to change the balance of power through military victory.

From balance of power to unipolarity. This is how military-political alliances were formed, Europe found itself divided into two opposing blocs. First World War was the result of these processes, political map the world and the balance of power in it have fundamentally changed. With the inclusion of Japan and the United States among the leading players, politics became truly global; even the first world body appeared that tried to influence (though not always effectively) the formation of new principles of international relations - the League of Nations.

But the world order after the First World War was established only for a very short time. Radical changes that occurred at this time, including the emergence of the USSR, the development of new weapons systems, a tremendous economic crisis, Germany’s reluctance to recognize the restrictions imposed on it and other reasons led to a new aggravation of relations and a new war.

The order that emerged after World War II had significant differences from previous versions of the world order. Firstly, there were now only two strongest powers (the USA and the USSR), that is, the world became bipolar, and then two-bloc (NATO and the Warsaw Pact). Secondly, it was formed on ideological grounds. Such foundations have never before underpinned the world order. Also, the creation of stable ideological blocs occurred on the world stage for the first time. It is possible that it was ideologization that ensured the rather long existence of the post-war world order.

Generally speaking, in some established and fairly stable form, the world order, which was one way or another recognized and supported by the leading forces, usually lasted for a maximum of three or four decades, or even less. The system, which existed before the French Revolution (1789), lasted less than 30 years. It arose after Seven Years' War(that is, after 1763) and was destroyed in 1790–1791. The order established after Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna, was destroyed by the revolutions of 1848–1849. and the Crimean War, that is, it lasted less than thirty-five years. The next system of world order began to take shape after the formation of the German Empire (1871). But it finally took shape only in the early 1890s. and was destroyed by the First World War, having existed for less than 20 years. The Treaty of Versailles (1919) was grossly violated by Germany already in 1935. Thus, the world order after the Second World War from 1945 to 1990, which lasted for 45 years, became a kind of record.

III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE WORLD ORDER AND ITS PROBLEMS

Turn to Pax Americana at the end of the twentieth century. The collapse of the socialist bloc and Soviet Union in the late 1980s - early 1990s. destroyed the former world two-bloc order. Since after the collapse of the USSR a unipolar world began to be established, ideas about a new world order were often projected onto the belief in the undivided dominance of Western economies, institutions and ideas (see, for example: Attali 1991), improving the rest of the world. Moreover, the characteristics of the new world order in a number of works have become almost synonymous with the idea of ​​Pax Americana (see, for example: Brzezinski 1998; Collins 2002: 118). The ideas of G. Kissinger (Kissinger 1997; 2002) about the search for a new system of balance of power were an exception, and this is not surprising. By that time, the United States, unlike previous world leaders, had concentrated in its hands key leadership resources: from technological, financial and military to scientific and cultural. This was the first (and, apparently, the last) case in world history.

Below is a series of characteristic features and methods of modern American foreign policy (for more details, see: Grinin 2015).

1. The arrogance of a superpower, abuse of force to the detriment of diplomacy, including in relation to allies. Since 1945, the United States has carried out many wars and interventions, but their frequency has increased significantly in the last two decades, from 1991 to 2011 (see, for example, Harland 2015; Larison 2015).

2. Use of so-called “soft power” (a euphemism for interfering in internal affairs using various methods, acting through all kinds of NGOs and non-profit organizations in coordination with intelligence and special agencies) to influence governments, legislators, businesses, etc. If necessary, implementation subversion and coups, “color revolutions”. Increasing use of intelligence and electronic surveillance to control the politicians of allied countries.

3. “Dollar diplomacy” through loans, assistance, and the influence of international financial organizations, strengthened by the imposition of certain operating rules for national central banks.

4. Narrow pragmatism of foreign policy, reaching the point that some actions begin to contradict others, and most importantly, the general goals of foreign policy and the interests of the country, the intention to achieve the enemy’s capitulation and insufficient desire for compromises that could ensure cooperation in the future.

5. Ideology of exclusivity, imposition of one’s own standards (including in the political and legal structure); excessive influence of internal political struggle on foreign policy.

Undoubtedly, all these practices took place before, but in the last twenty years they have become more visible and overt, and their justification is much weaker. The events of September 11, 2001 dispelled the idea that the United States was beyond the reach of adversaries and could strike without fear of retaliation. This moment became a turning point in the policy of the United States; many features and methods of its foreign and domestic policies became hypertrophied. The United States abandons its own principles of freedom and begins surveillance of the population, as well as the leaders and populations of other countries. They are finally losing respect for the norms of international law and the principle of state sovereignty (Herland 2015).

Globalization and the crisis of the unipolar world. As already mentioned, the international balance of power depends very significantly on the uneven economic and technological development of countries around the world. Over the past three to four decades, in this regard, it is globalization that has constantly and significantly influenced changes in the world order. It contributed to the destruction of the established post-war order and the establishment of complete US hegemony. But subsequently, quite naturally, changes in the balance of economic forces in the world began in favor of developing countries. One of the main reasons for this was the so-called deindustrialization, that is, the transition of a significant part of industry, economy and technology from developed to developing countries. As a result, economic growth in Western countries weakened and the role of the rest of the world (developing countries) increased. That is, in general, although this may sound unusual to many, to date globalization has proven to be beneficial to developing countries even more than to developed ones.

As a result, by the beginning of the global economic crisis in 2008, ideas about a new world order with Western hegemony came into clear conflict with real processes. Indeed, in these less than twenty years (since 1991), against the backdrop of the weakening of Europe and the continuing stagnation of Japan, economic giants in Asia (China and India) have grown, and a whole cohort of rapidly developing countries has emerged (from Mexico to Malaysia and Ethiopia). They continue to grow (although not without difficulties) and will occupy a leading position in the world in the not too distant future.

Thus, it was globalization, which America actively imposed on the world and which is seen as the source of difficulties for developing countries, that made this trend of weakening rich countries and strengthening poor countries inevitable. This is the logic of history, which, however, is still not fully understood: the development of globalization from a certain point turned out to be incompatible with the established model of American and Western hegemony (see: Grinin 2013; 2015; Grinin, Korotayev 2014a; 2015).

Decline of US and Western leadership. Is it possible to return? Economic crises beginning of the XXI V. made the process of weakening US leadership capabilities quite obvious. However, people began to talk about the inevitable decline of American power back in the 1970s and 1980s. (Kennedy 1987). Since the 1990s the number of forecasts regarding the inevitable weakening of American hegemony and at the same time the future emergence of Asia into a leading position began to increase (see, for example: Arrighi 1994; 2007; Frank 2002; Todd 2004; Wallerstein 2001; Kapchen 2004; Buchanan 2002; Mandelbaum 2005; World after the crisis 2009 ; NIC 2012; see also: Grinin 2009a; Grinin, Korotayev 2010a; 2010b; 2015; Pantin, Lapkin 2006; 2014). At first, such forecasts were viewed with skepticism. However, as the negative phenomena in America grew and the successes of Asian countries, the idea of ​​the decline of the United States seemed more and more justified, causing triumph or alarm, depending on preferences. Since 2008, more and more articles have appeared (and some appeared even before the start of the global crisis), which to one degree or another affirmed the idea that American power is declining, the United States is ceasing to be an absolute hegemon, the unipolar world is transforming, etc. (see, for example: Milne 2008; Zakaria 2008; Haass 2008; Le Monde 2008). Many of the articles bore very telling titles, for example: “The Illusoryness of American Power” (Greenway 2008); "The end of the American era?" (Kennedy 2009); “America's fall creates dangerous opportunities for its enemies” (Tisdall 2008); “The greatness of America has crumbled and shattered into pieces” (Gray 2008); “The American Century in its Decline” (Reid 2008). Articles of this kind have appeared and are constantly appearing (see, for example: Bremmer 2015; Clare 2015; Whitney 2015). It seems that US hegemony, which has lasted more than sixty years, is coming to an end. Sooner or later, the United States of America will no longer be able to be the leader of the World System in the sense that is familiar to us, as a result of which the geopolitical landscape of the world will seriously change (see below). The role of the United States and the West will decrease, and that of developing countries (especially large ones) will increase.

In 2008, Fareed Zakaria, a renowned political scientist and editor of Newsweek International, wrote that the United States has two options. They can strengthen the emerging world order by collaborating with the new “great powers,” giving up some of their power and privilege, and accepting that tomorrow’s world will be one of diversity and diversity of viewpoints. Or they can passively watch as the “rise of others” gives rise to a rise in nationalism and fragmentation that will gradually tear apart the world order that the United States has built over the past 60 years (Zakaria 2008; 2009). But he was wrong. The United States, having barely recovered from the crisis, chose the third option - to undermine the power of its rivals and thereby remain in its previous position as the only superpower. These US efforts have particularly increased turbulence in the world over the past few years. At the same time, the United States apparently does not care about the price the world will pay for their ambitions. And although there are increasing calls that the United States should take a more sober look at the true cost of supposedly good intentions divorced from reality (Havel 2015), Americans are not listening to them.

All this means that the new world order will be established with significant difficulties. However, sooner or later it will be established, and it will no longer be the American world. But the question of whether the “decline” of the United States could ultimately turn into its new “rise”, of course, remains open and debatable, especially since many Americans do not want to put up with this state of affairs. In addition, some stabilization of the American economy and a revitalization in the tradition of hegemonic foreign policy support the hopes of those who believe that the American Century will last. Many are hoping for some kind of technological or other miracle that will revive American power, or for the US's ability to contain rivals. Various kinds of opportunities to support the leadership of the United States have been noted by many (see, for example: Milne 2008; Kennedy 2009; Bremmer 2015; Troyo 2015). We will consider below how these judgments are justified.

The need for a new order, the problems of the transition period to it and the balance of power. The burden of the only superpower turns out to be unbearable. She has to reckon with the fact that her will collides not just with the desires of other nations, but with regional and even global interests. It is impossible to insist all the time that the interests of the United States are the interests of the world; it is unthinkable to bear the burden of a superpower indefinitely, interfering in everything (Buchanan 2015). It is not surprising that even maintaining claims to this becomes an impossible task, and the reaction to a lack of strength becomes more and more nervous.

At the same time, the hopes of some political scientists and economists for a quick and massive collapse of the United States are groundless: such a reduction will most likely occur gradually, as objective circumstances, including the growth of peripheral countries, contribute to this. As the expert on “great powers” ​​P. Kennedy says, this departure will be long (Kennedy 2009; see also: NIC 2008; Zakaria 2009). In addition, we must take into account that the world as a whole is still interested in maintaining American leadership (see, for example: Barber 2014; Zakaria 2009).

Indeed, the weakening of US leadership poses many problems. It is usually assumed that the place of the US as leader will be taken by the EU, China or someone else (from India to Russia; but most often we are talking about China). Nevertheless, this is a deep misconception; the matter will not be solved by simply changing the leader. Therefore, it is imperative to actively explore the full range of consequences arising from this process.

Our assumptions about the principles of the new world order are based on the following conclusions. Firstly, the United States cannot be replaced by a new hegemon that would have the same set of leadership advantages that the United States possesses today. Consequently, the loss of the United States' leadership status will lead to a radical change in the entire structure of the world economic and political order. And therefore (as well as for many other reasons), the loss of the US leadership role will mean a deep, very difficult and crisis transformation of the World System itself, even the immediate consequences of which are largely unclear (for more details, see: Grinin 2009; 2011; 2012a; 2012b; Grinin, Korotayev 2010b; 2011; 2015).

Secondly, the weakening of the leadership capabilities of the United States is inevitable and will become more and more noticeable while the United States retains a number of advantages over other competitors in the struggle for leadership (Bremmer 2015; Birling 2015; Zakaria 2009). Thirdly, the world is to a certain extent interested in the “soft” leadership of the United States, but not in a dictator whose task is to undermine the power of his rivals by any means. Fourthly, in order to transition to a new state of the world, we will have to grope and formulate principles and conditions, create precedents and the necessary combinations. Therefore, it will be a difficult and long search. Fifthly, the path to a new world order is associated with a temporary increase in turbulence and conflict, instability, and the struggle of different versions of the new order, that is, with the presence of a certain world “disorder.”

Thus, today there are increasingly clear trends towards the fact that the new world order will be different, a world without a hegemon, although it will include certain centers of power and influence, among which, perhaps, the most important will be the United States. But they can only claim the title of “first among equals” and not the role of superpower and hegemon (NIC 2008; Zakaria 2009). Accordingly, two scenarios for the “departure” of the United States emerge: 1) a meaningful and most beneficial for them in the long-term perspective, the path of building a new world order with maximum preservation of its influence, but not dictatorship; 2) the fierce struggle of the United States to maintain the status quo, including all kinds of actions to undermine and weaken rivals. This will inevitably create constant tension and conflict. So far it seems that the United States is choosing the second path (although the next economic crisis may force them to turn to the first, however, a lot of time and opportunities will already be lost). But even when moving along the second path, the United States will be forced to increasingly actively seek allies and form new global alliances (see below). One way or another, it is the struggle around US hegemony and America’s position in relation to large and fast-growing countries that will constitute the main intrigue of modern global contradictions.

Why is increased “disorder” to a certain extent, if not inevitable, then more likely than a “soft” transition? First of all, because moving towards a new state requires wisdom and compromise on the part of everyone, especially the United States. However, wisdom has always been a scarce quality among political elites. But there are also deeper reasons. The radical change in the balance of economic forces in the world, which we discussed above, creates objective conditions for a revision of the world order. However, it does not at all entail an automatic change in the military-political balance. This, figuratively speaking, requires “pulling up” the political component of world development (political globalization) to the economic one. Obviously, the second was significantly ahead of the first. AND further development without such a “pull-up” it will be difficult. We once called this inevitable narrowing of the gap between economic and political globalization the reconfiguration of the World System (see: Grinin 2012; Grinin, Korotayev 2012).

The main vectors of this reconfiguration are the weakening of the former center of the World System (the USA and the West), the simultaneous strengthening of the positions of a number of peripheral countries and, in general, an increase in the role of developing countries in the world economy and politics. The process of reconfiguration manifests itself in different countries and regions may vary, often unpredictably. It should be borne in mind that this “pull-up” of the political component of globalization to the economic one occurs in spurts and means more or less strong political and geopolitical crises in certain regions of the world. We consider the crises and upheavals in the Middle East since 2010, as well as the crisis in Ukraine, precisely as such “reconfigurative” crises, which at the same time become geopolitical, requiring changes in the world order (Grinin et al. 2016). At the same time, the emergence of serious and sudden crises also in other regions is becoming increasingly likely. Their suddenness can be akin to earthquakes. And, continuing geological comparisons, it is worth noting that just as tectonic shifts occur along the line of the most plastic sections of the earth’s crust at the boundaries of tectonic plates, the same kind of “reconfiguration” crises also arise in regions and societies that are the least stable and lie at the junctions of geopolitical “ slabs." Both the Middle East and Ukraine belong to such regions. Therefore, it can be assumed that especially strong changes will occur in peripheral countries, which, figuratively speaking, lie precisely at such “junctions”.

The period of “pulling up” the political component preceding the formation of a new world order will inevitably drag the world for a certain time (one or two decades) into a turbulent era of crises and increased tension. But economic development peace during this period will be relatively weak (Grinin 2009; Grinin 2012; Grinin, Korotayev 2012; 2014a; 2015), becoming an ambivalent factor, not only further increasing tension, but also inclining countries to cooperate.

IV. WHY AND HOW THE WORLD ORDER MUST CHANGE

Why should the world order change? First, let's look at the reasons and direction of the likely change in the balance of power. It is necessary to clearly distinguish between two aspects of the problem. The first is objective reasons and trends that make the process of change inevitable. The second is the specific course of events, which is extremely difficult to predict (temporary and significant US victories are possible here). And yet, it is possible for the United States to radically change the course of events only if it is able to once again increase its share in world GDP and other indicators, which so far seems almost impossible. On the contrary, we believe that the trend (albeit with fluctuations) of faster economic growth in developing countries compared to developed countries will dominate over the next two decades, which may irreversibly affect the change in the world order. To better substantiate these ideas, let’s look at the dynamics of how the main advantages that allow us to maintain the hegemony of the West today are being transformed, namely: financial, technological and economic superiority.

Financial dominance – one of the most important advantages of the West, which is also used to collapse the economies of rivals. In terms of the volume of capital turnover, the power of financial and banking corporations, the value of assets, etc., Western countries surpass other states almost to the same extent as they previously surpassed them in industrial development. Also, an extremely important advantage of Western countries is their freely convertible currencies. According to P. Krugman (2013), countries with such currencies do not have to worry about the volume of emissions and debts. Indeed, to some extent, financial technology has largely driven Western economic growth since 2008.

The advantages of the Western monetary and financial system are an important part of the modern world order (see, for example: Soros 2009). To some extent, in the last two or three decades, a new division of labor has emerged in the world: financial activity has concentrated in the United States and Western countries, and industrial production (including in manufacturing industries) has largely moved to developing countries. But the gap in the financial sector will narrow both because the growth of the economies of developing countries requires an appropriate financial base, and because sooner or later the importance of the currencies and financial centers of these countries will increase. Today, Western economies are caught between the Scylla of weak economic growth with low rates and the Charybdis of over-indebtedness that could threaten government default. This is a kind of trap, the way out of which is not obvious. All this, especially in connection with new financial crises (which are inevitable and may collapse the inflated "bubbles" of stocks and bonds), will ultimately lead to the fact that the system of international payments based on the dollar will begin to transform, and this will be a good opportunity for changes in the global monetary system as a whole. And with this, naturally, the superiority of the West will decrease.

Technological superiority. Despite the continued superiority of the West, the level of its technological lead is still decreasing and will decrease due to the following trends. Works in many large corporations and scientific laboratories big number scientists and technical specialists from developing countries (who, accordingly, become carriers of innovative information and technology). Many specialists are invited by developing countries, others willingly look for such vacancies themselves, since there are not enough vacancies in the West. States such as China have begun to actively acquire entire corporations with their technologies. The PRC and other advanced developing countries are bringing technology to less developed societies. TNCs are forced to transfer more and more technologies to developing countries and partially encourage advanced technologies in these countries. Scientific research. And the more developing countries advance culturally and scientifically, the more qualified scientific and technical personnel they have, the more active the process of transferring part of the research to them will be (where personnel costs are significantly lower). Something similar to the relocation of industrial enterprises will happen.

The formation of a new balance is significantly influenced by the technological component and the breakthrough to an innovative economy. We have already expressed our assumptions that a new powerful technological wave will begin in the 2030–2040s. (see: Grinin A.L., Grinin L.E. 2015). And the contours of the new world order largely depend on who will lead (“saddle”) the new technological order, especially if these innovations are converted into military superiority. Of course, the United States has a chance to maintain its leadership in the world. But it is quite likely that a breakthrough to new technologies will occur at the junction of the first and third worlds, in some TNCs that belong simultaneously to both the metropolis and peripheral countries (which, by the way, will be quite logical for the global world).

However, even in the event of a new technological breakthrough in the West, it will be difficult for these societies with limited labor resources and a population that is increasingly unaccustomed to working in industrial enterprises to launch any new innovative mass production only in their own states. And then either a new round of deindustrialization will begin, when the remaining industry will be curtailed and transferred abroad (which will again strengthen developing countries), or some of the innovative production will begin to unfold in developing countries. That is, even if the technological breakthrough of the West occurs again, it will not be as significant and fatal as happened before.

Western economic superiority currently expressed in more high level organization and labor productivity, per capita income, general labor and business culture. However, this gap is still gradually narrowing, since labor productivity in developing countries is growing much faster than in developed countries. We believe that this trend will continue for quite some time. The fact is that in the first, a huge increase in productivity is due to the influx rural population in industry and construction, gradual mechanization Agriculture. And in Western countries, the main jobs are created in the service sector, where the growth in labor productivity is not very high. At the same time, part of the sphere of qualified services (programming, management, accounting, etc.) goes to developing countries through information channels (a special kind of outsourcing, when services are provided by people remotely). As a result, in Western countries, a very large part of the population has a relatively low income level (after all, the work is not very skilled), it does not increase or grows slowly, which leads to a gradual erosion of the middle class. The latter was previously the basis of social stability in developed countries. Now the income gap in society is widening (which is quite dangerous), and in developing countries it is gradually decreasing as the middle class is growing.

If it is possible to sharply increase productivity in the service sector (for example, through its robotization), then in the distant future. But in general, even such breakthroughs would not be able to reverse the situation in narrowing the gap between developing and developed countries. The huge growing market of developing countries in itself, with inevitable fluctuations, setbacks and crises, will ensure a trend towards economic growth, increased productivity and the well-being of their population, although this will take several decades.

Accordingly, the economic structure of the World System will begin to be rebuilt, and the role of the current core will decrease.

Advantages of developing countries. The third world has begun to move towards development, and it can no longer be stopped. Considering its enormous population, this movement cannot but be monumental. The non-Western world makes up 6/7 of the total population of our planet and, most importantly, an even larger part of the young population (about 7/8 of the world's youth live there). Developing economies are increasingly geared towards growth, and the population – towards raising their educational, cultural and economic levels. At the same time, many countries, home to approximately a quarter of the world's population, are still little affected by the desire for growth and improvement. However, most of them sooner or later realize its necessity. And in countries that have already begun their rise, up to half of the inhabitants adhere to an archaic way of life. In other words, the bulk of the population of developing countries has not yet actually joined the rise, the active desire for growth, earnings, and advanced training. That is, the growth reserves here are huge.

Such inclusion will be more widespread at the level of the generation that is now young, while the gap in the number of youth between the first and third world will increase. Wave after wave of developing countries will rise. Many of them already surpass Germany in population and are approaching Japan, while others, such as Bangladesh (166.3 million), Indonesia (253.6 million), Nigeria (177.3 million), surpass Japan, accounting for half or three quarters of the US population (318 million). Not to mention India, with its 1.3 billion people - more than all developed countries combined. And this population will continue to grow at a noticeable pace.

It should also be borne in mind that the birth rate in these countries is declining, in some places faster and in others slower. Consequently, on the one hand, for some time, due to growing children, the number of youth and labor resources will increase, but then the number of children will decrease, that is, there will be fewer dependents and more workers (especially since women with fewer children will also be able to work ). This creates the so-called demographic dividend. Developed countries (and China) have already spent it, but many developing countries will have the most favorable ratio of workers to dependents. And there won't be very many elderly people. This will contribute to the growth of per capita income. Thus, the demographic aspect makes it largely inevitable that developing economies will “pull up” to developed ones, and in overall terms, that the share of developing countries will become significantly larger than developed ones. Against this background, the problems of providing for elderly and elderly people in the West will only increase (see: Grinin, Korotaev 2015).

And in the long term, in the context of globalization and increasingly close interaction between economies, the growing importance of TNCs and financial flows in general, it is the production volumes and the combined economic and demographic power of countries that will increasingly determine the balance of power in the world and their influence on the emerging world order. The views of Western businesses (primarily TNCs), in the context of a numerically stagnating and aging population in their own countries, will inevitably turn to growing markets and an increasing number of consumers in developing countries. The transfer of various forms of economic activity to these countries will continue. Together with the intensification of the economic and financial strategies of developing countries, this will make inevitable a change in the balance of power and the rules of the world order. We should not forget that among the population of developed countries, the proportion of immigrants or descendants of immigrants from developing countries is growing. By this time there will be a lot of them, and their influence on the general cultural situation in Europe and the USA, on politics and connections with the countries of origin will increase. And this could become an additional major trump card for developing countries (along with cultural, technological and currency injections from developed countries).

Transition period and contradictory trends. Such a period always contains many contradictory trends. For example, in the context of globalization, the tendency to reduce sovereign prerogatives, many of which are alienated voluntarily (for example, when joining various supranational associations, world agreements, etc.), is objective (Grinin 2005; 2008). However, at the moment there is some revision of the attitude towards sovereign powers, since a number of countries have begun to actively defend their sovereignty in connection with the threat of internal instability coming from the United States. But this struggle to preserve seemingly old institutions actually means a struggle for a new world order. Let us consider the contradictions of the transition period using the example of TNCs.

Creation of new transnational alliances. TNCs and metropolises. Today's US strategy aimed at maintaining hegemony is associated with the creation of several global associations, where the United States hopes to dominate and profitably use the resources of its member states to its advantage. These are the US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP); Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); Trade in Services Agreement (TISA). Negotiations on the latter are being conducted in secrecy. In October 2015, the signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership was announced. But this agreement still needs to be ratified. Regarding the other two, there is still a lot of controversy over the terms and there are doubts that their signing will take place at all. Nevertheless, if compromises are sought, sooner or later they can be signed, uniting in this case countries that produce from 1/2 to 2/3 of world GDP (according to purchasing power parity or nominal value). In this case, the United States will receive a certain, although not too great, benefit. However, we agree with the conclusions of some observers (see, for example, Hedges 2015) that these agreements benefit US multinationals rather than the US economy as a whole. The American economy, on the contrary, may be weakened by the expansion of imports and the further withdrawal of production from the country. So the biggest winners from these partnerships are likely to be fast-growing countries like Vietnam or Malaysia. It is also possible that S. Glazyev (2015: part 2) is right when he speaks about the fallacy of the US’s obsessive desire to form the Pacific and Transatlantic zones of preferential trade and cooperation without the participation of the BRICS countries. He believes that the United States is making the same mistake as the previous world leader, Great Britain, which during the Great Depression sought to protect its colonial empire from American goods with protectionist measures.

The above gives us the opportunity to continue the topic of the role of TNCs in the unintentional weakening of the West and the strengthening of developing countries (happening against the will of TNCs, simply because they are looking for the greatest efficiency). In fact, at present, TNCs can no longer be considered as belonging only to the West. In many ways they are part of the economies of non-Western countries. There is a certain “separation” of these giant corporations from the metropolis, in which they are cramped, and against their will, they are increasingly “grist to the mill” of developing countries. In the same way, English technology and capital “fertilized” in the 19th century. the rise of the USA, India, Canada, Australia, and England itself ceased to be a world leader.

Yes, the United States and European countries can still legally influence TNCs in certain respects (especially in terms of joining sanctions, complying with certain rules, bans on the import of technology; falsifying statistics, using ratings for political purposes, cooperation with intelligence). But in the vast majority of cases, they act freely under the influence of those impulses that come from different sectors, markets and movements. In this regard, it seems that for some time (in particular, since the beginning of deindustrialization and the so-called financial revolution, that is, since the 1980s), the interests of TNCs and metropolitan countries have gradually diverged. As is known, corporations have their own goals (Galbraith 1976), often different from the national ones. We believe that the more actively non-Western economies grow and global economic associations between developed and developing countries are created, the more noticeable will be the divergence between the interests of TNCs and the economies of their metropolitan countries. In other words, it seems that TNCs will increasingly enter the markets of developing countries if the economic opportunities of the latter promise them greater profits. Moreover, if the top management of such corporations will increasingly consist of non-Americans and non-Europeans.

The era of new coalitions and the contours of a new world order. The transition to a new order is always a search for new combinations. It is not surprising that the process of “pulling up” the political component also caused an increased desire to search for new alliances and partnerships, often unusual, illogical and unstable (which does not, of course, cancel the desire to preserve old associations). This movement, as we have seen, even captured the United States, although previously they considered themselves self-sufficient. We called this process of active creation of various unions, combinations of countries and their associations era of new coalitions(see: Grinin 2009b; 2012); it will become the basis for the formation of a new world order. The processes of forming new combinations and searching for new foundations will become more active after the acute phase of the struggle to preserve US hegemony in its previous form shows the inevitability and reasonableness of a change of course for this country (which is already evident in the statements of some presidential candidates).

Perhaps the most striking example of the process of creating new coalitions is BRICS, which appeared initially as an economist's fantasy and then acquired the features of a real union. At the same time, participation in this unofficial union opens up the possibility of joining other unions, such as the SCO or EurAsEC. This shows that countries will participate in a much larger number of different blocs, alliances and partnerships than today, and with the intensification of attracting new members to the unions, the combinations can be very diverse. At the same time, as a result, for some time, the mobility of partnerships within the World System will increase; emerging alliances and coalitions may sometimes seem chimerical or ephemeral, which can further increase general turbulence.

As we realize that a new world order is beginning to take shape, the competitive fight for who will direct the process of its formation in the world and individual regions. And those forces that will claim leadership will have to act under the slogans of a more equitable world and regional order, which, naturally, requires allies and blockages. Therefore, a regrouping of forces in the world and regional arenas will inevitably begin. In this case, the nature of defending national interests and the forms of conflicts will gradually begin to take on a different form. We hope that after a certain period of “game without rules,” the world arena will still begin to be viewed as a common field of interests in which it is necessary to establish and maintain acceptable and beneficial rules of the game for everyone. This means that in the very concept of foreign policy, gradually, but very unevenly in its practical implementation, the open pursuit of the selfish interests of states will begin to occupy less place than today. What has been said sounds utopian. Moreover, over the past few years, selfish approaches and double standards in politics seem to have even intensified. However, perhaps this indicates that the world is on the path of searching for the principles of a new device. This will probably require going through some kind of cataclysm (like a new economic crisis), since it is during moments of crisis that the situation changes more actively.

In the process of searching for the most sustainable, profitable and adequate organizational solutions, gradually some of the new supranational unions and associations may turn from temporary to permanent, thereby beginning to develop effective institutional forms of a new world order. In the same process, some new norms of world law and new general principles world order. And countries that continue to crudely defend national selfish interests will ultimately lose.

V. CHANGES NEEDED TO FORM A NEW ORDER

So, a turbulent era should ideally lead to the formation of a new balance of power, to the development of the basic principles of a new world order. Let's consider some of these principles, but on the basis of which, perhaps, it will be built.

1. Global influence system

Globalization as an object of regulation and consideration of interests. We think that it is globalization, no matter how it is viewed, that will become the economic basis for progress in the formation of a new world order. But for a more stable order, a certain consensus and reliance on the principles of compromise are necessary, such as: “in the same boat”, “friends are rivals”, “do not use unacceptable means”, etc. That is, in conditions of inevitable competition and attempts “ “to pull the blanket over oneself”, the need to support some acceptable stable position should be considered as an imperative.

Therefore, we believe that at least some processes of globalization should be formalized in the form of written or unwritten rules. A certain streamlining of international financial and economic activities will be required (most countries that have realized the severe consequences of economic crises will be interested in this). Here, of course, there will be great scope for attempts to strengthen the positions of certain countries and blocs. Since the role of TNCs in the process of globalization is very large, the positions of these corporations must be defined in some formal way. In general, it seems to us that, on the one hand, the responsibility of corporations for their public actions should increase. Thus, today a statement from a major rating agency could bring down the currency, or even the economy, of even a large country. These possibilities should be limited by the corresponding liability (and are already limited, for example by EU regulations). But on the other hand, TNCs may receive some additional privileges and rights. Which ones are still unclear, but it is clear that a rather long and intense struggle will be waged around this. Another very serious issue will be the issue of world currency, on the solution of which a lot depends. But, apparently, the traffic here will be two-way. On the one hand, attempts by developing countries to promote their currencies and try to strengthen their role in the international financial market, etc., will continue and intensify, and on the other hand, the coming powerful financial shocks will inevitably lead to at least a partial revision of the role of the dollar in the world.

Strengthening the role of supranational unions. About global regulatory bodies. The following trends seem likely: a) the growing importance of supranational organizations representing the interests of their members on the world stage; b) some ordering of the process of transformation of national sovereignty (in some ways it will be reduced, in others it will be strengthened), so that the national state will remain the leading subject of the international process, but will be forced to coexist with other subjects - supranational and transnational; c) occurrence mixed nature of the “concert” of world players in the form states, their various unions, and possibly some individual corporations or organizations (just as in medieval parliaments and bodies territories, corporations, cities, noble people, etc. were represented at once).

If this kind of supranational unions receive certain opportunities to influence the situation in the world, and even more so the formal right to vote in international forums, then this, on the one hand, will increase the desire to join them, on the other hand, it will more closely unite their members from within.

Of course, the question arises about any new world institutions that would allow the new principles to be put into practice. Although the old world bodies are unlikely to play a corresponding role, at the same time they are unlikely to be dismantled. Rather, new institutions will be created parallel to the old ones.

New world "concert"? So, on the one hand, the system of participants in the international arena will begin to gradually transform, moreover, towards supranational actors, on the other hand, of course, in the coming decades it is difficult to expect that it will be possible to create a system in which everyone could effectively participate. That is why reducing national representation through supranational associations could be an effective way. But in any case, the main role would be played by the largest supranational associations and states (the latter could be represented both independently and on behalf of the associations).

If the new order is neither unipolar nor bipolar, then, most likely, it will represent a certain collective of the largest players (countries and unions). Something like G-x, that is, a union of three - five - seven or more major powers and blocs that can somehow ensure and guarantee a new order. This could be, for example, the United States together with the Pacific Partnership or some bloc, the EU, China, India, Russia. Or the last three countries will also be represented by the BRICS association. The final balance of power can be very different. That is, a new world “concert” of states and suprastate unions will arise. Of course, all kinds of conflicts and collisions will always take place, but it will still be easier for the largest players to come to an agreement. And in order for order to be maintained, the trend should go towards the institutionalization of this “concert” (perhaps taking into account the experience of the UN, but more effectively formalized, something like the right of veto with several levels of participation and different rights).

2. On the principles of the new world order

The new world order will require a fairly stable balance of forces and interests, new models of supranational governance and coordination of world processes, new principles that help reduce confrontation and stimulate cooperation. Let us formulate a short list of them.

1)Pluralism political regimes , that is, recognition of: a) the legality and legitimacy of all regimes; b) the idea that any regime (including a democratic one) has its pros and cons; c) the values ​​of pluralism of regimes (similar to the pluralism of religions).

2)Refusal to forcefully impose institutions(including planting democracy).

Futurism- the general name for the avant-garde artistic movements of the 1910s and early 1920s, primarily in Italy and Russia. The futurists were interested not so much in the content as in the form of versification. They invented new words, used vulgar vocabulary, professional jargon, the language of documents, posters and posters.

Decadence- decline, cultural regression; originally used as a historical term to refer to cultural phenomena of the Roman Empire in the 2nd-4th centuries. This term also denotes the modernist movement in fine arts, music, literature and architecture, in creative thought, self-expression as such - late XIX- the beginning of the 20th centuries, characterized by perverted aestheticism, individualism, immoralism. Its founders acted primarily as opponents of old art movements, mainly academicism. The principles they proclaimed were initially of a purely formal nature: the decadents demanded the creation of new forms in art, more flexible and more consistent with the complex worldview of modern man.

Imagism - literary movement in Russian poetry of the 20th century, whose representatives stated that the goal of creativity is to create an image. The main expressive means of imagists is metaphor, often metaphorical chains that compare various elements of two images - direct and figurative. The creative practice of Imagists is characterized by shocking and anarchic motives.

Symbolism- one of the largest movements in art (in literature, music and painting), which arose in France in the 1870-80s. and reached its greatest development at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, primarily in France itself, Belgium and Russia. The Symbolists radically changed not only different kinds art, but also the very attitude towards it. Their experimental nature, desire for innovation, cosmopolitanism and wide range of influences became a model for many modern trends art. Symbolists used symbolism, understatement, hints, mystery, enigma. The main mood captured by the symbolists was pessimism, reaching the point of despair. Everything “natural” was represented only as an “appearance” that had no independent artistic significance.

Acmeism- a literary movement that opposes symbolism and arose at the beginning of the 20th century in Russia. The Acmeists proclaimed materiality, objectivity of themes and images, and precision of words. The formation of Acmeism is closely connected with the activities of the “Workshop of Poets”, the central figures of which were the founders of Acmeism N.S. Gumilyov, A. Akhmatova (who was the secretary of the “Workshop”) and S. M. Gorodetsky.

As you can see, the invention of new words, rejection of generally accepted rules (use of vulgar vocabulary), etc. inherent in such a modernist movement as futurism.