Who and how in our country before the revolution fought against espionage

Exactly 95 years ago, on June 8, 1911, Minister of War Vladimir Sukhomlinov signed the "Regulations on counterintelligence departments" being created at the headquarters of military districts.

The systematic activity of military counterintelligence in Russia was initiated. This, of course, does not mean at all that before that no one in Russia had caught spies interested in military secrets. They fought against them, but there were no special bodies dealing with this. General Nikolai Batyushin, a well-known counterintelligence officer, recalled: "Before the Russo-Japanese war, counterintelligence was entirely in the hands of political investigation (gendarmes), being its subsidiary business. This explains the fact that the fight against enemy spies was carried out haphazardly, espionage processes were rare" .

Catching spies without a system

During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, General Staff officer Alexei Ignatiev was responsible for working with foreign military representatives at the headquarters of the Manchurian army. Here is the episode described in his memoirs:

"I remember a curious incident with one of the officers of the German general staff, overzealous in their desire to excel at all costs. Emperor Wilhelm, as a token of his "traditional friendship," sent a special officer to us with an order to be with the Vyborg Infantry Regiment, in which he was listed as an honorary chief. The headquarters of the corps, which included the Vyborg regiment, preferred to keep the major, just in case, with him. But the German General Staff officer took advantage of this in order to familiarize himself with the work of the headquarters itself. To do this, he got into the habit of being late for dinner, stopping by the headquarters fanza on the way and devoting several minutes to perusal of staff papers. Our staff officers, noticing this, once made holes in the back wall of the fanza and left a note written in Russian in large handwriting on the table: "This, then, and that! Keep in mind that at this moment a dozen Russian eyes are looking at you."

The German General Staff officer had to quietly disappear after this story. But it is significant that no one was specifically engaged in the fight against espionage at the headquarters of the corps. Everything that happened was only the personal initiative of the officers, who played a kind of amateur performance. But it was in Russia that the remarkable experience of successful intelligence activities of official military representatives was accumulated.

A curious incident occurred on the eve of Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812. Shortly before that, the Russian military representative Chernyshov was in Paris (on the picture). It must be said that military representatives (military attaches) have long been perceived almost as official spies. It is clear what a person in such a position can do - to the best of his ability and ability to collect information about the local armed forces. Of course, Chernyshov was also under covert surveillance. But the agents assigned to the young and handsome Russian officer reported with depressing monotony about the same thing - about the endless love affairs of a Muscovite fascinated by beautiful Parisians. Napoleon Bonaparte, who was fed up with reports of Chernyshov's latest amorous pranks, finally ordered that surveillance be removed from him. The emperor reasonably believed that a man leading such an intense intimate life would find neither the strength nor the time for anything else. But when, a few months before the start of the war, Chernyshov left Paris, he took with him extremely detailed information about the state of the French army. During the outbreak of the war, it turned out that he had obtained extremely valuable and reliable information.

#comm#The great French commander did not take into account one circumstance: the brilliant Russian officer played novels not with laundresses and maids, but with wives and daughters, saying modern language, very important people. He combined, so to speak, business with pleasure - official duty and the extraction of valuable information with personal pleasure. #/comm#

It would seem that one should understand that if the Russian military representative can successfully collect information, then the foreign military in Russia can do the same. But, alas, no counterintelligence service was created during the Russo-Japanese war.

In the first months after the end of the war, Far East letters and reports from Russian officers with projects to create a special counterintelligence service began to arrive at the Ministry of the Interior and the General Staff. Former front-line soldiers sent many proposals. So, for example, the Cossack officer, lieutenant Syroezhkin, wrote a whole "Report from the practice of intelligence on espionage." But only in 1911, after many meetings, the counterintelligence departments were finally created.

The amount of expenses for counterintelligence was distributed as follows: for secret agents and payment for valuable information - 246,000 rubles, for salaries of employees - 157,260 rubles, for official travel - 63,600 rubles, hiring and maintaining offices - 33,840 rubles, translation services - 12,600 rubles, maintenance of secret apartments – 12,600 rubles.

Eternal temptations - wine and women

According to the experience of counterintelligence work, General Batyushin (on the picture) came to the following conclusions:

“Restaurants, coffee houses, gambling houses, cafes, cinemas, etc. are favorite places where a person tries to forget from the hard everyday life or the barracks situation at home, hoping sometimes in one day to improve his financial situation by participating in gambling. Here, under the influence of captivating temptations in the form of wine, women, etc., a person often becomes a slave to the passion lurking in him, goes beyond the limits of his budget.Help at this time in the form of a monetary subsidy or other kind of assistance can supposedly be accidentally provided by a secret recruiter of spies On the other hand, the observation of people who go on a rampage outside their budget can lead an experienced person to a number of conclusions that may interest the counterintelligence officer.In view of this, all these establishments should be under the supervision of counterintelligence agents, whether they themselves them, bartenders, footmen, artists, and especially actresses, or simply ladies of the demi-monde who frequent them. These people, for a relatively small remuneration, can provide valuable information for the counterintelligence officer about the visitors of these establishments.

In one of the Warsaw restaurants, which Russian military clerks liked to visit, they managed to expose an Austrian spy. The clerk was approached by one of the regulars with an innocent request to retype something on a typewriter, for which he was well paid. On his next visits, the regular, treating the clerk, asked him to give him copies of the papers that he rewrites, of course, also for a fee. Sensing something unkind, the clerk reported this to his superiors, which was the beginning of an interesting spy business. The clerk was ordered to agree to an imaginary recruitment...

A curious espionage scandal was connected with the marriage of the Minister of War, General Sukhomlinov (on the picture). He, when he was the commander of the Kyiv military district, drew attention to an attractive person almost half his age. Or she paid attention to him, who will figure it out now ... But the role of the general's mistress did not suit the lady. Only here's the bad luck: she was legally married, her husband was well-behaved, rich and very proud. General Sukhomlinov tried to intimidate him, but he only achieved that the offended spouse swore never to give a divorce. On principle, so to speak. There was only one remedy left: to accuse her husband of infidelity. No sooner said than done. After a brainstorming session, they found a suitable candidate to accuse him of treason, a French governess, who by this time had already returned to her homeland. With her, they say, the obstinate husband sinned. The court respected the general, and Sukhomlinov had a legal wife. In the meantime, this whole epic dragged on, a promotion arrived in time and Sukhomlinov became from the commander of the district the Minister of War of the entire Russian Empire.

#comm#This is where the real scandal erupted. The French newspapers described in detail the history of his marriage, they also wrote about the French governess, who, by decision of the Russian court, was recognized as a defiler of the family hearth. #/comm#

The former governess, unwittingly the target of the French yellow press, was indignant and decided to restore her trampled reputation. It would seem, how to do it? Well, how can you prove that you did not seduce someone else's husband in distant Russia, and even a few years later? But at the disposal of the innocently slandered Frenchwoman there was one completely undeniable argument, which was confirmed by the gynecologist. The fact is that the victim of slander did not have time to sin with anyone and never in his life. Simply put, she was a girl, which was confirmed by a medical examination. Then the certificate, signed by the doctors, was presented to the reporters. And they really mocked both the Russian Minister of War and the Russian Themis to their heart's content. One can imagine how many unpleasant minutes His Excellency and his wife spent reading newspaper articles. But, while journalists and ordinary people were discussing the details of the scandal with gusto, counterintelligence officers drew attention to extremely dubious individuals with double or even triple citizenship, surrounded by the young wife of the minister, whose “development” gave very interesting results ...

Reference

Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR RF). It has existed in its current form since February 1993. (It was created as the Foreign Department (INO) of the Cheka under the NKVD of the RSFSR. December 20, 1920.)

GRU - Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff Soviet army(military intelligence), since 1992 - the Russian Army, known as the Fourth Directorate of the General Staff and "VCH No. 44388". Formed in 1918, it was originally called the Registration Directorate of the Headquarters of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (the GRU began to be called from 1942).

FSB is the Russian Federal Security Service. It is called upon to oversee the observance of internal state laws and order and counterintelligence. Initially, it was called the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK). It was created in October 1991. In April 1995, it was renamed the FSB. At the same time, the functions of combating organized crime, banditry, terrorism, smuggling of goods and valuables, and corruption were transferred to the service.

Special for the Centenary

In Rus', organized intelligence appeared almost immediately after the emergence of the foundations of statehood, which, according to chronicles in the Middle Dnieper, dates back to the time of the Kyiv princes Askold and Dir. The princes subjugated the surrounding unions of tribes, conducted an active foreign policy: along with the campaign against Constantinople in 860, they fought with the Bulgarians and inflicted a heavy defeat on the Pechenegs. The Kiev principality of Askold and Dir became the ethnic, social and political core around which later, from the end of the ninth century, the Old Russian state began to take shape. This principality was the first East Slavic state located in a small area of ​​the Middle Dnieper.

There is no doubt that aggressive campaigns Askold and Dir could not be so successful without reconnaissance. But Askold and Dir probably had problems with counterintelligence, which was the reason for their death. So, according to legends and ancient chronicles, the prophetic Oleg, going down the Dnieper to conquer Kiev in 882, sent forward a ship with scouts who pretended to be Greek merchants and informed Askold and Dir about a large embassy following them, supposedly to negotiate and sign contracts. The princes of Kyiv could not figure out Oleg's insidious cunning in time. They came to the pier to meet a noble guest. Oleg got off the ship, holding the young Igor Rurikovich in his arms, which, probably, even more dulled the vigilance of the strong and brave warriors who had previously won so many victories. Nothing foretold a bloody denouement. After mutual greetings, Oleg suddenly exclaimed: “You are not princes and not a famous family, but I am the prince of Kyiv!” Further, pointing to Igor "Here is the son of Ruriks!". This is the last thing Askold and Dir heard before they were killed by bodyguards dressed as "merchants". And hundreds of vigilantes who jumped out of the courts took possession of Kiev.

Special services worked for Prince Vladimir (the future "Baptist"). After in 980 Yaropolk killed his brother Oleg, the prince of Drevlyane, the younger of the brothers Vladimir, who then reigned in Novgorod, gathered an army and went to Kiev. Having significantly smaller forces than his brother, Vladimir relied on a secret war using special methods of intelligence and counterintelligence. So, Vladimir identified a potential candidate in Yaropolk's entourage, the greedy and conceited boyar and voivode Blud, who was trusted by his brother. By bribery, he attracted him to his side, promised to be in his father's place if he helped to capture or kill his prince. Fornication advised Vladimir to lay siege to Kyiv, and he himself persuaded Yaropolk to flee the city under the pretext of an allegedly mature conspiracy of the people of Kiev to extradite Vladimir to the attackers. Yaropolk, with a small retinue, went to Rodnya, at the confluence of the Ros into the Dnieper, and the Kievans left by him submitted to Vladimir, who then laid siege to his brother in his last refuge. After a long defense in the besieged Rodna, Vladimir again obeyed the advice of the corrupt governor and came to negotiate with his brother in Kiev, despite the warnings of his devoted servant Varyazhok, who told Yaropolk that death awaited his brother and advised him to better run to the Pechenegs. Having introduced the Grand Duke into the palace to Vladimir, Blud locked the door so that Yaropolk's squad could not penetrate there, and two Varangians who jumped out of the ambush pierced the gullible Yaropolk with swords in the bosom.

Such were the first information in Rus' that came down to us from the depths of centuries about the first successes of domestic intelligence and the failures of counterintelligence Soloviev S.M. History of Russia since ancient times: in 15 books. Book 1. - M.: 1962. .

The very first known surviving written intelligence report Ancient Rus', scratched on birch bark, was found in 1981 in the Novgorod Nutny excavation. This is birch bark No. 590, the text of which reads: "Lithuania stood on Korela." The basis for its dating is the place of its discovery, referring to 1066.

In the Middle Ages, the North-Western Ladoga region was inhabited by ancient Karelian tribes, for whom the ethnonym Korela was used in Russian chronicles. A birch-bark report received in Novgorod informs Novgorodians about the conflict between Lithuanians and Karelians.

Prince Vseslav of Polotsk twice went on a campaign against Novgorod: in 1066 and 1069. A clash between Lithuanians and border Karelians could have occurred on the way from the Vodsk land to Novgorod. That is, with these intelligence data, the Novgorodians were actually warned that Vseslav's army was moving in their direction.

Subsequently, in history, you can find many descriptions success stories reconnaissance and counterintelligence activities: in preparation for the Battle of Kulikovo, well informed by his secret assistants about the forces and capabilities of the enemy, Prince Dmitry managed to do everything necessary to neutralize the Ryazanians loyal to Mamai and prevent the unification of the Tatars and Lithuanians on the eve of the battle, which predetermined success the battle itself History of the Patriotic state and law. Part I: Textbook (third edition, revised and supplemented) / Edited by O.I. Chistyakov. - M.: Jurist, 2004. - 67. .

Under Ivan IV the Terrible, the first central government bodies appeared, organizing and conducting intelligence, thanks to which the awareness of the state leadership about the plans and intentions of the enemy increased. As Russia's influence in international affairs grew, so did the role of intelligence.

So, the Secret Order was created, which was engaged in special operations, headed by the powerful boyar Vasily Ivanovich Kolychev (nicknamed Clever), who successfully deciphered the reports of foreign ambassadors, waged a counterintelligence struggle against the economic espionage of the English Moscow Company (which sought to get samples of ores, reveal recipes for dyeing fabrics and leather, etc.); exposed at royal court English agent Bomelin, posing as a prominent specialist in mathematics, astronomy and medicine.

In 1654, by decree of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, the Order of Secret Affairs was founded, where intelligence management is concentrated Essays on the history of Russian foreign intelligence. - M.: 1996. Vol.1. - P.111..

Peter I in the military regulations of 1716 for the first time sums up the legislative and legal framework for intelligence work.

Under Peter I, who understood the importance of obtaining and concealing information, a coherent and functioning system of special services was created in the person of the Board of Foreign Affairs (intelligence) and the Secret Investigation Office (counterintelligence), later transformed into the Secret Expedition under the Senate. The Collegium of Foreign Affairs has already managed to create more than ten permanent missions in Western Europe and the countries of the East in the course of a year: in Poland, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Turkey, Prussia, England, Macklenburg, Schaumburg, Venice, Courland and Bukhara. Using the entire apparatus of these missions, as well as the institute of consuls formed a little later, the Collegium successfully carried out tasks of an intelligence and counterintelligence nature. Thus, the special services managed to carry out a unique operation to disrupt the plans of Western states to stop the unacceptable trend for them of the growth of Russia's influence, while resorting to the "services" of Tsarevich Alexei.

In fact, a conspiracy was exposed in the highest circles of the Russian state, into which a member of the monarch's family, Tsarevich Alexei, was also drawn.

Peter I was dissatisfied with his son Alexei, he did not see in him a desire to serve the Russian State. All educational conversations did not help. Alexei was attracted to the church and traditional rituals. Monks and hysterics revolved around him. The tsarevich considered his father's orders a heavy burden - fulfilling them, one had to work, and he treated work with undisguised disgust. Knowing about the dissatisfaction of the tsar with his son, the entourage of the crown prince and, above all, the former quartermaster of the Admiralty A.V. Kikin, persuaded Alexei and his favorite serf Euphrosyne Fedorova to flee abroad and prepared this escape. On November 10, 1716, a Russian prince entered the house of the vice-chancellor of the Vienna court, Shenboria, and declared that "the emperor must save" him and that he wanted to reign.

A long search began, and only in March 1717 did Peter's envoys establish that Alexei was in Ehrenberg. There was a difficult diplomatic struggle with the Viennese court, which intended to unite with England in defense of Alexei. A crisis situation was brewing, threatening to escalate into a large-scale war. I had to use the entire diplomatic and intelligence arsenal of means and methods to prevent this.

Convinced of the loyalty of France and partly of England, Peter sends an experienced diplomat, intelligence officer Pyotr Andreyevich Tolstoy and guard captain Alexander Ivanovich Rumyantsev to Vienna with a cruel order to return Alexei to Russia. In long, many years of negotiations, Tolstoy showed remarkable resourcefulness and perseverance. He shook Alexei's confidence in the strength of the Austrian guardianship, at the same time, he managed to recruit and persuade the girl Efrosinya to his side. As a result, on October 4, 1717, Alexei announced his consent to return to Russia. On February 23, 1718, the prince entered the capital city of Moscow. So the crown prince was pulled out from under the care of Caesar of Rome (Austrian emperor), after which he appeared before the court of the Petrine Senate. Peter himself led the investigation, having received information from his son about accomplices. 50 people were immediately taken into custody. Among them were A.V. Kikin, Ivan Afanasiev, Senator Mikhail Samarin, brother of Admiral Apraksin Peter Afanasiev, Prince Vasily Dolgoruky and many other well-known people in the country. The first executions were carried out right there in Moscow. A.V. Kikin was wheeled.

• On March 18, the whole court went to St. Petersburg. The investigation and trial continued there. Moreover, now the whole matter has been handed over to the "loyal gentlemen of the ministers, the Senate and I will become a military and civilian." In doing so, Peter was extremely honest and showed the greatest courage: “With an oath of the judgment of God, I promised in writing forgiveness to one of my sons and then verbally confirmed if he told the truth, although he violated this by concealing the most important deeds, and especially the plan of his rebellious against us, like a parent and sovereign." Addressing the clergy, Peter said: “Look how hard his heart has become… Gather together after my departure, question your conscience, right and justice, and imagine… your opinion on punishment… I ask you not to pay attention to either the person or the social position guilty ... and execute your sentence on him according to conscience and laws.
• On June 14, 1718, the prince was taken into custody and imprisoned in Peter and Paul Fortress. From now on, he was in the position of an ordinary convict. After 10 days, the verdict was announced, sealed with 127 signatures: the prince is worthy of death both as a son and as a subject. Church hierarchs evaded categoricalness. However, the sentence was not carried out. According to the official version, registered in the journal of the St. Petersburg garrison office on June 26, "at 7 o'clock in the afternoon, Tsarevich Alexei Petrovich died in St. Petersburg." From this laconic entry, we can conclude that the tsarevich died, unable to withstand physical torture and nervous tension Alekseev M. Military intelligence of Russia. Book 1. - M.: 1998. - S.33-38 ..

On this tragic example, one can understand the greatness of Peter as the head of the Russian State. Peter had no doubt that everything he had done, to which he, together with the people, gave his talents and energy best years of his life, with the accession of his son, he will go to dust and the country will again turn into a backwater of Europe. The fate of a son or a country - such was the choice of the king, and he made it.

Petrovsky's special services managed to expose and prevent the attempt on the life of Peter himself. Russian intelligence In Istanbul, information was received, with all urgency transferred to Russia: “By order of the Sultan of Tours, it was ordered to the ruler of the Multian (Moldavian) to send on purpose two people from Greek merchants to the Russian state under the names of merchants, as if for trade, but in fact in order to they used all sorts of measures to repair the fishery: to kill the high person of his royal majesty through poison. For which he, the Multian ruler, was promised by the Port to have the state and his heirs forever. The State Chancellor, Count Golovin, ordered a search for the "merchants" who were arrested in Moscow. In addition to a carefully disguised bottle of poison, several tens of thousands of chervonets and diamonds worth a large amount were found in their possession.

Also, Peter's counterintelligence reported on the armed uprising of captured Swedes, many of whom were in Moscow, which was being prepared in 1712 by the secret agents of Karl KhP, with the subsequent capture of the Kremlin. Essays on the history of Russian foreign intelligence. T.1. - P.112-113..

An interesting development to open the channel for leaking top-secret state information was carried out during the time of Empress Catherine II, who herself brilliantly mastered the skills of intelligence and counterintelligence work. In the 1880s, the Empress became uneasy due to the exclusive knowledge of the French government about the contents of top secret documents relating to foreign policy. Suspicions, not without reason, fell on the French ambassador, Count Segur, but, despite all efforts, it was not possible to find the source through which the information was leaked. It was entrusted to the intelligence agent I. Simolin, the Russian ambassador in Paris, who brilliantly coped with the task, to expose someone else's "confidant". In April 1791, he reported to Vice-Chancellor I.A. Osterman: “Our confidant managed to find for me the source of obtaining the most reliable information about the informer of Count Segur, whom he has in our College of Foreign Affairs. I gave a report on this to Her Imperial Majesty also in the appendix to this letter. In his report to Catherine, the ambassador wrote: “I tried to get this information from a source that cannot arouse the slightest doubt or suspicion of its authenticity. I venture to attach to this an extract (extract) received from the Bureau of Foreign Affairs Funds, in which the name of the recipient and the time of the reward issued to the person who for the last three years is recorded under the name of Scribs are indicated. A confidant's receipt was attached to the report: "I swear that this information was received from the Bureau of Foreign Affairs Funds (the accounting department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and that I saw the original, on which the names appear." These data turned out to be enough to identify and arrest the court adviser Ivan Valts, recruited three years earlier for the annual 3 thousand rubles Tarle E. Talleyrand. - M.: 1992. - S.112-113 ..

The intensification of hostilities in the late 18th and early 19th centuries posed new tasks for intelligence, and ever new forces and means were involved in its conduct. This required the creation of a special central body of intelligence, especially military intelligence, which would combine both the mining and processing functions of undercover strategic and military intelligence. The decisive impetus for the organization of a permanent central body of the Russian military intelligence bloody wars that Russia waged since 1805 with Napoleonic France.

The Russian special services worked especially effectively at the beginning of the 19th century during the period of numerous wars raging in Europe, in which, one way or another, Russia was also involved.

The defeat of Russian troops in the companies of 1805 and 1806-1807. ended with the conclusion of the Treaty of Tilsit with France on June 25, 1807. But the signing of a peace treaty, which in many ways infringes on Russian interests, did not at all mean for Russia that there would never be another war with the French emperor. Emperor Alexander I and all Russians understood this very well. statesmen. In this regard, the timely receipt of information about the political and military plans of Napoleon acquired paramount importance.

In 1809, she declared war on Sweden, as a result of which she annexed Finland as an autonomy. During the preparation of the campaign, Russian intelligence worked effectively, which relied on patriotic Swedish officers of Finnish origin - some of them opened the gates of besieged fortresses to the Russians. Modern Finnish historians are convinced that Russia, which started the war, raised the self-consciousness of the Finnish nation on its shield. The Swedish king was deposed by his own officers, and Bernadotte, one of the rootless Napoleonic marshals, was invited to take his place. Three years later, after Napoleon's attack on Russia, the vain Bernadotte, who dreamed of the French throne, being recruited by Russian intelligence, began to supply Tsar Alexander with valuable information about the French emperor.

During the war of 1812, intelligence played a far from last role - largely due to the fact that most of the Russian nobles French often owned better than native. Alexander Figner was distinguished by special boldness, who managed to obtain valuable information, posing as an Italian merchant, then as a French officer and getting into the most incredible situations in terms of risk. At twenty-four, he was absolutely fluent: French, German (with dialects), Spanish, Italian (with dialects) and Polish. In addition to them, he knew a few more, but on the indicated ones he could freely impersonate a resident not only of the respective countries, but also of their individual dialect regions. And at the same time perfectly knowing the geography of these regions. In addition to the French, Poles, Austrians, Spaniards and Italians served in the occupying troops of Napoleon, and Figner pretended to be whoever he wanted, fearlessly infiltrating a foreign environment and receiving valuable information. After the French entered Moscow, he conducted reconnaissance in the city under the guise of a French officer.

After leaving Moscow, he commanded a partisan detachment, successfully operating behind enemy lines, carrying out a large number of sabotage and terrorist operations. The French offered very large sums for his head Durnovo N.D. Diary 1812 In the book: 1812 ... Military diaries. - M.: 1990. - P. 81 ..

Adjutant General Prince P.M. played an important role in the creation of military intelligence in Russia. Volkonsky, the future chief of the quartermaster unit of the General Staff of the Russian Army. In 1807-1810, he was on a business trip abroad, upon his return from which he presented a report "On the internal structure of the French army of the general staff." Under the influence of this report, Barclay de Tolly raised the question of organizing a permanent body of strategic military intelligence before Alexander I.

And the first such body was the Secret Affairs Expedition under the Ministry of War, created on the initiative of Barclay de Tolly in January 1810. In January 1812, it was renamed the Special Office under the Minister of War. In his opinion, the Expedition of Secret Affairs was supposed to solve the following tasks: conducting strategic intelligence (collecting strategically important secret information abroad), operational-tactical intelligence (collecting data on enemy troops on the borders of Russia) and counterintelligence (identifying and neutralizing enemy agents). The first heads of military intelligence in Russia were in turn three people close to the Minister of War: from September 29, 1810, the adjutant wing, Colonel A.V. Voeikov, from March 19, 1812 - Colonel A.A. Zakrevsky, from January 10, 1813 - Colonel P.A. Chuikevich.

In the same January 1810, Barclay de Tolly spoke with Alexander I about the need to organize strategic military intelligence abroad and asked permission to send special military agents to Russian embassies in order to collect information “on the number of troops, on the structure, weapons and spirit of them, of the state of their fortresses and stores, of the abilities and virtues of the best generals, and also of the well-being, character, and spirit of the people, of the location and products of the land, of the internal sources of the powers, or of the means of continuing the war, and of the different conclusions given to defensive and offensive actions ". These military agents were supposed to be at diplomatic missions under the guise of adjutants to ambassadors-generals or civil officials and employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Zhilin P.A. The death of the Napoleonic army in Russia. - M.: 1974. - S.251-252 ..

The special office under the Minister of War was dissolved in 1815, and its functions were transferred to the first branch of the Office of the Quartermaster General of the General Staff. However, in essence, it was the processing body of military intelligence, which received information mainly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the leadership of the first department made attempts to send their officers abroad as well. So, Colonel M.P. was sent to the Russian embassy in Paris. Buturlin, to the embassy in Bavaria - Lieutenant Vilboa, several officers under the cover of various diplomatic missions were sent to Khiva and Bukhara.

In 1836, after another reorganization, the Department of the General Staff was formed as part of the War Ministry, consisting of three departments. At the same time, intelligence functions were assigned to the Second (military-scientist) branch of the department of the general staff. However, this department was still engaged only in the processing of information coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The defeat of Russia in the Crimean War forced the leadership of the Ministry of War to pay close attention to intelligence. And already on July 10, 1856, Alexander II approved the first instruction on the work of military agents. It stated that “every agent is charged with the duty to obtain the most accurate and positive information possible on the following subjects:

• 1) On the number, composition, structure and disposition of both land and sea forces.
• 2) About the methods of the government for replenishing and multiplying its armed forces and for supplying the troops and fleet with weapons and other military needs.
• 3) About various troop movements, both already carried out and planned, trying as far as possible to penetrate the true purpose of these movements ... ".

Conventionally, military intelligence officers at that time can be divided into the following categories: quartermaster generals and officers of the quartermaster general unit (General Staff) of the Ministry of War, quartermaster generals and officers of military districts at their disposal, overt and covert military agents abroad, confidants , agents-walkers. The latter include officers of the General Staff sent on a secret mission abroad, and scouts sent to the rear of the enemy during the war.

However, full-fledged centralized military intelligence bodies appeared in Russia only in September 1863, when Emperor Alexander II approved the Regulations and States of the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GUGSH) as an experiment for two years. Intelligence functions in the GUGSH were assigned to the 2nd (Asian) and 3rd (military-scientist) departments, which were subordinate to the vice-director for the General Staff. At the same time, the military-scientific department was engaged in collecting military and military-technical information about foreign states, leading military agents abroad and military-scientific expeditions sent to collect information in the border regions of Russia and adjacent countries, etc. As for the Asian branch, it performed the same tasks, but in the countries of Asia bordering Russia.

Introduced for two years as an experiment, the new structure of military intelligence has generally justified itself. Therefore, in 1865, during the next reorganization of the military ministry, it was retained. The 3rd branch was renamed the 7th military-scientific branch of the General Staff, and Colonel F.A. was appointed its head. Feldman. The 2nd Asian branch, called the "Asian part", has also been preserved. Foreign military agents of the military-scientific department also continued their work, moreover, their number increased.

A serious test for the Russian military intelligence was the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. On the eve of and during hostilities, reconnaissance was still under the jurisdiction of the commanders of formations and units, starting with the army commander. It was carried out by specially trained staff. Just before the start of the Russian-Turkish war, the general leadership of undercover intelligence in Turkey and the Balkans was entrusted to Colonel of the General Staff P.D. Parensov, an officer "for special assignments", a recognized specialist in intelligence affairs.

Since the main burden of the upcoming hostilities was to fall on the powerful group concentrated in Bessarabia Russian army under the command of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, its headquarters needed fresh operational data on Turkish troops located on the territory of Bulgaria and Romania. Therefore, the commander-in-chief personally set the task for Parensov: to go to Bucharest and organize the collection of information about the Turks.

In mid-December 1876, under the name of Paul Paulson, Parensov left Chisinau for Bucharest, where he appeared as a relative of the Russian consul, Baron Stuart. In a short time, he established the necessary connections, created an active agent network and gathered around him devoted people from among the local residents. So, the observation of the movements of ships along the Danube was taken under control by the elder Matyushev and the voivode Velk.

Great help (and free of charge) was provided to Parensov by the Bulgarian patriot banker and grain merchant Evlogii Georgiev, who had sales agents and warehouses in many cities of Bulgaria that were of interest to the Russian command, which gave Parensov the opportunity to use ready-made and fairly reliable agents. Thanks to Evlogy, he acquired a valuable assistant Grigory Nachovich. An educated man who spoke French, German, Romanian and well understood Russian, he had great connections on both sides of the Danube, was unusually inventive in the ways of obtaining information. Nacovich helped Russian intelligence as true patriot his fatherland - for all the time he worked, he never accepted a monetary reward from the Russian command.

Throughout the winter of 1876-1877, the residency of Colonel Parensov delivered comprehensive information about the number of Turkish troops, their movements in Danube Bulgaria, ships and minefields on the Danube, the state of fortifications, and food supplies. So, for example, the Russian command was notified in advance of the arrival of reinforcements from Egypt.

With the outbreak of hostilities, new accurate operational information about the enemy was required. Therefore, Parensov and his closest assistants, in particular Colonel N.D. Artamonov, began to actively use walker agents. One of them was Konstantin Nikolaevich Favrikodorov, a Greek by birth, who was not a novice in military affairs.

The results of the work of Parensov, Artamonov, Favrikodorov and many other officers of Russian intelligence during the years of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 are generally reflected in the assessment given in 1880 by the managing Military Scientific Committee, the future chief of the General Staff, Adjutant General N. Obruchev: "The data on the Turkish army have never been worked out so carefully and in detail as before the last war: to the location of each battalion, each squadron, each battery ...".

However, despite such a laudatory statement by Obruchev, the Russian-Turkish war also revealed a number of shortcomings in Russian military intelligence, which caused another reorganization of its central apparatus. In December 1879, a new staff of the office of the Military Scientific Committee was approved, consisting of the manager of affairs, five senior and nine junior clerks, with a clear delineation of the functions of each of them. In 1886, the states of Asian office work were increased from two to five people. And in the mid-1890s, it already consisted of three office work. The first two were responsible for the work of the Asian military districts, and the third was directly engaged in intelligence abroad. In total to late XIX century, Russia had military agents in 18 world capitals, as well as maritime agents in ten countries.

The secret services of the Russian Empire were just as powerful and merciless towards the opponents of the monarchy, as were the state security agencies of the USSR towards the enemies of Soviet power. Another thing is that during the reign of Emperor Nicholas II, due to the latter’s weak political will, the tsarist secret services were less harsh towards external and internal enemies than, for example, under Emperor Nicholas I. Despite this, the Chekists borrowed a lot from their predecessors, but never admitted it.

The history of the special services of the Russian Empire began to be created back in Soviet times and reflected all the features of the official ideology that prevailed at that time. The state security agencies were engaged exclusively in political investigation. At the same time, the gendarmes were portrayed exclusively in a negative light, and the scope of terror on the part of the radical opposition was carefully hidden. An example is the book by V.M. Zhukhrai "Terror. Geniuses and victims ”(a reprint of the work of this author“ Secrets of tsarist secret police: adventurers and provocateurs). The fact of the existence of political and scientific-technical intelligence in the Soviet era was hushed up, and individual military intelligence operations were reported extremely succinctly. An example is the book by A. Gorbovsky, Yu. Semenov "Without a single shot: From the history of Russian military intelligence".

In the nineties, the situation changed. Now employees of the Police Department and officers of the Separate Gendarme Corps were declared heroes, or at least faithful defenders of the interests of the state. As a result, a lot of quality books appeared on the book market. We list the main ones: a collection of articles "The Gendarmes of Russia"; The undercover work of the political police of the Russian Empire. Collection of documents. 1880-1917" ; monographs: Z.I. Peregudova "Political Investigation of Russia (1880-1917)"; F. Lurie “Policemen and Provocateurs: Political Investigation in Russia. 1649-1917" ; A.A. Zdanovich, V.S. Izmozik "Forty Years in the Secret Service: The Life and Adventures of Vladimir Krivosh"; B.N. Grigorieva, B.G. Kolokolova "Daily life of Russian gendarmes"; VC. Agafonova " Parisian secrets tsarist secret police"; A. Borisov "Special Department of the Empire"; V. Dzhanibekyan "Provocateurs"; N.V. Voskoboynikova "Management and paperwork of the political investigation bodies of the Nizhny Novgorod province (1890–1917)"; memoirs "Okhranka": Memoirs of the heads of security departments "in two volumes and K.I. Globachev "The Truth about the Russian Revolution: Memoirs of the Former Chief of the Petrograd Security Department".

In the last decade it has become popular to write about the Third Department of His Imperial Majesty's Chancellery (1826–1880). True, most of the authors devoted most of their works to the story of the organization of political investigation on the territory of Russia and beyond its borders, touching extremely succinctly on the topic of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. It is possible that they followed a tradition that originated in the Soviet era. Then the Third Branch had a "label" of the main fighter against dissent in the Russian Empire of the 19th century. Allegedly, it was created after the Decembrist uprising, and disbanded when it became clear that it could not cope with the radical left opposition. Among the books devoted to the Third Section are: G.N. Bibikov “A.Kh. Benckendorff and the policy of Emperor Nicholas I"; O.Yu. Abakumov "... So that the moral infection does not penetrate our borders": from the history of the struggle of the III branch with European influence in Russia (1830 - early 1860s)" ; A.G. Chukarev "The Secret Police of Russia: 1825–1855" and a collection of documents "Russia under Surveillance: Records of Section III, 1827–1869".

A separate topic is the history of political investigation bodies from the oprichnina of Ivan the Terrible to the Third Branch of Nicholas I. Of course, even in Soviet times, historians regularly published their monographs, only they were written in a dry scientific language and designed for fellow scientists. In addition, many ideological clichés were present in them. But in the popular science literature published in the last two decades, you can find out the details of the organization of political investigation: I.V. Kurukin "The Daily Life of the Guardsmen of Ivan the Terrible"; V.D. Volodikhin "Oprichnina and" the sovereign's dogs "; AND I. Froyanov "Terrible oprichnina"; I.V. Kurukin, E.A. Nikulin "Daily life of the Secret Office"; E.V. Anisimov "Russian dungeon. Secrets of the Secret Office "; M.I. Semenovsky "Secret Chancellery under Peter the Great"; N.M. Molev "Secret Chancellery of the Russian Empire (secret people, secret affairs, secret time)".

The history of military intelligence of the Russian Empire in the domestic literature is reflected modestly. It is possible that this is one of the consequences of the Soviet book publishing policy. It was not customary to write about undercover military intelligence, especially of the pre-revolutionary period. It is difficult to say what caused such a ban. Maybe in the USSR military intelligence did not officially exist. Recall that the book "Aquarium" by the defector Viktor Suvorov, published then in the Soviet Union in the late eighties, produced the effect of an exploding bomb. It was then that the citizens of the USSR learned a new abbreviation - the GRU.

The appearance of books on the military intelligence of the Russian Empire did not produce a similar effect. Monographs published in the late 1990s and early 2000s have now become a bibliographic rarity. We list these publications: V. M. Bezotosny "Intelligence and plans of the parties in 1812"; four books by M. Alekseev “Military intelligence of Russia from Rurik to Nicholas II” (books I and II) and “Military intelligence of Russia. First World War» (book III, parts 1 and 2); V. Avdeev, V. Karpov "Secret mission in Paris: Count Ignatiev against German intelligence in 1915-1917", E. Sergeev, Ar. Ulunyan “Not subject to disclosure. Military agents of the Russian Empire in Europe and the Balkans. 1900–1914”, K.K. Zvonarev "Intelligence: Russian undercover intelligence before and during the war of 1914-1918" (a reprint from a book published in 1931 in the USSR, where the military intelligence of the tsarist period was, to put it mildly, depicted very subjectively), as well as memoirs (P. Ignatiev "My mission in Paris"). In May 2010 on the shelves bookstores M. Alekseev's book "Military Intelligence of the Russian Empire from Alexander I to Alexander II" appeared.

There is an opinion that intelligence is one of the oldest professions on earth. This is often cited as proof of this. old testament or from the Sumerian Epic of Gilgamesh. To a large extent, this statement is correct. Indeed, the word "intelligence" in its original sense implies the conduct of some kind of secret survey for a special purpose. But something else is much more important: that intelligence is a necessary mechanism for solving the most important state tasks. This has been proven by history, it is confirmed by modernity.

Speaking about Russia, it should be noted that since the formation Kievan Rus intelligence was a matter of state and was conducted at two levels - by foreign policy and military departments. Russian subjects were used to collect intelligence information: ambassadors and employees of embassies sent for negotiations, from the 17th century - members of permanent missions abroad, messengers, merchants, representatives of the clergy, residents of the border regions, large and small military detachments, as well as individual military personnel. Foreigners were also involved in intelligence, including those living on the territory of the Russian state (merchants, clergy, employees of foreign missions, defectors and prisoners of war).

In the 16th century, the first central government bodies appeared in Russia, organizing and conducting intelligence, thanks to which the awareness of the state leadership about the plans and intentions of the enemy increased. As Russia's influence in international affairs grew, so did the role of intelligence. In 1654, by decree of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, the Order of Secret Affairs was founded, where intelligence management is concentrated. The leaders of the Order - clerks - were D. M. Bashmakov, F. M. Rtishchev, D. L. Polyansky and F. Mikhailov. The Preobrazhensky Prikaz (1686-1729), which carried out the functions of the secret police, including intelligence, was led by the father and son of the Romodanovsky princes - Fedor Yuryevich (1686-1717) and Ivan Fedorovich (1717-1729).

Peter I in the military regulations of 1716 for the first time provides a legislative and legal basis for intelligence work.

The intensification of hostilities in the late 18th and early 19th centuries posed new tasks for intelligence, and ever new forces and means were involved in its conduct. This required the creation of a special central body of intelligence, especially military intelligence, which would combine both the mining and processing functions of undercover strategic and military intelligence. The decisive impetus for the organization of a permanent central body of Russian military intelligence was the bloody wars that Russia had waged with Napoleonic France since 1805. We will dwell on this period in the history of Russian military intelligence in more detail.

The defeat of Russian troops in the companies of 1805 and 1806-1807. ended with the conclusion on June 25, 1807 of the Peace of Tilsit with France. But the signing of a peace treaty, which in many ways infringes on Russian interests, did not at all mean for Russia that there would never be another war with the French emperor. This was well understood by Emperor Alexander I and all Russian statesmen. In this regard, the timely receipt of information about the political and military plans of Napoleon acquired paramount importance. Therefore, when General M. Barclay de Tolly became Minister of War in 1810 and began to strengthen the army, he began to pay great attention to the organization of military strategic intelligence.

An important role in the creation of military intelligence in Russia was played by Adjutant General Prince P. M. Volkonsky, the future head of the quartermaster unit of the General Staff of the Russian Army. In 1807–1810 he was on a business trip abroad, upon his return from which he presented a report "On the internal structure of the French army of the general staff."

Under the influence of this report, Barclay de Tolly raised the question of organizing a permanent body of strategic military intelligence before Alexander I.

And the first such body was the Expedition of Secret Affairs under the Ministry of War, created on the initiative of Barclay de Tolly in January 1810. In January 1812 it was renamed the Special Office under the Minister of War. In his opinion, the Expedition of Secret Affairs was supposed to solve the following tasks: conducting strategic intelligence (collecting strategically important secret information abroad), operational-tactical intelligence (collecting data on enemy troops on the borders of Russia) and counterintelligence (identifying and neutralizing enemy agents). Three people close to the Minister of War in turn became the first heads of military intelligence in Russia: from September 29, 1810 - adjutant wing Colonel A. V. Voeikov, from March 19, 1812 - Colonel A. A. Zakrevsky, from January 10, 1813 - Colonel P. A. Chuikevich.

In the same January 1810, Barclay de Tolly spoke with Alexander I about the need to organize strategic military intelligence abroad and asked permission to send special military agents to Russian embassies in order to collect information “on the number of troops, on the structure, weapons and their spirit, the condition of fortresses and reserves, the abilities and virtues of the best generals, as well as the well-being, character and spirit of the people, the location and products of the land, the internal sources of powers or the means to continue the war and the various conclusions provided to defensive and offensive action." These military agents were supposed to be at diplomatic missions under the guise of adjutants to ambassador-generals or civil officials and employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Alexander I agreed with the proposals of Barclay de Tolly, and the following officers were sent on foreign business trips to carry out secret assignments:

Colonel A. I. Chernyshev (Paris);

Colonel F. W. Theil von Seraskeren (Vienna);

Colonel R. E. Rennie (Berlin);

Lieutenant M. F. Orlov (Berlin);

Major V. A. Prendel (Dresden);

Lieutenant P. H. Grabbe (Munich);

Lieutenant P. I. Brozin (Kassel, then Madrid).

Intelligence tasks they had to carry out secretly. For example, the instruction to Major Prendel stated:

“... your present assignment should be subject to impenetrable secrecy, therefore, in all your actions, you must be modest and careful. The main purpose of your secret mission should be ... to acquire accurate statistical and physical knowledge about the state of the Saxon kingdom and the Duchy of Warsaw, paying special attention to the military state ... and also to report on the merits and properties of military generals.

Colonel A. I. Chernyshev, an officer of the Special Office of the Quartermaster of the General Staff, especially distinguished himself in this field. In a short time, he managed to create a network of informers in the government and military spheres in France and receive from them, often for a large reward, information of interest to Moscow. So, on December 23, 1810, he wrote that "Napoleon has already decided on a war against Russia, but so far he is gaining time due to the unsatisfactory state of his affairs in Spain and Portugal."

Here is another report from Chernyshev to St. Petersburg, where he, giving a description of Marshal Davout of France, shows himself to be an attentive and intelligent observer:

“Davout, Duke of Auerstadt, Prince of Ekmulsky. Marshal of the Empire, commander-in-chief of the troops in northern Germany. A rough and cruel man, hated by all who surround the Emperor Napoleon; a zealous supporter of the Poles, he is a great enemy of Russia. Currently, this is the marshal who has the most influence on the Emperor. Napoleon trusts him more than anyone else and whom he uses most willingly, being sure that, whatever his orders, they will always be executed exactly and literally.

Not revealing particularly brilliant courage under fire, he is very persistent and stubborn and, moreover, knows how to force everyone to obey him. This marshal has the misfortune of being extremely short-sighted."

One of Chernyshev's informants was M. Michel, an employee of the French Ministry of War. He was part of a group of employees who, once every two weeks, compiled personally for Napoleon in a single copy a summary of the number and deployment of the French armed forces. Michel gave a copy of this report to Chernyshev, who sent it to Petersburg. Unfortunately, Chernyshev's activities in Paris ended in 1811. While he was in St. Petersburg, the French police discovered M. Michel's note during a covert search of his Parisian home. As a result, Chernyshev was accused of espionage, and he could not return to France, and Michel was sentenced to death.

Another valuable Russian agent in France was, as it may not seem surprising, Prince Charles-Maurice Talleyrand, former minister foreign affairs of Napoleon. In September 1808, during the Erfurt meeting between Alexander I and Napoleon, he himself offered his services to the Russian emperor. Alexander was initially distrustful of Talleyrand's words, but after a confidential meeting, his suspicions were dispelled. For a huge reward for those times, Talleyrand reported on the state of the French army, gave advice on strengthening the Russian financial system, etc. And in December 1810, he wrote to Alexander I that Napoleon was preparing to attack Russia and even named a specific date - April 1812

But despite the fact that Talleyrand's correspondence with Alexander was carried out in compliance with all the rules of secrecy, by the beginning of 1809, Napoleon had suspicions of Talleyrand's double game. In January, Napoleon unexpectedly handed over the command of the Spanish armies to the marshals, and he himself returned to Paris. On January 28, 1809, a famous scene took place, which has been cited many times in memoirs. The emperor literally attacked Talleyrand with the words:

“You are a thief, a scoundrel, a dishonorable person! You do not believe in God, you have violated all your obligations all your life, you have deceived everyone, betrayed everyone, nothing is sacred to you, you would have sold your own father! But there is, there is still enough time for this! You are dirt in silk stockings! Dirt! Dirt!..".

However, Napoleon did not have concrete evidence of Talleyrand's betrayal, the storm passed by, and Talleyrand transmitted important information to Russia until the very beginning of the war.

Barclay de Tolly paid much attention to undercover intelligence, which was conducted by the commanders of field armies and corps commanders on their own. On January 27, 1812, Alexander I signed three secret additions to the "Institution for the management of the Large active army": "Education of the higher military police", "Instruction to the director of the higher military police" and "Instruction to the Chief of the General Staff on the management of the higher military police." These documents incorporated the ideas of Barclay de Tolly and his entourage on approaches to the organization and conduct of military intelligence and counterintelligence on the eve of and during hostilities. In them, special attention is drawn to the conduct of undercover intelligence. So, in the supplement on the "Education of the Higher Military Police" it was said about the constant use of agents (paragraph 13 "On scouts"):

"1. Scouts on a permanent salary. They ... are sent in the right cases, under different types and in various attire. They must be quick, cunning and experienced people. Their duty is to bring the information for which they go, and to recruit scouts of the second kind and peddlers of correspondence.

2. Scouts of the second kind should preferably be residents of neutral and enemy lands of various states, and deserters among them. They bring information on demand and mostly local. They receive a special payment for each news, according to its importance.

The classification of agents was also given there, whose task was “to collect information about the enemy army and the land it occupies:

1st in the land of the union;

2nd in neutral land;

3rd in the land of the enemy.

The following clarifications were made:

“- Agents in the land of the union may be civil and military officials of that land or sent from the army.

Agents in a neutral land can be neutral subjects who have acquaintances and connections, and by this, or for money, are supplied with certificates, passports and routes, necessary for moving. They can also be burgomasters, customs inspectors, and so on.

Agents in the land of the enemy can be scouts sent to it and permanently staying there, or monks, sellers, public girls, healers and scribes, or petty officials who are in the enemy's service.

And in addition to the "Instructions to the Chief of the General Staff on the management of the higher military police" there was also the following provision:

“In case of complete impossibility to have news of the enemy in important and decisive circumstances, one should have a refuge for forced espionage. It consists in persuading, by promises of rewards and even by threats, the natives to pass through places occupied by the enemy.

This position did not come about by chance. An explanation for this can be found in a letter from de Leather, who was organizing undercover intelligence on the western border, to Barclay de Tolly dated December 6, 1811:

“Extreme prudence,” writes de Lezer, “which is shown by the inhabitants of the Duchy (Principality of Warsaw. - Approx. Aut.) in relation to travelers, creates great difficulties for us in establishing agents and spies who can be useful.”

But despite all the difficulties, undercover intelligence in the troops before the start of the war was quite active and brought a lot of information. Evidence of this is the memorandum of the commander of the 2nd Western Army, Prince Bagration, Barclay de Tolly. Here is an excerpt from it:

“And as I intend to send parcels to dubious places for secret reconnaissance under some other pretext worthy of power of attorney and reliable people, then for free travel abroad, would it please Your Excellency to send me several passport forms signed by Mr. Chancellor in order to ... remove the powerful fall suspicion."

As for military intelligence, its conduct has practically not changed. Basically, it was carried out in the old fashioned way - horse patrols. "Instruction to the Chief of the General Staff on the management of the highest military police" ordered to conduct military intelligence as follows:

“Armed espionage is carried out in the following way. The commander detaches different parties of Cossacks ... he entrusts these teams to the most courageous officers and gives each agile scout who would know the local situation ... ".

A few words should also be said about the counterintelligence operations carried out in Russia on the eve of the war of 1812. Archival documents contain information that in the period from 1810 to 1812, 39 military and civilians working for foreign special services were detained and neutralized on the territory of the Russian Empire .

As a result of the measures taken by the Russian command, by the summer of 1812, despite the difficult operational conditions, intelligence was able to achieve good results. Yes, she found out exact time the expected offensive of the French troops, their numbers, the location of the main units, as well as to establish the commanders of the army units and give them characteristics. In addition, she established undercover communications in the territories controlled by the enemy. But, what should be specially noted, the data obtained by intelligence, unfortunately, did not have a significant impact on the development of a plan for conducting military operations. Ful's defensive plan, according to which the strategic initiative was conceded to the enemy, not only did not correspond to the real situation, but also completely ignored intelligence data.

Of course, this was reflected in the first stage of hostilities and led to the fact that for the Russian command the start of hostilities in operational and tactical terms became sudden. So, in Vilna, where Alexander I was, they learned about Napoleon's crossing of the Neman only a day later from General V.V. Orlov-Denisov, whose regiment was on the very border. The suddenness of the French offensive introduced some disorganization into the work of the Russian command and affected intelligence management. In the diary of N. D. Durnovo, who at the beginning of 1812 was in the retinue of the head of the quartermaster section of the General Staff P. M. Volkonsky, there are the following entries dated June 27 and 28:

“27 ... The main apartment of His Majesty remained in Yanchiny, Barclay de Tolly - in Dvorchany, two versts from ours. There was no news of enemy movement. Some suggest that he went to Riga, others - to Minsk; I am of the last opinion...

28. The whole day was spent at work. There is no information about the French. Our outposts traveled twenty miles from their positions without meeting a single enemy. The Jews assume that Minsk is occupied by Napoleon himself.”

But soon the confusion passed, and the command of the Russian army began to regularly receive information from intelligence. Throughout the war, the command paid great attention to reconnaissance, realizing the importance of obtaining timely and accurate data about the enemy. Evidence of this, for example, is Kutuzov's order to General Platov dated October 19, 1812:

“Under the current circumstances, I absolutely need your Excellency to deliver information about the enemy as often as possible, because, without having fast and reliable news, the army made one march in the wrong direction, as it should, which can cause very harmful consequences” .

Of all types of reconnaissance, the most difficult was the collection of information with the help of agents, especially in the area of ​​activity of the 3rd Western Army of General A. Tormasov. This was due to the hostile attitude of the local population towards the Russians and the lack of sufficient funds. Here is what General V. V. Vyazemsky, who commanded a division in the 3rd Western Army, writes about this in his Journal:

“30th (August). To this day we still do not know where the enemy corps are located and what their intention is - little money, no true spies. The townsfolk are devoted to them, the Jews are afraid of the gallows.”

However, in the original Russian lands, especially after the French occupied Moscow, undercover intelligence acted fruitfully and obtained important information. Here is one example. The merchant Zhdanov did not have time to leave Moscow and was taken prisoner by the French. At the headquarters of Marshal Davout, he was offered to penetrate the location of the main Russian army and collect the information the French needed, for which he was promised a large reward. Zhdanov "agreed". Having received a list from the French with questions of interest to them and being at the location of the Russian troops, he immediately demanded that he be delivered to General Miloradovich and told him in detail about the assignment received from the enemy and his situation in Moscow. Kutuzov, appreciating his patriotic deed, accepted Zhdanov and awarded him a medal, and General Konovnitsyn on September 2 gave him the following certificate:

“The Moscow third guild merchant Pyotr Zhdanov, being zealous and zealous for his Fatherland, despite any flattering proposals from the French who inclined him to espionage, left his house, wife and children, appeared in the main apartment and delivered very important information about the state and position of the enemy army. Such a patriotic act of his deserves the gratitude and respect of all the true sons of Russia.

Undercover intelligence did not lose its significance even during the transition of the Russian army to the counteroffensive. Here is what A. Yermolov, who during the war of 1812 was the chief of staff of the 1st, and then the main army, writes about this:

“I reported to the Field Marshal that from the evidence collected from the surrounding villagers, confirmed by the residents leaving Smolensk, Count Osterman reports that it has been more than a day since Napoleon set out with his guards on Krasny. There could not be more pleasant news for the field marshal ... ".

Along with undercover intelligence, interrogation of prisoners and interception of enemy correspondence were used and played an important role. These methods of conducting reconnaissance were used constantly. So, during the retreat of the Russian army before the battle of Smolensk, important data were obtained in this way. General Ermolov describes this incident as follows:

“Ataman Platov, reinforced by the vanguard of Count Palen, met a strong detachment of French cavalry near the village of Leshne, defeated him and pursued him to Rudnya. Captured: one wounded colonel, several officers and 500 lower ranks. The colonel said that they had no news of our approach and no special orders had been made for that, evenly and in other corps no movements were taking place. From the papers taken in the apartment of the commanding general Sebastiani, one could see the order for the advanced posts and instructions to the generals, which of them, for which part of the troops and with what forces should serve as reinforcements to maintain a common connection.

Another example of obtaining valuable information when interviewing prisoners is Kutuzov's report to Alexander I dated August 29, written after the Battle of Borodino. In it, Kutuzov, on the basis of the information reported by the prisoners, draws conclusions about the losses of the French army:

“... Prisoners show, however, that the enemy's loss is extremely great. In addition to the divisional general Bonami, who was taken prisoner, there were others killed, among other things, Davoust was wounded ...

P.S. Some prisoners claim that the general opinion in the French army is that they lost forty thousand killed and wounded.

The interception of enemy correspondence and documents was also of great benefit. So, the detachment of Colonel Kudashev on the day of the Tarutinsky battle on October 5 captured the order of Marshal Berthier to a French general to send all the burdens to the Mozhaisk road. This allowed Kutuzov to make the right decision to abandon the pursuit of the defeated enemy vanguard under the command of Murat and concentrate the main forces on the Kaluga road, thereby blocking the French way to the south. Another illustration of the importance of intercepting enemy correspondence for acceptance by the Russian command important decisions serves as a letter from Kutuzov to the commander of the 3rd Army, Admiral P. Chichagov, dated October 30:

"Mr. Admiral!

For greater certainty, I am sending once again to Your Excellency reliable details, gleaned from correspondence, up to letters from Napoleon himself, copies of which I have already sent you. From these excerpts, you will see, Mr. Admiral, how insignificant are the means that the enemy has in his rear in terms of food and uniforms ... "

As before, the most important role in the course of hostilities was played by military intelligence, carried out with the help of patrols and parties of Cossacks. There is no need to dwell specifically on this type of intelligence. It seems that its importance will be visible from the report of Kutuzov to Alexander I of August 23:

“... Regarding the enemy, for about a few days now, he has become extremely cautious, and when he moves forward, this, so to speak, is groping. Yesterday, sent from me, Colonel Prince Kudashev, with 200 Cossacks, forced the entire cavalry of the Davust Corps and the King of Neapolitan to sit motionless on horseback for several hours. Yesterday the enemy did not make a single step forward. Today, our Cossack outposts from me, 30 versts of the road, are watching very carefully ... ".

Every opportunity was used to conduct reconnaissance and collect information about the enemy. For example, parliamentarians were sent to the French army. One of them - lieutenant Mikhail Fedorovich Orlov (later major general, future Decembrist) - returning back, described in detail everything he had seen. Based on his report, Kutuzov compiled the following report dated August 19 to Alexander I on the size of the French army:

“Lieutenant Orlov of the cavalry guard regiment, sent by a truce before my arrival to the armies by the commander-in-chief of the 1st Western Army to find out about the captured Major General Tuchkov, after 9 days of keeping him with the enemy, brought me quite detailed information when returning yesterday. When he was met by an enemy outpost along the Smolensk road near the village of Korovino, he found the king of Neapolitan with all his cavalry, which he believes to be about 20,000. In the distance of Field Marshal Davoust, a corps consisting of 5 divisions, namely from the Moran division, the Friant division, the Godin division , who was wounded and died during the battle at Zabolotye, of the Dessek division and the Compans division, whose forces he believes to be about 50,000. , the division of Razu and the division of the Wirtemberg troops, commanded by the Crown Prince of Wirtemberg. This corps, he believes, is about 20,000.

Then in Smolensk he found the emperor Napoleon with his guards, about 30,000 strong, and the 5th corps, composed of Poles, about 15,000, which the corps was composed of the divisions of General Zayonchek and General Knyazevich, following the road where the 2nd Western Army was retreating , according to which he, Orlov, being returned, did not find anyone else, and only he heard from the French officers that on the left enemy flank in the direction of Sychevka, the corps of Field Marshal Junot and Mortier follow under the command of the Viceroy of Italy, no more than both in 30,000, which would be 165,000.

But according to the interrogations made by our quartermaster officers from prisoners, I believe Orlov's report is somewhat enlarged.

(General of Infantry Prince G(Olenishchev) Kutuzov.)

However, a story about the reconnaissance operations of the Russian army in 1812 would not be complete without mentioning the collection of information about the enemy with the help of partisan detachments, the main task of which was formulated by Kutuzov as follows:

"Because now autumn time comes, through which the movement of a large army becomes completely difficult, then I decided, avoiding a general battle, to wage a small war, because the separate forces of the enemy and his oversight give me more ways to exterminate him, and for this, being now 50 miles from Moscow from with the main forces, I give up important parts from myself in the direction of Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk.

Army partisan detachments were created mainly from Cossack troops and were unequal in number: from 50 to 500 people. The following tasks were set for them: to destroy enemy manpower behind enemy lines, strike at garrisons, suitable reserves, disable transports, deprive the enemy of food and fodder, monitor the movement of enemy troops and report this to the Main Headquarters of the Russian army. On the latest direction of partisan activity famous poet and the commander of the partisan detachments Denis Vasilyevich Davydov writes as follows:

“Partisan warfare also has an impact on the main operations of the enemy army. Moving it during the campaign along strategic lines must meet insurmountable difficulties, when its first and every step can be immediately known to the opposite commander through parties (partisan - Approx. Aut.) ".

The first army partisan detachment was the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydov, sent to the rear of the French army immediately after the Battle of Borodino. And after the occupation of Moscow by the French, this practice became permanent. General A. Yermolov speaks quite specifically about this in his memoirs:

“Shortly after leaving Moscow, I reported to Prince Kutuzov that Captain Figner offered artillery to deliver information about the state of the French army in Moscow and that there would be some emergency preparations in the troops; the prince gave full consent ...

Prince Kutuzov was very pleased with the first successes of his partisan actions, found it useful to increase the number of partisans, and Captain Seslavin was appointed second after Figner to the Guards Cavalry Artillery, and soon after him Guards Colonel Prince Kudashev.

Indeed, the commanders of the partisan detachments regularly informed the main headquarters of the Russian army about the movement of the French troops and their numbers. So, in one of the reports, Figner reported to the duty general of the headquarters of the main army, Konovnitsyn:

“Yesterday I learned that you are anxious to learn about the strength and movements of the enemy. Why, yesterday, the French had one, and today he visited them with an armed hand, after which he again had negotiations with them. Captain Alekseev, who I sent to you, will tell you better about everything that happened, for I am afraid to boast.”

The importance and necessity of military partisan intelligence was most fully manifested at the beginning of the retreat of the French army from Moscow, when Napoleon decided to attack the southern provinces of Russia, not affected by the war. The episode, when on October 11 Kutuzov received from Seslavin accurate data on the movement of the main French forces to Maloyaroslavets, is given in every work devoted to the war of 1812. There is no point in retelling it. It will be enough to give an excerpt from Kutuzov's report to Alexander I about the battle of Maloyaroslavets:

“... Partisan Colonel Seslavin really opened the movement of Napoleon, striving with all his forces along this road (Kaluga. - Approx. Aut.) To Borovsk. This prompted me, without wasting time, on the 11th of October in the afternoon with the whole army to come out and make a forced flank march to Maloyaroslavets ...

This day is one of the most famous in this bloody war, because the lost battle at Maloyaroslavets would have entailed the most disastrous consequences and would have opened the way for the enemy through our grain-growing provinces.

Another activity of the partisan detachments was the capture of French couriers. At the same time, not only important information of a reconnaissance nature was obtained, but most importantly, control in the enemy troops was violated. True, some French participants in the war of 1812, including Napoleon himself, argued that "not a single baton was intercepted." This was convincingly refuted by D. V. Davydov, citing a large amount of concrete evidence to the contrary. Here are just some of them:

“In the report of the Field Marshal to the Sovereign Emperor, dated September 22 (October 4), it is said: “On September 11/23, Major General Dorokhov, continuing operations with his detachment, delivered the mail he had intercepted from the enemy in two sealed boxes, and the third box - with robbed church things; On September 12/24, two couriers with dispatches were caught by his detachment on the Mozhaisk road, "and so on.

In the report of General Wintsengerode to the Emperor from the city of Klin, dated October 3/15, it is said: “Today, this last colonel (Chernozubov) took two French couriers who were traveling from Moscow with dispatches.”

The field marshal also informs the sovereign emperor, dated October 1/13, about the capture on September 24 (October 6) of a courier near Vereya by Lieutenant Colonel Vadbolsky.

Therefore, we will not exaggerate if we say that the reconnaissance operations of the partisan detachments significantly supplemented the usual military reconnaissance operations: undercover reconnaissance, reconnaissance conducted by patrols and parties of Cossacks, interrogation of prisoners and interception of couriers. And in some cases, the information obtained by the partisans had a decisive influence on the adoption of operational decisions (Seslavin's report on October 11).

Finishing the conversation about the activities of the young Russian military intelligence in Patriotic war 1812, we note that the Russian command took into account the experience of conducting reconnaissance operations and successfully applied it in the foreign campaigns of the Russian army in 1813-1814. And the experience of conducting a guerrilla war, including intelligence, was collected by D.V. Davydov in his book “1812”. As for the influence of the data obtained by intelligence on the course of military operations in the war of 1812, it is quite large. If we discard the initial period, when they were ignored when drawing up the defense plan, all subsequent time intelligence information played an extremely important role in the adoption by the Russian command of all responsible operational and strategic decisions.

After graduation Napoleonic Wars and the transition of the Russian army to peacetime states, another reorganization of the military ministry took place. In particular, the General Staff was created, which included the War Ministry.

As for military intelligence, the Special Office under the Minister of War was dissolved in 1815, and its functions were transferred to the first branch of the Office of the Quartermaster General of the General Staff. However, in essence, it was the processing body of military intelligence, which received information mainly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the leadership of the first department made attempts to send their officers abroad as well. So, Colonel MP Buturlin was sent to the Russian embassy in Paris, Lieutenant Vilboa was sent to the embassy in Bavaria, several officers under the cover of various diplomatic missions were sent to Khiva and Bukhara.

In 1836, after another reorganization, the Department of the General Staff was formed within the Ministry of War, consisting of three departments. At the same time, intelligence functions were assigned to the Second (military-scientist) branch of the department of the general staff. However, this department was still engaged only in the processing of information coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The defeat of Russia in the Crimean War forced the leadership of the Ministry of War to pay close attention to intelligence. And already on July 10, 1856, Alexander II approved the first instruction on the work of military agents. It stated that “every agent is charged with the duty to obtain the most accurate and positive information possible on the following subjects:

1) On the number, composition, structure and disposition of both land and sea forces.

2) About the methods of the government for replenishing and multiplying its armed forces and for supplying the troops and fleet with weapons and other military needs.

3) About various movements of troops, both those already carried out and those planned, trying as far as possible to penetrate into the true purpose of these movements.

4) About the current state of the fortresses, new fortification works being undertaken to strengthen the banks and other points.

5) About the experiments of the government on inventions and improvements in weapons and other military needs that have an impact on the art of war.

6) On camp gatherings of troops and on maneuvers.

7) About the spirit of the troops and the way of thinking of officers and higher ranks.

8) About status various parts military administration, such as: artillery, engineering, commissariat, provisions with all their branches.

9) About all the remarkable transformations in the troops and changes in military regulations, weapons and uniforms.

10) On the latest works relating to the military sciences, as well as maps-plans published, especially those areas about which information can be useful to us.

11) On the state of military educational institutions, in relation to their organization, methods of teaching sciences and the prevailing spirit in these institutions.

12) On the structure of the General Staff and the degree of knowledge of the officers who make up it.

(This article for an agent sent to Turkey, where the general staff has not yet been established, has been replaced by the following paragraph: “On the persons who make up the military administration of Turkey, the degree of their knowledge, the ability of each and the power of attorney to him of the government and subordinate persons.”)

13) On the means of moving troops by rail, with possible details on the number of troops and the time when they completed their movement between these points.

14) On the improvement of military administration in general for the speedy execution of written cases and the reduction of time in the transmission of orders.

15) Collect all the above information with the strictest care and discretion and carefully avoid everything that could bring the slightest suspicion of the local government to the agent.

16) Each agent is to be completely dependent and subordinate to the head of the mission with whom he is. Without his permission, do nothing special, ask for instructions and be guided by them exactly. The collected information, especially which may be in connection with political relations, before sending them to the Minister of War, first report to the head of the mission and, in case of urgently necessary expenses, ask him for benefits.

Conventionally, military intelligence officers at that time can be divided into the following categories: quartermaster generals and officers of the quartermaster general unit (General Staff) of the Ministry of War, quartermaster generals and officers of military districts at their disposal, overt and covert military agents abroad, confidants , agents-walkers. The latter include officers of the General Staff sent on a secret mission abroad, and scouts sent to the rear of the enemy during the war. More specifically, in 1856 they were sent abroad: to Paris - adjutant wing Colonel P. P. Albedinsky, to London - adjutant wing Colonel N. P. Ignatiev, to Vienna - Colonel Baron F. F. von Thornau, to Constantinople - Captain Franchini. Simultaneously with them in Italy, the plenipotentiary representative of Russia in Turin, Major General Count Shtakelberg (before that he was in Vienna) and the representative of Russia in Naples, Colonel V. G. Gasfort, were collecting military information.

However, full-fledged centralized military intelligence bodies appeared in Russia only in September 1863, when Emperor Alexander II approved the Regulations and States of the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GUGSH) as an experiment for two years. Intelligence functions in the GUGSH were assigned to the 2nd (Asian) and 3rd (military-scientist) departments, which were subordinate to the vice-director for the General Staff. At the same time, the military-scientific department was engaged in collecting military and military-technical information about foreign states, leading military agents abroad and military-scientific expeditions sent to collect information in the border regions of Russia and adjacent countries, etc. As for Asian branch, then it performed the same tasks, but in the countries of Asia bordering Russia. According to the states, 14 employees were provided for in the military scientific department, and 8 in the Asian department. Thus, for the first time since 1815, an attempt was made to restore military intelligence.

Introduced for two years as an experiment, the new structure of military intelligence has generally justified itself. Therefore, in 1865, during the next reorganization of the military ministry, it was retained. The 3rd branch was renamed the 7th military-scientific branch of the General Staff, and Colonel F.A. Feldman was appointed its head. The 2nd Asian branch, called the "Asian part", has also been preserved. Foreign military agents of the military-scientific department also continued their work, moreover, their number increased. So, in Paris there was an adjutant wing, Colonel Wittgenstein, in Vienna - Major General Baron Thornau, in Berlin - Adjutant General Count N. V. Adlerberg 3rd, in Florence - Major General Gasfort, in London - Colonel Novitsky, in Constantinople - Colonel Frankini.

In January 1867, the 7th military-scientific branch of the General Staff was transferred to the Advisory Committee, which was formed to manage "scientific" and topographic activities. And on March 30, 1867, the Advisory Committee was transformed into the Military Scientific Committee of the General Staff, and an office was created on the basis of the 7th department. It was the office of the Military Scientific Committee that until 1903 was the central body of Russian military intelligence. Its first leader was General N. Obruchev, the right hand of Minister of War Milyutin, and after him - Generals F. A. Feldman (from 1881 to 1896), V. U. Sollogub (from 1896 to 1900) and V. P. Tselebrovsky (from 1900 to 1903). As for the Asian part, it remained an independent subdivision of the General Staff, although in 1869 it was renamed the Asian clerical work. The Asian production consisted of the head, Colonel A.P. Protsenko, and his assistant.

A serious test for the Russian military intelligence was the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. On the eve of and during hostilities, reconnaissance was still under the jurisdiction of the commanders of formations and units, starting with the army commander. It was carried out by specially trained staff. Just before the start of the Russian-Turkish war, the general leadership of undercover intelligence in Turkey and the Balkans was entrusted to Colonel of the General Staff P. D. Parensov, an officer "at special assignments", a recognized intelligence specialist.

Since the main burden of the upcoming hostilities was to fall on the powerful grouping of the Russian army concentrated in Bessarabia under the command of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, its headquarters needed fresh operational data on the Turkish troops located on the territory of Bulgaria and Romania. Therefore, the commander-in-chief personally set the task for Parensov: to go to Bucharest and organize the collection of information about the Turks.

In mid-December 1876, Parensov, under the name of Paul Paulson, left Chisinau for Bucharest, where he appeared as a relative of the Russian consul, Baron Stuart. In a short time, he established the necessary connections, created an active agent network and gathered around him devoted people from among the local residents. So, the observation of the movements of ships along the Danube was taken under control by the elder Matyushev and the voivode Velk.

Great help (and free of charge) was provided to Parensov by the Bulgarian patriot banker and grain merchant Evlogii Georgiev, who had sales agents and warehouses in many cities of Bulgaria that were of interest to the Russian command, which gave Parensov the opportunity to use ready-made and fairly reliable agents. Thanks to Evlogy, he acquired a valuable assistant Grigory Nachovich. An educated man who spoke French, German, Romanian and well understood Russian, he had great connections on both sides of the Danube, was unusually inventive in the ways of obtaining information. Nacovich helped Russian intelligence as a true patriot of his fatherland - for all the time he worked, he never accepted a monetary reward from the Russian command.

Throughout the winter of 1876–1877 Colonel Parensov's residency provided comprehensive information about the number of Turkish troops, their movements in Danube Bulgaria, ships and minefields on the Danube, the state of fortifications, and food supplies. So, for example, the Russian command was notified in advance of the arrival of reinforcements from Egypt.

With the outbreak of hostilities, new accurate operational information about the enemy was required. Therefore, Parensov and his closest assistants, in particular Colonel N. D. Artamonov, began to actively use walker agents. One of them was Konstantin Nikolaevich Favrikodorov, a Greek by birth, who was not a novice in military affairs. Favrikadorov participated in the Crimean War of 1853-1856, bravely fighting on the bastions of Sevastopol as a volunteer of the Greek Legion, and received awards - the George Cross of the 4th class and silver medal. Outwardly similar to a Turk, besides speaking Turkish, he was ideally suited for the role of a scout.

On June 26, 1877, Colonel of the General Staff Artamonov sent Favrikodorov under the name of the Turkish citizen Hasan Demershioglu from the city of Sistov to a deep reconnaissance raid on the rear of the Turkish army - the cities of Vidin and Plevna. From there, he should have gone southeast to find out the number of Turkish troops concentrated in Rumelia, as well as in the fortresses of Shumla and Varna.

Favrikodorov did an excellent job with the task assigned to him. He visited Plevna, the Shumla fortress, Varna, Andrianopol, Philippopolis (Plovdiv), collected a large amount of valuable information about the Turkish army and, returning to the Headquarters of the Russian army, handed them over to Artamonov. And this was not the only raid of the brave scout. Subsequently, he repeatedly went to the rear of the Turkish army and each time obtained extremely valuable intelligence information.

The results of the work of Parensov, Artamonov, Favrikodorov and many other Russian intelligence officers during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. are generally reflected in the assessment given in 1880 by the managing Military Scientific Committee, the future chief of the General Staff, Adjutant General N. Obruchev: battalion, each squadron, each battery ... ".

However, despite such a laudatory statement by Obruchev, the Russian-Turkish war also revealed a number of shortcomings in Russian military intelligence, which caused another reorganization of its central apparatus. In December 1879, a new staff of the office of the Military Scientific Committee was approved, consisting of the manager of affairs, five senior and nine junior clerks, with a clear delineation of the functions of each of them. The states of the Asian office work in 1886 were increased from two to five people. And in the mid-1890s, it already consisted of three office work. The first two were responsible for the work of the Asian military districts, and the third was directly engaged in intelligence abroad. In total, by the end of the 19th century, Russia had military agents in 18 world capitals, as well as maritime agents in ten countries.

In July 1900, another reorganization of military intelligence began. As part of the General Staff, a quartermaster general unit was established, which included operational and statistical departments. At the same time, the statistical department was entrusted with the functions of Asian office work, namely, intelligence in China, Korea, Japan and other Asian countries. And six months later, in December 1900, the office of the Military Scientific Committee was also transferred to the quartermaster general unit.

In April 1903, new states of the General Staff were announced. According to them, instead of the office of the Military Scientific Committee, intelligence was assigned to the 7th (military statistics of foreign states) department of the 1st (Military statistics) department of the Office of the 2nd quartermaster general of the General Staff. The 7th department consisted of the chief, 8 head clerks and the same number of their assistants. Almost immediately, behind the scenes, within the 7th department, a mining unit was allocated, called the Special Office Work, in which two officers worked. However, in the 7th division, as before, the mining and processing functions of intelligence were not separated and work was not carried out to direct the intelligence of the military districts. In 1903, General Tselebrovsky, who had previously headed the Military Scientific Committee of the General Staff, was appointed head of the 7th department. He headed military intelligence until 1905, when he was replaced by General N. S. Ermolov, who held this post until 1906.

The defeat of Russia in the war with Japan revealed significant shortcomings in the organization of military intelligence. War 1904–1905 clearly showed the need not only for continuous military reconnaissance during the period of hostilities, but also for constant undercover surveillance of potential enemies, which, in the opinion of most intelligence officers, was not given due attention.

Therefore, the military reforms that began to be carried out in 1906 forced intelligence officers to begin a radical reorganization of their service. In the autumn of 1906, the GUGSH received memos from several officers of the intelligence department with specific proposals for restructuring the activities of the intelligence agencies. In their opinion, intelligence should have been carried out by the headquarters of the border districts under the leadership of the GUGSH, which created an agent network in the most important centers of the alleged enemies, while the headquarters of the districts - in the border areas of adjacent states. Another important link in identifying the forces of potential enemies of Russia, they considered the secret missions of officers of the General Staff to reconnoitre communications and fortified areas in the border zone.

As a result, in April 1906, a new structure of the GUGSH was approved. For the first time, it formalized the separation of the mining and processing functions of military intelligence. The mining functions were now concentrated in the 5th (intelligence) office of the 1st Chief Quartermaster of the Office of the Quartermaster General of the GUGSH. It consisted of one clerk and two of his assistants, one of whom was responsible for the eastern and the other for the western direction of intelligence. Colonel M.A. Adabash was appointed the first clerk, and young officers O.K. Enkel and P.F. Ryabikov were appointed his assistants. And in March 1908, Adabash was replaced by Colonel N. A. Monkevits, who led military intelligence until the start of the First World War.

The processing functions were assigned to parts of the 2nd and 3rd quartermasters: for the 2nd - for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th office work, and for the 3rd - for 1st, 2nd and 4th paperwork. The employees of the former 7th department became the employees of these office-processing departments.

However, the reorganization did not stop there, and on September 11, 1910, new states of the Main Directorate of the General Staff were approved. The 5th office was transformed into the Special Office (intelligence and counterintelligence) as part of the Department of the Quartermaster General. The Special Office was subordinated directly to the Quartermaster General, which indicated an increase in the status of the intelligence service and a strengthening of the role of intelligence. A journal part was formed in its composition for conducting secret correspondence. And the entire staff of the Special Office included a clerk, his three assistants and a journalist.

Processing office work became part of the parts of the 1st and 2nd Chief Quartermasters. Parts of the 1st quartermaster were engaged in the western direction: 4th clerical work - Germany, 5th - Austria-Hungary, 6th - Balkan states, 7th - Scandinavian countries, 8th - other countries Western Europe. Office work of the 2nd chief quartermaster was engaged in the eastern direction: 1st office work - Turkestan, 2nd - Turkish-Persian, 4th - Far East.

If we talk about intelligence personnel, then as a result of the transformation of intelligence office work in 1909–1910. there have been no major changes. And although the heads of the GUGSH, as before, changed too often - 5 people in 6 years: F. F. Palitsyn (1906–1908), V. A. Sukhomlinov (1908–1909), E. A. Gerngros (1910), Ya. G. Zhilinsky (1911–1914), N. N. Yakushkevich (since 1914), however, the staffing of departments and office work practically remained the same until the beginning of the First World War. So, in October 1910, Colonel Monkevits was appointed assistant to the 1st Chief Quartermaster of the Main Directorate of General Staff, and his task was to manage the Special Records Management and military statistical productions of the 1st Chief Quartermaster, that is, the mining and processing intelligence agencies for Western countries . As for the leaders of the Special Office, they were Colonel O. K. Enkel (in 1913–1914) and Colonel N. K. Rasha (in 1914–1916).

Talking about the specific operations of the Russian military intelligence before the First World War, one cannot avoid the story associated with the name of the colonel of the Austro-Hungarian army Alfred Redl. And since those events remain largely unclear to this day, it is worth dwelling on them in more detail.

On May 26, 1913, all newspapers published in the Austro-Hungarian Empire placed on their pages a message from the Vienna Telegraph Agency announcing the unexpected suicide of Colonel Alfred Redl, Chief of Staff of the 8th Corps of the Austro-Hungarian Army. "A highly talented officer," the report said, "who had a brilliant career ahead of him, while in Vienna on duty, committed suicide in a fit of insanity." Further, it was reported about the upcoming solemn funeral of Redl, fallen victim nervous exhaustion caused by prolonged insomnia. But the very next day, an article appeared in the Prague newspaper Prague Tageblatt with the following content:

“A high-ranking official is asking us to refute the rumors, circulated mainly in military circles, about the chief of staff of the Prague Corps, Colonel Redl, who, as already reported, committed suicide in Vienna on Sunday morning. According to these rumors, the colonel is allegedly accused of passing military secrets to one state, namely Russia. In fact, the commission of senior officers who came to Prague in order to search the house of the late colonel pursued a completely different goal.

Under the strictest censorship then in force in Austria-Hungary, this was the only way for the editor of the Prague Tageblatt to inform his readers that Colonel Redl had in fact shot himself after being exposed as a Russian agent. Before publication in a Prague newspaper, only 10 senior Austrian officers knew about the betrayal of Colonel Redl. Even Emperor Franz Joseph was not informed. But after May 27, this secret became known to the whole world.

Alfred Redl, undoubtedly one of the most capable scouts, was born in Lemberg (Lvov) in the family of an auditor of the garrison court. Choosing for yourself military career, at the age of 15 he entered the cadet corps, and then to the officer school, which he graduated brilliantly. Excellent knowledge of foreign languages attracted the attention of the personnel officers of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army to the young lieutenant, and Redl, instead of serving in the provincial units, was enrolled in the staff of this highest military body of the country. Once in such a prestigious place, Redl did everything possible to be noticed. And he succeeded in this, despite the caste prejudices that prevailed in the Austrian army, when only noblemen were preferred in promotion. In 1900, already in the rank of captain, he was sent to Russia to study the Russian language and get acquainted with the situation in this country, which was considered one of the likely opponents. For several months, Redl was an intern at a military school in Kazan, leading a carefree lifestyle in his spare time and attending numerous parties. It goes without saying that all this time he was being secretly monitored by Russian counterintelligence agents in order to study his strengths and weaknesses, hobbies and character traits. Later, the conclusions made formed the basis of the following characteristic of Redl, dated 1907:

“Alfred Redl, Major of the General Staff, 2nd Assistant Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff ... Medium height, grayish blond, with a grayish short mustache, somewhat prominent cheekbones, smiling insinuating eyes. The person is crafty, closed, concentrated, hard-working. Mindset is petty. The whole appearance is sweet. Speech is sweet, soft, obliging. The movements are calculated, slow. Likes to have fun."

Returning to Vienna, Redl was appointed Assistant Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff, General Baron Giesl von Gieslingen. Giesl appointed Redl as head of the intelligence section of the bureau ("Kundschaftsstelle", abbreviated "KS"), responsible for counterintelligence operations. In this post, Redl proved himself to be an excellent organizer, completely reorganizing the counterintelligence department and turning it into one of the strongest special services of the Austro-Hungarian army. First of all, this was due to the introduction of new technology and new methods of work. So, at his direction, the reception room for visitors was equipped with a newly invented phonograph, which made it possible to record on a gramophone record located in the next room, every word of a person invited for a conversation. In addition, two hidden cameras were installed in the room, with the help of which the visitor was secretly photographed. Sometimes during a conversation with a visitor, the phone suddenly rang. But it was a false call - the fact is that the duty officer himself "called" himself to the phone, pressing the electric bell button located under the table with his foot. “Speaking” on the phone, the officer gestured to the guest at the cigarette case lying on the table, inviting him to take a cigarette. The lid of the cigarette case was treated with a special composition, with the help of which the smoker's fingerprints were preserved. If the guest did not smoke, the officer called himself out of the room by telephone, taking the briefcase from the table with him. Beneath it was a folder marked "Confidential, not to be made public." And few of the visitors could deny themselves the pleasure of looking into a folder with such an inscription. Needless to say, the folder has also been suitably processed to preserve fingerprints. If this trick also failed, then another method was used, and so on until success was achieved.

Redl, in addition, owned the development of a new method of conducting interrogation, which made it possible to achieve the desired result without the use of additional "efforts". Among other things, at his direction, counterintelligence began to keep a dossier on every inhabitant of Vienna, who at least once visited the then main centers of espionage, such as Zurich, Stockholm, Brussels. But the main merit of Redl was that he mined unique secret documents Russian army. These successes were so impressive that his superior, General Giesl von Gieslingen, appointed commander of the 8th Prague Corps, took Redl, by then a colonel, with him as chief of staff. Thus, Redl's career went up steeply, and many began to say that he could take the post of chief of the general staff in the future.

Departing for a new duty station, Redl left his successor, Captain Maximilian Ronge, a handwritten document in a single copy called "Advice on the Disclosure of Espionage." It was a small 40-page bound book where Redl summed up his work as head of the KS department and gave some practical advice. Captain Ronge and the new head of the intelligence bureau of the Austrian General Staff, August Urbansky von Ostromitz, took full advantage of Redl's advice. At the suggestion of Ronge, in 1908, the so-called black cabinet was created, perusal was carried out here postal items. At the same time, special attention was paid to letters coming from the border regions of Holland, France, Belgium and Russia, as well as those sent by Poste restante. Only three people knew that the real purpose of the perusal was counterintelligence - Ronge, Urbansky and the head of the "black office". Everyone else was told that such strict censorship was introduced to combat smuggling. The department of the main Vienna post office, where letters of demand were issued, was connected by an electric bell to the police station, located in an adjacent building. And when a suspicious person came for a letter, the postal clerk pressed the bell button and after a couple of minutes two surveillance officers appeared.

It was the work of the “black cabinet” that laid the foundation for the spy story that is associated with the name of Colonel Redl. The first to speak in more or less detail about the "Redl case" was Colonel Walter Nicolai, who on the eve of the First World War held the post of head of the intelligence department of the German General Staff. Although indirect, but a participant in the events then taking place in Vienna, he describes them in his book “Secret Forces”, published in Leipzig in 1923. Ronge clarifies his version in the book “War and the espionage industry” (in Russian translation - “Intelligence and counterintelligence”, M. 1937) and Urbansky in the article “The Failure of Redl”. And although all three stories do not coincide in small details, they can be used to reconstruct the course of events.

At the beginning of March 1913, a letter was returned to Berlin, addressed on demand to Vienna to Mr. Nikon Nicetas. In Berlin, it was opened by the German "black cabinet". The letter contained 6,000 crowns and a note informing about the deportation of money and giving the address of a certain Mr. Largier in Geneva, who should have been written in the future, and another address in Paris. The fact that a letter with such a large amount was not declared valuable aroused certain suspicions, which were strengthened by the fact that it was sent from the German town of Eidkunen, bordering Russia, and the stamp was pasted on it in an unusual way. After reviewing the contents of the letter, Colonel Nicolai decided to forward it to his Austrian colleague Urbansky, rightly believing that it was connected with espionage activities on the territory of Austria-Hungary. Having received a message from Nikolai, Urbansky gave the order to return the letter to the Vienna post office and establish the identity of the addressee - Mr. Nicetas. But time passed, and the mysterious Mr. Nicetas did not come for the letter. Moreover, soon two more letters came to his name, one of them contained 7 thousand crowns and a note with the following content:

“Dear Mr. Nicetas. Of course, you have already received my letter of S/May, in which I apologize for the delay in the deportation. Unfortunately, I could not send you money earlier. Now I have the honor, dear Mr. Nicetas, to send you 7,000 crowns, which I will venture to send in this simple letter. As for your proposals, they are all acceptable. Respectfully yours, I. Dietrich.

P.S. Once again I ask you to write to the following address: Christiania (Norway), Rosenborggate, No. 1, Else Kjernli.

Meanwhile, Austrian intelligence was checking the addresses contained in the first letter. At the same time, it was decided not to check the Paris address, so that, according to Ronge, "not to fall into the clutches of the French counterintelligence." As for the Swiss address, it turned out that Largier was a retired French captain who had retired from 1904-1905. for Austrian intelligence. As a result, the Austrian counterintelligence suspected that Largier was "working" for different masters. Therefore, compromising materials were collected on him, which were anonymously handed over to the Swiss authorities, after which Largier was expelled from the country.

The denouement of this protracted case came on Saturday, May 24, in the evening. The counterintelligence officers, who were on duty at the police station near the post office, received the long-awaited signal, which meant that Mr. Nicetas had come for letters. Despite the fact that two surveillance officers arrived at the post office three minutes later, the recipient of the letter had already left. Running out into the street, they saw a receding taxi. There was no other taxi or cab nearby, and it seemed that Mr. Nicetas had managed to escape from surveillance. But this time, the counterintelligence officers were lucky - the taxi, in which the recipient of the letter left, returned to the parking lot near the post office. The driver said that his client, a well-dressed and fashionably dressed gentleman, drove to the Kaiserhof cafe, where he got off. The counterintelligence officers headed there, and on the way they carefully examined the interior of the car. They found a suede pocketknife case left behind by the last passenger.

The Kaiserhof cafe did not have a mysterious passenger, but after interviewing taxi drivers in the parking lot near the cafe, it was established that a tall and well-dressed gentleman had recently hired a taxi and went to the Klomzer Hotel. At the hotel, the detectives learned that four visitors returned to the hotel within an hour, including Colonel Redl from Prague, who lives in suite No. 1. Then they handed the receptionist a knife case and asked him to ask their guests if they had lost it ? After some time, the porter asked this to Colonel Redl, who was leaving the hotel. "Oh, yes," Redl replied, "this is my case, thank you." But a minute later he remembered that he had dropped it in a taxi when he opened the envelopes. His suspicions were heightened after he noticed that he was being followed. Trying to tear himself away, he took some papers out of his pocket and, tearing them finely, threw them out into the street. But that didn't help either. Despite the late evening, one of the detectives managed to collect the scraps and hand them over to Ronge with the message that Colonel Alfred Redl turned out to be the mysterious Mr. Nicetas.

Comparison of handwriting on torn pieces of paper, which turned out to be receipts for sending money and receipts for sending registered foreign letters to Brussels, Lausanne and Warsaw at addresses known to counterintelligence as the headquarters of foreign intelligence services, with handwriting on a form that must be filled out at the post office upon receipt of registered correspondence, and Redl's handwriting of the document "Counsels for the Disclosure of Espionage" established that they were all written by the same person. Thus Ronge learned to his horror that his predecessor, Colonel Redl, had turned out to be a spy.

Ronge immediately informed his chief Urbansky about his discovery, who, in turn, informed the Chief of the General Staff, General Konrad von Getzendorf, about this. On his instructions, a group of four officers headed by Ronge went to the Klomzer Hotel with a proposal to Redl to shoot himself in order to wash off the shameful stain on his uniform. At midnight they went up to Redl's room. He was already waiting for them, finishing something to write.

I know why you came, he said. - I ruined my life. I am writing farewell letters.

Those who came asked if he had accomplices.

I didn't have them.

We need to know the scope and duration of your activities.

You will find all the evidence you need in my house in Prague,” Redl replied and asked for a revolver.

But none of the officers were carrying weapons. Then one of them went out for half an hour, after which he returned and placed a Browning in front of Redl. Then, after some hesitation, the officers left the room. After spending the whole night in a cafe opposite, they returned to the hotel at about five o'clock in the morning and asked the porter to call Redl to the phone. Literally a minute later the porter returned and said: "Gentlemen, Colonel Redl is dead." When examining the room, two letters were found on the table: one addressed to Brother Redl, and the second to Baron Giesl von Gieslengen, Redl's chief in Prague. There was also a posthumous note:

Frivolity and passions have ruined me. Pray for me. I pay for my sins with my life. Alfred.

1:15 am Now I'm going to die. Please don't autopsy my body. Pray for me."

After the Chief of the General Staff was informed about the suicide of Colonel Redl, he ordered that a commission be sent to Prague to inspect his apartment and establish the extent of the damage caused to him. The survey results were stunning. A large number of documents were found confirming that Redl worked for Russian intelligence for many years (as it was later stated - since 1902). Redl's services were very well paid. His apartment turned out to be luxuriously furnished, 195 overshirts, 10 military overcoats with fur, 400 kid gloves, 10 pairs of patent leather boots, and 160 dozen bottles of champagne of the highest brands were found in it. In addition, it has been established that in 1910 he bought an expensive estate, and in the last five years he has acquired at least four cars and three first-class trotters.

As already mentioned, the true reasons for the suicide of Colonel Redl were decided to be kept secret. But, according to Ronge, there was an unforeseen leak of information. The fact is that to open the safe and locks of cabinets located in Redl's apartment, they invited the best locksmith in Prague, a certain Wagner. He was not only present during the search, but also saw a large number of papers, some of which were in Russian. But unfortunately for the Austrian counterintelligence, Wagner turned out to be the leading player of the Prague football team Storm 1, and because of the search in Redl's apartment, he had to miss the match, which his team lost. When the next day the team captain, who is also the editor of the Prague Tageblatt newspaper, became interested in the reasons for Wagner's absence from the game, he replied that he could not come due to extraordinary circumstances. At the same time, he spoke in detail about everything he saw at Redl’s apartment, mentioning that the officers who conducted the search were very embarrassed and constantly exclaimed: “Who would have thought!”, “Is it really possible!”. The editor, having compared the message of the Vienna Telegraph Agency about Redl's suicide and the facts communicated to him by Wagner, realized that he had discovered a sensational secret. And, using Aesopian language, the next day he placed a refutation note in the newspaper, from which it followed that Redl was a Russian spy.

This is the generally accepted version of the “Redl case”, as presented by the main participants in the events. But on closer examination, it does not look convincing at all. First of all, this concerns evidence of Redl's espionage activities found in his Prague apartment. Describing the results of the search, Ronge reports that Urbansky found "extensive material" in Redl's apartment that occupied an entire room. Urbansky himself writes that Redl retained numerous unsuccessful photographs from secret documents, testifying to his inexperience in photography. In addition, both report that the things of the late Redl were sold at auction and a certain student of a real school bought a camera, where there was an undeveloped photographic film on which secret documents were filmed. And it's all.

If we take what was said on faith, then it seems that the search was carried out by amateurs who do not understand anything about the business assigned to them. Otherwise, the film incident cannot be explained. Moreover, no one has ever named a single specific document found in Redl's apartment, which is also rather strange.

It is also strange that neither Urbansky nor Ronge provide a photocopy of a letter that came to the Vienna post office addressed to Nicetas, with the Swiss address of the French captain Largier, who was actually arrested in Geneva on suspicion of espionage. Therefore, a legitimate suspicion creeps in - did this letter even exist? And if it did exist, it is not clear why the professional counterintelligence officer Redl delayed the receipt of the reward for so long, thereby increasing the risk of being exposed.

No less strange is the fact that Redl kept receipts for sending registered letters abroad and, which is completely incomprehensible, why he took them with him to Vienna. And the fact that he threw them out on the street when they were watching him, and did not destroy them elsewhere, does not fit into the head at all. Even more surprising is the dexterity of the surveillance staff, who managed to collect torn and deliberately scattered pieces of paper in the evening in complete darkness.

But what is most striking is the description of Redl's interrogation at the Klomzer Hotel. The speed and superficiality of the interrogation is astonishing. It is completely incomprehensible why such a professional as Ronge was satisfied with nothing meaningful words Redl that he worked alone, and did not try to establish important details: who recruited, when, how reports were transmitted, etc. Also unclear are the reasons why Redl was offered to commit suicide immediately. True, later, apparently realizing that the evidence of Redl's guilt was clearly not enough, Ronge told about the voluntary confession of the spy. “Redl was completely broken, but agreed to give his testimony to me alone,” writes Ronge. - He said that during 1910-1911. widely served some foreign countries. Recently, he had to limit himself to only the material available to the Prague corps command ... The most serious crime was the issuance of a plan for our deployment against Russia in the form in which it existed in the years mentioned and which, in general terms, remained in force ... ". And Urbansky, trying to explain the reasons that pushed Redl to betrayal, focuses on his homosexual inclinations. They, having become known to foreign intelligence, allowed her to recruit the colonel under the threat of exposure.

Another oddity is connected with the locksmith Wagner, who turned out to be closely acquainted with the editor of the Prague Tageblatt newspaper. Didn't the Prague branch of counterintelligence have an absolutely reliable locksmith who knows how to keep his mouth shut? And even if this was the case, nothing prevented us from doing with Wagner the way the chief of police in Vienna Geier did with Redl's lackey I. Sladek. When the latter drew the attention of the chief of police to the fact that the Browning, from which Redl shot himself, did not belong to his owner, and four officers came to the room at night, Guyer had such an impressive conversation with him that the next day the reporters could not get a word out of Sladek .

From the foregoing, we can conclude that in the case of Colonel Redl there is no serious evidence proving his treason. And the question immediately arises: was Redl an agent of Russian intelligence? In order to try to answer it, one should familiarize oneself with the organization of Russian military intelligence and its employees who worked against Austria-Hungary before the First World War.

Intelligence against Austria-Hungary was carried out both by the GUGSH and by the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the Warsaw and Kyiv military districts. And the military agent in Vienna until 1903 was Colonel Vladimir Khristoforovich Roop. It was he who recruited a certain officer holding a responsible position in the Austrian General Staff, who later supplied valuable information to Russian intelligence.

In 1903, having been recalled from Vienna and appointed regimental commander of the Kiev military district, Roop transferred all his Viennese connections to Captain Alexander Alekseevich Samoilo, who at that time was the senior adjutant of the headquarters of the Kiev military district and was responsible for collecting intelligence data about the Austro-Hungarian army. Using Roop's information, Samoilo traveled illegally to Vienna and, through an intermediary, established contact with his source in the General Staff. He agreed to continue cooperation with Russian intelligence for a substantial reward, and for several years the headquarters of the Kyiv district received important information from his unknown agent. Here, for example, is an excerpt from the report of the quartermaster general of the district to the GUGSH, dated November 1908:

"Behind Last year the following documents and information were acquired from the Vienna agent mentioned above: new data on the mobilization of Austrian fortified points, some detailed information on the organization of the armed forces of Austria-Hungary, information on P. Grigoriev, seconded to the headquarters of the Warsaw Military District, who offered his services to Vienna and Berlin as a spy, the full schedule of the Austrian army in case of war with Russia ... ".

In 1911, Samoilo was transferred to the Special Office of the GUGSH, and a valuable Austrian agent was also transferred there. In the "Note on the activities of the headquarters of the Warsaw and Kiev military districts and secret agents in Austria-Hungary in collecting intelligence information in 1913", compiled by Samoilo, this agent is listed under the heading "Unspoken agents" under No. 25. Secret documents are also listed there, received from this agent in 1913:

““Krieg ordre Bataille” (combat deployment plan in case of war) by March 1, 1913 with a special “Ordre de Bataille” (combat deployment plan) for the war with the Balkans, mobilization of fortified points, instruction on stage service, regulation on protection railways during mobilization, new wartime states…”. In the same “Note”, Samoilo, summing up the activities of agent No. 25, writes: “The Redl case indicates that this agent was Redl, but this is denied by General Roop, by whom the agent was originally recruited.”

From this it follows that in Vienna he was accused of espionage and committed suicide by a stranger to Russian intelligence. This is confirmed by the fact that just before the war in 1914, Samoilo again went on a date with agent No. 25 to Bern and received from him information of interest to Russian intelligence, although he did not find out the name of his informant. Therefore, it can be argued that Redl was not a Russian agent, since information from a source in Vienna continued to flow even after the colonel's suicide.

Accordingly, the question arises: why was Redl accused of betrayal? The following explanation can be offered for this. At the beginning of 1913, the Austrian counterintelligence received information about the presence in the General Staff of a secret agent who was passing secret materials to the Russians. However, the search for a spy did not yield results, which threatened with great trouble for the leadership of the special services of the Austrian army. In the end, Urbansky and Ronge decided to make Redl a "scapegoat", especially since the counterintelligence leadership was aware of his homosexual inclinations. This circumstance made him vulnerable to blackmail and could serve as an explanation for the reasons for the "betrayal". Counterintelligence quickly organized "evidence" and thus forced Redl to commit suicide. (It is also possible that he was simply killed in general.) This was a necessary condition for the "exposing" of the spy, since there could be no question of any trial or investigation. After Redl's death, information about his "espionage activities" was quickly and accurately slipped to journalists through the football locksmith Wagner. In the future, the myth of Redl's betrayal was diligently kept afloat by the efforts of Urbansky and Ronge, who were not at all interested in making the truth about this case known.

But, as you know, ostentatious processes are never useful. This happened in the case of Redl. By killing him, the Austrian counterintelligence did not deprive Russia of a true source of information, thereby losing the secret war.

The First World War, which began in August 1914, became a serious test for Russian military intelligence. Its main task was to reveal the enemy's military plans, to identify the groupings of his troops and the directions of the main attack. So, about the actions of intelligence during the offensive of the Russian troops in East Prussia in August 1914 can be judged by the following report of the Quartermaster General of the 1st Army:

“By the beginning of the reporting year, the area was serviced by a network of 15 secret agents, of which three were in Koenigsberg, the rest in Tilsit, Gumbinen, Eidkunen, Insterburg, Danzig, Stettin, Allenstein, Goldap, and Kibarty. It was planned to plant three more agents in Schneidemuhl, Deutsch-Eylau and Thorn. To maintain the network and strengthen it, the GUGSH approved leave for the cost of 30,000 rubles a year.

During the reporting year, the agent network underwent major changes, main reason which is a change in dislocation. Currently, 53 agents are in the service, 41 of them are on the ground, the rest are sent out with new tasks.

And the senior adjutant of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 2nd Army, Colonel of the General Staff Lebedev, in a report dated August 22, 1914, indicated that since the beginning of the war, 60 agents had been sent behind enemy lines to perform various tasks.

However, during the offensive of the 1st and 2nd armies, intelligence reports were not taken into account. Moreover, at the headquarters Northwestern Front intelligence about the possibility of a flank attack by three German corps was considered the product of an overdeveloped imagination of intelligence officers. As a result, the forward units of General Samsonov's 2nd Army were surrounded and destroyed on August 28–30.

In 1915, when between the Russians and German troops a solid front line was established, the possibilities of undercover intelligence were reduced. And the lack of centralized management of intelligence operations made it even more difficult to obtain objective and accurate information. In this regard, in April 1915, the Quartermaster General of the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General M.S. Pustovoitenko, sent the following telegram to the Quartermaster General of the fronts and armies:

“From the very beginning, the headquarters of the armies and fronts conduct covert reconnaissance abroad completely independently, sending their agents to different cities of neutral countries, without notifying either the higher headquarters or each other mutually. As a result, a large number of agents were concentrated in Bucharest, Stockholm and Copenhagen, working independently and without any connection. These agents try to discredit each other in the eyes of the respective authorities, sometimes being in the service of several headquarters at once, which often leads to undesirable consequences. In view of the foregoing, I appeal to Your Excellency with a request: would you consider it possible and useful to inform me completely confidentially about all the covert agents of the front (army) headquarters who have been abroad, both since the beginning of the war, and who are newly sent.

However, as a rule, the quartermaster generals of the fronts and armies refused to transfer their agents to the GUGSH, and it was not possible to establish a unified leadership of undercover intelligence until the end of the war. Nevertheless, Russian military intelligence continued to work actively, sometimes achieving significant success.

Colonel Count Pavel Alekseevich Ignatiev (1878-1931), brother of the famous Alexei Ignatiev, military attache in Paris, author of the memoirs "50 years in the ranks", successfully operated in Paris. Pavel Ignatiev graduated from the Kiev Lyceum and St. Petersburg University, served in the Life Guards Hussar Regiment, then graduated from the Academy of the General Staff, from the beginning of the war with Germany at the head of a squadron of the Guards Hussars fought in East Prussia, from December 1915 he served in Paris in the Russian Military Bureau (office of the military attaché) under the name of Captain Istomin. The Russian section of the ISB was headed by P. A. Ignatiev from January 1917 to January 1918, when it was liquidated by the French military authorities. He was engaged in the creation of an undercover apparatus, despite the lack of support in the General Staff. He also provided assistance to the soldiers of the Russian expeditionary corps in France after its dissolution in 1918. P. A. Ignatiev died in Paris in exile. In 1933, his memoirs were published in Paris, the Russian translation of which was republished in 1999 in Moscow under the title My Mission in Paris.

Many military agents in neutral countries performed their duties until the spring of 1918 - until the funds for the maintenance of employees were exhausted from most Russian diplomatic missions.

Subsequently, N. F. Ryabikov gave the following assessment of the Russian military intelligence of this period: “It must be admitted that the establishment of intelligence in Russia did not have a sufficiently state character, there was not felt in this branch of service a sufficient definite ideological leadership of the government, and there was only a modest departmental work, quite often pursuing its own narrow goals and objectives, sometimes opposite in different departments.

In October 1917, the question arose before Russian intelligence officers: with whom to go further? Each of them made their choice. And for the Russian military intelligence began new period, which lasted more than 70 years and brought her both the glory of victories and the bitterness of defeats.

The history of the tsarist special services is full of heroic moments. From scratch, Nicholas II managed to create a full-fledged structure for collecting secret information, identifying foreign agents and recruiting his own.

Tsarist intelligence

The secret services of the empire managed to recruit even influential Western politicians and officers.

For example, in 1903, Russian intelligence managed to recruit the head of the military counterintelligence of Austria-Hungary Alfred Redl.

For ten years, he betrayed the Russian command of Austrian agents in St. Petersburg, and also handed over the plan for the Austrian invasion of Serbia. These actions allowed the Serbs to successfully resist the Austrians at the initial stage of the World War (up to half a million killed on the Austrian side)

There were legends about Redl that there were no secrets in Europe that were not available to the intelligence service led by him. In reality, Russian intelligence owned these secrets, for Redl served Russia.

Redl was recruited by a Russian officer, later Major General of the General Staff, Nikolai Batyushin.

Photo from the ceremony of reburial of the great Russian intelligence officer Nikolai Batyushin

As FSB Major General A. A. Zdanovich noted, the name and deeds of a talented professional and a wonderful person named Batyushin certainly deserve to be widely known in modern Russia.

Imperial intelligence services have developed a powerful intelligence network in Europe. Among the agents was the future dictator of Italy Mussolini.

counterintelligence

Since 1911, a separate department of Counterintelligence was created. A real hunt begins for other people's spies and agents.

The first professional spy hunters

On June 8, 1911, the "Regulations on counterintelligence departments" were approved in the Russian Empire.

From that day on, a new professional structure was thrown into the fight against spies.

§ 22. Counterintelligence officer job description:

The duties of the counterintelligence departments, in addition to combating military espionage, are to investigate and combat the activities of foreign states in Russia aimed at:

1) To the creation of internal complications in the empire, capable of disrupting the successful course of mobilization, the concentration of our troops for war with the mentioned states.

2) To increase the armed forces of the latter at the expense of the foreign population of the empire.

The event categories mentioned above include:

a) Preparations in Russia for an armed uprising.

b) Preparation of the formation at the expense of the border alien population of the empire, armed detachments military organization(training of personnel, arrangement of secret stores of weapons, subversive means, etc.).

c) Preparation for damage to artificial structures (railway bridges, tunnels, station and port structures, stations, wireless telegraph, as well as all buoys, lighthouses and other signals and signs enclosing the safety of navigation, etc.) in border areas.

d) Collection among the foreign and unreliable population of the empire of funds for military needs.

For the recruitment of agents at a time, funds were allocated in the amount of 246,000 rubles, that is, 263.5 million rubles. in a modern equivalent.

The justification was the report of General Batyushin:
“Restaurants, coffee houses, gambling houses, cafeterias, cinemas, etc. are favorite places where a person tries to forget from the hard everyday life or the barracks situation at home, hoping sometimes in one day to improve his financial situation by participating in gambling. Here, under the influence of captivating temptations in the form of wine, women, etc., a person often becomes a slave to the passion lurking in him, goes beyond the limits of his budget. Help at this time in the form of a monetary subsidy or other kind of assistance may supposedly be accidentally provided by a secret recruiter of spies and thereby connect him with himself. On the other hand, watching people who go out of their budget and go on a rampage can lead an experienced person to a number of conclusions that may be of interest to the counterintelligence officer. In view of this, all these establishments must be under the supervision of agents of counterintelligence, whether they be their own owners, bartenders, lackeys, artists, and especially actresses, or simply ladies of the demi-monde who frequent them. These people, for a relatively small remuneration, can provide valuable information for the counterintelligence officer about the visitors of these establishments.

Special Section

In addition to counterintelligence, another tsarist special service, the Special Section of the Police Department, was engaged in the development of spies.

“Special Department “A” dealt with issues of political search, the issues of monitoring the activities of political parties, managing the activities of local search bodies, developing intelligence information and surveillance data, issuing search circulars, forming a library of revolutionary publications, correspondence on it, questions organizing foreign agents, monitoring revolutionary propaganda among the troops, managing the photography department, deciphering cryptograms, compiling "most subject" notes. The special department "B" dealt with the issues of monitoring the social movement, trade unions, which had and did not have political overtones, revolutionary uprisings among workers, peasants, speeches by railway employees, telegraph operators, preparing reports on strikes, strikes, illegal congresses, deployment of troops "

Okhrana

And of course, the famous Security Department calculated foreign agents and spies.

It also recruited its own agents, who by 1917 numbered more than 10,000.

Worthy of mention are the reports of the Department to the Tsar, prepared in a single copy. The secret police presented them twice a month to the Emperor, who read and made notes with his own hand. The Minister of the Interior specifically drew the attention of the Police Department to the places marked by the Tsar, and ordered that the most thorough investigation of these cases be carried out. As a result, the Guard always knew exactly which investigations particularly attracted the attention of the Emperor.

The imperial intelligence services, in addition to resounding successes in the field of intelligence and recruitment of Western political and military leaders, also achieved success within the country.

The revolution from below was stopped. The numbers speak for it.

According to official statistics, from January 1908 to mid-May 1910, there were 19,957 terrorist acts and expropriations.

Attention: This is 300 crimes per day!

By 1911, the terrorist wave was stopped.

Secret circles of revolutionaries were also neutralized, and those that remained consisted of more than 80% of Okhrana agents.

We know Lenin's public statement in January 1917 in Switzerland that he did not expect to live to see the revolution.

The revolution from below was decisively stopped. As you know, the empire was ruined by the betrayal of the generals, who conspired with the liberal forces.

The Bolsheviks and the proletarian revolution from below - that's later. Tsarist Russia did not even leave the Bolsheviks a chance, which was clearly recognized by Lenin.

After the tsar was betrayed and overthrown, and the liberals managed to release all the scum from prisons, the work of the secret services was buried. The Reds have risen from oblivion.