Thrice exposed plan "Gelb". At the origins of the German airborne troops

PLAN "GElb"

The plan of operation "West" provided for the use of three army groups "A", "B", "C". Part of Group B was tasked with the occupation of Holland - the Germans hoped to use this country as a base for attacks on Belgium and France and thus lure most of the allied forces to the north, where they would have to fight on the terms dictated by the German side. These occupying forces included the Leibstandarte and a division of the SS Special Forces. The other part of Army Group B, together with Army Group A, was to pass through Southern Belgium and Luxembourg and invade France. The reserve of Army Group "A" included the "Dead Head" division. The police division was assigned to Army Group C, located along the French Maginot Line, and did not take an active part in the fighting for the first 45 days of the campaign. As soon as Holland and Belgium were under the German boot, Army Groups A and B, united, launched an offensive deep into France.

The first of the SS units of gunpowder had a chance to sniff the soldiers of the Leibstandarte. On May 9, 1940, at 5.30 am, they crossed the Dutch border and, moving at a staggering speed, by noon they had already deepened 70 km into Dutch territory, capturing the bridges over the Issel. Two bridges were blown up by the Dutch army, which, however, did not prevent the Life Standard from crossing to the other side and capturing Hoven. For participation in this campaign, Obersturmführer Hugo Krass became the first SS officer to be awarded the Iron Cross, first degree. After that, the Leibstandarte was transferred to the south, where the unit joined up with the 9th Panzer Division, as well as the Special Forces Division of the SS, in order to continue the attack on Rotterdam.

On May 10, 1940, the Fuhrer Regiment crossed the Issel at Arnhem, and the next morning the 9th Panzer Division and the Special Forces Division of the SS crossed the Maass with little to no resistance. The French immediately transferred a significant part of their forces to the north in the hope of blocking the path of the aggressor - it was assumed that the French units would approach Breda - and clear the bridges of the Germans. Unfortunately, the 9th Panzer Division and the SS Special Forces Division cut their way. However, the French column ran straight into German tanks and SS motorized formations, while the other was attacked from the air - German Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers rained down on it. The French were forced to retreat in disorder back to Breda.

On May 12, Luftwaffe units were ordered to bomb Rotterdam in order to hasten the surrender of Holland. In this case, the German units could be thrown in full strength to conquer France. But due to communication problems, Luftwaffe planes bombarded the city, unaware that a surrender agreement had already been reached. Immediately after the air raid, parts of the Life Standard entered Rotterdam, again as auxiliary forces of the 9th Panzer Division. On the streets in the city, in some places, one could see Dutch soldiers loitering around waiting for the outcome of the negotiations that were being conducted at that moment by the Dutch command and generals Student and von Holitz. Unaware of the negotiations, the Leibstandarte, seeing representatives of the enemy army, immediately opened fire. A stray bullet hit General Student in the head, seriously wounding him. Leibstandarte units passed Rotterdam at full speed and rushed to Delft, they not only managed to break any resistance in their path, but also captured about 4 thousand people. The next day the regiment reached The Hague just at the moment when Holland agreed to an unconditional surrender. Meanwhile, SS-Gruppenführer Paul Hausser led a special SS division and some army formations against the remnants of the French forces at Zeeland. He very quickly made his way to the coast, and the French were forced to urgently evacuate their troops by sea.

In a short time they completely occupied the territory of Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and Northern France.


1. Definition of strategic goals

W. Brauchitsch, A. Hitler and F. Halder

The beginning of the development of a plan for an offensive against France was laid on September 27 of the year. At a meeting of the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the armed forces and their chiefs of staff, Hitler ordered the immediate preparation of an offensive in the west: "The purpose of the war is to bring England to its knees, to defeat France.

The commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Walther von Brauchitsch, and the chief of the general staff, Franz Halder, spoke out against. They even prepared a plan to remove Hitler from power, but, having not received the support of the commander of the reserve army, General Friedrich Fromm, they left him.

The main attack was to be made by Army Group B on both sides of Liège, with the aim of defeating the Anglo-French forces in Belgium, along with the Belgian and Dutch armies. Further south will be Army Group A. The 12th Army will cover the southern flank of Army Group B, the 16th Army will attack in the direction of southern Belgium and Luxembourg. After marching through Luxembourg, the 16th Army is to take up defensive positions north of the western flank of the Maginot Line between the Saar and the Meuse. Army Group C to operate against the Maginot Line. Depending on the political climate, Army Group "N" was intended to defeat Holland. The directive ended with an order to Army Groups "A" and "B" to concentrate their troops in such a way that they could take their starting positions for the offensive in six night marches.


3. Remarks of the OKW


5. Criticism of the OKH Plan

Adolf Hitler called the plan prepared by the OKH the height of mediocrity. At one of the meetings to discuss the operational plan, Hitler, referring to Keitel and Jodl, remarked:

"Yes, this is the old Schlieffen plan with a reinforced right flank and the main direction of attack along the Atlantic coast. Such numbers do not work twice!"

The repetition of the Schlieffenian plan of the beginning of the century, the attack on France with a crescent-shaped movement through Belgium, did not suit him. In the year it was obvious than in that if they take place fighting between Germany and the Allies, it was precisely in Belgium, since the Maginot Line along the Franco-German border reliably protected France. Compared to the Maginot Line, the Belgian fortifications were very weak. It is obvious that the French also understood this and expected such a development of events. However, although Hitler had a different point of view, he sought to start the offensive as soon as possible:

"Time works for the enemy ... Our Achilles' heel is the Ruhr ... If England and France break through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we will be in great danger."

Manstein first discussed his plan with the commander of the 19th Army Corps, Heinz Guderian, and then convinced General Rundstedt that he was right. After that, Rundstedt and Manstein sent a memorandum to the headquarters of the Brauchitsch and Halder ground forces. The note contained the following proposals:

The headquarters of the ground forces did not agree with Manstein's proposals, but Franz Halder nevertheless reported to Hitler on the variant of the plan, noting that an offensive in this direction was impossible, since the forest and mountainous terrain would interfere with the advance of technology.


7. Addition to the OKH plan

Critical comments on the OKH plan forced some adjustments. So the OKH directive of October 29 provided for the temporary abandonment of the offensive against Holland in order to free up forces to build up the strike in the main direction. But on November 15, the OKW revised this decision and issued a directive for the capture of Holland. On the same day, by order of Brauchitsch, the task was assigned to Army Group "B".


8. "Mechelen Incident"

The growing strength of Western armies, doubts as to whether the operational plan of October 29 would achieve anything but a more or less major initial success, and the loss of secret documents led in the following months to a revision of the plan jointly by all higher command and staffs. army groups.


9. "Long start"

Since the main content of the operational plan became the property of the Allies, the stake on the surprise of a military operation lost its appeal. According to OKH directives of October 19 and 29, German troops were to take up their starting positions for the offensive six night marches from the moment they received the order. Prior to this, the nature of their location did not allow the enemy to guess the direction of the main attack. On January 16, after the "Mechelen incident", a decision was made at Hitler's headquarters build an operation on a new basis".


11. Military staff games

Later in his memoirs Erich Manstein write:

It happened to me that General Halder, who was present at the maneuvers, had come to understand the correctness of our [army group "A"] thought.


12. Manstein Plan

Manstein plan

The results of the staff games led to guesses about the Manstein plan. On the 17th of the fierce fate the zustrich of Erich Manstein and Adolf Hitler was born. So, just look at the operation they carried out, they had a lot of things to do, Hitler already the next day punished the headquarters of the ground troops to develop a new plan.

Manstein's plan, based on Hitler's powerful ideas, was simple, but I declared I could win. Army Group "B" under the command of von Bock was small in order to quickly occupy Holland, cross the border between the Dutch and the allies, throw the enemy onto the Antwerp-Namur line, and also break through Belgium to Pivnichnu France, imitating the enemy the hitness of Schlieffen's ideas. for the French part of the night, then the wines will inevitably threaten Paris. Like the French and the English stand on this path and turn to look at the lane, the stench leans on the pasture. On the left flank, Army Group C (General Wilhelm Ruth ter von Leeb defend the Maginot Line, and, if possible, zahopit її. Virishal blow was transferred to the zone of the dії group of armies "A", as a result of the new plan, the 4th army was added and the 44th division was small in its warehouse. ", with a tank group Kleist in the forefront, break through the Ardenni, grab the crossings across the Somme and Dinan, pass between Sedan and Dinan, and then turn to the pivnіchny stop along the Somme river valley to Am "єnu, Abvіlu and save the English Channel. Itself here will be the tasks of ten tank divisions of the Wehrmacht. Leeb will not have a single tank division on the pivdni, and von Bock will have only three.

This plan, on the 24th of fierce fate, became the residual version of the "Gelb" plan.


13. Criticism of the Manstein Plan

Not everyone in the German generals supported the Manstein plan. The commander of Army Group "B", Colonel-General von Bock, expressed serious doubts about the residual version of the "Gelb" plan. At the end of the day, on the additional Braukhich wine, stating:

“Your operational plan doesn’t give me peace of mind. You know that I’m for smart operations, but here I crossed the boundaries of the reasonable, otherwise you don’t call it. tse baiduzhe We have seen the main mass of tanks on the dekilkoh roads near the mountainous Ardennes, there is no enemy air force! Nana and їm will be necessary for the exit to the river on the Dinans - Namur less than one quarter of that hour, which is necessary for us. You will work, as if forcing the Meuse not to go in and you will militantly sit down between the cordon and the Maas near the Ardennes without roads? do not waste our services and not join Belgium?

Tank blitzkrieg Mikhail Baryatinsky

OPERATION GElb

OPERATION GElb

The guns in Poland had not yet fallen silent, and the German General Staff had already begun planning military operations in the West. The first version of the OKH operational directive was ready on October 14, 1939. For the offensive in the West, it was supposed to use 75 divisions. 16 divisions were left to defend the Siegfried Line and 13 divisions in the east. On October 19, Brauchitsch signed the directive of the main command of the ground forces, which received the code name "Gelb" ("Yellow").

According to this directive, the offensive on the northern flank was to be carried out by army unit N (3 infantry divisions), in the center - army group "B" (2nd, 6th and 4th field armies - 37 divisions, of which 8 were tank and 2 motorized) and on the left flank - Army Group "A" (12th and 16th field armies - 27 divisions, of which 1 tank and 2 motorized).

Echelon with tanks Pz.I and Pz.II before being sent to the west. Poland, November 1939.

This first version of the strategic plan continued the traditional ideas of the German General Staff, established long before the First World War: to advance on France through Belgium and Holland, attacking on the right flank. But in 1914, such a blow pursued far-reaching goals. In October 1939, the Belgian direction was chosen because, firstly, the German industrialists were afraid of the Ruhr and wanted to protect it from invasion and air raids; secondly, the German command sought to counter the expected Allied offensive in Belgium with its own counteroffensive; thirdly, to seize the Belgian coast and create the prerequisites for the further conduct of the war, the prospects and methods of which were not yet entirely clear.

The order to go on the offensive was given and the date of readiness was set - November 12, 1939. However, soon the date for the invasion of France was pushed back to the spring of 1940, mainly due to the unpreparedness of the German armed forces to the "big war" with France and England. The latter themselves gave Germany time to prepare, and the Germans did not waste it. The main attention was paid to aviation and tank troops.

This echelon with the motorized unit of the Wehrmacht is also heading to the west. Opel Blitz trucks on the platforms. 1940

After the Polish campaign, the Germans brought the number tank divisions up to ten, converting all four light divisions into armored divisions. The latter had a regular structure not with two, but with one tank regiment, however, of a three-battalion composition. However, it was not possible to fully equip them with the standard number of all types of tanks. However, the "old" five tank divisions did not differ much from the "new" ones in this regard. In a tank regiment, for example, it was supposed to have 54 Pz.III and Pz.Bf.Wg.III tanks. It is easy to calculate that in ten tank regiments of five divisions there should have been 540 Pz.III. However, this number of tanks was not just physically. Guderian complained about this: “The re-equipment of tank regiments with tanks of the Pz.III and Pz.IV types, which was especially important and necessary, progressed extremely slowly due to the weak production capacity of the industry, as well as as a result of the canning of new types of tanks by the high command of the ground forces.”

The first reason expressed by the general is indisputable, the second is highly doubtful. The presence of tanks in the troops was fully correlated with the number of vehicles produced by May 1940.

Be that as it may, the Germans had to concentrate scarce medium and heavy tanks in formations operating in the directions of the main attacks. So, in the 1st tank division of the Guderian corps, there were 68 tanks Pz.III and 40 Pz.IV. The 2nd Panzer Division had 58 Pz.III and 32 Pz.IV. Other divisions had fewer combat vehicles of these types.

To undermine the Maginot Line fortifications, a number of Pz.I tanks were converted into Ladungsleger I destroyer tanks.

By the beginning of active hostilities in the West, the Panzerwaffe had 3620 tanks, of which 2597 vehicles were in combat readiness. At the same time, most of the non-combat-ready tanks were light Pz.I - about 700 units. The share of medium and heavy tanks has increased significantly. The troops already had 381 medium tanks Pz.III and 290 heavy Pz.IV (until 1943, the Germans classified tanks according to the caliber of weapons, so the Pz.IV, armed with a 75-mm cannon, was considered heavy). True, only 349 and 278 vehicles of these two types were in immediate readiness for combat operations, respectively. As for the Pz.II light tanks, they still formed the basis of the Panzerwaffe fleet: there were 1,110 vehicles for the offensive on France, of which 955 were combat-ready. Significantly increased in the troops and the number of combat vehicles of Czech production. At the same time, the number of Pz.35 (t) tanks, already out of production, almost did not change and amounted to 138 linear and command vehicles (against 120 on the eve of the Polish campaign). But the number of much more effective Pz.38 (t) has increased. If in September 1939 the Wehrmacht had 78 combat vehicles of this type, then by May 1940 the 7th and 8th tank divisions already had 230 Pz.38 (t) line and command tanks.

By the invasion of France, the Wehrmacht was replenished with completely new types of combat vehicles. So, in 1940, the formation of the first batteries of assault guns began, of which four were ready by May. Each battery included 6 StuG III Ausf.A assault guns.

Shortly before the French campaign, German tank units were replenished with another self-propelled gun. We are talking about a 47-mm Czech anti-tank gun on the chassis of a light tank Pz.I. Such machines, called Panzerj?ger I, were ordered 132 units. In the anti-tank companies of tank divisions, they were equipped with one company each - 12 vehicles.

Overhaul of tanks Pz.35(t) and assembly of self-propelled guns Panzerj?ger I (apparently, in the workshop of the Skoda plant). 1940

As part of the 701st - 706th companies of heavy infantry guns, 38 150-mm self-propelled infantry guns, also on the chassis of the Pz.I tank, were preparing to take part in the battles.

By the beginning of May, the Wehrmacht had 338 half-track armored personnel carriers, 800 light and 333 heavy armored vehicles.

In addition to the qualitative and quantitative growth of the Panzerwaffe in the winter of 1940, the provisions of the Gelb plan continued to be improved. As the plans of the allied command became more and more precise, the leadership of the Wehrmacht more and more confidently refused the main attack in the West with the northern flank, which did not promise major results, and came to the idea of ​​​​moving the main efforts to the southern sector of the front, favorable for the offensive, to the region of the Ardennes, in order to exit in the rear of the Northern Allied Army Group and its defeat.

The initiator of the new version of the Gelb plan was the chief of staff of Army Group A, Lieutenant General E. von Manstein. Here is how it looks in the presentation of G. Guderian: “Once in November 1939, Manstein asked me to come to him. He presented to me his views on the advance of a large armored force through Luxembourg and southern Belgium on the Maginot Line at Sedan with the aim of breaking through this fortified sector, and then the entire French front. Manstein asked me to consider his proposal from the point of view of an armored specialist. After a detailed study of the maps and on the basis of personal acquaintance with the conditions of the area during the First World War, I was able to assure Manstein that the operation he planned was feasible. The only condition I could set was the use of a sufficient number of tank and motorized divisions in this offensive, and best of all!

The assault gun unit crosses the Dutch border. May 1940. In the foreground is the StuG III Ausf.A.

However, Manstein was not the only one who thought about the shortcomings of the original plan. Already in mid-October 1939, the commander of the 6th Army, Reichenau, told General Bock that a possible frontal clash on the Franco-Belgian border could lead to "losing the operation." The commander of the 4th Army, Kluge, expressed the same opinion. Bock fully shared this point of view. He wrote in the OKH on 12 October: "An offensive with a foreseen purpose will have no prospect of a decisive military success."

On February 24, 1940, the High Command of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces issued a directive that contained the final version of the Gelb plan. The idea of ​​the operation was to cut through the Allied front with a powerful force grouping, press the enemy’s northern grouping to the English Channel and destroy it. The direction of the main blow passed through the Ardennes to the mouth of the Somme, south of the district the deployment of Franco-British troops destined for advancement in Belgium, and north of the Maginot Line. The core of the strike force was to be tank and motorized formations, whose operations were supported by large aviation forces.

To ensure the operation from the south and repel possible counterattacks by French troops from the depths of the country in a northerly direction, it was planned to create an external defense front along the line of the Aisne, Oise and Somme rivers. Subsequently, from this frontier it was planned to conduct a second strategic operation with the aim of finally defeating France.

The German troops, located north of the strike force, were to carry out a quick capture of Holland, invade the north-eastern part of Belgium, break through the defenses of the Belgian army and divert as many Anglo-French troops as possible. The planned advance of a strong group of allies to Belgium, which became known to the command of the Wehrmacht, greatly facilitated the implementation of the main plan of Operation Gelb. The most combat-ready British and French divisions, advanced in accordance with the "Diehl plan" to Belgium, were to be pinned down in order to ensure an offensive in the main direction.

The troops concentrated against the Maginot Line were to prevent the transfer of opposing French forces to the direction of the main attack of the Wehrmacht through the Ardennes.

German tanks (head - Pz.III Ausf.E) on one of the streets of Rotterdam. May 1940.

In accordance with the Gelb plan, three army groups were deployed consisting of 8 armies (a total of 136 divisions, of which 10 were tank and 7 motorized), whose operations were supported by two air fleets.

To deliver the main blow in a strip 170 km wide - from Retgen (south of Aachen) to the junction of the borders of Germany, Luxembourg and France - Army Group A under the command of Colonel General von Rundstedt occupied the starting area. It included the 4th, 12th and 16th armies (a total of 45 divisions, including 7 tank and 3 motorized).

This army group had the task of passing through the Ardennes through the territory of Luxembourg and Southern Belgium, reaching the Meuse, forcing it between Dinan and Sedan, breaking through the enemy defenses at the junction of the 9th and 2nd French armies and inflicting a dissecting blow in a northwestern direction to English Channel. Rundstedt's troops were also entrusted with securing the left flank of the advancing strike force against a possible enemy counterattack from the fortified area of ​​Metz-Verden. In the first echelon of Army Group A, it was planned to use the bulk of the mobile troops. In the center, in the zone of the 12th Army, the tank group of General P. Kleist was concentrated, which included two tank and one motorized corps (1250 tanks). Here we should immediately make a reservation - in 1940, the Wehrmacht did not yet have tank and motorized corps. All the corps were army, sometimes they added a prefix (mot. - motorisiert). However, it is more convenient to name them according to their actual composition.

Heavy armored radio vehicles Sd.Kfz.263 (8-Rad) from the 38th communications battalion of the 2nd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht overcome a water barrier. Belgium, May 1940.

On the right, in the offensive zone of the 4th Army, the tank corps of General G. Hoth (542 tanks) was to operate. The actions of the Rundstedt Army Group were supported by the aircraft of the 3rd Air Fleet.

Army Group "B" under the command of Colonel-General von Bock, consisting of the 18th and 6th armies (29 divisions, including 3 tank and 2 motorized) deployed from the North Sea coast to Aachen and was supposed to capture Holland, prevent the connection of the Dutch armies with the forces of the allies, break through the defenses created by the Belgians along the Albert Canal, throw back the Anglo-French-Belgian troops behind the Antwerp-Namur line and tie them down with active actions. In the offensive zone of Army Group B in Holland and Belgium, it was planned to drop parachute groups, which were supposed to capture bridges on the routes of the advancing troops, airfields, disorganize defense control and carry out sabotage. Particular attention was paid to the capture by airborne forces of the Liege fortified area, blocking the path to Central Belgium. Air support for Army Group Bock was provided by the 2nd Air Fleet.

Army Group "C" under the command of Colonel General von Leeb as part of the 1st and 7th armies (19 divisions) occupied positions along the Franco-German border. She received the task of providing defense on a 350 km section - from the Franco-Luxembourg border to Basel. Through active reconnaissance and a demonstration of readiness for an offensive in the Palatinate area, von Leeb's troops were to mislead the French command and pin down as many French divisions as possible on the Maginot Line and on the Rhine. In addition, Army Group C was to assist in securing the southern flank of the strike group.

42 divisions remained in the reserve of the German command of the ground forces. They were planned to be used to build up the strike in the main direction.

Tractor Utility In one of the anti-tank units of the Belgian army towing a 47-mm anti-tank gun FRC mod. 1932. May 1940.

Plan "Gelb" was designed to conduct a fleeting war. The command of the Wehrmacht tried with all its might to avoid a repetition of the events of September 1914, when the armies of Wilhelm II were stopped by the French on the Marne, and the war took on a protracted positional character. The calculation was made on the maximum use of the factor of surprise, the creation of a decisive superiority in forces in the main direction and the massive use of tanks and aircraft.

In this regard, one cannot ignore the von Kleist tank group, which was created on the basis of the study by the German general staff of the experience of the Polish campaign, especially the 10th Army with its three mobile corps and the Guderian group, created on the left flank of Army Group North after September 8 1939. The Kleist group, which made up the strike force, had to overcome the Ardennes, force the Meuse River at Sedan and go to the rear of the main Allied forces conducting operations in Belgium and Northern France. The passage through the Ardennes mountains was thought out to the smallest detail. The German headquarters collected detailed information about roads, water barriers, bridges, crossings. Developed methods of transport on the road, ways to overcome all sorts of obstacles. The assault detachments were trained in forcing water obstacles such as the Meuse River on rubber inflatable boats. The engineering troops created designs for easy-to-handle and high-speed pontoon ferries and bridges. The motorized infantry spent at least six months learning to move through mountains and forests.

A Belgian anti-tank battery advances towards the German tanks. May 1940.

The tank group was an unusually powerful formation. Its 5 tank and 3 motorized divisions, a large number of corps and army units, rear services totaled 134,370 people, 41,140 different vehicles, including 1,250 tanks and 362 armored vehicles. The group worked closely with aviation - with the headquarters of the 3rd Air Fleet, the 2nd Aviation Corps, especially with the Stutterheim group of short-range bombers that supported it, and with the 1st Air Defense Corps.

A necessary shortcoming in the planning of the Kleist group was the fact that it received only four through routes through the Ardennes on a front 35 km wide, although it needed at least five. She did not have an independent line of action, but was a "guest" in the lines of armies, which reluctantly gave way to her. The narrow front of the offensive and the extreme overload of the routes made the group extremely vulnerable from the air. The length of its marching columns on each of the routes, including reinforcements and rear, exceeded 300 km!

The Allies had another chance here to disrupt the German offensive with their aircraft. However, they did not use this chance either.

It must be said that practically all the operational-strategic planning of the French command in 1939-1940 essentially boiled down to the development of a troop maneuver to Belgium. The plans of the allies testified to the passive nature of their strategic concept and major miscalculations in assessing the probable course of hostilities, as well as an underestimation of new means and methods of armed struggle. And this at a time when, even without taking into account the French forces in the Alps and in Africa, there was a superiority of the Allies over the Wehrmacht in terms of forces and means. The Germans had a slight advantage only in aviation. As for tanks, the allied command on the North-Eastern Front had 3099 tanks at its disposal, many of which were superior to German vehicles in terms of armor protection and armament, although they were inferior to them in mobility. But the quantitative advantage of the Allies lost its significance due to the fact that most of the French tanks were reduced to separate tank battalions distributed among the armies. This limited the possibilities of their application. On the North-Eastern Front, half of all tank battalions were part of the 2nd Army Group, in the defense zone of which the enemy did not plan active combat operations. The 2nd and 9th armies, which the Kleist tank group was supposed to attack, had only 6 tank battalions! Organizationally, German tanks were part of tank formations and were intended for massive use. The French command had only three tank divisions at its disposal, and even those were planned to be used not in the zone of the main attack of the German troops.

Light tank ASG1 from a separate armored squadron of the cavalry corps of the Belgian army. May 1940. On the side of the turret is the emblem of the squadron.

At 05:35 on May 10, 1940, the Wehrmacht ground forces launched an invasion of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg.

Having received information about the beginning of the German offensive and the request of the Belgian and Dutch governments for help, the French commander-in-chief, General Gamelin, at 6:35 ordered the 1st Army Group to enter Belgium according to the Diehl Plan. At the same time, the left-flank 7th Army was supposed to make a maneuver according to the “Bred option”, that is, move forward to Holland, establish contact with the Dutch army and protect the poorly fortified gap between the Belgian and Dutch defensive lines. The 2nd Army Group was ordered to move part of its forces to Luxembourg.

Cavalry and mechanized divisions moved forward in all directions. According to the calculations of the French General Staff, they had to win 5-6 days, necessary for the main forces of the allied armies to be located on the defensive line provided for by the "Diehl plan". The same calculations said that the Germans would not be able to attack with significant forces across the Meuse River southwest of Liège and through the Albert Canal before the 5th day of the offensive; consequently, the "Diel maneuver" was supposed to be carried out without much interference.

A 1.5-ton Krupp L2H143 truck with a 37-mm cannon on a trailer from one of the motorized units of the Wehrmacht on the street of Liege. Belgium, May 1940.

The allied command resolutely threw the armies forward. Mines on the Belgian border were removed, barriers were opened. The French army and the British expeditionary forces left their long and carefully prepared positions along the Franco-Belgian border and moved along all roads to the Antwerp-Louvain-Namur line, welcomed by the population of the Belgian cities and villages. The imagination of the generals pictured a well-equipped front along this line with a system of anti-tank barriers and trenches. True, due to Belgian neutrality, not a single French officer has ever seen this position, it has so far existed only on staff maps. It is easy to imagine the disappointment of the first French reconnaissance groups that arrived on May 10 at the “Diel position” and instead of powerful defensive structures they saw an open plain suitable only for the maneuver of German tanks.

On the same day, alarming information about the events in Holland and Belgium began to arrive at the Allied headquarters. In Holland, German airborne assault forces were thrown out, which managed to capture several bridges on the Meuse and Waal rivers. The German 18th Army broke the resistance of the Dutch border detachments, captured the northeastern provinces and broke through the defensive positions on the Pel line on the very first day. The Dutch troops hastily retreated behind the water barriers in the "Holland Fortress". On May 14, part of the forces of the 9th Panzer Division occupied the seaside town of Bergen op Zoom, thereby cutting off the Dutch army from the rest of the allied forces. On the same day, the main forces of the 9th Panzer Division and the SS Adolf Hitler Regiment captured Rotterdam, and on May 15 entered The Hague.

Self-propelled anti-aircraft installation of the 37-mm FlaK 36 automatic gun based on the Sd.Kfz.6 / 2 half-track tractor on the bank of the river. Maas. Belgium, May 1940.

The 6th German Army struck south - through Maastricht. Having crossed the Maas with units of the 4th Army Corps and the 4th Panzer Division, it fought its way several kilometers west of the river. In view of the obvious threat to the defense on the Albert Canal, the Belgian General Staff decided already on the evening of May 10 to withdraw the main forces of the army to the main line of defense, that is, to the Antwerp-Louvain line, and here to stop the enemy with forces withdrawn and pulled up from the depths of the formations. It was part of the very line to which the 1st group of the Allied army was now moving. By the evening of May 11, the French 1st Army reached its intended position; marching to its right, the left-flank formations of the 9th Army were approaching the Meuse south of Namur; the vanguards of the British Expeditionary Force appeared at the River Deal. On the morning of May 11, the German 4th Panzer Division quickly completed the crossing of the Meuse and moved along the roads to the southwest, bypassing the Liege fortress from the north. Following it, 6 infantry divisions advanced, expanding the breakthrough towards the northern flank. By the middle of the day, the Meuse had already been forced in the Maastricht area on a front of up to 30 km. Belgian formations quickly retreated.

A Belgian T.13 Type III SPG captured by the Wehrmacht.

Meanwhile, on the evening of May 11, the city of Breda was captured by German tanks in Holland. The next day, the advance detachment of the 9th Panzer Division, with air support, connected with the paratroopers holding the bridge over the Meuse at Moerdijk. The intention of the commander of the German Army Group "B" was to turn the 9th Panzer Division to invade "Fortress Holland" from the south. The Dutch defense system was disintegrating. Having lost faith in the Anglo-French support, feeling abandoned and exhausted, on May 13 the representatives of the Dutch command informed the Nazi leadership of their desire to start negotiations. The quick surrender of Holland and the unsuccessful actions of the 7th Army, which hastened to its aid, were the first blow to the allies. The 18th German Army was being released, the appearance of which was to be expected soon in Belgium.

The 4th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, advancing in Belgium, crossed the Albert Canal on the morning of May 11. The next day, she came across in the region of Annu, Tisne, Vansin on the French 1st mechanized cavalry corps under the command of General Priou. Due to the resistance offered by the French light mechanized divisions, General Hoepner threw his entire tank corps into battle on May 13th. Fierce tank battles unfolded, in which both sides suffered heavy losses. So, for example, only the 3rd DLM lost 105 tanks, the losses of the Germans amounted to 164 tanks. On May 14, the 16th German Panzer Corps, continuing its offensive, approached the first Belgian line of anti-tank barriers of Cointe, unfortunately for the defenders not continuous, and in the afternoon attacked the French positions near Gembloux. The offensive, resumed on May 15 and 16, did not lead, despite the massive support of attack aircraft, to breaking through the front of the 1st French army, whose artillery inflicted heavy losses on the German tank divisions. The German offensive in Belgium was stopped, and the Allied command perked up, not yet knowing that this fact did not decide anything. The main events developed to the south, in the offensive zone of the German Army Group "A".

German tanks Pz.II Ausf.C in France. May 1940.

At the very time when the Belgian army was fighting hard, and the 1st Allied Army Group was in a hurry to help it, to the south, in the Ardennes, a German strike force was already moving, which no one had paid attention to yet. Throughout the night of May 10, hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles, thousands of trucks and motorcycles of the Kleist group roared on the roads, approaching the Luxembourg border. At 05:35, the advanced tank detachments crossed the border line. Luxembourg was asleep, and not a single rifle shot was heard on the border. German troops poured into the Ardennes. The well-prepared march proceeded without delay. Mechanized columns met on the mountain roads unguarded concrete fences, a little higher than human height, with iron rails built into them, deep pits, minefields, to overcome which the German engineering troops were prepared. Ramp with decking was installed to the fences, and the cars passed freely over the obstacles. Detours were arranged around the pits. A small detachment of motorcyclists forded the border river Urk and overcame electrically controlled and even unlocked iron gates. A battalion of German paratroopers landed behind the Belgian border fortifications near Martelange and occupied them, opening the way for the armored advance guards further west.

A column of vehicles of the 37th engineer battalion of the 1st tank division of the Wehrmacht in the Sedan area. France, May 1940.

By the beginning of the offensive, Kleist's tank group was located as follows: in front of the 19th tank corps, which was entrusted with the implementation of a breakthrough; on the right flank, the 41st Panzer Corps, which covered the actions of the Panzer Group from the north and interacted with Guderian's corps; behind them is the 14th Army Corps. In addition to its three tank divisions, the 19th tank corps also had separate units: the Great Germany regiment, an artillery regiment (two divisions of 105-mm and one division of 150-mm howitzers), an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, a communications battalion, an engineer battalion, a squadron reconnaissance aviation. The corps reached the Belgian border in a section about 40 km long between Bastogne and Arlon, built at an angle forward: in front and in the center of the 1st Panzer Division, followed by individual units. Behind, on the flanks, were: on the right the 2nd Panzer Division and on the left the 10th Panzer Division. Resuming its advance on the morning of May 11, the 1st Panzer Division ran into a second line of destruction and defensive works in Neuchâteau. She captured Neuchâteau, but at Bertry she was attacked by elements of the French 5th Light Cavalry Division, which she managed to repulse. Turning then to the south, the tanks of this division broke into Bouillon, but it was not possible to completely capture this settlement. After that, the motorcyclists of the 1st Panzer Division managed to cross the river. Semois in the zone of the 2nd Panzer Division and create a bridgehead on the south bank of the river. In the first half of May 12, having made a 110-kilometer march along mountain roads, German tank divisions crossed the French border and began to reach the Meuse.

Light tank R35 hurries to meet the German troops. May 1940.

Forcing the river. The Meuse south of Namur was scheduled to be carried out simultaneously on May 13 and 14 by the forces of the 15th Panzer Corps north of Dinan and the Kleist Panzer Group near Monterme (41st Panzer Corps) and Sedan (19th Panzer Corps). Each of these corps was supposed to attack only on a very narrow front - 2.5 km, but their joint offensive on a 80 km stretch (from Dinan to the area east of Sedan) was supposed to bring down the entire French defense system.

On the night of May 13, the motorized infantry of the 7th Panzer Division of the 15th Panzer Corps crossed the Meuse in inflatable boats and captured a bridgehead 3-4 km wide and the same depth, which the French failed to liquidate the next day. On May 14, the 15th Panzer Corps, supported by powerful air strikes, moved its tanks to the left bank and expanded the bridgehead to 25 km along the front and up to 12 km in depth. On May 15, the 15th Panzer Corps encountered the French 1st Panzer Division north of Flavion.

German tank Pz.IV Ausf.B of the 10th Panzer Division in the vicinity of Sedan. France, May 1940.

The 1st Armored Division was a strong, well-equipped formation with 150 tanks. She arrived on the morning of May 12 from Champagne to the Charleroi region. The French command, confident that the Germans are inflicting main blow in Belgium, in accordance with pre-war calculations, it was supposed to introduce the division into battle in the 1st Army zone on the Belgian front. But on May 14, the dimensions of the catastrophe of the 9th Army began to emerge more and more clearly. In the afternoon of May 14, the commander of the 1st Armored Division, General Bruno, received a new task by telephone - to urgently transfer the division to the southeast, counterattack the enemy in the Dinan area and push him back beyond the Meuse. The tanks moved towards the Meuse, but soon got into a continuous stream of refugees, convoys and soldiers retreating in disorder. The slow, endless march among the crowds of people moving towards them led the division into complete disorder. The crews of the tanks were dead tired. Driving in low gears and constantly shifting them led to increased fuel consumption, and the tankers were at the tail of the column, which stretched for tens of kilometers. Only by the morning of May 15 did trucks with fuel reach the combat units. Two battalions of B1bis tanks were refueling when at 8:30 am they were attacked first by German Ju.87 bombers and then by General Rommel's 7th Panzer Division. Finding that the shells of their tank guns did not penetrate the armor of heavy French tanks, the Germans began to hit the tracks and the radiator shutters. The absence of radio stations on most French tanks made it very difficult to control the battle, and the tanks acted either individually or in small groups.

The 7th Panzer Division began to bypass the French, leaving them to the 5th Panzer Division moving to the right. By this time, almost nothing remained of the two French battalions: four B1bis tanks were in service in one, and two in the other. According to the French, they knocked out up to 100 German tanks in this battle, which in itself is quite possible. But the nature of the German losses is different from the French. The 1st DCR retreated to Beaumont and then to Aven, leaving the battlefield. Therefore, all French tanks can be considered irretrievably lost, while German ones are not. However, General Bruno still had a battalion of R35 tanks at his disposal, which did not take part in the battle on May 15th. However, due to lack of fuel during the retreat, serviceable tanks had to be abandoned, and the 1st DCR reached Aven with only 17 combat vehicles. Not far from Aven, on May 16, these tanks were discovered by the advancing German 7th Panzer Division, which completed the destruction of the French formation.

Light tank Pz.II Ausf.С on the road to Sedan. 2nd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, France, May 1940.

The 2nd Armored Division was alerted at noon on May 13 in the Chalon camp and moved to the Soir-le-Château in the reserve of the main command. At the same time that the bombardment preceding the attack on Sedan was intensifying, General Georges ordered the 2nd Armored Division to follow Bruno's 1st Division into Belgium to help the 1st Army. But as soon as the first echelons moved to Belgium, a new order came from the commander of the North Eastern Front. Worried about the situation of the 9th Army, he changed his original decision and transferred the 2nd Armored Division to the 9th Army. Because of the unimaginable confusion with orders that have been repeatedly canceled, and the terrible confusion that prevailed these days on railways, the division was literally taken in parts to different areas and ceased to exist, never reaching the battlefield.

French 25 mm Hotchkiss anti-tank gun mod. 1934.

Meanwhile, Kleist's group crossed the Meuse between Monterme and Sedan.

The 41st Panzer Corps crossed the Meuse at Nouzonville on 15 May. Leaking between the retreating French columns, German tanks approached Lyar; some of them even advanced as far as Montcornet, located 80 km from the Meuse. After that, the 41st Tank Corps, in close cooperation with the 19th Corps, could already begin to develop success.

The 19th Panzer Corps used the night of 12/13 May and the morning of 13 May to prepare for the simultaneous crossing of the Meuse by the 1st and 10th Panzer Divisions.

Destroyed German light tank Pz.I Ausf.A from the 5th Panzer Division. France, May 1940.

The 2nd Panzer Division only supported them with its forward units (reconnaissance battalion, motorcycle battalion, artillery) and therefore did not cross the Meuse on the same day. The offensive was preceded by a massive bombardment carried out by 12 squadrons of dive bombers. As a result of air raids, which lasted from 08:00 to 15:00 and then with maximum intensity from 15:50. until 4 p.m., French artillery (especially anti-aircraft artillery) was suppressed, field-type fortifications were destroyed, and telephone communications were interrupted. The bombardment had a significant morale impact, and thick dust and smoke blinded the defenders. German artillery (4 divisions of 105-mm howitzers, including 2 belonging to the 1st tank division, and 2 - artillery regiment of the 19th tank corps; 4 divisions of 150-mm howitzers, including one each from the 1st, 2 th and 10th tank divisions and one from the artillery regiment of the 19th tank corps) operated on a 2.5 km front from 8 to 16 hours and was especially intensive in the last 10 minutes. Anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns and tanks fired direct fire at the embrasures of the French fortifications. This bombardment allowed the foot soldiers to cross the Meuse in inflatable boats. The attackers managed to break through the front in the sector of the 55th French Infantry Division and, by the end of the day, capture the defenses on the banks of the Meuse. At midnight, the advanced units reached Cheeri and Chaumont, creating a bridgehead 5–6 km deep on the left bank of the Meuse. During the night, tanks, light artillery and trucks crossed the Meuse on a bridge built at Gaulle. The 10th Panzer Division, which found itself under fire from French artillery, managed to transport only insignificant forces to the left bank. On the morning of May 14, this division managed to cross the Meuse between Wadlecourt and Basel, and the 2nd Panzer Division, taking advantage of the French withdrawal, at Donchery.

Light tank Pz.38(t) from the 10th Tank Regiment of the 8th Tank Division. France, 1940

On the same day, the French 3rd Armored Division (two battalions of B1bis tanks and two battalions of H39 tanks) received orders to move east towards the Sedan area. The march was slow. B1bis tanks experienced difficulties at every river crossing - not all bridges could withstand 32-ton fighting vehicles. However, the column faced even greater difficulties when it had to move through crowds of refugees and retreating French soldiers. The hysteria was such that it happened that the French troops opened fire on their own tanks, mistaking them for German ones.

The 3rd DCR reached the Stene area around 0600 on 15 May. She was ordered to attack the city at 11:00 in conjunction with the 2nd Light Cavalry Division (DLC). However, the commander of the 3rd armored division, not wanting to throw his battalions into the attack almost on the move, gave the order to go on the defensive, especially since the vague orders of the higher command could be interpreted in different ways. The tanks of the three battalions were dispersed along a 20 km front in the form of barriers, one B1bis and two H39s each.

French campaign in 1940.

When the time came to advance, it was not possible to fully collect the tanks scattered over the area. In addition, the approaching motorized regiment "Grossdeutschland" managed to organize a solid defense around the Wall, saturated with a large number of anti-tank guns. The indiscriminate attacks launched by the French at the end of the day were repulsed. On the night of May 15-16, the B1bis tank company and the H39 battalion again moved towards the Wall, but, having lost 33 tanks, were forced to withdraw. Tanks of the 10th tank and motorized infantry of the 2nd motorized divisions Wehrmacht, and belated attacks by scattered units of the 3rd DCR became useless.

Tank Pz.III Ausf.E on the street of a French town. May 1940.

It should be noted that against the background of the unsuccessful actions of the French tank units and formations, small groups and even individual tanks fought quite successfully. So, for example, on May 16, 1940, B1bis tanks of the 41st battalion were ordered to attack German positions near the city of Stene. Later, the commander of the battalion, Captain Malaguti, who led the attack, recalled: “This attack was carried out in the best conditions, like on maneuvers. It was carried out quickly, and in about twenty minutes, having destroyed many German infantrymen - very good fighters, we captured Stene. On the northwestern outskirts of the city, the captain's tank unexpectedly stumbled upon a German tank column standing on the highway. Without thinking, he opened fire from a distance of 30 m. At the same time, Captain Billot's B1bis approached from the other side of the highway. French tankers managed to disable 13 German tanks (two Pz.IV and 11 Pz.III) within 15 minutes. But this particular success did not affect the situation as a whole.

A German officer inspects a wrecked French B1bis tank. In front of the car lies the commander's cupola torn off by an internal explosion.

On May 15, German tank divisions broke through the French front in two places: in the center of the 9th French Army and on the left flank of the 2nd French Army. On the night of May 16, the development of success was almost stopped by the order of von Kleist, according to which the tank corps were to remain in place in order to strengthen the defense of the bridgeheads on the Meuse. This was the first stop order during the French campaign. The appearance of this order at first glance looks rather strange, but if you look at it, it is quite understandable.

Destroyed medium tank Pz.III Ausf.E. France, May 1940. Judging by the image of a bison on the side of the turret, this tank belongs to the 7th Panzer Regiment of the 10th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht.

Indeed, in the direction of the main attack of group "A" in an open 50-kilometer space, five German tank divisions could move freely. Of these, three (1st, 2nd, 6th) reached Montcornet on a narrow front, and the advanced detachments of Guderian's corps were already approaching the Marl road junction, located 20 km west of this point. “The offensive of the shock group, which is being conducted in the form of a wedge,” wrote the chief of the German general staff Halder that day, “is developing very successfully. West of the Meuse, everything was in motion." However, the German command could not even imagine that the French military leadership would be so helpless that it would allow the Wehrmacht to achieve such brilliant results at such an inexpensive price. Still not believing what was happening and expecting the growing resistance of the French in the near future, unable to overcome the confusion in organizing the actions of the tank group, the high command of the ground forces categorically ordered to stop the offensive. It considered it necessary, as planned before the outbreak of hostilities, to secure a bridgehead behind the Meuse, for which the 14th Army Corps was to be transferred to it. Guderian's requests for permission to move forward were answered by the high command with a decisive refusal. The conflict that began was becoming more and more acute. “It never occurred to me,” Guderian writes, “that my superiors still think of gaining a foothold on the bridgehead at the Meuse ... However, I was terribly mistaken.” There was open space ahead, but the German tanks stopped. Nevertheless, Guderian's violent reaction prompted him to first postpone the execution of the order for a day, and then completely cancel it. Guderian demanded that the tankers move forward without delay and stops. The situation on the 190-kilometer front between the rivers Sambre and Aisne became catastrophic for the French.

A medium tank D2 from the 345th separate tank company (345th CACC), which was part of the 4th French armored division, is in a hurry to the front line. Laon area, May 16, 1940. Attention is drawn to the landing of the commander of the vehicle in the stowed position on the hinged cover of the aft turret hatch.

Nevertheless, the retreating French 9th Army planned a counterattack from the south against the flank of the German divisions turning westward. At the same time, the main hopes were placed on the newly formed 4th armored division of Colonel de Gaulle. On May 11, 1940, it had 215 tanks of various types. Formed after the start of hostilities, it was a complex conglomeration of units of various levels of training. On this occasion, de Gaulle wrote in his memoirs: “In the meantime, I received the 3rd Cuirassier Regiment for replenishment, which consisted of two squadrons of SOMUA tanks (medium tank S35 - Approx. Author). However, the tank crews were led by commanders who had never fired guns before, and the drivers had a total of no more than four hours of driving a tank.

In addition to the S35 battalion, the 4th DCR included a B1bis heavy tank battalion, two R35 light tank battalions, a D2 medium tank company, and one infantry battalion.

Colonel de Gaulle - Commander of the 4th Armored Division. May 1940.

With these forces, de Gaulle began on May 17 an offensive northeast of Laon in the direction of Montcornet in order to cut the road junction and prevent the enemy from approaching the positions that the 6th Army, which was moving out of the reserve, was supposed to take. Overturning the Germans, the 4th DCR advanced 20 kilometers and approached Montcornet. But it was not possible to take the city by forcing the Sere de Gaulle river. His division came under heavy artillery fire. German aircraft continuously bombed its battle formations. However, the cover mission was completed, and on the night of May 18-19, de Gaulle withdrew the troops back to Laon. His hastily organized division experienced an acute shortage of everything. There was no artillery cover, air support, and finally, radio communications - we had to use messengers in the old fashioned way. Nevertheless, at dawn on May 19, Colonel de Gaulle again threw his division into the offensive, this time north of Laon. By this time, a light artillery regiment and another infantry battalion were at his disposal. The 4th DCR approached the river, on the other side of which were the main German forces with heavy artillery. They easily destroyed French tanks that tried to approach the crossings. It was impossible to cross the water line without the support of heavy artillery, aviation and infantry. De Gaulle's division ended up on the flank of General Guderian's 19th Panzer Corps, which turned to the sea after breaking through the French front. “At these moments,” wrote de Gaulle, “I could not help thinking what the mechanized army, which I had dreamed of for so long, was capable of. If I now had such an army, the advance of German tank divisions would immediately be stopped, their rear would be engulfed in confusion ... However, our forces in the area north of Laon are extremely insignificant.

One of the D2 tanks of the 345th separate tank company, shot down in the battle for the town of Crecy-sur-Cerre on May 19, 1940.

Fate brought de Gaulle almost face to face with General Guderian, the chief German tank theorist. He wrote the book "Attention, Tanks!", which was, as it were, a German version, however independent, of de Gaulle's book "For a Professional Army". But a kind of personal duel could take place between two fans of tanks! Alas, no matter how de Gaulle dreamed, such a duel did not work out - the forces were not equal. However, Guderian noted the efforts of the 4th DCR: “Even on May 16, we knew about the presence of a French armored division, a new formation of General de Gaulle, which first entered the battle at Montcornet. De Gaulle confirmed our data a few days later. On May 18, several tanks from his division came within 2 km of my forward command post in the Olnon Forest, guarded only by a few 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. I survived a couple of hours in agonizing obscurity until these formidable guests turned back.

From the book Aviation and Cosmonautics 2001 05-06 the author

OPERATION "URAN" November 13, 1942 plan approved counteroffensive near Stalingrad. In accordance with the plan, the main blow was delivered by the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts. It was planned to surround the main forces with converging powerful blows.

From the book Warships author Perlya Zigmund Naumovich

From the book Aviation 2001 03 author author unknown

Operation "Paravan" Vladimir Kotelnikov (Moscow) The German battleship Tirpitz was "sitting in the liver" for a long time at the British Admiralty. Few ships in His Majesty's fleet could match this giant. Although Tirpitz hid more in the fjords of Northern Norway,

From the book Such is the torpedo life author Gusev Rudolf Alexandrovich

2. Operation "Smerch" Don't dig a hole for another, you'll fall into it yourself Kozma Prutkov Larion. Ivan Kudryavtsev was the squad leader in our first year. When he arrived, he was quiet and modest. And suddenly, overnight, he became a dictator. The first

From the author's book

18 Operation Ples. From the first compartment of a firing submarine, two buglers are ahead, They play clearly and clearly Kozma Prutkov They are used to firing anti-ship torpedoes in the fleets and carried them out either according to plan or according to unexpected introductory meticulous

Plan
Introduction
1 Plan alternatives
2 Designation of strategic goals
3 OKH plan of October 19, 1939
4 Comments of the OKW
5 OKH plan of October 29, 1939
6 Criticism of the OKH plan
7 Remarks of Army Group "A"
8 Additions to the OKH plan
9 "Mechelen Incident"
10 "Long start"
11 OKH plan of January 30, 1940
12 Military staff games
13 Manstein Plan
14 Criticism of the Manstein Plan
15 Implementation of the Gelb Plan
16 Notes
17 Sources

Introduction

Plan "Gelb" or Gelb plan (German. Fall Gelb- Yellow plan) - code name German plan blitzkrieg against the countries of modern Benelux: Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and also France in 1940. Later it was partially implemented during the Nazi offensive, known as the French campaign. The plan became one of the stages strange war", which was skillfully used by the German command as a kind of strategic pause-respite. This allowed Germany to successfully complete the Polish campaign, implement the plan for the occupation of Denmark and Norway (the Danish-Norwegian operation), as well as prepare the invasion of France (the Gelb Plan itself), finally consolidate the results of the Anschluss (annexation of Austria) and the capture of the Sudetenland.

1. Plan alternatives

The first version of the Gelb military campaign, known as "OKH Plan", was rather theoretical, positional in nature. He was not destined to come true. Another option, known as the "Manstein Plan", was more successful and was successfully implemented on May 10, 1940 in the first phase of the French campaign. The result of the implementation of the plan was the occupation by German troops of the territories of Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and northern France.

2. Designation of strategic goals

The development of an offensive against France began on September 27, 1939. At a meeting of the commanders-in-chief and military commanders of staffs, Hitler emphasized: "The purpose of the war is to bring England to its knees, to defeat France."

The plan was opposed by the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Brauchitsch, and the chief of the general staff, Halder. They even prepared a plan to remove Hitler from power, but, not finding the support of the commander of the reserve army, General Fromm, they abandoned the attempt.

On October 6, 1939, German troops completed the occupation of Poland, and on October 9, the commander of the armed forces, Brauchitsch, Goering and Raeder, was sent a "Message on the conduct of the war on the Western Front." In this document, based on the concept of "blitzkrieg", the strategic goals of the future campaign were determined:

“3. ... for the further conduct of hostilities I order:

a) on the northern flank Western front prepare an offensive through the territories of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. It is necessary to attack with as many forces as possible and as quickly as possible; b) the purpose of this operation is to destroy, if possible, large associations of the French army and allies on its side, and at the same time capture as much of the territory of Holland, Belgium and Western France as possible in order to create springboard for successful air and naval warfare against England and to expand the buffer zone of the vital Ruhr area."

“3. … Für die weitere Durchführung der Feindseligkeiten bestellt:

a) auf der nördlichen Flanke des westlichen Front bereiten Offensive teritorrii durch Luxemburg, Belgien und Holland. Die Offensive sollte so viel Kräfte wie möglich und so schnell wie möglich;b) Der Zweck dieser Maßnahme - zerstören die Möglichkeit der großen französischen Armee und Verbündete auf seiner Seite, und gleichzeitig zu nutzen, so viel Gebiet der Niederland e, Belgien und Westen Frankreichs zu schaffen, ein Sprungbrett für eine erfolgreiche Luft-und Seeweg Krieg gegen England und erweitern Sie den Puffer Die Umgebung von entscheidender Bedeutung Ruhrgebiet.”

The highest German generals reacted to Hitler's decree with doubt. One of the generals even shouted: "France is not Poland!" But, despite fears about the failure of the operation, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Walter von Brauchitsch, ordered the General Staff (OKH) to develop "Guelb Directive on the strategic deployment of troops" .

The ground forces command (OKH) took the Schlieffen plan of 1914 as the basis for the operation plan, but unlike the Schlieffen plan, the OKH plan did not aim for a complete victory in Flanders, but had an exclusively positional character - its complete implementation only led to the establishment of a positional front along river Somme.

Army Group "B" (Fyodor von Bock) - 2, 4 and 6 armies (37 divisions)

Army Group "A" (Gerd von Rundstedt) - 12th and 16th armies (27 divisions)

Army Group "C" (Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb) - 1st and 7th armies (25 divisions)

Army group "N" - 18th army (3 divisions)

Reserve - 9 divisions

The main blow was to be delivered by Army Group B on both sides of Liège, with the aim of defeating the Anglo-French forces in Belgium, along with the Belgian and Dutch armies. To the south will be Army Group A. The 12th Army will cover the southern flank of Army Group B, the 16th Army will attack in the direction of southern Belgium and Luxembourg. After marching through Luxembourg, the 16th Army is to take up defensive positions north of the western flank of the Maginot Line between the Saar and the Meuse. Army Group C will operate against the Maginot Line. Depending on the political climate, army group "N" was intended to defeat Holland. The directive ended with an order to Army Groups "A" and "B" to concentrate their troops in such a way that in six night marches they could take up exit positions for the offensive.

4. Remarks of the OKW

On October 21, 1939, the commander of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), Wilhelm Keitel, criticized Hitler about the "Gelb plan". They boiled down to the following:

· Army Group "N" has unreasonably large forces. She has equally little chance of breaking through the fortified Grebbe line.

· The left-flank 4th Army of Army Group "B", advancing south of Liège, should strike to the west, and only in extreme cases - to the north-west.

· It is worth reviewing the composition of the 6th Army, which strikes north of Liege. The three tank and one motorized divisions allocated to it are not enough to develop success.

· After the start of the offensive and the withdrawal of French troops from the Maginot Line, ten divisions from Army Group C can be transferred to reinforce the advancing group.

Thus, the headquarters of the operational leadership of the OKW proposed to further strengthen the northern flank, mainly with mobile troops.

In the strategic plan of October 29, 1939, a broader goal was set - to destroy the allied grouping in the area north of the Somme and reach the English Channel. The 18th Army was additionally included in Army Group B, and the number of its divisions increased to 43 (including 9 tank and 4 motorized). The composition of Army Group A was reduced to 22, and Army Group C to 18 divisions. The liberated divisions reinforced the northern wing of the front. Army Group B was tasked to break through with one strike group north of Liege, to the Brussels area, and with another strike group south of Liege, to the area to the west of Namur, and then continue the offensive in a northwestern or southwestern direction. Army Group "A" had an auxiliary mission - to cover Army Group "B" on the southern and southwestern flanks; Army Group C, as in the plan of October 19, took up a position against the Maginot Line. The border with Holland was covered by the 6th Corps District, which was subordinate to Army Group B.

It was planned to complete the sweep by November 5th. On November 12, 1939, the offensive was to begin.

6. Criticism of the OKH Plan

Adolf Hitler called the plan prepared by the OKH the height of mediocrity. At one of the meetings to discuss the operational plan, Hitler, referring to Keitel and Jodl, noted:

“So this is the old Schlieffen plan with a reinforced right flank and the main thrust along the Atlantic coast. Twice such numbers do not pass!”

The repetition of the Schlieffen plan of the beginning of the century, the attack on France with a crescent-shaped movement through Belgium, did not suit him. In 1939 it was clearer than in 1914 that if there was any fighting between Germany and the Allies, it would be in Belgium, since the Maginot Line along the Franco-German border reliably protected France. Compared to the Maginot Line, the Belgian fortifications were very weak. It is obvious that the French also understood this and expected such a development of events. However, although Hitler had a different point of view, he wanted the offensive to start as quickly as possible:

"Time works for the enemy ... Our Achilles' heel is the Ruhr ... If England and France break through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we will be in great danger."

On November 5, Brauchitsch again tried to dissuade Hitler from invading France. Hitler, in turn, reaffirmed that the offensive must begin no later than 12 November. However, on November 7, the order was canceled due to adverse weather conditions. Later, the start of the operation will be postponed 29 more times.

7. Remarks of Army Group "A"

Even during the preparation of the OKH plan, the chief of staff of Army Group A under the command of Rundstedt, Erich von Manstein, noted that his plan was too obvious. Another drawback of the OKH plan, according to Manstein, was that the German troops would have to face the British units, who would definitely be a harder enemy than the French. Moreover, this plan did not promise a decisive victory.

Thinking about this problem, Manstein concluded that it would be better to launch the main attack through the Ardennes in the direction of Sedan, which the Allies could not possibly have expected. The main idea of ​​this plan was "luring". Manstein had no doubt that the Allies would definitely react to the invasion of Belgium. But by deploying their troops there, they will lose a free reserve (at least for several days), load the roads to failure, and most importantly, weaken the Dinan-Sedan operational sector by “sliding north”.

Three-engine passenger Ju 52 / 3m were operated in many countries of the world. The largest number of cars served in the German airline Deutsche Lufthansa. She received the first Ju 52 / 3mce aircraft on May 1, and the second on September 10, 1932. From November, the Junkers entered the Munich - Milan - Rome line, and a few years later became the most common aircraft in the German civil aviation. They served both domestic and international lines. Ju 52/3m flew to all European capitals. In 1934, pilot Untukht flew from Berlin to Shanghai on a Junkers. From 1936, the Germans began flights to Kabul in Afghanistan. One of the longest routes of Lufthansa was the line Berlin - Rio de Janeiro via Seville and Bathurst.


All German civil aircraft had their own names, which were applied on board near the cockpit. They were given in honor of various prominent figures. About a dozen cars before the war were assigned as personal to the top leaders of the Reich. Hitler flew the Immelmann plane, Goering flew the Manfred von Richthofen, and Field Marshal von Blomberg flew the Hermann Goering. Ju 52 / 3m formed the backbone of the Lufthansa fleet until the end of World War II.


Since 1934, the Junkers have been operated by the Soviet-German company Deruluft on the Moscow-Berlin line. It owned three cars, which had the names "Condor", "Cormoran" and "Milan". The liners were registered in Germany. Landing in Moscow was carried out at the Central Airfield, but at one time they also landed in Bykovo. In winter, "Deruluft" cars were put on skis.


In general, Ju 52 / 3m were in the fleet of 30 airlines from 25 countries, in particular: Aero (Finland), AGO (Estonia), Olag (Austria), Sabena (Belgium), DDL (Denmark) and others. Junkers were bought even by states with their own developed aircraft manufacturing. For example, one car flew in the colors of British Airways. In Latin America, Ju 52 / 3m were part of the fleet of three companies in Brazil (Varig, VASP and Condor Syndicate). They were also available at Aeropost Argentina, LAB (Bolivia), CAUSA (Uruguay), SETA (Ecuador). In Peru, the Junkers used the local branch of Lufthansa.


Many Latin American companies were wholly or partly owned by German capital. In September 1941, under US pressure, Ecuador requisitioned two Ju 52 / 3m from the Condor Syndicate. One of them was handed over to the Americans as a trophy at the beginning of 1942. The American crew accepted the aircraft in Talara (Peru) and flew it to the Albrook Field base in the Panama Canal Zone. "Junker" became part of the US Army Air Force as C-79. The entire engine setup has been replaced. The place of the “native” BMW 132 engines was taken by the American R-1690-23 (also “hornets”) with a power of 525 hp each. The hoods were taken from the DC-2. The C-79 was operated by the 20th transport squadron until the end of 1943. Then it was sold to Costa Rica, and from there in 1948 it was resold to Nicaragua. A year later, the plane crashed on landing and was never recovered.


In Africa, Ju 52 / 3m served in Mozambique (DETA) and the Union of South Africa (South African Airways). In China, they were flown by German crews of the Eurasia Joint Society.

Baptism of fire

The first war in which the Ju 52/3m was used was in South America. Colombia fought with Peru. In August 1932, Peruvian troops captured the border port of Letizia in the upper reaches of the Amazon. Three "Junkers" of the Colombian Air Force deployed reinforcements to the border, which managed to stop the advance of the enemy. The conflict ended in July 1933.


Then the Bolivian-Paraguayan War began. In 1928, the American company Standard Oil found oil in the sparsely populated frontier region of Chaco. Perhaps this is what spurred the neighbors to conflict. In the same year, the first armed clashes took place on an ill-defined border. The lukewarm skirmishes escalated into something more serious when, in June 1932, the Bolivian president declared war on Paraguay.


In October 1932, the Bolivian company LAB received the first Junker from Germany. From the end of the year, he began regular flights to the front. Weapons, ammunition, food, and medicines were brought to the forward airfield of Villa Montes. They even moved cannons; at the same time, their carriages had to be disassembled. The wounded were evacuated on return flights. In 1933, two more planes arrived to the Bolivians, they were not even registered as civilians.


But the LAB crews, consisting of Germans, both local and hired in Germany, flew on all three machines. I had to work in difficult conditions. Heat during the day and rather cool nights, dust, primitive airfields without any equipment. Nevertheless, before the end of the war in July 1935, three Junkers transported up to 40,000 soldiers and 4,850 tons of various cargoes. True, this did not help the Bolivians - they still lost the war.


The last Bolivian Ju 52/3m crashed in November 1940.

Revival of the Luftwaffe

Treaty of Versailles forbade Germany to have military aircraft. The Germans constantly tried to circumvent this limitation. After the Nazis came to power, these attempts became even more active.


Under the guise of a Lufthansa flight school, the training of bomber aircraft crews began. Formally, the school was subordinate to ... the railway department. It taught mainly navigation and blind flight techniques. Pilots practiced cross-country instrument flight at night and in the clouds. The school received both new Junkers from the factory and old cars from Lufthansa. All aircraft carried civil designations.


On April 10, 1934, the Reich Commissar for Aviation Goering gave a secret order to form the first bomber squadron in Nuremberg by October 1. It was supposed to consist of three squadrons.


It began with the creation of the Auxiliary Bomber Squadron. It was the first bomber aviation unit in Germany after the end of the World War. She disguised herself as the Lufthansa Line Inspectorate. The squadron was tasked with training flight and technical personnel. By April 1, 1934, she received 24 ordinary passenger Ju 52 / 3mge and three new Dornier Do 11 C bombers. But the latter were not very reliable in operation, so they were quickly removed from service. Only Junkers remained in the squadron.


Meanwhile, the appetites of the Nazis grew rapidly. At the end of 1934, the formation of four bomber squadrons began at once. Now, according to the state, the squadron included three groups (regiments). The group included two squadrons of 12 aircraft. Since the new Ju 86, He 111 and Do 17 bombers (created for political purposes as dual-purpose vehicles - passenger and military at the same time) existed only in the form of prototypes, these squadrons began to equip the Ju 52 / 3m and Do 11. At the same time, more reliable and better mastered "Junkers" accounted for more than two-thirds of the park.


The KG 152 Hindenburg squadron was the first to be completed, followed by KG 153, KG 154 and KG 155. Their squadrons were located at the airfields of Giebelyitadt, Tutov, Greifswald, Merseburg, Finsterwalde and Fasberg. Ju 52 / 3mg3e with full armament already arrived there.


In March 1935, the German government officially announced the revival of its Air Force - the Luftwaffe. The Reich Commissariat for Aviation was renamed the Reich Ministry. A rapid quantitative growth of military aviation began. It was on the Junkers that the most experienced Luftwaffe personnel were trained. Then came the stage of rapid introduction of a new generation of bombers. Nevertheless, Ju 52 / 3mg3e and Ju 52 / 3mg4e carried bomb weapons until 1937-1938. By the spring of 1938, the re-equipment of bomber aircraft was over. The old "Junkers" remained in service in only one group - IV / KG 152 in Finsterwalde. It became the core of the German military transport aviation.


Ju 52 / 3m were used as bombers in civil war in Spain.

In Spain

In July 1936, the Spanish generals rebelled against the government of the republic. After the death of General Sanjurjo in a plane crash, General Franco, who arrived from the Canary Islands, became the leader of the rebels. The troops supporting him were mainly in that part of Morocco, which was then a Spanish colony. They needed to be thrown across the strait. The fleet, for the most part, remained loyal to the republic. The soldiers decided to transport by air. But Franco also had few planes. However, the fascist regimes of Italy and Germany came out on his side.


On July 19, the rebels sent their representatives to Rome and Berlin. Three days later, Franco sent a telegram to Hitler asking for ten transport aircraft with crews. On July 24, after a meeting with representatives of the rebels, the Fuhrer ordered to give 20 Junkers.


The Luftwaffe headquarters received an order on the 25th, and a day later the first aircraft took off from Berlin's Tempelhof airfield. In total, until August 9, ten vehicles went to Morocco by air - Ju 52 / 3mg3e with weapons removed. German civil designations were applied to their sides and wings. Formally, these Junkers were sold to Hispano-Morocco de Transneptes (HISMA). The crews were recruited in the squadrons of the Luftwaffe and replenished with experienced pilots from the Lufthansa. All the staff, of course, were dressed in civilian clothes.


Lieutenant R. von Moro was appointed commander of the transport unit. The already mentioned E. Milch, who by this time had become a general, was watching the dispatch of equipment to Spain.


They flew through Italy with a landing in Sicily. One Junker entered Republican-controlled territory and landed at Barajas Airfield. Convinced of a mistake, the Germans immediately took off, but again sat down at the Republicans for the second time. The aircraft was requisitioned, and it began to be converted into a bomber. The work was stopped due to the protest of the German embassy, ​​and in October the Francoists bombed the car itself.


Ten more "Junkers" arrived in Morocco by sea. They were sent by steamer from Hamburg on 29 July. At the destination, the cars were unloaded on August 11.


Immediately after their arrival, German pilots began regular flights from Tetouan (Morocco) to the Tablada airfield near Seville. In the very first days they transferred 500 soldiers. This allowed the rebels to go on the offensive and move north of the city.


Aircraft made up to four sorties a day. At the same time, instead of 17 people, the norm was taken on board up to 40. The record was set by the pilot Henke (from Lufthansa), who transported 243 soldiers and officers in a day. Together with the troops, the aviation transferred ammunition and weapons, including machine guns and small cannons.


From the beginning of August, Italian aircraft also began to operate on the "air bridge" from Morocco. By the end of the month, 7,350 people had already been airlifted to Spain. These included units of the Foreign Legion and Moroccans. On August 5, under the cover of Italian aviation, sea transportation began. Therefore, the importance of the air route gradually weakened. Flights stopped in mid-October. In total, during the operation, 868 flights were made, 14,000 soldiers, 44 guns and 500 tons of various cargoes were transferred. Hitler said: "Franco must erect a monument to the Ju 52. The victory of the revolution in Spain is due to this aircraft."


On August 20-21, the Junkers used to dump food, ammunition and medicines to the rebels defending the Alcazar fortress in Toledo.


But the Ju 52 / 3mg3e was used in Spain not only as military transport aircraft. Since the beginning of August, they began to work as bombers. On August 3, 1936, the German crew bombed for the first time on the accumulation of Republican troops. Ten days later, two Junkers attacked the battleship Jaime I near Malaga. The leader of the pair, Lieutenant von Moro, could not hit the target, but the crew of his wingman, the already mentioned pilot Henke, achieved two hits with 250-kg high-explosive bombs. On the battleship, 47 sailors were killed and wounded.


Success led to the decision to create an impromptu bomber squadron, simply called "Moro's squadron". By the end of August, the Germans had installed machine guns and cluster bombs on six aircraft.


By this time, the Spanish rebels themselves were also already armed with Ju 52 / 3m3e. Apparently, they received all the cars that they sent by sea. In August 1936, Group B was formed in Salamanca under the command of X. Diaz de Lecea. It consisted of three units of three aircraft each. Specialists from the "Moro squadron" helped in the training of the crews.


On August 14, bombers from group "B" had already attacked the republican airfield of Getafe near Madrid, and two days later another - Cuatro Vientos. On 27 and 28 August they bombed the capital of Spain. The raid on Getafe on October 4 turned out to be very effective. A pair of "Junkers" destroyed nine aircraft on the ground.


In the meantime, in Stettin and Swinemünde, they were loading onto ships of the Condor Legion, a German air force created specifically for military operations in Spain. Its main strike force was the K88 group. Initially, it was divided into three squadrons of 12 bombers. The group mainly received improved Ju 52 / 3mg4e, but there were also earlier "g3s". The equipment was distilled to Salamanca through Italy. After arriving in Spain, K88 absorbed the Moro squadron. She was reorganized, forming four squadrons of nine cars.


"Junkers" took Active participation in the battles near Madrid in the autumn of 1936. While the Republicans were flying on all sorts of junk, low-speed three-engine bombers worked quietly during the day. But in October, Soviet I-15 and I-16 fighters were unloaded from the ships. Pilots arrived for them. On November 4, I-15s shot down the first Junker over the suburbs of Madrid. The pilot Lieutenant Kolbitts died, the rest of the crew escaped with parachutes.


On the same day, Soviet pilots intercepted in the clouds a flight of Ju 52 / 3m, flying to Madrid, and attacked the last bomber. The damaged car turned back, but did not reach its airfield. I had to sit where I needed to. The navigator died of his wounds.


The next day, according to Soviet data, two "Junkers" were shot down, on November 6 - another one (it is interesting that the enemy on this day recognizes the loss of not one, but two bombers; the first, with a Spanish crew, died, the second, on which the background flew Moreau, forced to sit not far from the front, the German pilots were not injured).


Soviet pilots rated the Ju 52/3m as a fairly serious opponent. Here is what Ya.I. Chernykh fighter pilot, who returned from Spain, to Alksnis: “The machine is very tenacious. We came close, shot at her, you feel that the bullets are flying into the car, but it does not fall and does not burn. High combat survivability was ensured by a multi-spar wing, thick tubes of rudder control rods, and distribution of fuel over a large number of protected tanks. If the motor mount was damaged, the engine was held by safety cables.


Nevertheless, the losses of the "Junkers" grew. They were destroyed not only in the air, but also on the ground. According to Soviet data, the first five bombers were put out of action at the airfield in Seville, which on October 28 came under attack from the republican SB and Pote 54. On November 11, bombs fell on aircraft parking in Avila. There, among other aircraft, two Junkers were destroyed.


But the Ju 52 / 3m continued to fly during the day, dropping bombs on Madrid from medium altitudes. So, on November 19, almost 40 tons of deadly cargo were brought down on the city, and the republican fighters in response shot down one Junker and damaged two.


At the end of December, the "Junkers" from K88 began to operate on the Northern Front, in the area of ​​Santander and Bilbao. There were few Republican planes there.


Basically, these were "motley" obsolete cars. This allowed the Ju 52 / 3m to continue to operate fairly confidently during the day. But on January 4, 1937, two bombers became victims of the republican I-15s at once. One, shot down by S. Bulkin, fell near Bilbao, the second, attributed to S. Petrukhin, crashed on the way to the Vitoria airfield.


Near Madrid, Francoist aircraft tried to reduce their losses by increasing fighter escort, but this did not give significant results. Already in October 1936, the first cases of the use of "Junkers" at night were noted. During several raids on the San Javier airfield, they damaged a total of eight SBs, two of which had to be written off. On the night of January 11, 1937, enemy planes bombed Madrid and the Campo Real airfield in the dark. However, Junkers groups with a powerful escort (three to five or more fighters per bomber) met during the day until April 1937. As Ju 52 / 3m day bombers, they participated in the battles on the river. Jarama and in Guadalajara.


Later, in the central part of Spain, the Junkers switched exclusively to night operations. By the beginning of the battles for Brunete, the Francoists had 12 Ju 52 / 3m (groups 1-G-22 and 2-G-22), the Condor Legion had 25 (group K88).


On the night of July 26, 1937, Republican fighters carried out the first night interception. The Soviet pilot M. Yakushin on the I-15 at an altitude of 2000 m attacked a single Junker from squadron 3 / K88 near the front line. The bomber caught fire and crashed. The entire crew was killed.


The next night, A. Serov discovered at an altitude of 3000 m a Ju 52 / 3m illuminated by a searchlight. He fired at it, but the bomber got away. Almost immediately, Serov noticed the second plane and joined him in the tail. Despite the fire of the top gunner of the Junkers, after the third round, the Soviet fighter set fire to the German. Four members of the bomber's crew bailed out and were taken prisoner. After that, Serov chased after the third car, but burned all the fuel and was forced to sit down at the front line.


I. Eremenko won another victory on the night of September 14-15. He shot down the Junkers of the rebels. Interestingly, the captured aircraft commander turned out to be a Russian white émigré.


On October 15, more than 60 Republican fighters stormed the Garapinillos airfield. The smoke from the fires was visible almost 100 km away. It was possible to destroy a significant number of aircraft of various types. Three Ju 52 / 3m burned out completely, several more were damaged.


In the north, the "Junkers" longer adhered to the practice of conducting operations during the day, and, despite the weakness of the Republican air force on this front, they periodically paid for it. On April 13, 1937, anti-aircraft gunners shot down one of the three planes that bombed Bilbao. The car crashed in the Mondragon area. On July 19, two Junkers fell on republican territory, shot by fighters.


It was on the Northern Front that the well-known massive raid on the small town of Guernica took place, which became a symbol of fascist barbarism. On April 26, 1937, German and Italian planes practically wiped it off the face of the earth. At the same time, both the nearby bridge and the military factory on the outskirts remained intact, and more than 1,500 civilians died. 18 Junkers from K88 took part in the raid. The lead car was driven by Major Fuchs. When the noise arose in the foreign press, at first the Francoists blamed everything on the republican sappers, who allegedly blew up the town during the retreat, then they began to talk about a navigational error. Now it is already known that it was a deliberate act of intimidation, plus the development of tactics for the destruction of cities by aviation.


From February 1937, K88 units began to re-equip themselves with new equipment. In mid-May, two squadrons were already flying the new He 111B bombers. The last time the Junkers were actively used in the north of the country was in October (and during the daytime), by the end of the month the re-equipment of the group was completed.


The Germans handed over most of the Ju 52 / 3m, which had become redundant, to the Francoists, the rest were used as transport aircraft. In mid-August 1938, according to Republican intelligence, the enemy had about 25 Junkers left. It is known for sure that on December 23 in two groups of night bombers (1-G-22 and 2-G-22) there were 13 vehicles; three more were in the Condor Legion.


The Francoist Junkers made their last sortie on March 26, 1939, the day the republican government capitulated. In April, all the surviving cars were assembled at the airfield in Leon. There were 23 of them. In total, according to various sources, the Germans sent from 55 to 61 Ju 52 / 3m to Spain, including two vehicles on floats.


One aircraft, captured by the Republicans at the end of 1936, was delivered to the USSR at the beginning of the next year, tested and studied.

"Junkers" Chiang Kai-shek

In February 1930, Lufthansa and the Chinese government agreed to establish a joint Eurasia airline. From September 1934 to September 1938 she received nine Ju 52/3mge. These planes flew on domestic and international (to Southeast Asia) lines. The crews were recruited mainly from Lufthansa personnel. After the Japanese attack on China in July 1937, Eurasia continued to function.


On August 1, Japanese aviation destroyed one of the company's liners at the Kunming airfield. By December 1939, Eurasia lost four more aircraft from enemy actions and accidents. After the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, which created the "axis" Berlin - Rome - Tokyo, the Chinese government ceased the company's activities, but until August 1941 its aircraft and crews continued to work as if they were in government service.


In September, the Germans left China, the vehicles were accepted by the crews of the Chinese Air Force.


Aircraft were used as transport aircraft, mainly for the transportation of high-ranking officials. President Chiang Kai-shek himself has repeatedly made trips around the country on them. In particular, on one Ju 52 / 3mge he flew to meet with the communist leader Mao Tse Tung.


Three Chinese Junkers were destroyed by Japanese bombers in Hong Kong on December 8, 1941. It is not known when the last Chinese Junker was written off.

At the origins of the German airborne troops

By the beginning of 1938, only one group remained in the Luftwaffe, armed with three-engine "Junkers" - IV / KG 152 in Fünsterwald. She was assigned to the 7th Airborne Division. On March 13, 1938, the group conducted its first combat operation - during the Anschluss of Austria, its planes landed a battalion of paratroopers at the Thalerhof airfield in Graz. 54 cars participated.


On April 1 of the same year, this unit became known as KGrzbV 1 - the 1st Special Purpose Group. At this time, she had 39 aircraft. Part of the equipment and crews were allocated as the core new group KGrzbV 2 in Brandenburg. Each of the groups in the state was to have four squadrons of 12 aircraft and a headquarters link of five vehicles. In the summer of 1939, two more such groups were created.


All of them were united in the KGzbV 1 squadron. At the end of August, the formation of the second squadron, KGzbV 2, and then the third, KGzbV 172, began. The latter, which consisted of two groups, received 59 Junkers requisitioned from Lufthansa along with the crews. During the invasion of Poland, it was planned to land a large landing near Poznan, but it was not needed. Transport aircraft were mainly engaged in the supply of advanced units and the removal of the wounded. So 19,760 people and 1,600 tons of various cargoes were transferred. To do this, it was necessary to hastily assemble three more transport groups at the expense of equipment and personnel of flight schools. On September 25, the "Junkers" in the role of bombers participated in a major raid on Warsaw. At the same time, small incendiary bombs of 2 kg each were loaded into the fuselage and thrown out of the doors manually. Polish fighters were no longer seen in the sky. Bombing was carried out as at a training ground. The Junkers dropped 72 tons of incendiary and 486 tons of fragmentation and high-explosive bombs. After the capture of the city, the Fuhrer personally examined its destruction from the board of a personal aircraft.


During the fighting, the Poles managed to shoot down a dozen Ju 52 / 3m, another 44 (according to other sources - 47) vehicles were written off due to various damages (including due to accidents). At the same time, several aircraft ended up on the territory occupied by the Red Army. On October 8, at least three Junkers were on our side: two in Lvov and one stuck in a meadow near the village of Shklo. All this equipment was returned to the Germans, although not in a complete set. The disappearance of the equipment was attributed to the Poles, although it was carefully packed and taken to the Air Force Research Institute.

Operation Weserübung

Following Poland, it was the turn of Denmark and Norway. The German General Staff called the operation to capture them "Weserübung" - "Teachings on the Weser". By its beginning, the forces of transport aviation had increased significantly. Only for the transfer of the first wave of airborne troops involved ten groups and four separate squadrons. At the same time, almost all military transport aviation in Germany was equipped with Ju 52 / 3m. Only one squadron had a mixed composition, and three groups were equipped with seaplanes. A total of 573 three-engine Junkers were involved in the operation.


On April 9, 1940, these machines landed on airfields in southern Norway. The sites were captured by paratroopers, after which German airfield teams arrived there by air. They ensured the unloading of infantry, various weapons and equipment. According to this scheme, the Germans captured the airfields of Forneby in Oslo and Sola in Stavanger. The landing in Sola, however, was not particularly successful - all Norwegian planes flew north just a few minutes before the arrival of German transport workers. But the paratroopers managed to prevent the explosion of an important bridge in Vordingborg.


Later, units that were rapidly moving north were also supplied by air. About 160 tons of fuel were transported alone. Reinforcements were also transferred by planes. At the same time, they had to land on any more or less suitable sites. On April 14, the Norwegian biplane Fokker C.V found 11 Junkers on the ice of Lake Hartvigvann, which landed a unit of mountain rangers. These planes from the group KGrzbV 102 got stuck on the lake due to lack of fuel on the way back. Six "Fokkers" dropped bombs on them, but missed - only a few transport workers were damaged by shrapnel. After refueling, the Norwegians carried out a second raid on stationary vehicles. This time two of them were burned and four more were damaged. By April 16, the Germans were able to deliver a certain amount of fuel to the lake, but the Norwegian pilots destroyed three aircraft with a new strike and completely disabled five. One "junker-su" managed to fly away, but the pilot got lost and landed in Sweden, where the car was interned. Soon the ice melted, and all the other planes went to the bottom.


In total, during the Norwegian campaign, Ju 52 / 3m transported more than 29,000 people, 2414 tons of various cargoes, plus 118 tons of aviation gasoline for aircraft at advanced airfields.

Plan "Gelb"

The next step of the Nazi strategists was an offensive in the west. According to the Gelb plan, the main blow to France was delivered through Belgium and the Netherlands. The airborne troops played an important role in the capture of strategic objects. The landing of parachute, glider and landing troops was provided by about 430 Ju 52 / 3m, consolidated into seven air groups.


The operation began on May 10, 1940. In Belgium, the Germans set the task of capturing an important transport hub in the Maastricht region. There were three bridges across the Albert Canal - at Veldweselt, Vroenhofen and Kann. All of them were controlled from Fort Eben-Emael - a powerful modern defensive structure.


Early in the morning, 11 Junkers delivered nine DFS 230 landing gliders to the target, two of them unhooked along the road due to problems. The gliders landed right in the courtyard of the fort. The paratroopers pierced the armored caps of the gun turrets with cumulative charges and threw grenades at the gunners. The Germans managed to paralyze the fort until the approach of motorized units. Paratroopers landing from other aircraft captured two of the three bridges.


Landing troops were widely used in the Netherlands. "Junkers" landed right on the airfields of the Dutch Air Force, at airports, and even on wide highways. Luftwaffe fighters and bombers were the first to appear, destroying enemy aircraft and suppressing anti-aircraft weapons. Immediately after this, the transporters were landing. The infantry was unloaded under fire, often while continuing to steer along the lane. Together with the soldiers, machine guns, small guns, small-caliber anti-aircraft guns were delivered by air. Dutch aviation diligently stormed the airfields captured by the Germans. For example, on May 10, 11 Dutch aircraft stormed Ipenburg and Valkenburg, where, according to intelligence, up to 50 Junkers had accumulated. They dropped bombs on the parking lots and fired on the transport workers and the landing force with machine guns. The Dutch lost five vehicles, but many Junkers remained on the ground to burn out.


The enemy and fighters were pretty battered. On the morning of May 10, several Fokker D.XXI monoplanes intercepted 55 Ju 52 / 3m from the KGrbzV 9 group. Dutch pilots shot down 18 cars one after another; Anti-aircraft gunners also made their contribution.


All landing operations in the Netherlands, including the capture of bridges over the Meuse at Dordrecht, were generally successful. But the losses were huge. Separate groups lost up to 40% of their composition. In total, the Luftwaffe lost 162 Junkers. Since the damaged vehicles remained in the hands of the Germans, some of them were restored. From two or three, one plane was assembled. A total of 53 transport workers were repaired.


The aircraft fleet was restored due to the new release and requisition of cars from Lufthansa. However, the most


the battered squadron KGzbV 1 had to be temporarily disbanded, as well as groups KGrzbV 11, 12 and 101. In total, until the surrender of France in June 1940, the Germans lost 242 Ju 52 / 3m.

On the other side of the front

Three-engine "Junkers" were used in World War II not only by the Germans and their allies, but also by opponents. After the declaration of war, the South African Air Force requisitioned 11 Ju 52 / 3mge from South African Airways. They became part of the bomber-transport group, assembled from former passenger aircraft.


In the autumn of 1940, South African soldiers were transferred to the border with Somalia. Then, already as part of the 50th squadron, the Junkers provided supplies for the troops advancing north and took out the wounded. They also periodically made flights to South Africa and Egypt. In 1942, the squadron was re-equipped with American C-47s.

in the mediterranean

In October 1940, Mussolini asked Hitler for help. He needed planes to transport troops to Albania. Italy, which at that time owned Albania, used it as a springboard to attack Greece. But the Greeks not only repulsed the attack, but also launched an offensive themselves. The Fuhrer came to the aid of an unlucky ally.


One group of Junkers (53 vehicles) was sent to Foggia in eastern Italy. On December 9, German planes began flying to Tirana from there. In 50 days they transported 30,000 soldiers and 4,700 tons of cargo. Return flights delivered 8346 wounded.


Since the flights were made far from the front, the Germans had no losses.


German transport aircraft returned to the Mediterranean at the beginning of 1941. From February they began to carry out flights to Libya for Rommel's Afrika Korps. The Ju 52 / 3m group was stationed at the Comiso airfield in Sicily. Aircraft made up to three flights a day, while the crews were in the air for up to 12 hours. Every day, up to 1000 people and 25 tons of cargo were delivered through the Mediterranean Sea. English fighters diligently hunted for the leisurely transporters, and the Germans constantly suffered significant losses.


April 6, 1941 Germany attacked Yugoslavia and Greece. In preparation for this campaign, three new transport groups were formed. They, along with other units, were concentrated in Plovdiv (Bulgaria), uniting them into the XI air corps. From there, part of the aircraft flew to Larissa in the northern part of Greece, already captured by the Germans. There they refueled and took on board the landing force.


The task was to capture the bridge over the Corinth Canal. The operation involved six tugs with gliders and 40 Junkers with paratroopers. Parachute troops captured the surrounding heights and took up defense. The gliders had to take the bridge itself. One of the gliders hit the abutment and crashed; the rest sat down safely. The paratroopers managed to disarm the guards, but an English battery opened fire on the bridge. The shell hit the explosives planted in the support, and the bridge flew into the air.


The largest airborne operation carried out by the Germans in World War II, of course, was the occupation of. Crete. For this purpose, ten transport groups were assembled plus a separate squadron of glider tugs (also on Ju 52 / 3m) - a total of 493 serviceable vehicles.


Early in the morning of May 20, 1941, after being hit by bombers, the DFS 230 gliders disengaged from the tugboats and began to land in the designated places. The main task of the first wave was the destruction of anti-aircraft batteries. This was followed by the landing of paratroopers. They were thrown out in four places. In total, 10,000 people parachuted. This was not seen even at the pre-war maneuvers of the Red Army. Paratroopers were shot in the air, and on the ground they immediately had to engage in battle with English and Greek soldiers. The losses were very great.


By the end of the second day of fighting, paratroopers captured the Maleme airfield. Although the artillery fired on him, the "Junkers" landed one by one, unloading the 5th division of mountain rangers. The wrecked planes were on fire, they were extinguished, the wreckage was dragged to the side and new cars were taken. Aviation delivered everything necessary to the island - ammunition, food, medicines, as well as heavy weapons and vehicles. In total, more than 13,000 soldiers, 353 guns and 771 motorcycles were transferred to Crete during the landing. The latter were partially transported on an external sling between the landing gear.


The island was captured, but at the cost of heavy losses. By May 31, only 185 serviceable aircraft remained in the XI Air Corps, that is, less than half of the original composition. Some groups again had to be disbanded. By the time of the attack on the USSR, German transport aviation had not yet managed to fully restore its combat capability.

Plan "Barbarossa"

On June 22, 1941, German troops crossed the border of the Soviet Union. Large airborne landings were not planned here, but the rapid advance to the east often forced them to resort to supplying advanced units with aviation. The four transport groups sent to the territory of the USSR were clearly not enough. Already in December, Hitler ordered the formation of five new groups specifically for the Eastern Front. The personnel for them were assembled from instructors and cadets of flight schools.


At the beginning of 1942, the Red Army broke through the front south of Lake Ilmen and surrounded the 16th Army of General von Busch. About 100,000 German soldiers and officers ended up in the “cauldron” near Demyansk. The grouping of Lieutenant General von Seydlitz rushed to help. She managed to break through the narrow, 4 km wide, "Ramushevsky corridor" (passing through the village of Ramushevo). It was completely shot through by Soviet artillery. The only way to supply the encircled was by air. The Germans collected suitable aircraft along the entire front, pulled them from the rear, and even transferred a group of KGrzbV 500 from the Mediterranean theater. But even this was not enough. In Germany, five groups were hastily completed, two of which received Ju 52 / 3m, and in two they were combined with obsolete bombers.


On February 20, 1942, the first four Junkers landed in Demyansk. Only before landing, the intense fire of the anti-aircraft gunners cut off the Soviet fighters pursuing them. The whole armada began to run between Demyansk and the airfields behind the encirclement. In the Kholm area, cargo was dropped by parachute.


At first, German planes flew in small groups and singly, changing routes all the time. Ambush anti-aircraft gunners and fighters advanced to the forward sites were waiting for them. Only the 161st Fighter Aviation Regiment shot down 12 Junkers in a short time, including Lieutenant Usenko destroyed three aircraft in one sortie. The transporters were hunted not only by our fighters, but also by bombers and attack aircraft. IL-2s with cannon fire quite successfully dealt with clumsy three-engine vehicles. Stormtroopers went to hunt for the "Junkers" one by one or in small groups. Protected by powerful armor in front, the pilots, ignoring the fire of the enemy shooter, shot the transporters from cannons point-blank. Sergeant Ryaboshapka shot down four enemy planes in a short period of time. The record was set by Senior Lieutenant V. Oleinik, who accounted for six Junkers destroyed in the air and eight on the ground. German vehicles loaded with ammunition or fuel often exploded in the air. Sometimes attack aircraft worked as "beaters", directing groups of transport workers under the blows of our fighters.


Fleeing from the air threat, the German pilots began to fly close to the ground, descending to 15-20 m. But there the planes came under intense fire from small arms. Passengers shot back with machine guns and threw hand grenades. But soon heavy losses forced the Germans to build a bypass route. They spent more fuel on it, but the route ran over snow-covered forests, bypassing settlements and roads. They flew into the encirclement already in the evening and returned at dawn. The Soviet 6th Air Army concentrated its efforts on strikes against airfields in the Demyansk area. After a large group of transport workers was discovered at some site during the day, at night it became a target for U-2 biplanes, which bombarded it with incendiary ampoules. Twin-engine bombers navigated through the fires, destroying the airfield with high-explosive bombs. When in the morning the German airfield teams hurriedly filled up the funnels and removed the burned-out aircraft, our Il-2 attack aircraft appeared and dispersed the workers with machine-gun fire and at the same time shot the equipment that was on the field. After such a combined strike, the airfield was usually inactive for several days. This tactic also ensured significant enemy losses in equipment. At the Glebovshchina airfield, aerial photography showed up to 70 crashed aircraft.


On the one hand, by the end of April, the Germans managed to deliver more than 65,000 tons of various cargoes to the surrounded, transport 30,500 reinforcements and evacuate 35,400 wounded. On the other hand, they lost 265 aircraft, mostly Ju 52 / 3m. Only attack aircraft shot down from March to November 1942, according to Soviet data, more than 60 Junkers. Nevertheless, the "air bridge" saved the 16th Army. In March 1943, she managed to break through to her own. At the airfields in the Demyansk area, the enemy abandoned 78 damaged aircraft, mostly transport aircraft.

For Rommel case

Another big problem for the German command was the supply of the African Corps. Allied fleets and aircraft hindered shipping between Italy and the North African coast. At the same time, everything needed had to be delivered from Europe. The more important became air transportation.


The transport aviation force stationed in Italy and Greece was constantly growing. "Junkers" usually flew across the Mediterranean in large groups (up to 25-30 cars) in close formation at low altitude. Fighter cover on the route, as a rule, was absent. To increase the defensive capability of the groups, they began to include "waffentregers" - converted Ju 52 / 3mg4e with enhanced weapons. All vehicles of this type belonged to the 11/KGzbV 1 group.


When in November 1942, under pressure from the British, the Italian army and the African Corps rolled back, and the Allied landings landed in Algiers, it was time to organize an "air bridge" to Tunisia. But no matter how hard the Germans tried, they failed to ensure the full supply of either their units, let alone the Italians. They only lost a large number of aircraft. But these losses could not be compared with what they lost during Battle of Stalingrad

To save the 6th Army

On November 19, Soviet troops closed the ring around the 6th Paulus Army that entered Stalingrad. Surrounded needed to deliver approximately 750 tons of various cargoes per day. Goering promised the Fuhrer to do so. A large number of aircraft were concentrated at the Morozovskaya and Tatsinskaya airfields to the west of the city. These included 375 Ju 52/3m.


They began to fly to the sites inside the encirclement. Mass transportation began on November 23. They flew during the day. Transport workers acted in small groups and one by one. Sometimes they were accompanied by fighters, but more often they were not: there were not enough fighters for all. The destruction of transport aircraft became the main task of Soviet pilots and anti-aircraft artillery. They shot down up to 30-50 cars a day, about a third of all those flying across the front line. So, four Soviet fighters overtook a group of 17 Ju 52 / 3m and four Bf 109 fighters near Bolshaya Rossoshka. An unexpected attack deprived the Germans of five Junkers and one Messerschmitt.


Heavy losses forced the enemy to change tactics. Small groups with strong cover were released forward, diverting Soviet fighters, followed by the rest of the machines. Having lost air supremacy, the Germans began to fly late in the evening and early in the morning, as well as in conditions of poor visibility, masking themselves with clouds. Enemy fighters covered only takeoff and landing inside the ring. Since mid-December, transport workers have generally stopped flying during the day.


Soviet aviation also destroyed transport aircraft at airfields. Tatsinskaya and Morozovskaya were regularly bombed. Every day they bombed and stormed all the sites in Stalingrad several times. Long-range aviation regiments worked at night, as well as light night bombers and pairs of U-2 illuminators and Il-2 attack aircraft. On November 30, 15 Junkers were burned on the ground, on December 1 - 13, on December 10 - 31 (including 22 at the Basargino airfield), on December 11 - 58! On December 30, six dive bombers from the 35th Guards Bomber Regiment destroyed about 20 aircraft in Tormosin.


The Germans managed to deliver no more than 90 tons of cargo to the city daily. This was clearly not enough. The encirclement was shrinking. Airfields were captured one by one. Soviet troops. The Junkers took off and landed on them until the last moment, until the tanks burst into the airfield. In the end, only one airfield remained at the disposal of the 6th Army - Nursery, cluttered with broken aircraft. Our pilots managed to thwart the enemy's attempts to evacuate the command staff. So, in one of the downed Ju 52 / 3m, officers of the headquarters of the 376th Infantry Division, led by its commander, were killed.


By January 11, 1943, the enemy managed to deliver only 5227 tons of cargo to Stalingrad at the cost of huge losses. When transport planes lost the ability to land, they began to drop cargo with and without parachutes. "Parcels" often fell in the wrong place and were gladly picked up by the Red Army. More than half of the dropped “arrived” for other purposes. There was a case when a bag with orders fell right in the camp for German prisoners of war.


By the time Paulus gave the surrender order on February 2, 1943, the Luftwaffe had lost 266 Junkers and more than 1,000 aircrew. Interestingly, ours estimated their successes a little more modestly - 250 destroyed and captured Ju 52 / 3m. All airfields near Stalingrad were lined with abandoned aircraft of varying degrees of serviceability. Only in Bolshaya Rossoshka they counted more than 40, in Basargino -17. Retreating, the Germans tried to disable machines that could not take off. Sometimes planes that looked serviceable were mined. Some of the captured "Junkers" were later restored and used in the rear.

Eastern Front, 1943-1945

All further major operations of the German military transport aviation were associated with the Eastern Front, more precisely with attempts to supply one or the other encircled grouping. After Stalingrad, she was never able to restore her former power. In May 1943, the Luftwaffe had five transport squadrons, four of which were armed with Ju 52 / 3m.


In the spring of 1943, the "Junkers" were used for the export of soldiers of the 17th Army from the Kuban. Then they had to deliver goods to the blocked Crimea. For this, a TG 2 squadron was transferred from the Mediterranean Sea, which became unnecessary there after the defeat of the Axis troops in North Africa.


In April 1943 the Ju 52/3m was used for the last time as a bomber. During the uprising in the Warsaw ghetto, they dropped bombs and leaflets on the city.


In March - April of the following year, four groups of "Junkers" tried to deliver the necessary goods to units of the 1st tank army, driven into the "bag" at Kamenetz-Podolsky. In May, the Germans organized an airborne assault for the last time. Paratroopers landed near the Yugoslav city of Drvar tried to capture the headquarters of Tito's partisans, but unsuccessfully - Soviet pilots took him to Italy.


Since the summer of 1944, the activity of the German transport aviation began to decline - there was not enough fuel. But sporadic attempts to help the encircled continued. In January 1945, the Junkers broke through into the besieged Budapest. The last significant operation was the "air bridge" in Breslau in February - April of the same year. They flew here only at night. Nevertheless, the Germans lost 165 vehicles (not only the Ju 52 / 3m type).


"Junkers" tried to fly to besieged Berlin. On April 29, an aircraft from the TG 3 squadron dropped cargo in the area of ​​​​the Reich Chancellery.


As of April 25, the Luftwaffe had another 190 Ju 52/3m. They continued to come across to our pilots even after the official surrender of Germany. On May 8, Captain Dobrov and Senior Lieutenant Struchalin discovered two Junkers near Fr. Bornholm. They were heading towards Sweden. One transport was shot down, however, Dobrov's "yak" also received damage from return fire. The next day D.A. Matveev from 486th fighter regiment shot the Junkers in the Brno region in Czechoslovakia. This may have been the last Ju 52/3m destroyed in World War II.


After the surrender, the allied armies got about 140 vehicles in various conditions.

"Maysi"

"Mausi" - "mice", such a nickname was given to minesweepers Ju 52 / 3m (MS) by German pilots. They were first used in combat conditions in September 1940 off the Dutch coast. The planes were supposed to destroy magnetic bottom mines dropped by British bombers.


Soon, six squadrons of minesweepers operating in the North, Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas, as well as off the Atlantic coast of France, entered service. After the appearance of mines with acoustic fuses by the enemy, the squadrons began to consist of half of the vehicles with magnetic windings and half of the carriers of the "K" containers.


The usual tactics of the Mausi looked like this. A link of aircraft with magnetic windings went in a wedge at a height of 10 to 40 m above the water. With an interval of 200 m, they were followed by a link with explosive charges.


In November 1943, the Luftwaffe had 74 minesweepers, united in a mine-sweeping group. Soviet pilots met them more than once over the Black Sea in 1943-1944. near the mouth of the Danube. At the end of November 1943, an IL-2 shot down one Ju 52 / 3m (MS) in the Ochakov area.


In April 1944, six aircraft of this type were sent to Hungary, where they trawled the Danube. From the beginning of 1945, most Mausi were laid up due to lack of fuel.

The allies of the Reich

The first six Ju 52 / 3m arrived in Hungary in 1937. They were operated by the Malert airline. During the war, they were transferred to the Air Force, to the 2nd Transport Squadron. In the summer of 1942, they worked on the Don, providing transportation for the 2nd Hungarian Army. In September, one Ju 52 / 3mg7e transferred by the Germans was added to them. For the most part, these aircraft were engaged in the evacuation of the wounded. In October 1944, five Hungarian Junkers burned American Mustangs at the Bergend airfield. The last aircraft remaining with the Hungarians in December of the same year participated in transportation to Budapest surrounded by Soviet troops.


The Germans sold a total of 33 Ju 52/3m to Romania. The first of them arrived in November 1941. In the winter of 1941/42, our pilots came across them near Stalingrad. Some of them were shot down. At the beginning of 1944, the "Junkers" took out the Romanian soldiers and officers from the besieged Crimea. After the transition of Romania to the side of the Allies in August of the same year, the Romanians captured German aircraft that were on their airfields. Among them were 11 Ju 52/3m; six of them were later taken to the USSR. In Romania, the last Junkers were operated until the early 1960s.


The Italian Air Force in 1940 requisitioned the Ju 52 / 3mlu of the Ala Littoria airline. It was used as a military transport. In September 1943, after a coup in Italy, the Germans captured the car. For some time she served in Lufthansa.


Bulgaria in 1939 acquired two Ju 52 / 3mg4e. Although they were registered as civilians, they were actually used by the Air Force. In 1943, two Ju 52 / 3mg10e were added to them. In September 1944 Bulgaria declared war on Germany. A month later, the grouping of Bulgarian troops was surrounded by the Germans in the Ratunda-Drenyak area.


Planes delivered various cargoes to the encircled. The Bulgarian "Junkers" made 13 sorties and dropped 14 tons of food and ammunition. In Bulgaria, Ju 52 / 3m were operated until the mid-1950s.

As already mentioned, at the end of 1936, the Spanish Republicans managed to capture a practically intact Ju 52 / 3mg3e. In January of the following year, he was already near Moscow, at the airfield of the Air Force Research Institute. Our car received the masking designation DB-29 (or DB-29 -3M-BMW). There was snow, and skis from TB-1 began to be fitted to the aircraft. After a test flight, the shock absorbers had to be strengthened. By March 10, the Junkers had already completed five flights.


Captain Stefanovsky was appointed the lead pilot, and military engineer 3rd rank Antokhin and captain Datsko also flew with him. In addition to them, the Junkers were tested by more than a dozen pilots, including the head of the Research Institute, Divisional Commander Bazhanov. In total, 70 flights were made by car with a total duration of 32 hours 45 minutes.


Testing ended in May. In general, the aircraft was declared obsolete. Although at low altitudes, the DB-29 was slightly superior in speed and rate of climb to the TB-3 with M-34RN engines, its flight data was considered insufficient for a modern bomber. At the same time, they noted the ease of piloting, the availability of the machine for pilots below average qualification. The report states: "The aircraft is very reliable and very easy to operate both on the ground and in the air."


Junkers could be quickly disassembled into knots, numerous hatches provided access to parts that needed to be checked, adjusted or lubricated. Gas tanks were easily removed from the wing through large hatches. It took only 15 minutes to fill the car with fuel, and even less with oil. If necessary, gasoline was quickly merged in flight through special valves. To prevent splashes from falling on the wing, canvas sleeves fell out under the necks. In general, 55 new products were found on the Junkers, which they considered useful for the domestic aircraft industry. They noted the successful design of welded gas tanks, wheels and their brakes, chassis shock absorbers, and many elements of electrical equipment.


The defense capability of the bomber was tested by air battles with both fighters and SB and DB-3 bombers. All of them could easily catch up with a slow-moving and not very maneuverable car. The "German" had a lot of non-shooting angles from which he could be attacked. Armament Ju 52 / 3m as a whole was considered completely obsolete.


The conclusion of the testers read: “Despite the outdated design of the aircraft as a whole, it deserves special attention».


After the tests, the head of the Air Force Alksnis ordered: “The aircraft should be kept as an exhibit for further study by workers of serial aircraft factories and designers of these factories ...” The car entered factory No. 156 in Moscow, where it was disassembled, measured and carefully studied.


Passenger Ju 52 / 3m in Moscow were not new - they regularly landed at the Central Airfield. Military vehicles again met our Red Army soldiers in Poland. Our mechanics even dismantled one of them on their own before returning it to the Germans.


After the Baltic republics joined the Soviet Union, two Ju 52 / 3m of the Estonian airline AGO entered the fleet of the Baltic Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet. We began to call them Yu-52. For some time they were operated on the line Riga - Velikiye Luki - Moscow.


Aircraft of the Luftwaffe, just like the Soviet ones, violated the border from time to time. So, on July 28, 1940, a single Junker passed over Kaunas. Two flights of I-15bis from the 31st Fighter Wing went up to intercept. In the area of ​​​​Mariampol, the German car was overtaken and given several warning bursts, after which the Ju 52 / 3m went towards the border.


At the end of 1940 Soviet Union ordered 10 Junkers in Germany in a cargo version. In February - April of the following year, three of them flew around and took off. But these machines did not arrive in the USSR. This was due to the fact that the delegation headed by I.F. Petrov, having familiarized herself in Germany with the Ju 52 / 3m, converted into a flying laboratory for testing engines, asked to hand over five out of ten ordered machines in this version. The firm agreed to finalize only one aircraft with a deadline of October 1941.


After the start of the war, two Baltic Junkers were evacuated to Siberia, where they were used on the Moscow-Irkutsk air route. On July 14, 1942, the head of the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet B.C. Molokov sent a letter to Stalin asking him to allow the use of captured German aircraft in the rear. In October of the same year, the first Junker was added to the Aeroflot fleet, and a month later, another one. But due to the lack of spare parts, out of four Yu-52s, only two could fly. All four cars at that time were registered with the West Siberian Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet (the administration of the highway was disbanded).


But at the beginning of the next year, the situation changed dramatically. Near Stalingrad, many German transport aircraft were captured. Brigades were sent there from the air repair bases for the selection and primary repair of vehicles. Upon closer examination, the Junkers turned out to be not as serviceable as it seemed to the infantrymen and tankmen who captured them. The fuselages, wings and engines were in place, but the tires were punctured, the engines were out of order, there were not enough instruments and radio stations. Yes, and a long standing under the snow did not benefit the technique.


The most suitable Yu-52s were brought “to condition” right on the spot, since there were enough spare parts around. What is not on one plane was on another. On April 1, 1943, the Civil Air Fleet already had 14 Junkers, and the NKAP had one more German transport. 11 of them were concentrated in the Moscow Department. Of the subsequent receipts, three more Yu-52s were given to the NKAP and two to an exhibition of trophies deployed in the Central Park of Culture and Recreation. Gorky in Moscow.


On some Junkers, Soviet radio stations MRK-005 appeared (only where there were no German ones). Rubber was used from TB-3, skis from Li-2. A tail wheel from the Il-4 was put on one aircraft.


Meanwhile, the collection of trophies continued. In May 1943, air repair base No. 405 sent a brigade led by engineer Pevzner to Stalingrad. A total of 29 vehicles were selected. 15 were considered suitable for restoration, and the rest were taken for spare parts. The Junkers were repaired by air repair bases No. 401, 403, 405 and plant No. 243.


Major alterations fell on base No. 405, which was considered the lead one. Among them, the project of replacing three BMW 132 engines with two domestic ASh-62IR should be mentioned. The drawings were developed by the engineers of base No. 405, and an experimental motor mount was also made there. By September 28, 1943, her static tests were completed. In October - November, one "Junkers" was reworked for a pair of ASh-62IR, but it is not known whether it was completed.


From the end of the spring of 1943, Yu-52s began to be widely used for transportation in the European part of the USSR. At first, they acted on the air defense services like a red rag on a bull. When a characteristic silhouette appeared, the firing immediately opened. On April 29, anti-aircraft artillery fired on a plane flying from Syzran to Kuibyshev. There were no casualties, no holes. But on May 12, Yu-52, which was coming from Chelyabinsk, came under fire near the bridge in Ulyanovsk. The car made an emergency landing at the Strigino airfield. Mechanics found two decent holes in the right wing. Such incidents were not isolated.


Many planes were idle due to lack of rubber. On October 25, the Civil Air Fleet had 31 Yu-52s, including 23 serviceable ones, but six of them turned out to be “undressed”. It was even proposed to replace the German wheels with wheels from Li-2. On the basis of No. 405, a set of drawings was completed. True, things did not go further.


On September 21, Aeroflot resumed regular service on a number of airlines. Yu-52 worked on the Sverdlovsk-Krasnoyarsk and Kuibyshev-Tashkent-Alma-Ata routes.


By winter, the Junkers were put on skis. The skis were different: both from Li-2 (they were installed on base No. 405), and from TB-1, and special ones. The latter were developed at the Research Institute of the Civil Air Fleet. They were first mounted on the L-23 aircraft in October 1943.


In 1943, the task was to get 25 Yu-52s. The plan was overfulfilled: according to the documents of the Civil Aviation Air Force, 27 Junkers were handed over. As of January 1, 29 Yu-52s were in service (including 21 serviceable ones). Lost only one. On October 24, 1943, the plane with the number L-37 crashed and burned down near the Asha station. The crew died.


As the situation at the front changed, there were more and more trophies. "Junkers" continued to enter the Civil Air Fleet, making up for relatively small losses (in 1944 they lost three aircraft, in 1945 - two). The number of cars gradually increased, but there was never such a quantitative jump as after the Battle of Stalingrad. On June 1, 1944 there were 30 of them, on January 1, 1945 - 31.


According to the GKO decree of December 12, 1944, all captured Yu-52s were to be handed over to the Civil Air Fleet. But there were also exceptions. One "Junker" served for quite a long time in the sanitary detachment of the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet. Three flying minesweepers were operated after the war in the Black Sea. They destroyed magnetic mines off the Crimean coast, in the Odessa area and at the mouth of the Danube.


But most of the trophies still went to civil aviation. After the capitulation of Germany, planes, engines, various equipment and spare parts were sent to the Soviet Union by echelons. By October 1, 1945, the Civil Air Fleet already had 37 Junkers. Of these, five perfectly serviceable aircraft arrived from Romania - they were seized by order of the Allied Control Commission.


Now the "Junkers" worked not only in the Moscow Department. Already from 1944, the Civil Air Fleet, which had considerably replenished its composition with Li-2s and American S-47s, could afford to equip rear units with new vehicles. They began to push the Yu-52 to the outskirts of the country. Seven planes were sent to Turkmenistan to transport sulfur. They had to replace the obsolete and extremely worn-out G-2s. Four Yu-52s had been working there since the end of 1944. Or rather, three were working - the fourth was waiting for new engines for a long time. One of these planes (the pilot of Borovoy) crashed on March 15, 1945 during an emergency landing on two engines.


Two cars arrived in Yakutia. Two planes in Tajikistan served the line to Kulyab. Among the pilots there were two women. One of them, Komissarova, died in an accident in 1945.


In Central Asia, the Yu-52 engine installation was revised. German engines suffered greatly from sand dust. Even in winter, piston rings wore out in 15–20 flight hours. In the first days of June 1945, air filters designed by the Research Institute of the Civil Air Fleet were installed on the right and middle engines of the L-68 aircraft. On the left, at the suggestion of local craftsmen, the suction pipe was installed not under the engine nacelle, but above it. After successful tests on the Ashgabat-Tashauz and Ashgabat-Darvaza lines on all aircraft in Turkmenistan, medium-sized engines were equipped with new suction pipes. Later, another version of the pipe appeared, tested on the L-35 machine.


The last Yu-52 entered the Civil Air Fleet in 1946. After the Li-2 and S-47, released from front service, entered the line, there was no longer a great need to use German aircraft. On June 28, 1947, an order was issued by the head of the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet on the decommissioning and further use of captured equipment. After fault detection, by the end of the year, nine of the most worn-out Yu-52s were written off, another one crashed in an accident. On December 1, there were 23 Junkers in total. From now on, they were ordered to be used only as cargo in remote areas. For example, in the East Siberian Directorate, Yu-52 entered the 10th transport detachment and began to carry food to the mines.


In 1948, ten more Junkers disappeared from the lists. According to the results of the aircraft fleet census conducted in May, two aircraft remained in stock - one was waiting for decommissioning, the second flew the resource to Eastern Siberia. As of June 1, there was only one Yu-52 on the lists. By the end of the year, he was gone.


Captured Junkers were also operated by departmental aviation. In June - August 1945, the crews of the Moscow group of the Polar Aviation Administration (UPA) overtook from Germany one aircraft on wheels and one on floats. At plant No. 477 in Krasnoyarsk, a cab heating system and new engine hoods were designed for them. They designed, manufactured and tested skis with a “positive result”. "Junker" with the number H-380 served for quite a long time in the Igarsk air group. In 1946, polar Yu-52s flew 351 hours. The last of them was written off in early 1949.


The NKAP (later MAP) also had German aircraft. The People's Commissariat received the first Yu-52s at the beginning of 1943. These vehicles ensured the urgent transportation of components from one plant to another. In April 1947, the ministry had six Junkers; later, the fleet increased due to the transfer of equipment from the Civil Air Fleet and the Air Force. On October 1 of the same year, it already included ten Yu-52s. Their write-off began the following year. On January 1, 1950, five vehicles remained in service. All of them were written off in the 1st quarter of the following year.


A certain number of aircraft were in the aviation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They served camps in remote areas. For example, in April 1947, two Yu-52s worked in the squadron of the Norilsk Combine (subordinate to the Main Directorate of Metallurgical Industry Camps). But even here they tried to get rid of them. By April 1949, only one "Junker" remained in the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and at the beginning of 1950 he was also written off.


Ministry of Fisheries western regions in April 1947, it had one aircraft based at the Izmailovsky airfield in Moscow. By the beginning of 1949, three such machines were operated by the Sevryba trust in Arkhangelsk. By April 1, only one of them was flying.


By 1951, not a single Yu-52 in Soviet aviation not left.

In Portugal and Switzerland

In November 1936, the Portuguese government asked Berlin to sell ten Junkers. The Germans supplied them with a batch of Ju 52 / 3mg3e under the designation Ju 52K. The machines were delivered by sea from Hamburg in 1937. They armed the bomber squadron at the Sintra airfield. Later, this unit was transferred to the Azores, where it was disbanded in January 1944. The aircraft flew to the mainland and were mothballed at the Ota base.


In September 1950, the Portuguese acquired two captured Ju 52/3mg7e from Norway. The planes were airlifted via Copenhagen and Brussels. At the end of 1960, the fleet was replenished with 15 French AAS.1. The cars were received in Oran (Algeria), and then they flew to Lisbon with an intermediate landing in Seville. These "junkers" served as transport. They were also used to train paratroopers. The last of them "survived" until 1968.


In October 1939 three Ju 52/3mg4e were sold to Switzerland. The aircraft were intended for air navigation training, but were also used as transport aircraft. After the war, the main wheels from AAS.1 were put on them, and the tail wheels were replaced with nose wheels from the English Vampire fighters. The Swiss "Junkers" were the last to be operated in military aviation. They were sold in September 1982 to a company in Germany, which uses these rare cars for demonstration flights.

Wars after the war

The Second World War ended, but the Ju 52 / 3m still had a chance to participate in several local conflicts. French "Toucans" fought in Indochina. In February 1946, a GT I/34 Bearn squadron arrived at the Bien Hoa airfield (northwest of Saigon). It included 16 AAS.1. The machines were equipped with bomb racks under the center section and consoles. "Toucans" were used to support troops on the ground. In addition to bombs, they carried canisters of combustible mixture, which were simply thrown from the doors. The aircraft have proven themselves well in terms of reliability and ease of maintenance.


In the summer of 1946, the squadron participated in the landing of several paratroopers - in Luang Prabang (Laos) and north of Haiphong. In December of the same year, its aircraft supported the advance of the French troops to Hanoi, and on January 6, 1947, they carried out a landing at Nam Dinh. The paratroopers were supposed to capture two bridgeheads for the landing of amphibious assault, but the fire of anti-aircraft artillery scattered the transport aircraft, and with them the paratrooper units.


More successfully was the landing of paratroopers near Hoa Binh in April of the same year, which contributed to the capture of the city. The number of "toucans" in Indochina gradually increased. In May, two squadrons of these machines operated there. In October, another dozen AAS.1s were delivered on the deck of the Diksmünde aircraft carrier.


Aircraft were alternately used either as transporters or as bombers. On May 27, 1949, 30 Tucans dropped a parachute battalion near the Dong Khe post besieged by the Vietnamese. The post was saved. But in October of the following year, two battalions had to land in the same area. The Vietnamese smashed them to smithereens. Despite the support of aviation (including AAS.1 with bombs), only 23 people left the jungle. In January - May 1951, "ersatz bombers" were actively working near Hanoi.


The last combat operation of the "toucans" was the landing at Hoa Binh on November 14, 1951. There they dropped three battalions. As auxiliary aircraft AAS.1 served in Indochina almost until the armistice in 1954.


In France, "toucans" were in service until the spring of 1960.


Spanish CASA 352 fought in Western Sahara. In February 1958, they dropped cargo to the Ifni garrison surrounded by partisans. There they also landed a paratrooper unit. Several vehicles were equipped with bomb racks and used to attack partisan positions. The Spanish "Junkers" operated in Western Sahara until 1969. The process of removing them from service began in 1965, but the last aircraft of this type were decommissioned only in 1978.

In civil aviation

After the war, Ju 52 / 3m were operated by civilian pilots in many countries. The British sold the captured cars to the BEA company. The Short factory in Belfast converted them into 12-seat passenger ones by sewing up the cargo hatch on the starboard side and replacing the radio equipment. 11 aircraft worked on local lines in Great Britain, in particular, on the London - Belfast route, until August 1948.


Float cars flew in Sweden and Norway. The Swedish company SAS scrapped them only in 1956. Three former military Junkers served in Bulgaria on the Vrazhdebna-Burgas line. In Romania, the same aircraft were operated until 1947.


The Ju 52/3m lasted the longest in New Guinea. In 1955, Gibbs Sepik Airways bought three Junkers from Sweden. The owner of the company, a former military pilot Gibbs, personally flew the first plane to the town of Goroka in October. In January 1957, two more cars followed.


The planes were equipped with additional gas tanks, and already on the spot the engines were replaced with Australian-made R-1340-SH-G (600 hp) and three-bladed Hamilton Standard 3D40 propellers were installed. German cars were able to take off and land where the American C-47s could not. They carried passengers and cargo throughout New Guinea and occasionally flew to Australia. One aircraft crashed during a forced landing in October 1959, and two more were scrapped in April 1960.