USSR: Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR, Moldavian SSR, Lithuanian SSR, Latvian SSR, Estonian SSR; regions: Pskov, Smolensk, Kursk, Oryol, Leningrad, Belgorod.
	Aggression of Nazi Germany
	Tactical - the defeat of Soviet troops in border battles and the retreat into the interior of the country with relatively small losses of the Wehrmacht and Germany's allies. The strategic outcome is the failure of the blitzkrieg of the Third Reich.
Opponents
Commanders
Joseph Stalin	Adolf Gitler
Semyon Timoshenko	Walther von Brauchitsch
Georgy Zhukov	Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb
Fedor Kuznetsov	Fedor von Bock
Dmitry Pavlov	Gerd von Rundstedt
Mikhail Kirponos †	Ion Antonescu
Ivan Tyulenev	Carl Gustav Mannerheim
	Giovanni Messe
	Italo Gariboldi
	Miklos Horthy
	Josef Tiso
Side forces
2.74 million people + 619 thousand Reserve GK (VSE) 13,981 tanks 9397 aircraft (7758 serviceable) 52,666 guns and mortars	4.05 million people + 0.85 million German allies 4215 tanks + 402 allied tanks 3909 aircraft + 964 allied aircraft 43,812 guns and mortars + 6673 allied guns and mortars
Military casualties
2,630,067 killed and captured 1,145,000 wounded and sick	Approximately 431,000 dead and dead 1,699,000 missing

(Directive No. 21. Plan "Barbarossa"; German. Weisung Nr. 21. Fall Barbarossa, in honor of Frederick I) - a plan for the German invasion of the USSR in the Eastern European theater of World War II and a military operation carried out in accordance with this plan at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War.

The development of the Barbarossa plan began on July 21, 1940. The plan, finally developed under the leadership of General F. Paulus, was approved on December 18, 1940 by the directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht No. 21. The lightning defeat of the main forces of the Red Army west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers was envisaged, in the future it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass with the subsequent exit to the Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line.

The estimated duration of the main hostilities, calculated for 2-3 months, is the so-called Blitzkrieg strategy (German. Blitzkrieg).

Prerequisites

After Hitler came to power in Germany, revanchist sentiments also increased sharply in the country. Nazi propaganda convinced the Germans of the need for conquest in the East. Back in the mid-1930s, the German government announced the inevitability of a war with the USSR in the near future. Planning an attack on Poland with the possible entry into the war of Great Britain and France, the German government decided to secure itself from the east - in August 1939, a Non-Aggression Pact was concluded between Germany and the USSR, dividing the spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe. On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland, as a result of which Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3. During the Polish campaign of the Red Army, the Soviet Union sent troops and annexed former possessions from Poland Russian Empire: Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. A common border appeared between Germany and the USSR.

In 1940, Germany captured Denmark and Norway (the Danish-Norwegian operation); Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France during the French campaign. Thus, by June 1940, Germany managed to radically change the strategic situation in Europe, withdraw France from the war and expel the British army from the continent. The victories of the Wehrmacht gave rise to hopes in Berlin for an early end to the war with England, which would allow Germany to devote all its forces to the defeat of the USSR, and this, in turn, would give her a free hand to fight the United States.

However, Germany failed to either force Great Britain to conclude peace or defeat her. The war went on fighting led to the sea North Africa and in the Balkans. In October 1940, Germany attempted to bring Spain and Vichy France into an alliance against England, and also initiated negotiations with the USSR.

The Soviet-German negotiations in November 1940 showed that the USSR was considering the possibility of joining the Tripartite Pact, but the conditions set by it were unacceptable for Germany, since they demanded that she refuse to interfere in Finland and closed her the possibility of moving to the Middle East through the Balkans.

However, despite these autumn events, based on Hitler's demands put forward by him in early June 1940, the OKH draws up draft plans for a campaign against the USSR, and on July 22, the development of an attack plan, code-named "Plan Barbarossa", began. The decision to go to war with the USSR and the general plan for the future campaign was announced by Hitler shortly after the victory over France - on July 31, 1940.

England's Hope - Russia and America. If hopes for Russia collapse, America will also fall away from England, since the defeat of Russia will result in an incredible strengthening of Japan in East Asia. […] If Russia is defeated, England will lose her last hope. Then Germany will dominate Europe and the Balkans. Conclusion: According to this reasoning, Russia must be liquidated. Deadline - spring 1941. The sooner we defeat Russia, the better. The operation will only make sense if we defeat the entire state with one swift blow. Just capturing some part of the territory is not enough. Stopping action in winter is dangerous. Therefore, it is better to wait, but make a firm decision to destroy Russia. […] Beginning [of the military campaign] - May 1941. The duration of the operation is five months. It would be better to start already this year, but this is not suitable, since it is necessary to carry out the operation with one blow. The goal is to destroy the life force of Russia. The operation is divided into: 1st hit: Kyiv, exit to the Dnieper; aviation destroys crossings. Odessa. 2nd strike: Through the Baltic states to Moscow; in the future, a bilateral strike - from the north and south; later - a private operation to seize the Baku region.

The Axis are made aware of the Barbarossa plan.

Side Plans

Germany

The overall strategic objective of the Barbarossa plan is " defeat Soviet Russia in a fleeting campaign before the war against England is over". The concept was based on the idea " to split the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of the country, with quick and deep blows from powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat marshes and, using this breakthrough, destroy disunited groupings of enemy troops". The plan provided for the destruction of the bulk of Soviet troops west of the Dnieper and Zapadnaya Dvina rivers, preventing them from retreating inland.

In development of the Barbarossa plan, on January 31, 1941, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces signed a directive on the concentration of troops.

On the eighth day German troops were supposed to reach the line of Kaunas, Baranovichi, Lvov, Mogilev-Podolsky. On the twentieth day of the war, they were supposed to capture the territory and reach the line: the Dnieper (to the area south of Kyiv), Mozyr, Rogachev, Orsha, Vitebsk, Velikiye Luki, south of Pskov, south of Pyarnu. This was followed by a pause of twenty days, during which it was supposed to concentrate and regroup formations, rest the troops and prepare new base supplies. On the fortieth day of the war, the second phase of the offensive was to begin. During it, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass.

Special meaning attached to the capture of Moscow: The capture of this city means, both politically and economically, a decisive success, not to mention the fact that the Russians will lose the most important railway junction.". The Wehrmacht command believed that the Red Army would throw the last remaining forces to defend the capital, which would make it possible to defeat them in one operation.

The line Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan was indicated as the final one, but the German General Staff did not plan the operation so far.

The Barbarossa plan set out in detail the tasks of army groups and armies, the procedure for interaction between them and with the Allied forces, as well as with the Air Force and Navy, and the tasks of the latter. In addition to the OKH directive, a number of documents were developed, including the assessment of the Soviet Armed Forces, the disinformation directive, the calculation of the time for preparing the operation, special instructions, etc.

In Directive No. 21 signed by Hitler, as the most early term attack on the USSR, the date was May 15, 1941. Later, due to the diversion of part of the Wehrmacht forces to the Balkan campaign, June 22, 1941 was named the next date for the attack on the USSR. The final order was given on 17 June.

USSR

Soviet intelligence it was possible to obtain information that Hitler had made some kind of decision related to Soviet-German relations, but its exact content remained unknown, like the code word "Barbarossa". And the information received about the possible start of the war in March 1941 after withdrawal from the war in England were unconditional disinformation, since Directive No. 21 indicated the approximate date for the completion of military preparations - May 15, 1941, and emphasized that the USSR should be defeated " more before that How will the war against England be ended?».

Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership did not take any action to prepare the defense in the event of a German attack. In the operational-strategic staff game that took place in January 1941, the issue of repelling aggression from Germany was not even considered.

The configuration of the Red Army troops on the Soviet-German border was very vulnerable. In particular, the former Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov recalled: “ On the eve of the war, the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies of the Western District were located in the Belostok ledge, concave towards the enemy, the 10th army occupied the most disadvantageous location. Such an operational configuration of troops created a threat of deep coverage and encirclement from the side of Grodno and Brest by striking under the flanks. Meanwhile, the deployment of front troops in the Grodno-Suvalkovsky and Brest directions was not deep enough and powerful enough to prevent a breakthrough here and the coverage of the Bialystok grouping. This erroneous disposition of troops, admitted in 1940, was not eliminated until the war itself ...»

Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership took certain actions, about the meaning and purpose of which discussions continue. In late May-early June 1941, troops were partially mobilized under the guise of reserve training camps, which made it possible to call up over 800 thousand people used to replenish divisions located mainly in the West; from mid-May, four armies (16th, 19th, 21st and 22nd) and one rifle corps began to advance from the internal military districts to the line of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers. From mid-June, a covert regrouping of the formations of the western border districts themselves began: under the guise of reaching the camps, more than half of the divisions that made up the reserve of these districts were set in motion. From June 14 to June 19, the commands of the western border districts received instructions to withdraw front-line departments to field command posts. Since mid-June, vacations for personnel have been canceled.

At the same time, the General Staff of the Red Army Army categorically suppressed any attempts by the commanders of the western border districts to strengthen the defense by occupying the foreground. Only on the night of June 22 did the Soviet military districts receive a directive on the transition to combat readiness, but it reached many headquarters after the attack. Although, according to other sources, orders to withdraw troops from the border by the commander western districts were given from 14 to 18 June.

In addition, most of the territories located on the western border were included in the USSR relatively recently. Powerful defensive lines at Soviet army was not at the border. The local population was rather hostile towards the Soviet authorities, and after the German invasion, many Baltic, Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalists actively helped the Germans.

balance of power

Germany and allies

Three army groups were created to attack the USSR.

• Army Group North (Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb) was deployed in East Prussia, at the front from Klaipeda to Goldap. It included the 16th Army, the 18th Army and the 4th Panzer Group - a total of 29 divisions (including 6 tank and motorized). The offensive was supported by the 1st Air Fleet, which had 1070 combat aircraft. The mission of Army Group North was to defeat Soviet troops in the Baltic, capture Leningrad and the ports on the Baltic Sea, including Tallinn and Kronstadt.

• Army Group Center (Field Marshal Fedor von Bock) occupied the front from Goldap to Vlodava. It included the 4th Army, the 9th Army, the 2nd Tank Group and the 3rd Tank Group - a total of 50 divisions (including 15 tank and motorized) and 2 brigades. The offensive was supported by the 2nd Air Fleet, which had 1680 combat aircraft. Army Group Center was tasked with cutting the strategic front Soviet defense, encircle and destroy the troops of the Red Army in Belarus and develop an offensive in the Moscow direction.

• Army Group South (Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt) occupied the front from Lublin to the mouth of the Danube. It included the 6th Army, the 11th Army, the 17th Army, the 3rd Romanian Army, the 4th Romanian Army, the 1st Panzer Group and the mobile Hungarian Corps - a total of 57 divisions (including 9 tank and motorized) and 13 brigades (including 2 tank and motorized). The offensive was supported by the 4th Air Fleet, which had 800 combat aircraft, and the Romanian Air Force, which had 500 aircraft. Army Group "South" had the task of destroying Soviet troops in the Right-Bank Ukraine, reaching the Dnieper and subsequently developing an offensive east of the Dnieper.

USSR

In the USSR, on the basis of the military districts located on the western border, according to the decision of the Politburo of June 21, 1941, 4 fronts were created.

• The Northwestern Front (commander F.I. Kuznetsov) was created in the Baltics. It included the 8th Army, the 11th Army and the 27th Army - a total of 34 divisions (of which 6 were armored and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the North Western front.
• The Western Front (commander D. G. Pavlov) was created in Belarus. It included the 3rd Army, the 4th Army, the 10th Army and the 13th Army - a total of 45 divisions (of which 20 were armored and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Western Front.
• The Southwestern Front (commander MP Kirponos) was created in Western Ukraine. It included the 5th Army, the 6th Army, the 12th Army and the 26th Army - a total of 45 divisions (of which 18 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force Southwestern Front.
• The Southern Front (commander I. V. Tyulenev) was created in Moldova and southern Ukraine. It included the 9th Army and the 18th Army - a total of 26 divisions (of which 9 were armored and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Southern Front.
• The Baltic Fleet (commander VF Tributs) was located in the Baltic Sea. It included 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, 2 destroyer leaders, 19 destroyers, 65 submarines, 48 ​​torpedo boats and other ships, 656 aircraft.
• The Black Sea Fleet (commander F. S. Oktyabrsky) was located in the Black Sea. It consisted of 1 battleship, 5 light cruisers, 16 leaders and destroyers, 47 submarines, 2 brigades of torpedo boats, several divisions of minesweepers, patrol and anti-submarine boats, over 600 aircraft.

The development of the USSR Armed Forces since the signing of the non-aggression pact

By the beginning of the forties, the Soviet Union, as a result of the industrialization program, came in third place after the USA and Germany in terms of the development of heavy industry. Also, by the beginning of the Second World War, the Soviet economy was largely focused on the production of military equipment.

First phase. Invasion. Border battles (June 22 - July 10, 1941)

Start of the invasion

Early in the morning at 4 o'clock on June 22, 1941, the German invasion of the USSR began. On the same day, Italy declared war on the USSR (Italian troops began hostilities on July 20, 1941) and Romania, on June 23 - Slovakia, and on June 27 - Hungary. The German invasion took the Soviet forces by surprise; on the very first day, a significant part of ammunition, fuel and military equipment was destroyed; the Germans managed to ensure complete air supremacy (about 1200 aircraft were disabled). German aircraft attacked naval bases: Kronstadt, Libava, Vindava, Sevastopol. Submarines were deployed on the sea lanes of the Baltic and Black Seas, and minefields were laid. On land, after strong artillery preparation, the advanced units, and then the main forces of the Wehrmacht, went on the offensive. However, the Soviet command was unable to soberly assess the position of its troops. The Main Military Council on the evening of June 22 sent directives to the Military Councils of the fronts demanding that decisive counterattacks be launched on the enemy groupings that had broken through from the morning of June 23. As a result of the failed counterattacks, the already difficult situation of the Soviet troops worsened even more. The Finnish troops did not cross the front line, waiting for the development of events, but giving the German aviation the opportunity to refuel.

On June 25, the Soviet command launched bombing attacks on Finnish territory. Finland declared war on the USSR and German and Finnish troops invaded Karelia and the Arctic, increasing the front line and endangering Leningrad and the Murmansk railway. The fighting soon turned into a positional war and did not affect general position affairs on the Soviet-German front. In historiography, they are usually distinguished into separate campaigns: the Soviet-Finnish War (1941-1944) and the Defense of the Arctic.

North direction

Against the Soviet Northwestern Front at first, not one, but two tank groups operated:

• Army Group North operated in the Leningrad direction, and its main strike force, the 4th Panzer Group, advanced on Daugavpils.
• The 3rd Panzer Group of the Army Group "Center" was advancing in the Vilnius direction.

An attempt by the command of the North-Western Front to launch a counterattack with the forces of two mechanized corps (almost 1000 tanks) near the town of Raseiniai ended in complete failure, and on June 25 a decision was made to withdraw troops to the line of the Western Dvina.

But already on June 26, the German 4th tank group crossed the Western Dvina near Daugavpils (E. von Manstein's 56th motorized corps), on July 2 - at Jekabpils (G. Reinhard's 41st motorized corps). The infantry divisions followed the motorized corps. On June 27, units of the Red Army left Liepaja. On July 1, the German 18th Army occupied Riga and entered southern Estonia.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Panzer Group of the Army Group Center, having overcome the resistance of the Soviet troops near Alytus, took Vilnius on June 24, turned to the southeast and entered the rear of the Soviet Western Front.

central direction

A difficult situation has developed on the Western Front. On the very first day, the flank armies of the Western Front (3rd Army in the Grodno region and 4th Army in the Brest region) suffered heavy losses. The counterattacks of the mechanized corps of the Western Front on June 23-25 ​​ended in failure. The German 3rd Panzer Group, having overcome the resistance of the Soviet troops in Lithuania and developing an offensive in the Vilnius direction, bypassed the 3rd and 10th Armies from the north, and the 2nd Panzer Group, leaving the Brest Fortress in the rear, broke through to Baranovichi and bypassed them from the south. On June 28, the Germans took the capital of Belarus and closed the encirclement ring, in which the main forces of the Western Front found themselves.

On June 30, 1941, the commander of the Soviet Western Front, General of the Army D. G. Pavlov, was removed from command; later, by decision of the military tribunal, he, along with other generals and officers of the headquarters of the Western Front, was shot. The troops of the Western Front were first led by Lieutenant General A. I. Eremenko (June 30), then People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S. K. Timoshenko (appointed on July 2, took office on July 4). Due to the fact that the main forces of the Western Front were defeated in the Battle of Belostok-Minsk, on July 2, the troops of the Second Strategic Echelon were transferred to the Western Front.

In early July, Wehrmacht motorized corps overcame the line of Soviet defense on the Berezina River and rushed to the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, but unexpectedly ran into the troops of the restored Western Front (in the first echelon of the 22nd, 20th and 21st Armies). On July 6, 1941, the Soviet command launched an offensive in the Lepel direction (see Lepel counterattack). During the tank battle that broke out on July 6-9 between Orsha and Vitebsk, in which more than 1,600 tanks participated from the Soviet side, and up to 700 units from the German side, German troops defeated the Soviet troops and took Vitebsk on July 9. The surviving Soviet units withdrew to the area between Vitebsk and Orsha. German troops took up starting positions for the subsequent offensive in the area of ​​​​Polotsk, Vitebsk, south of Orsha, as well as north and south of Mogilev.

South direction

The military operations of the Wehrmacht in the south, where the most powerful grouping of the Red Army was located, were not so successful. June 23-25 ​​aviation Black Sea Fleet bombed the Romanian cities of Sulina and Constanta; On June 26, the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, together with aircraft, attacked Constanta. In an effort to stop the offensive of the 1st Panzer Group, the command of the Southwestern Front launched a counterattack with the forces of six mechanized corps (about 2500 tanks). During a major tank battle in the Dubno-Lutsk-Brody region, the Soviet troops were unable to defeat the enemy and suffered heavy losses, but they prevented the Germans from making a strategic breakthrough and cutting off the Lvov grouping (6th and 26th Armies) from the rest of the forces. By July 1, the troops of the Southwestern Front withdrew to the fortified line Korosten-Novograd-Volynsky-Proskurov. In early July, the Germans broke through the right wing of the front near Novograd-Volynsky and captured Berdichev and Zhitomir, but thanks to the counterattacks of the Soviet troops, their further advance was stopped.

At the junction of the Southwestern and Southern fronts on July 2, the German-Romanian troops crossed the Prut and rushed to Mogilev-Podolsky. By July 10, they reached the Dniester.

Results of border battles

As a result of border battles, the Wehrmacht inflicted a heavy defeat on the Red Army.

Summing up the results of the first phase of Operation Barbarossa, on July 3, 1941, the Chief of the German General Staff F. Halder wrote in his diary:

« In general, it can already be said that the task of defeating the main forces of the Russian land army in front of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper has been completed ... Therefore, it will not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia was won within 14 days. Of course, it's not finished yet. The vast extent of the territory and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, using all means, will fetter our forces for many weeks to come. ... When we force the Western Dvina and the Dnieper, then we will talk not so much about destruction armed forces the enemy, how much about taking away his industrial areas from the enemy and not giving him the opportunity, using the gigantic power of his industry and inexhaustible human resources, to create new armed forces. As soon as the war in the east passes from the phase of defeating the armed forces of the enemy into the phase of economic suppression of the enemy, the further tasks of the war against England will again come to the fore ...»

Second phase. The offensive of the German troops along the entire front (July 10 - August 1941)

North direction

On July 2, Army Group North continued its offensive, its German 4th Panzer Group advanced in the direction of Rezekne, Ostrov, Pskov. On July 4, the 41st motorized corps occupied Ostrov, on July 9 - Pskov.

On July 10, Army Group North continued its offensive in the Leningrad (4th Panzer Group) and Tallinn (18th Army) directions. However, the German 56th motorized corps was stopped by a counterattack by the Soviet 11th Army near Soltsy. Under these conditions, on July 19, the German command suspended the offensive of the 4th Panzer Group for almost three weeks until the formations of the 18th and 16th armies approached. Only at the end of July did the Germans reach the line of the Narva, Luga and Mshaga rivers.

On August 7, German troops broke through the defenses of the 8th Army and reached the coast of the Gulf of Finland in the Kunda area. The 8th Army was divided into two parts: the 11th rifle corps withdrew to Narva, and the 10th Rifle Corps to Tallinn, where, together with the sailors of the Baltic Fleet, they defended the city until August 28.

On August 8, the offensive of Army Group North resumed on Leningrad in the direction of Krasnogvardeisk, on August 10 - in the Luga region and in the Novgorod-Chudovsk direction. On August 12, the Soviet command launched a counterattack near Staraya Russa, but on August 19, the enemy struck back and defeated the Soviet troops.

On August 19, German troops occupied Novgorod, on August 20 - Chudovo. On August 23, battles began for Oranienbaum; the Germans were stopped southeast of Koporye (Voronka River).

Attack on Leningrad

To reinforce Army Group North, the 3rd Panzer Group of G. Hoth (39th and 57th motorized corps) and the 8th Air Corps of V. von Richthofen were transferred to it.

At the end of August, German troops launched a new offensive against Leningrad. On August 25, the 39th motorized corps took Luban, on August 30 went to the Neva and cut off the railway communication with the city, on September 8 they took Shlisselburg and closed the blockade ring around Leningrad.

However, having decided to conduct Operation Typhoon, A. Hitler ordered the release of most of the mobile formations and the 8th Air Corps no later than September 15, 1941, which were called to participate in the last attack on Moscow.

On September 9, the decisive assault on Leningrad began. However, the Germans failed to break the resistance of the Soviet troops within the specified time frame. On September 12, 1941, Hitler gave the order to stop the assault on the city. (For further hostilities in the Leningrad direction, see Siege of Leningrad.)

On November 7, the Germans continue their offensive in a northerly direction. cut through railways through which food is delivered to Leningrad through Lake Ladoga. German troops occupied Tikhvin. There was a threat of a breakthrough of German troops to the rear and encirclement of the 7th Separate Army, which was defending the lines on the Svir River. However, already on November 11, the 52nd Army launched a counterattack on the fascist troops that occupied Malaya Vishera. During the ensuing battles, the Malaya Vishera group of German troops suffered a serious defeat. Her troops were driven back from the city across the Bolshaya Vishera River.

central direction

On July 10-12, 1941, Army Group Center launched a new offensive in the Moscow direction. The 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper south of Orsha, and the 3rd Panzer Group struck from the direction of Vitebsk. On July 16, German troops entered Smolensk, while three Soviet armies (19th, 20th and 16th) were surrounded. By August 5, the fighting in the Smolensk "cauldron" was over, the remnants of the troops of the 16th and 20th armies crossed the Dnieper; 310 thousand people were taken prisoner.

On the northern flank of the Soviet Western Front, German troops captured Nevel (July 16), but then fought for Velikiye Luki for a whole month. Big problems for the enemy also arose on the southern flank of the central sector of the Soviet-German front: here the Soviet troops of the 21st Army launched an offensive in the Bobruisk direction. Despite the fact that the Soviet troops failed to capture Bobruisk, they pinned down a significant number of divisions of the German 2nd Field Army and a third of the 2nd Panzer Group.

Thus, taking into account two large groupings of Soviet troops on the flanks and incessant attacks along the front, the German Army Group Center could not resume the attack on Moscow. On July 30, she went on the defensive with her main forces and focused on solving problems on the flanks. At the end of August 1941, German troops managed to defeat the Soviet troops in the Velikiye Luki region and capture Toropets on August 29.

On August 8-12, the advance of the 2nd Panzer Group and the 2nd Field Army began in a southerly direction. As a result of operations, the Soviet Central Front was defeated, Gomel fell on August 19. The large-scale offensive of the Soviet fronts in the Western direction (Western, Reserve and Bryansk), launched on August 30 - September 1, was unsuccessful, the Soviet troops suffered heavy losses and went on the defensive on September 10. The only success was the liberation of Yelnya on 6 September.

South direction

In Moldova, an attempt by the command of the Southern Front to stop the Romanian offensive with a counterattack by two mechanized corps (770 tanks) was unsuccessful. On July 16, the 4th Romanian Army took Chisinau, and in early August pushed the Separate Primorsky Army to Odessa. The defense of Odessa fettered the forces of the Romanian troops for almost two and a half months. Soviet troops left the city only in the first half of October.

Meanwhile, at the end of July, German troops launched an offensive in the Bila Tserkva direction. On August 2, they cut off the 6th and 12th Soviet armies from the Dnieper and surrounded them near Uman; 103 thousand people were captured, including both commanders. But although the German troops, as a result of a new offensive, broke through to the Dnieper and created several bridgeheads on the eastern bank, they failed to take Kyiv on the move.

Thus, the Army Group "South" was not able to independently solve the tasks assigned to it by the "Barbarossa" plan. From the beginning of August to the beginning of October, the Red Army carried out a series of attacks near Voronezh.

Battle near Kyiv

In pursuance of Hitler's order, the southern flank of Army Group Center launched an offensive in support of Army Group South.

After the occupation of Gomel, the German 2nd Army of the Army Group "Center" advanced on the connection with the 6th Army of the Army Group "South"; On September 9, both German armies joined in eastern Polissya. By September 13, the front of the Soviet 5th Army of the Southwestern Front and the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front was finally broken, both armies switched to mobile defense.

At the same time, the German 2nd Panzer Group, having repulsed the blow of the Soviet Bryansk Front near Trubchevsk, entered the operational space. On September 9, V. Model's 3rd Panzer Division broke through to the south and captured Romny on September 10.

Meanwhile, on September 12, the 1st Panzer Group launched an offensive from the Kremenchug bridgehead in a northerly direction. On September 15, the 1st and 2nd Panzer Groups joined at Lokhvitsa. The main forces of the Soviet Southwestern Front ended up in the giant Kiev "cauldron"; the number of prisoners was 665 thousand people. It turned out that the administration of the South-Western Front was defeated; the front commander, Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos, died.

As a result, Left-bank Ukraine ended up in the hands of the enemy, the way to the Donbass was opened, and Soviet troops in Crimea were cut off from the main forces. (For further military operations in the Donbas direction, see Donbas operation). In mid-September, the Germans reached the approaches to the Crimea.

Crimea was of strategic importance as one of the routes to the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus (through the Kerch Strait and Taman). In addition, the Crimea was important as a base for aviation. With the loss of Crimea Soviet aviation would lose the possibility of raids on the oil fields of Romania, and the Germans would be able to strike at targets in the Caucasus. The Soviet command understood the importance of holding the peninsula and concentrated on this, abandoning the defense of Odessa. On October 16, Odessa fell.

On October 17, the Donbass was occupied (Taganrog fell). On October 25, Kharkov was captured. November 2 - Crimea is occupied and Sevastopol is blocked. November 30 - the forces of the Army Group "South" entrenched themselves at the turn of the Mius Front.

Turn from Moscow

At the end of July 1941, the German command was still full of optimism and believed that the goals set by the Barbarossa plan would be achieved in the near future. The following dates were indicated as the deadlines for achieving these goals: Moscow and Leningrad - August 25; the border of the Volga - the beginning of October; Baku and Batumi - early November.

On July 25, at a meeting of the chiefs of staff of the Eastern Front of the Wehrmacht, it was said about the implementation of Operation Barbarossa in time:

• Army Group North: Operations developed almost in full accordance with plans.
• Army Group Center: Prior to the start of the Battle of Smolensk, operations developed in accordance with plans, then development slowed down.
• Army Group South: Operations progressed slower in time than anticipated.

However, Hitler was increasingly inclined to postpone the attack on Moscow. At a meeting at the headquarters of Army Group South on August 4, he stated: First, Leningrad must be captured, for this the troops of the Gotha group are used. In the second place, the capture of the eastern part of Ukraine is carried out ... And only in the last turn will an offensive be undertaken to capture Moscow».

The next day, F. Halder clarified the opinion of the Fuhrer from A. Jodl: What are our main goals: do we want to defeat the enemy or are we pursuing economic goals (capture of Ukraine and the Caucasus)? Jodl replied that the Führer believed that both goals could be achieved simultaneously. To the question: Moscow or Ukraine or Moscow and Ukraine should answer - both Moscow and Ukraine. We must do this, because otherwise we will not be able to defeat the enemy before the onset of autumn.

On August 21, 1941, Hitler issued a new directive which stated: The most important task before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of the Crimea, industrial and coal areas on the Donets River and blocking the routes of Russian oil from the Caucasus. In the north, such a task is the encirclement of Leningrad and the connection with the Finnish troops».

Evaluation of Hitler's decision

Hitler's decision to abandon an immediate attack on Moscow and turn the 2nd Army and 2nd Panzer Group to help the Army Group South caused mixed assessments among the German command.

The commander of the 3rd Panzer Group G. Goth wrote in his memoirs: “ Against the continuation of the offensive against Moscow at that time there was one weighty argument of operational importance. If in the center the defeat of the enemy troops stationed in Belarus was unexpectedly quick and complete, then in other directions the successes were not so great. For example, it was not possible to push back to the south an enemy operating south of Pripyat and west of the Dnieper. An attempt to drop the Baltic grouping into the sea was also unsuccessful. Thus, both flanks of the Army Group Center, when advancing to Moscow, were in danger of being attacked, in the south this danger was already making itself felt ...»

The commander of the German 2nd Panzer Group G. Guderian wrote: “ The battles for Kyiv undoubtedly meant a major tactical success. However, the question of whether this tactical success was also of major strategic importance remains in doubt. Now everything depended on whether the Germans would be able to achieve decisive results before the onset of winter, perhaps even before the onset of the autumn thaw period.».

Only on September 30 did the German troops, having pulled up their reserves, go on the offensive against Moscow. However, after the start of the offensive, the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, difficult weather conditions in late autumn led to a halt in the offensive against Moscow and the failure of Operation Barbarossa as a whole. (For further military operations in the Moscow direction, see the Battle of Moscow)

The results of Operation Barbarossa

The ultimate goal of Operation Barbarossa remained unattained. Despite the impressive successes of the Wehrmacht, the attempt to defeat the USSR in one campaign failed.

The main reasons can be attributed to the general underestimation of the Red Army. Despite the fact that before the war the total number and composition of the Soviet troops was determined by the German command quite correctly, the incorrect assessment of the Soviet armored forces should be attributed to the major miscalculations of the Abwehr.

Another serious miscalculation was the underestimation of the mobilization capabilities of the USSR. By the third month of the war, no more than 40 new divisions of the Red Army were expected to be encountered. In fact, the Soviet leadership only sent 324 divisions to the front in the summer (taking into account the previously deployed 222 divisions), that is, German intelligence made a very significant mistake in this matter. Already during the staff games held by the German General Staff, it turned out that the available forces are not enough. The situation was especially difficult with reserves. In fact, the "Eastern Campaign" was to be won by one echelon of troops. Thus, it was established that with the successful development of operations in the theater of military operations, "which expands to the east like a funnel", the German forces "will be insufficient if it is not possible to inflict a decisive defeat on the Russians to the Kiev-Minsk-Lake Peipsi line."

Meanwhile, on the line of the rivers Dnieper-Western Dvina, the Wehrmacht was waiting for the Second Strategic echelon of Soviet troops. The Third Strategic Echelon was concentrated behind him. An important stage in the disruption of the Barbarossa plan was the Battle of Smolensk, in which the Soviet troops, despite heavy losses, stopped the advance of the enemy to the east.

In addition, due to the fact that the army groups struck in divergent directions on Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv, it was difficult to maintain interaction between them. The German command had to carry out private operations to protect the flanks of the central advancing group. These operations, although successful, resulted in the loss of time and resources of the motorized troops.

In addition, already in August, the question of the priority of goals arose: Leningrad, Moscow or Rostov-on-Don. When these goals came into conflict with each other, a crisis of command arose.

Army Group North failed to capture Leningrad.

Army Group "South" was unable to make a deep envelopment of its left flank (6.17 A and 1 Tgr.) And destroy the main enemy troops on the right-bank Ukraine on schedule, and as a result, the troops of the South-Western and Southern fronts were able to retreat to the Dnieper and gain a foothold .

Later, the turn of the main forces of Army Group Center away from Moscow led to a loss of time and strategic initiative.

In the autumn of 1941, the German command tried to find a way out of the crisis in Operation Typhoon (the battle for Moscow).

The campaign of 1941 ended with the defeat of the German troops in the central sector of the Soviet-German front near Moscow, near Tikhvin on the northern flank and under

The operation was supposed to ensure a quick and unconditional victory. Nazi Germany over the USSR due to the surprise factor. However, despite the preparations in secrecy, the Barbarossa plan failed, and the war of the Germans with domestic troops dragged on and lasted from 1941 to 1945, after which it ended in the defeat of Germany.

Plan "Barbarossa" got its name in honor of the medieval King of Germany Frederick 1, who was a glorious commander and, as was previously believed, planned raids on Rus' in the 12th century. Later, this myth was debunked.

The content of the plan "Barbarossa" and its significance

The attack on the USSR was to be Germany's next step towards world domination. The victory over Russia and the conquest of its territories should have opened up for Hitler the opportunity to enter into an open clash with the United States for the right to redistribute the world. Having managed to conquer almost all of Europe, Hitler was confident in his unconditional victory over the USSR.

In order for the attack to go smoothly, it was necessary to develop a plan for a military attack. That plan was Barbarossa. Before planning the attack, Hitler ordered his intelligence officers to collect detailed information about the Soviet army and its weapons. After analyzing the information received, Hitler decided that the German army was significantly superior to the Red Army of the USSR - based on this, they began to plan the attack.

The essence of the Barbarossa plan was to strike at the Red Army suddenly, on its own territory and, taking advantage of the unpreparedness of the troops and the technical superiority of the German army, conquer the USSR within two and a half months.

At first, it was planned to conquer the front line located on the territory of Belarus by wedging German detachments from different sides of the Soviet army. The disunited and unprepared Red Army had to surrender quickly. Then Hitler was going to move towards Kyiv in order to conquer the territory of Ukraine and, most importantly, its sea routes and cut off the paths of Soviet troops. Thus, he could enable his troops to further attack the USSR from the south and north. In parallel, Hitler's army was to launch an offensive from Norway. Surrounding the USSR on all sides, Hitler planned to move on Moscow.

However, already at the very beginning of the war, the German command realized that the plans began to crumble.

Operation Barbarossa and results

Hitler's first and main mistake was that he underestimated the strength and armament of the Soviet army, which, according to historians, was superior to the German one in some areas. In addition, the war was on the territory of the Russian army, so the fighters easily navigated the terrain and could fight in different natural conditions which was not so easy for the Germans. One more distinctive feature The Russian army, which greatly influenced the failure of Operation Barbarossa, was the ability of Russian soldiers to mobilize in the shortest possible time to fight back, which did not allow the army to be divided into scattered detachments.

Hitler set his troops the task of quickly penetrating deep into the Soviet army and dividing it, not allowing Russian soldiers to carry out major operations, as this could be dangerous. The plan was to split the Soviet army and force it to flee. However, the opposite happened. Hitler's troops quickly penetrated deep into the Russian troops, but they could not conquer the flanks and defeat the army too. The Germans tried to follow the plan and surrounded the Russian detachments, but this did not lead to any results - the Russians quickly left the encirclement thanks to the surprisingly clear and competent leadership of their military leaders. As a result, despite the fact that Hitler's army still won, it happened very slowly, which ruined the whole plan for a swift conquest.

On the approaches to Moscow, Hitler's army was no longer so strong. Exhausted by endless battles, which dragged on for a long time, the army could not go on to conquer the capital, in addition, the bombing of Moscow never began, although according to Hitler's plans, by this time the city should not have been on the map. The same thing happened with Leningrad, which was taken under blockade, but never surrendered, and was not destroyed from the air.

The operation, which was planned as a swift victorious attack, turned into a protracted war and stretched from two months to several years.

Reasons for the failure of the Barbarossa plan

The main reasons for the failure of the operation can be considered:

• The lack of accurate data on the combat power of the Russian army. Hitler and his command underestimated the capabilities of the Soviet soldiers, which led to the creation of an incorrect offensive and battle plan. The Russians gave a strong rebuff, which the Germans did not count on;
• Excellent counterintelligence. Unlike the Germans, the Russians were able to establish intelligence well, thanks to which the command was almost always aware of the next step of the enemy and could adequately respond to it. The Germans failed to play on the element of surprise;
• Difficult areas. It was difficult for Hitler's troops to get maps of the Soviet terrain, in addition, they were not used to fighting in such conditions (unlike the Russians), so very often impenetrable forests and swamps helped the Soviet army to leave and deceive the enemy;
• Lack of control over the course of the war. The German command already in the first few months lost control over the course of hostilities, the Barbarossa plan turned out to be unworkable, and the Red Army conducted a skillful counteroffensive.

In his book, which was pompously titled "My War", as well as in numerous speeches, Hitler proclaimed that the Germans, as a superior race, needed more living space.

At the same time, he meant not Europe, but the Soviet Union, its European part. The mild climate, fertile lands and geographical proximity to Germany - all this made Ukraine, from his point of view, an ideal place for a German colony. He took as a basis the experience of the colonization of the British in India.

According to his plan, the Aryans should live in beautiful houses, enjoy all the benefits, while the fate of other peoples is to serve them.

Negotiations with Hitler

The plan, if it was beautiful, then certain difficulties arose with the incarnation. Hitler was well aware that it would hardly be possible to conquer Russia so quickly, due to its territorial size and population, like Europe. But he firmly hoped to conduct a military operation before the famous Russian frosts, realizing that getting bogged down in the war was fraught with defeat in it.

Joseph Stalin was not ready for the beginning of the war of the year. According to some historians, he sincerely believed that Hitler would not attack the USSR until he defeated France and Great Britain. But the fall of France in 1940 made him think about the possible threat from the Germans.

Therefore, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov was delegated to Germany with clear instructions - to drag out negotiations with Hitler for as long as possible. Stalin's calculation was that Hitler would not dare to attack closer to the fall - because then he would have to fight in the winter, and if he did not have time to speak in the summer of 1941, then his military plans would have to be postponed until next year.

Plans to attack Russia

Plans for an attack on Russia by Germany have been developed since 1940. Historians believe that Hitler canceled Operation Sea Lion, deciding that with the fall Soviet Union the British will surrender themselves.

The first version of the offensive plan was made by General Erich Marx in August 1940 - in the Reich he was considered the best specialist in Russia. In it, he took into account many factors - economic opportunities, human resources, huge territories conquered country. But even careful reconnaissance and development of the Germans did not make it possible to discover the reserve of the Supreme High Command, which included armored forces, engineering troops, infantry and aviation. Subsequently, for the Germans, this was an unpleasant surprise.

Marx developed the attack on Moscow as the main line of attack. Secondary strikes were to be directed at Kyiv and two distractions - through the Baltic states to Leningrad, as well as Moldova. Leningrad was not a priority for Marx.

The plan was developed in an atmosphere of strict secrecy - through all channels of diplomatic communication there was disinformation about Hitler's plans to attack the Soviet Union. All troop movements were explained by exercises or redeployment.

The next version of the plan was completed in December 1940 by Halder. He changed Marx's plan, highlighting three directions: the main one against Moscow, smaller forces were to be concentrated on advancing towards Kyiv, and a major attack was to go to Leningrad.

After the conquest of Moscow and Leningrad, Harold proposed to go towards Arkhangelsk, and after the fall of Kyiv, the Wehrmacht forces were to head to the Don and the Volga region.

The third and final version was developed by Hitler himself under the code name "Barbarossa". This plan was created in December 1940.

Operation Barbarossa

Hitler made the advance to the north the main focus of military activity. Therefore, Moscow and Leningrad remained among the important strategic goals. Units moving south were to be tasked with occupying the Ukraine west of Kyiv.

The attack began early in the morning on Sunday 22 June 1941. In total, the Germans and their allies involved 3 million soldiers, 3,580 tanks, 7,184 artillery pieces, 1,830 aircraft and 750,000 horses. In total, Germany gathered 117 army divisions for the attack, not counting the Romanian and Hungarian ones. Three armies participated in the attack: "North", "Center" and "South".

“You just have to kick in the front door, and the whole rotten Russian structure will collapse down,” Hitler said smugly a few days after the outbreak of hostilities. The results of the offensive were really impressive - 300,000 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were killed or captured, 2,500 tanks, 1,400 artillery pieces and 250 aircraft were destroyed. And this is only for the central advance of the German troops in seventeen days. Skeptics, seeing the results of the first two weeks of hostilities disastrous for the USSR, predicted the imminent collapse of the Bolshevik empire. But the situation was saved by the miscalculations of Hitler himself.

First promotions fascist troops were so fast that even the command of the Wehrmacht was not prepared for them - and this endangered all supply lines and communications of the army.

The army group "Center" in the summer of 1941 stopped at the Desna, but everyone believed that this was only a respite before the inexorable movement. But in the meantime, Hitler decided to change the balance of power of the German army. He ordered the military units led by Guderian to head towards Kyiv, and the first tank group to go north. was against Hitler's decision, but could not disobey the Fuhrer's order - he repeatedly proved his case as a military leader with victories, and Hitler's authority was unusually high.

The crushing defeat of the Germans

The success of the mechanized units in the north and south was as impressive as the attack on June 22 - huge numbers of dead and captured, thousands of pieces of equipment destroyed. But, despite the results achieved, this decision already included defeat in the war. lost time. The delay was so significant that the onset of winter had to be earlier than the troops had achieved the goals set by Hitler.

The army was not equipped for the winter cold. And the frosts of the winter of 1941-1942 were especially severe. And this was a very important factor that played a role in the loss of the German army.

Plan Barbarossa, or Directive 21, was developed with great care. Much attention was paid to the flow of disinformation designed to cover up intentions to attack the Soviet Union. But during the operation "Barbarossa" difficulties arose. The reason and details of the failure of the blitzkrieg in the USSR.

Adolf Hitler examines the map of the Barbarossa plan, on the left, Field Marshals Keitel, 1940.

By 1940, things were going well for Hitler. The political struggle with opponents was left behind. The power was already completely concentrated in his hands. Plans to take over Europe were carried out, almost without a hitch, without a hitch. The new tactics of blitzkrieg fully justified the hopes placed on it. However, Hitler understood that in order to dominate the conquered states, he needed to provide the people with agricultural and industrial resources. And the German economy was already working at full capacity, and it was unrealistic to squeeze something else out of it. The time has come to begin a new chapter in German history. The chapter to which Adolf Hitler decided to codename the plan "Barbarossa".

The German Fuhrer dreamed of building great empire which will dictate its will to the whole world. In the first half of the 19th century foreign policy Germany brought a number of independent states to their knees. Hitler managed to subjugate Austria, Czechoslovakia, part of Lithuania, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Luxembourg, Belgium and France. Moreover, a little more than a year has passed since the beginning of World War II. By that time, England was the most obvious and problematic enemy for Germany. Despite the signed official non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, no one had any illusions on this score. Even Stalin understood that an attack by the Wehrmacht was simply a matter of time. But he felt calm while the confrontation between Germany and England was going on. The experience gained in the First World War gave him such confidence. The Russian Generalissimo was firmly convinced that Hitler would never start a war on two fronts.

Contents of Operation Barbarossa. Hitler's plans

According to the policy of living space in the East, the Third Reich needed a territory rich in natural resources and large enough to comfortably accommodate a master race. Today, the phrase "living space" will say little to the non-specialist. But since the end of the thirties, for any German it has been as familiar as today, for example, the phrase "integration into Europe." There was an official term "Lebensraum im Osten". Such ideological preparation was also important for the implementation of Operation Barbarossa, the plan of which at that time was under development.

Plan Barbarossa Map

On December 17, 1940, Hitler was presented with a document detailing the operation to seize the Soviet Union. The ultimate goal was to push the Russians beyond the Urals and create a barrier along the line from the Volga to Arkhangelsk. This would cut off the army from strategically important military bases, functioning factories and oil reserves. In the original version, it was supposed to achieve all the goals in one jerk.

Hitler was generally pleased with the design, but made some adjustments, the most significant of which was the splitting of the campaign into two stages. First it was necessary to capture Leningrad, Kyiv and Moscow. This was followed by a strategic pause, during which the army of the victors received rest, strengthened morale and built up strength at the expense of the resources of the defeated enemy. And only then was the final victorious breakthrough to occur. However, this did not cancel the blitzkrieg technique. The whole operation took two, maximum - three months.

What was Barbarossa's plan

The essence of the approved Barbarossa plan, which the Fuhrer signed in December 1940, was to break through the Soviet border with lightning speed, quickly defeat the main armed forces and push the demoralized remnant away from strategically important points for defense. Hitler personally chose the code name for the German command. The operation was called Plan Barbarossa or Directive 21. The ultimate goal is to completely defeat the Soviet Union in one short-term campaign.

The main forces of the Red Army were concentrated on the western border. Previous military campaigns have proven the effectiveness of using tank divisions. And the concentration of the Red Army was in the hands of the Wehrmacht. Tank wedges cut into the enemy ranks like a knife through butter, sowing death and panic. The remnants of the enemy were taken into the environment, falling into the so-called boilers. The soldiers were either forced to surrender or finished off on the spot. Hitler was going to advance the offensive on a wide front in three directions at once - southern, central and northern.

For the successful implementation of the plan, surprise, speed of advance and reliable detailed data on the disposition of Soviet troops were extremely important. Therefore, the start of the war was postponed until the end of the spring of 1941.

Number of troops to implement the plan

In order to successfully launch Operation Barbarossa, the plan involved a secret concentration of Wehrmacht forces to the borders of the country. But the movement of 190 divisions had to be somehow motivated. Since the second World War was in full swing, Hitler threw all his strength into trying to convince Stalin of the priority of the capture of England. And all the movements of troops were explained by redeployment for waging war with the West. Germany had 7.6 million people at its disposal. Of these, 5 million had to be delivered to the border.

The general balance of forces on the eve of the war is shown in the table "The balance of forces of Germany and the USSR at the beginning of the Second World War."

The balance of forces of Germany and the USSR at the beginning of the Second World War:

From the above table it can be seen that the superiority in terms of the number of equipment was clearly on the side of the Soviet Union. However, this does not reflect the real picture. The fact is that economic development Russia at the beginning of the century was significantly slowed down civil war. This affected, among other things, the state of military equipment. Compared to German armament, it was already outdated, but worst of all, a very large part of it was physically unusable. She was only conditionally combat-ready and very often needed repairs.

In addition, the Red Army was not completed for wartime. There was a catastrophic shortage of personnel. But even worse, even among the available fighters, a significant part were untrained recruits. And from the German side, veterans who had gone through real military campaigns spoke. Given this, it becomes clear that Germany's attack on the Soviet Union and the opening of a second front was not such a self-confident action.

Hitler took into account the development of Russia at the beginning of the century, and the state of its weapons, and the deployment of troops. His plan to crash deep into the Soviet army and redraw the political map of Eastern Europe seemed quite feasible.

Direction of the main attack

The German attack on the Soviet Union was not like a single point javelin strike. The attack came from three directions at once. They are indicated in the table "Goals of the offensive of the German army." This was the Barbarossa plan, which marked the beginning of the Great Patriotic War for Soviet citizens. The largest army, led by Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt, advanced south. Under his command were 44 German divisions, 13 Romanian divisions, 9 Romanian brigades and 4 Hungarian brigades. Their task was to capture the whole of Ukraine and provide access to the Caucasus.

In the central direction, an army of 50 German divisions and 2 German brigades was led by Field Marshal Moritz von Bock. The most trained and powerful tank groups were at his disposal. He was supposed to capture Minsk. And after that, according to the approved scheme, through Smolensk, move to Moscow.

To the north, the advance of 29 German divisions and the army "Norway" was led by Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb. His task was to occupy the Baltic, establish control over the sea exits, take Leningrad and move to Murmansk through Arkhangelsk. Thus, these three armies were eventually to reach the Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line.

Goals of the German offensive:

Direction	South	Center	North
Commanding	Carl von Rundstedt	Moritz von Bock	Wilhelm von Leeb
Army strength	57 divisions	50 divisions 2 brigades	29 divisions Army "Norway"
Goals	Ukraine Caucasus (exit)	Minsk Smolensk	the Baltics Leningrad Arkhangelsk Murmansk

Neither the Fuhrer, nor the field marshals, nor ordinary German soldiers doubted a quick and inevitable victory over the USSR. This is evidenced not only by official documents, but also by the personal diaries of military commanders, as well as letters sent by ordinary soldiers from the front. Everyone was in euphoria from previous military campaigns and looked forward to a quick victory and eastern front.

Implementation of the plan

The outbreak of war with the Soviet Union only strengthened Germany's belief in a quick victory. The German advanced divisions managed to easily crush the resistance and enter the territory of the USSR. The field marshals acted strictly, as instructed them secret document. The Barbarossa plan began to materialize. The results of the first three weeks of the war for the Soviet Union were extremely discouraging. During this time, 28 divisions were completely disabled. The text of Russian reports indicates that only 43% of the army remained combat-ready (from the number at the beginning of hostilities). Seventy divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.

The first German attack on the USSR was on June 22, 1941. And by July 11, the main part of the Baltic states was occupied, and the approach to Leningrad was liberated. In the center, the advance of the German army took place at an average speed of 30 km per day. Von Bock's divisions reached Smolensk without much difficulty. In the south, they also made a breakthrough, which was planned to be made at the first stage, and the main forces were already in sight of the Ukrainian capital. The next step was to take Kyiv.

For such dizzying successes, there were objective reasons. The tactical factor of surprise disoriented not only the Soviet soldiers on the ground. Heavy losses in the first days of the war were suffered due to uncoordinated defense actions. Do not forget that the Germans followed a clear and carefully planned plan. And the formation of a Russian defensive rebuff was almost spontaneous. Often, commanders simply did not receive reliable reports about what was happening in time, so they could not react accordingly.

Among the reasons why Soviet Russia suffered such significant losses at the beginning of the war, Candidate of Military Sciences, Professor G.F. Krivosheev identifies the following:

• The suddenness of the impact.
• Significant numerical superiority of the enemy at the points of collision.
• Deployment of troops.
• The real combat experience of German soldiers, contrasted a large number untrained recruits in the first echelon.
• Echelon disposition of troops (the Soviet army was drawn to the border gradually).

German failures in the north

After the vigorous capture of the Baltic states, it was time to sweep away Leningrad. An important strategic task was assigned to the army "North" - it was supposed to provide for the army "Center" freedom of maneuver during the capture of Moscow, and for the army "South" the ability to perform operational and strategic tasks.

But this time, the Barbarossa plan failed. The newly formed Leningrad Front of the Red Army on August 23 managed to stop the Wehrmacht forces near Koporye. On August 30, after heavy fighting, the Germans were able to reach the Neva and cut off the railway communication to Leningrad. On September 8th they occupied Shlisselburg. Thus, the northern historical capital was enclosed in a blockade ring.

Blitzkrieg clearly failed. Lightning capture, as in the case of the conquered European states Did not work out. On September 26, the advance of the army "North" to Leningrad was stopped by the Red Army under the command of Zhukov. A long blockade of the city began.

The situation in Leningrad was very difficult. But for the German army, this time was not in vain. I had to think about the supply, which was actively interfered with by the activities of the partisans along the entire length of the route. The joyful euphoria from the rapid advance inland also subsided. The German command planned to reach the extreme lines in three months. Now, at the headquarters, more and more often they openly recognized the Barbarossa plan as a failure. And the soldiers were exhausted by the protracted endless battles.

The failures of the army "Center"

While the army "North" was trying to conquer Leningrad, Field Marshal Moritz von Bock led his people to Smolensk. He clearly understood the importance of the task assigned to him. Smolensk was the last step before Moscow. And the fall of the capital, according to the plans of German military strategists, was to completely demoralize the Soviet people. After that, the conquerors would only have to trample down individual scattered pockets of resistance.

Although by the time the Germans approached Smolensk, Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb, who commanded the North Army, was unable to ensure the unhindered deployment of troops in the direction of the upcoming main attack, the Center Army was still developing successfully. They reached the city with a vigorous march and, in the end, Smolensk was taken. During the defense of the city, three Soviet armies were surrounded and defeated, 310 thousand people were taken prisoner. But the fighting continued from July 10 to August 5. The German army again lost the pace of advance. In addition, von Bock could not count on support from the troops of the northern direction (as was supposed to be done if necessary), since they themselves were stuck in one place, holding the cordon around Leningrad.

It took almost a month to capture Smolensk. And for another month there were fierce battles for the city of Velikiye Luki. It was not strategically important, but the battles delayed the advance of the German army. And this, in turn, gave time to prepare for the defense of Moscow. Therefore, from a tactical point of view, it was important to keep the defense as long as possible. And the Red Army soldiers fought furiously, despite the losses. They not only defended themselves, but also raided the enemy's flanks, which further dispersed his forces.

Battle for Moscow

While the German army was held near Smolensk, the Soviet people managed to thoroughly prepare for the defense. For the most part, the fortifications were erected by the hands of women and children. A whole layered defense system has grown up around Moscow. Managed to staff the people's militia.

The attack on Moscow began on 30 September. It was supposed to consist of a rapid one-time breakthrough. Instead, the Germans, although moving forward, did so slowly and painfully. Step by step they overcame the defense of the capital. Only by November 25 did the German army reach Krasnaya Polyana. Moscow was 20 km away. No one believed in the Barbarossa plan.

The Germans did not go beyond these lines. And already in early January 1942, the Red Army threw them back 150 kilometers from the city. A counteroffensive began, as a result of which the front line was pushed back 400 km. Moscow was out of danger.

The failures of the army "South"

Army "South" met with resistance all the way through the territory of Ukraine. The forces of the Romanian divisions fettered Odessa. They could not support the attacks on the capital and serve as reinforcements for Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt. However, the Wehrmacht forces reached Kyiv relatively quickly. It took only 3.5 weeks to advance to the city. But in the battles for Kyiv itself, the German army got stuck, as in other directions. The delay was so significant that Hitler decided to send reinforcements from the Center Army units. The Red Army suffered huge losses. Five armies were encircled. Only 665 thousand people were taken prisoners. But Germany was wasting time.

Each of the delays delayed the moment of impact on the main forces of Moscow. Each day won gave more time to the Soviet army and militia forces to prepare for defense. Every extra day meant the need to bring supplies for German soldiers who were far away in the territory of a hostile country. It was necessary to deliver ammunition and fuel. But worst of all, the attempt to continue to adhere to the Barbarossa plan approved by the Fuhrer launched the reasons for its failure.

Firstly, the plan was thought out and calculated really well. But only under the condition of blitzkrieg. As soon as the pace of advance through enemy territory began to decrease, his installations already became untenable. Secondly, the German command, in an attempt to patch up their crumbling offspring, sent many additional directives, which often directly contradicted one another.

Map of the German advance plan

When considering the plan for the advance of the German troops on the map, it is clear that it was developed holistically and thoughtfully. For more than one month, German intelligence officers meticulously collected information, photographed the territory. The wave of the trained German army was supposed to sweep away everything in its path and liberate fertile and rich lands for the German people.

The map shows that the first blow should have been concentrated. Having destroyed the main military forces, the Wehrmacht spread across the territory of the Soviet Union in breadth. From the Baltics to Ukraine. This made it possible to continue to disperse enemy forces, lock them into an environment and destroy them in small portions.

Already on the twentieth day after the first strike, the Barbarossa plan ordered to take the line Pskov - Smolensk - Kyiv (including cities). Further, a short rest was planned for the victorious German army. And already on the fortieth day after the start of the war (by the beginning of August 1941), Leningrad, Moscow and Kharkov were to submit.

After that, it remained to drive away the remnants of the defeated enemy behind the Astrakhan-Stalingrad-Saratov-Kazan line and finish it off on the other side. This freed up space for a new Germany spread across central and eastern Europe.

Why did the blitzkrieg fail in Germany?

Hitler himself claimed that the failure of the operation to take over the Soviet Union was due to false premises based on incorrect intelligence. The German Fuhrer even claimed that having the correct information, he would not have approved the start of the offensive.

According to the data available to the German command, only 170 divisions were available in the Soviet Union. And all of them were concentrated on the border. There was no information about reserves or additional lines of defense. If this were true, Barbarossa's plan would have every chance of being brilliantly executed.

Twenty-eight divisions of the Red Army were completely destroyed during the first breakthrough of the Wehrmacht. In 70 divisions, approximately half of all equipment was disabled, and personnel losses were 50% or more. 1200 aircraft were destroyed, which did not even have time to take to the air.

The offensive really crushed and divided the main enemy forces with one powerful blow. But Germany did not count on powerful reinforcements, on the incessant rebuff that followed this. After all, having captured the main strategic points, the German army could really deal with the remnants of the scattered parts of the Red Army in a month.

Reasons for failure

There were other objective factors why the blitzkrieg failed. The Germans did not particularly hide their intentions regarding the destruction of the Slavs. Therefore, they resisted desperately. Even in conditions of complete cut-off, lack of ammunition and food, the Red Army soldiers continued to fight literally until their last breath. They understood that death could not be avoided, so they sold their lives dearly.

Difficult terrain, poor road conditions, swamps and swamps, which were not always mapped in detail, also added to the headache of the German commanders. At the same time, this area and its features were well known to the Soviet people and they made full use of this knowledge.

The huge losses suffered by the Red Army were greater than among the German soldiers. But the Wehrmacht did not do without dead and wounded. None of the European campaigns had such significant losses as on the eastern front. It also did not fit into the tactics of blitzkrieg.

The front line, spreading like a wave, looks pretty nice on paper. But in reality, this meant the dispersal of parts, which, in turn, added difficulties for the convoy and supply units. In addition, the possibility of a massive strike on points of stubborn resistance was lost.

The activity of partisan groups also distracted the Germans. They counted on some help from the local population. After all, Hitler assured that ordinary citizens oppressed by the Bolshevik contagion would gladly stand under the banner of the arrived liberators. But this did not happen. There were very few defectors.

Numerous orders and directives that began to pour in after the main headquarters recognized the failure of the blitzkrieg, along with outright competition between the generals of the advancing army, also contributed to the deterioration of the Wehrmacht's position. At that time, few people realized that the failure of Operation Barbarossa marked the beginning of the end of the Third Reich.

Operation Barbarossa (plan "Barbarossa" 1941) - a plan for a military attack and the rapid seizure of the territory of the USSR by Hitler's troops during.

The plan and essence of Operation Barbarossa was to quickly and unexpectedly attack the Soviet troops on their own territory and, taking advantage of the confusion of the enemy, to defeat the Red Army. Then, within two months, the German army was to move inland and conquer Moscow. Control over the USSR gave Germany the opportunity to fight the United States for the right to dictate its terms in world politics.

Hitler, who had already managed to conquer almost all of Europe, was confident in his victory over the USSR. However, the plan "Barbarossa" was a failure, a protracted operation turned into a long war.

The plan "Barbarossa" got its name in honor of the medieval king of Germany, Frederick the 1st, who bore the nickname Barbarossa and was famous for his military achievements.

Contents of Operation Barbarossa. Hitler's plans

Although in 1939 Germany and the USSR made peace, Hitler still decided to attack Russia, as this was a necessary step towards the world domination of Germany and the Third Reich. Hitler instructed the German command to collect information about the composition of the Soviet army and, on this basis, draw up a plan of attack. This is how the Barbarossa plan was born.

German intelligence officers, after checking, came to the conclusion that the Soviet army was in many ways inferior to the German one: it was less organized, worse prepared, and the technical equipment of Russian soldiers left much to be desired. Focusing precisely on these principles, Hitler created a plan for a swift attack, which was supposed to ensure the victory of Germany in record time.

The essence of the Barbarossa plan was to attack the USSR on the borders of the country and, taking advantage of the unpreparedness of the enemy, smash the army and then destroy it. Hitler made the main emphasis on modern military equipment, which belonged to Germany, and the effect of surprise.

The plan was to be carried out at the beginning of 1941. First, German troops were to attack the Russian army in Belarus, where the bulk of it was assembled. Having defeated the Soviet soldiers in Belarus, Hitler planned to advance towards Ukraine, conquer Kyiv and the sea routes, cutting off Russia from the Dnieper. At the same time, a blow was to be struck at Murmansk from Norway. Hitler planned to launch an offensive against Moscow, surrounding the capital from all sides.

Despite careful preparations in an atmosphere of secrecy, it became clear from the first weeks that the Barbarossa plan was a failure.

Implementation of the Barbarossa plan and results

From the very first days, the operation did not go as successfully as planned. First of all, this happened due to the fact that Hitler and the German command underestimated the Soviet troops. According to historians, the Russian army was not only equal in strength to the German one, but in many ways surpassed it.

The Soviet troops turned out to be well prepared, in addition, military operations were taking place on Russian territory, so the soldiers could use the natural conditions, which they knew better than the Germans, to their advantage. The Soviet army was also able to resist and not fall apart into separate detachments thanks to good command and the ability to mobilize and make lightning-fast decisions.

At the beginning of the attack, Hitler planned to quickly move deep into the Soviet army and begin to break it into pieces, separating the detachments from each other in order to avoid massive operations by the Russians. He managed to advance, but he did not manage to break the front: the Russian detachments quickly gathered together and brought up new forces. This led to the fact that Hitler's army, although winning, was advancing catastrophically slowly inland, not by kilometers, as planned, but by meters.

Only a few months later, Hitler managed to approach Moscow, but the German army did not dare to launch an attack - the soldiers were exhausted by prolonged hostilities, and the city was never bombarded, although otherwise was planned. Hitler also failed to bomb Leningrad, which was besieged and blockaded, but did not surrender and was not destroyed from the air.

It began, which dragged on from 1941 to 1945 and ended with the defeat of Hitler.

Reasons for the failure of the Barbarossa plan

Hitler's plan failed for several reasons:

• the Russian army turned out to be stronger and more prepared than the German command expected: the Russians compensated for the lack of modern military equipment with the ability to fight in difficult natural conditions, as well as competent command;
• the Soviet army had excellent counterintelligence: thanks to the scouts, the command almost always knew about the next step of the enemy, which made it possible to quickly and adequately respond to the actions of the attackers;
• inaccessibility of territories: the Germans did not know the territory of the USSR well, since it was extremely difficult to get maps. In addition, they did not know how to fight in impenetrable forests;
• loss of control over the course of the war: the Barbarossa plan quickly proved to be ineffective, and after a few months Hitler completely lost control over the course of hostilities.