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XVII

Bibliographic description:
Izotova K.A. Russian-Polish relations in the 2nd half of the 17th century. Negotiations in Andrusovo. 1674 (Based on materials from article lists of Russian ambassadors) // Studies on source studies of the history of Russia (before 1917): collection of articles / Russian Academy Sciences, Institute Russian history; resp. ed. P.N. Zyryanov. M., 2004. pp. 150-164.

Article text

Izotova K.A.

RUSSIAN-POLISH RELATIONS IN THE 2ND HALF OF THE 17TH CENTURY. NEGOTIATIONS IN ANDRUSOVO. 1674

(Based on materials from article lists of Russian ambassadors)

In January 1667, Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth signed a truce for 13.5 years, and in December the great and plenipotentiary Polish ambassadors arrived in Moscow to exchange instruments of ratification and conclude an alliance against the Sultan and the Crimean Khan, as provided for in the 30th article of Andrusovsky agreement. According to the new agreement, Russian and Polish troops were to unite for joint actions against the “common enemies of the Busurmans,” i.e. Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate, and the Cossacks, if they do not voluntarily return to the citizenship of Russia or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Also in the 12th article of the Andrusovo Treaty it was stipulated that the parties should use the time of the truce to resolve disputes existing between them at specially designated meetings here in Andrusovo, in June 1669, 1674 and 1678, after which Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth will conclude Eternal Peace among themselves. But the commissions did not live up to the expectations placed on them. Instead of looking for compromise solutions, the commissioners presented claims to each other, so none of the meetings ended with the signing of any agreement on controversial issues. And yet, the article lists of Russian commissars significantly expand our understanding of the relations between Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The first commission began only in September 1669 due to the delay of the Polish and Lithuanian representatives and lasted until March 1670. During this meeting, the guardian A.L. Ordin-Nashchokin, who headed the Russian diplomats for embassy affairs, unsuccessfully tried to convince the commissars of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to make peace on conditions of the Andrusovo truce. For the Polish-Lithuanian state this was unacceptable: the problem of “expelled people” in Poland was so acute that the thought of a final abandonment of the temporarily ceded territories was not allowed. Ordin-Nashchokin also expressed serious concern about the uncertainty of the situation in Right Bank Ukraine. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth actually did not control these possessions. Hetman P.D. Doroshenko was in charge here, who not only negotiated citizenship simultaneously with the Polish and Russian governments, but also established contacts with the Ottoman Empire, the nature of which is still the subject of debate in national historiography. But in any case, the actions of the above-mentioned hetman created the conditions for the intervention of a serious enemy in the person of Turkey in the Russian-Polish rivalry for Ukraine.

Nashchokin proposed to start calming Ukraine with its clergy: “so that they don’t go to the Patriarch of Constantinople for a blessing,” since this would orient Little Russia towards Turkey. To achieve this goal, he planned to hold a congress in Kyiv, to which both the clergy and the Cossack elders of both sides of the Dnieper would be summoned with special letters. Nashchokin argued that representatives of the Sultan and Khan should also be invited to this commission so that they can witness that nothing is being plotted against them, and everything is being done only to reassure Ukraine. Only in case of failure of the commission or resistance of the clergy and Cossacks should one think about coercing them by force, which was provided for by the terms of the Russian-Polish alliance. But there was one miscalculation in the plan proposed by Ordin-Nashchokin: it was the troubled Ukraine that suited Turkey and Crimea, so the planned commission initially contradicted the interests of the Sultan and Khan, but was in the interests of Poland and Russia, especially the latter, which really wanted to calm Ukraine. In this case, the likelihood of a clash with Muslims increased sharply, and the Kiev meeting could unite Christians. Another thing is that with such a development of events, most of the Ukrainian Cossacks would not follow the Catholic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but the Orthodox Russia, which, after the signing of the Andrusovo truce, did not at all abandon its intention to include the whole of Ukraine. Poland understood this, so Nashchokin’s proposal was ultimately rejected.

Soon, the commissioners signed the Treaty of Andrusovo II, which stated that the conclusion of the Eternal Peace “did not take place through disputes” and fully confirmed the Truce of Andrusovo and the Moscow Agreement of 1667.

Over the five years since the signing of the Truce of Andrusovo, the parties not only failed to resolve the conflicts that already existed between them, but also began to make new claims against each other, so in 1671-1672. tsarist diplomacy insisted on revising the union treaty of 1667. Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth signed a new agreement that preserved the anti-Ottoman alliance, but its terms changed. One of the main differences of the new treaty was the annulment of the article on the unification and joint actions of Russian and Polish troops during hostilities until the “past difficulties” were resolved to mutual satisfaction. This was supposed to be done at the second border meeting in Andrusovo in 1674.

By the time the commission began its work, Russian-Polish relations had undergone major changes. The Ottoman Empire attacked the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1672, and Russia, fulfilling its obligations, also entered the war, striking the enemy with the forces of Kalmyks, Nogais and Cossacks, Don and Zaporozhye. But this assistance was not enough to repel the Turkish-Tatar aggression, and already in October the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth went to sign peace with Turkey. Despite the weakness of the Polish army, which was shown by the military campaign of 1672, and internal turmoil, the Sejm did not ratify the treaty, and the war continued, and since there were few of its own forces, the Polish-Lithuanian state began to insist on immediate"accident of forces".

In the context of ongoing military operations against the Ottoman Empire since 1672, the next round of Russian-Polish negotiations began in Andrusovo in 1674. The Ambassadorial Congress of 1674 has never been the subject of special research in Russian historiography. A little information about him can be gleaned from S.M. Solovyov, who quite rightly noted the disinterest of the tsarist government in a military alliance with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which was reflected in the commission of 1674. But this statement is not enough. The meeting of 1674 on the border is important because it was here that Russian diplomacy open declared its claims to the territory all Ukraine. It is no coincidence that the princes Nikita Ivanovich Odoevsky, one of the first boyars of the state, and Yuri Mikhailovich Odoevsky, who had been in the tsar’s inner circle since the late 60s, were placed at the head of the embassy.

From Moscow to the Andrusov Congress, the great and plenipotentiary ambassadors were the nearby boyar Prince Nikita Ivanovich Odoevsky, the nearby steward Prince Yuri Mikhailovich Odoevsky, the steward Prince Pyotr Semenovich Prozorovsky, the okolnichy Matvey Stepanovich Pushkin, the Duma nobleman Ivan Ivanovich Chaadaev, the Duma clerk Lukyan Golosov and the clerk Stepan Paul we went 11 June 1674. They had to constantly report to Moscow about what was happening at the congress, for which a special post was installed. The congress was supposed to begin in June, but Russian diplomats received information that Polish and Lithuanian commissars would not appear at the border before August, since the election of a new king was underway in Warsaw. And indeed, only on August 24, one of the main commissioners, Antony Khrapovitsky, arrived at the border, and on September 9, Marcian Oginsky. This was far from a complete composition; the Polish-Lithuanian representatives were still to be joined by the voivode of Chelminsky, Jan Gninsky, and the referendum of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Cyprian Pavel Brostovsky, but since no one could say when they would arrive, at the suggestion of the Russian ambassadors, it was decided to start without them.

The first meeting took place on September 16. The diplomats exchanged credentials and announced the matters with which they would like to begin negotiations. N.I. Odoevsky proposed to start by discussing the conditions of the Eternal Peace, but the Polish side considered it necessary to first discuss all the difficulties that had arisen since the conclusion of the Truce of Andrusovo in 1667. The second meeting on September 22 was devoted to these difficulties, which ended with the transfer of a complete list of claims to Russian diplomats Polish government.

From the point of view of the Polish side, one of the main “difficulties” of Russian-Polish relations was Kyiv, which was held by Russia, although under the terms of the truce it should have been returned to Poland back in 1669. The complaint about the lack of help from Russian troops during the Cossack war was also traditional for the Poles. unrest on the Right Bank. But by 1674, new reasons for Polish discontent appeared. Firstly, the Russian side was reproached for evading the “accident of forces” (although in 1672 this article of the treaty was temporarily removed), as a result of which the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth lost Kamenets-Podolsky (1672). Secondly, in 1673 the Zaporozhye and Don Cossacks supposedly did not go to sea, which allowed the Turks to freely pass to Khotyn, although in fact in specified year Cossacks repeatedly went to Crimea. Thirdly, taking advantage of the difficult situation of the Polish-Lithuanian state, the tsarist troops captured the Right Bank and devastated many cities, “when we (the Poles) could by good means. K.I.) bring them (Right Bank Cossacks. - K.I.) to obedience. They became increasingly desperate for that offensive by force and already succumbed more firmly to the Turkish defense, especially Doroshenko, who feared execution when he had enough in captivity. Since those times, Ukraine has been lost." Thus, the Polish side blamed Russia for the fact that Warsaw lost power over its part of Little Russia.

By September 27, Prince N. Odoevsky and his comrades drew up a detailed response to the Polish-Lithuanian commissars. At the beginning of the letter, Russian diplomats stated that Russia had never violated the Russian-Polish agreements, and that all the losses of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were “from disagreement and from domestic strife and confederation.” This phrase is unusually eloquent. Firstly, in this way the diplomats demonstrated that the tsarist government was well aware of the internal situation of the Polish-Lithuanian state, and secondly, they tried to knock down the arrogance of their opponents.

Kyiv's delay in the letter was explained by the fact that the tsar learned about P.D. Doroshenko's desire to succumb to the Turkish Sultan and transfer the capital of Ukraine to the latter. To prevent the city from falling into the hands of the Busurman, Alexey Mikhailovich, suffering huge losses, left Kyiv behind him. At the same time, he does not refuse to support the Polish fortress - the White Church. Now Kyiv of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth " it is never possible to give in order that by the military craft of His Royal Majesty the military people, the subjects of the Tur Saltan on that side of the Dnieper, many Ukrainian cities with local residents who succumbed to the Tur Saltan from the citizenship of the Royal Majesty and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, from what the Royal Majesty repaired to them in the Greek faith great persecution and oppression against her, and their rights and liberties were violated, carried out under the high sovereign hand ... of his royal majesty in eternal citizenship.” The acceptance of the right-bank Ukrainian lands into royal citizenship, from the point of view of Moscow, was not a violation of any agreements with Warsaw, since Poland ceded to Turkey in 1672 “all of Ukraine... along the old borders.” “You gave Ukraine to the Sultan, in which Kyiv is included: so is it possible to give Kyiv to you after that?” At the same time, the fact was completely ignored, which was repeatedly pointed out by the Polish commissioners: the Buchach Treaty of 1672 cannot be a justification for the actions of the tsarist government, since the representatives sent to negotiate with the Sultan were not authorized by the Sejm and subsequently the Sejm did not accept the conditions on which it was concluded peace with the Ottoman Empire.

The Odoevskys, “old school” diplomats, paid special attention to formal issues - violations of the article of the Andrusov Treaty on titles, adding the following to the previously announced reasons for the detention of Kyiv: the city was “detained for many and countless dishonors and vexations to us in the registration of our name and title in printed books; in the letters sent from your office they write me as Mikhail Alekseevich!..”

The very fact of concluding a peace treaty with Turkey without notifying Alexei Mikhailovich of what was happening was also considered a violation of the agreements, and particular indignation was caused by the fact that I. Komar, who arrived, “only asked for advice and an announcement about whether to keep His Royal Majesty’s peace with the Saltan of Tours.” And on what articles was that agreement with Saltan established and from that agreement list and with that envoy... the royal majesty did not deign to send.”

Russian diplomats also remembered that in 1672, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth violated the agreement, not for the first time, according to which the parties must mutually notify each other about negotiations with Turkey and Crimean Khanate. For example, in 1670, the Polish envoy to Crimea Karwowski, supposedly sent “to implement the Moscow decree,” nevertheless did not want to see Russian diplomats, and later “the royal majesty and senators wrote to Crimea about friendship many times, but about the side of the royal The majesties did not mention the treaty in those letters and sheets at all.”

The Russian commissars categorically rejected the accusation that Russia did not provide any assistance to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, describing in detail the efforts made by Russia and especially emphasizing that if not for the actions of Russian troops in Right Bank Ukraine, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would also have been attacked by the troops of Hetman P. Doroshenko .

Thus, the Russian side tried in its response to emphasize the diversity and selflessness of its assistance to the Polish-Lithuanian state, loyalty to Russian-Polish treaties and numerous violations of these treaties by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Since the received answer M. Oginsky, J. Khrapovitsky and others were supposed to discuss, perhaps communicate with Warsaw to adjust their position in accordance with the received statement from the Russian side, the Polish commissioners proposed devoting the 3rd meeting to discussing the conditions of the Eternal Peace, but unexpectedly came across to the resistance of Russian diplomats, who insisted first to decide how to deal with the numerous mistakes in the royal title that Polish subjects allowed themselves. The commissioners proposed not to touch upon this issue, “putting aside the annoyances on both sides, and proceeding ... with eternal peace to the discussion,” but this was never done. Only on October 9, at the 4th meeting, Russian diplomats announced that Alexey Mikhailovich “wishes eternal peace to be on such terms that the conquered city, which is now on the side of His Tsar’s Majesty, will remain on the side of His Tsar’s Majesty forever.” . The Polish conditions announced in response read: “so that the Tsar’s Majesty deigns to cede all those cities conquered in the last war towards His Royal Majesty and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, as was the case before the current war. And his royal majesty would have inflicted losses on the royal majesty and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which were caused by failure to provide assistance under the agreement to help in the efforts against the onset of the Turkish war, and, moreover, he would have given way to his royal majesty and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth." In addition, the Poles insisted on an alliance “against the Hagarians”, not considering as allied the actions of the tsarist troops under the command of G. Romodanovsky and Hetman I. Samoilovich in Right Bank Ukraine against the Tatars and Cossacks of P. Doroshenko. Prince Romodanovsky, according to the Polish commissars, is now “fighting back not for their occurrence, but in order to take possession of Ukraine forever.”

The parties failed to reach an agreement, and the Polish representatives were the first to propose postponing the conclusion of peace until the next commission in 1678.

Returning to Mignovichi, the Odoevsky princes and their comrades wrote a letter to the Tsar. It said that, most likely, numerous difficulties would not allow the parties to sign the Eternal Peace, but the Polish-Lithuanian representatives would raise the issue of “continuing the years of peace to reconcile the forces.” On what conditions will the tsar allow the truce with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to be extended? For how long?

While waiting for an answer, the Russian plenipotentiary ambassadors met several more times with the Polish commissioners, who tried to convince their interlocutors to accept the conditions offered to them. In turn, the royal representatives read out a detailed explanation of why they could not do this. “Pashkvil” by A. Olshovsky, full of insults to the Moscow ruling house, took one of the first places among the reasons preventing the adoption of the Polish articles. The question again arose about which of the parties was the first to violate the article on the “accident of forces”, but to the proposal of the Polish commissioners to set aside the proceedings and renegotiate the treaty, Russian diplomats responded with an unequivocal refusal: “due to the violation on the part of the Royal Majesty and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the Union Article of the Treaty it is impossible to make an accident again... impossible.” “Before the recent time, the Turk and Crimean troops went to the Tsar’s Majesty’s military people in Ukraine, but the Royal Majesty’s Korun and Lithuanian troops at that time did not go behind those enemies to the rear, and the Tsar’s Majesty’s troops did not happen to hunt the enemies,<...>and His Royal Majesty’s hetmans and generals and military men, where they were during times of need, the military men had no knowledge of that Royal Majesty.” Moreover, “from the side of the Royal Majesty and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, universals were sent out so that His Royal Majesty’s military men would not be collected at that time, but who was in the assembly and went and ordered those to be returned, rejoicing at the enemy’s campaign against Moscow State". Another argument looks no less weighty, which testifies to how well Russia knew about everything that was happening in Poland, where, in particular, “military people who want to go to war, and who don’t want to stay at home, and how with such chance who are disobedient to their sovereign and are lazy in defense of their fatherland.” The only thing that could change the tsar’s position was the adoption at the Sejm of a decision on a joint method of defense, and “so that this resolution would be strong and permanent and henceforth reliable and safe for both sides.” Until such a resolution is adopted, the tsarist troops will operate in Ukraine and the Don, defending both powers, but on their own. That is, contrary to the prevailing opinion in Polish historiography that the tsarist government refused to help its western neighbor, documents indicate the opposite. Russia was ready to provide support to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but demanded certain guarantees, since over the past years Poland had proven itself to be a weak and unreliable ally.

Realizing that Russian diplomats were determined on this issue, the Polish commissioners began to threaten the conclusion of a separate peace with Turkey. They no longer wanted to talk about Eternal Peace, and they agreed to begin negotiations on extending the truce only after the Russian side agreed to unite troops without any reservations. For the tsar, it was more important to maintain peaceful relations with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and his representatives considered the problems of a truce and union as independent. The Polish-Lithuanian commissioners adhered to the opposite point of view: there was no reason to conclude an agreement to extend the truce without a clash of forces. But the version of the alliance proposed by the Poles was absolutely unacceptable for Russia, since among its conditions the following were indicated: the tsarist troops should fight against the Turks and Tatars together with the Polish-Lithuanian ones, and in case of emergency, “instead of All(emphasis mine. - K.I.) to create forces and guns, and one side to the other, demanding, in a brotherly way, livestock, guns, and other military needs to be supplied from their treasury, without demanding any money from the city for that”; in addition, it was assumed that the tsar would undertake the obligation to “bring the Cossacks of that side of the Dnieper into obedience to the royal majesty with his state army,” thus renouncing any claims to Right Bank Ukraine. Therefore, it is not surprising that the very next day after receiving such a proposal, Prince N. Odoevsky and his comrades gave the Polish commissioners the answer: “it is impossible for us to repair such an agreement with you.” But at the same time, Russian diplomats pointed out that the tsarist troops were not going to stop military operations against the “Busurmans”.

In the fall of 1674, Russian troops attacked Azov, and the Cossacks raided Perekop. The latter broke the Tatar barrier put up against them, freed many prisoners, took large booty and returned safely to Sich. A 15,000-strong detachment of Turkish Janissaries arrived in Crimea to help the Tatars with an order to the khan to destroy Zaporozhye with united forces. But the campaign was not a success. When the Turkish-Tatar army surrounded the Zaporozhye Sich, and the Janissaries penetrated its territory, they were shot almost point-blank by the quickly oriented Cossacks, who then went hand-to-hand.

The Ambassadorial Prikaz believed that in 1674 significant assistance was provided to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. What in Warsaw was seen as an attempt to seize the part of Ukraine belonging to Poland was explained in Moscow in a completely different way: “if the Tsar’s Majesty’s military people had not carried out such a military operation against him, Doroshenko, and the cities, then the sides of the Dnieper would not have fought... and now they would he, Doroshenko, was strong and to help the Turkish troops in the state of the royal majesty he went and repaired the devastation, and thus the royal majesty did a lot to help the royal majesty of Poland.” It seems to us that both are right. Russia provided assistance to Poland, but only within the framework of the treaty of 1672, while in Warsaw they were counting on more, and, seeing the weakness of their ally and the unpredictability of the decisions of the Polish Sejm, they considered it possible to simultaneously achieve two goals: weaken the Ottoman Empire and annex Right Bank Ukraine to Russia.

Meanwhile, at the border, the commissioners continued to exchange letters and meet, but it became clear that the negotiations had reached a dead end. Apparently, awareness of this fact and the desire to change the situation in their favor by any means forced the Polish representatives to use very dubious arguments. For example, at the 10th meeting on December 3, having once again heard the refusal of Prince N. Odoevsky to return Kyiv to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in particular, due to numerous errors in the spelling of the royal title and other insults caused royal family, they announced that “dishonor must be exchanged for dishonor, and not a fortress to maintain” and began to threaten Russia with war. But the tsarist ambassadors did not even take this threat seriously: Turkey was too dangerous an enemy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was too weak for Warsaw to decide on a war with its eastern neighbor without regulating relations with the Sultan. Information about success There were no Polish peace initiatives.

At the 11th meeting, held on December 12, the tsarist representatives handed over to the opposing side their version of the traveling letter. The very next day they were sent a Polish version, which was very different from the Russian one. The main thing was that Russian diplomats wanted to postpone until the commission of 1678 both the question of the Eternal Peace and the adoption of decisions on violated articles (royal titles, treaty of union, ownership of Kyiv), and the Polish commissioners postponed until the commission only the conclusion of the Eternal Peace, nevertheless the remaining “difficulties” were proposed to be resolved during the first exchange of plenipotentiary embassies after the coronation of the new Polish king Jan Sobieski. The Polish side did not lose hope of getting Russia to agree to an “accident of forces” and the return of Kyiv, about which they said in Ukraine: in whose hands the city is, he owns all of Little Russia.

Alexei Mikhailovich instructed the Russian ambassadors to make concessions to the Polish commissars. Moscow did not want a break in peaceful relations with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and although they sought to conclude Eternal Peace, they were in no hurry. The truce was still quite far from expiration, and the situation in which the Polish-Lithuanian state found itself gave reason to hope that if events in Ukraine were successful, the conditions of peace between the states could be significantly changed in favor of Russia.

On December 31, 1674, the last, 13th, meeting of the parties took place, at which the final version of the traveling letter was finally agreed upon. The conclusion of the Eternal Peace was postponed until the commission of 1678, which was to take place with the participation of mediators, and all other “difficulties” were postponed until the first exchange of embassies between Moscow and Warsaw. Just two days after the signing of this document, the Russian embassy left Mignovichi.

Subsequently, events did not develop as expected in Moscow. In the fall of 1676, P. Doroshenko was forced to swear allegiance to the Russian Tsar and it seemed that the annexation of Ukraine to Russia was completed. But a few days later, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth signed a truce with the Ottoman Empire and the entire power of the Turkish-Tatar army turned against Russia, since the Sultan had long considered Right Bank Ukraine his possession.

Due to the Russian-Turkish war, the commission of 1678 did not take place. Instead, in the summer the great and plenipotentiary embassy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth arrived in Moscow. As a result of negotiations, the truce between the Russian and Polish-Lithuanian states was extended for another 13 years

The issue of relations between Russians and Poles is historically complex. So much so that almost any topic related to the two nations can escalate into a quarrel, full of mutual reproaches and listing of sins. There is something in this acuteness of mutual affection that is different from the carefully hidden, alienated hostility of the Germans and the French, the Spaniards and the English, even the Walloons and the Flemings. In relations between Russians and Poles, there will probably never be a sobering coldness and averted glances. Lenta.ru tried to figure out the reason for this state of affairs.

Since the Middle Ages in Poland, all Orthodox Christians living in the former territory Kievan Rus, were called Russians, without making distinctions for Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians. Even in the 20th century, in the documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the definition of identity, as a rule, was based on religious affiliation - Catholic, Orthodox or Uniate. At the time when Prince Kurbsky sought refuge in Lithuania, and Prince Belsky in Moscow, the mutual connection was already quite strong, the differences were obvious, but there was no mutual perception through the prism of “friend or foe”. Perhaps this is a normal property of the feudal era, when it is too early to talk about national identity.

Any self-awareness is formed in times of crisis. For Russia in the 17th century it was the era of the Troubles, for Poland - the Swedish Flood (the Swedish invasion of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1655-1660). One of the most important results of the “flood” was the expulsion of Protestants from Poland and the subsequent strengthening of the influence of the Catholic Church. Catholicism became the blessing and curse of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Following the Protestants, the Orthodox Christians, who made up a large part of the country's population, came under attack, and a mechanism of self-destruction was launched in the state. The former Polish-Lithuanian state was distinguished by fairly high national and religious tolerance - Polish Catholics, Muslims, Karaites, Orthodox and pagans, Lithuanians who worshiped Perkunas successfully coexisted together. No wonder the crisis state power, which began under the most prominent of the Polish kings, John III Sobieski, led to a catastrophic contraction and then the death of the Polish state, which had lost its internal consensus. The system of state power opened up too many opportunities for conflicts, giving them legitimacy. The work of the Sejm was paralyzed by the right of liberum veto, which allowed any deputy to cancel everything with his vote. decisions made, A royalty was forced to reckon with the gentry confederations. The latter were an armed association of the gentry, which had every right, if necessary, to oppose the king.

At the same time, to the east of Poland the final formation of Russian absolutism was underway. Then the Poles will talk about their historical inclination towards freedom, and the Russians will be simultaneously proud and embarrassed by the autocratic nature of their statehood. Subsequent conflicts, as usual in history inevitable for neighboring peoples, acquired an almost metaphysical meaning of rivalry between two peoples very different in spirit. However, along with this myth, another will form - about the inability of both Russians and Poles to implement their ideas without violence. Famous Polish public figure, Chief Editor Gazeta Wyborcza Adam Michnik writes wonderfully about this: “Every now and then we feel like students of a magician who have freed powers that no one can control from captivity.” The Polish uprisings and the Russian revolution, in the end, the Ukrainian Maidan - a senseless and merciless instinct of self-destruction.

Russian statehood grew stronger, but this was not, as it may seem now, a consequence of territorial and human superiority over its neighbors. Our country at that time was a huge, poorly developed and sparsely populated territory. Someone will say that these problems still exist today, and they will probably be right. At the end of the 17th century, the population of the Muscovite kingdom exceeded 10 million people, which is slightly more than in the neighboring Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, where 8 million lived, and in France - 19 million. In those days, our Polish neighbors did not and could not have the complex of a small people who were threatened from the East.

IN Russian case it was all about the historical ambitions of the people and the authorities. Now it no longer seems at all strange that, having completed the Northern War, Peter I accepted the title of Emperor of All Russia. But let's look at this decision in the context of the era - after all, the Russian Tsar placed himself above all other European monarchs. The Holy Roman Empire of the German nation does not count - it was not an example or a rival and was going through its worst times. In relations with the Polish king Augustus II the Strong, Peter I undoubtedly dominated, and in terms of development, Russia begins to outstrip its western neighbor.

In just a century, Poland, which saved Europe from the Turkish invasion in 1683 near Vienna, turned into a completely unviable state. Historians have already concluded the debate about whether internal or external factors became fatal for Polish statehood in the 18th century. Of course, everything was decided by their combination. But as for the moral responsibility for the gradual decline of Poland's power, it can be said quite definitely that the initiative of the first partition belonged to Austria, the second - to Prussia, and the final third - to Russia. Everything is equal, and this is not a childish argument about who started it first.

The response to the crisis of statehood was, although belated, fruitful. The Educational Commission (1773-1794) begins work in the country, which was actually the first ministry of education in Europe. In 1788, the Four-Year Diet met, embodying the ideas of the Enlightenment almost simultaneously with the French revolutionaries, but much more humanely. The first in Europe and the second in the world (after the American) Constitution was adopted on May 3, 1791 in Poland.

It was a wonderful undertaking, but it lacked revolutionary force. The Constitution recognized all Poles as the Polish people, regardless of class (previously only the gentry were considered such), but retained serfdom. The situation in Lithuania was noticeably improving, but no one thought to translate the Constitution itself into Lithuanian. The subsequent reaction to changes in the political system of Poland led to two partitions and the fall of statehood. Poland has become, in the words of British historian Norman Davies, “God’s plaything,” or, to put it simply, an object of rivalry and agreement between neighboring and sometimes distant powers.

The Poles responded with uprisings, mainly in the territory of the Kingdom of Poland, which became part of the Russian Empire in 1815 following the results of the Congress of Vienna. It was in the 19th century that the two peoples truly got to know each other, and then mutual attraction, sometimes hostility, and often non-recognition formed. Nikolai Danilevsky considered the Poles to be an alien part of the Slavs, and a similar approach would later appear among the Poles in relation to the Russians.

Polish rebels and Russian autocrats saw the future differently: some dreamed of reviving statehood by any means, others thought in terms of an imperial house in which there would be a place for everyone, including the Poles. The context of the era cannot be underestimated - in the first half of the 19th century, Russians were the only Slavic people who had statehood, and a great one at that. Ottoman domination in the Balkans was seen as enslavement, and Russian power - as deliverance from suffering (from the same Turks or Persians, Germans or Swedes, or simply from native savagery). This view, in fact, was not without reason - the imperial authorities were very loyal to the traditional beliefs and customs of the subject peoples, did not try to achieve their Russification, and in many cases the transition to the rule of the Russian Empire was a real deliverance from destruction.

Following their usual policy, Russian autocrats willingly integrated local elites. But if we talk about Poland and Finland, then the system was failing. We can only remember Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, who served as Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1804-1806, but thought more about the interests of Poland.

Contradictions accumulated gradually. If in 1830 the Polish rebels came out with the words “For our freedom and yours,” then in 1863, in addition to the slogan “Freedom, equality, brotherhood,” completely bloodthirsty calls were heard. The methods of guerrilla warfare brought bitterness, and even the liberal-minded public, who initially sympathized with the rebels, quickly changed their opinion about them. In addition, the rebels thought not only about national liberation, but also about the restoration of statehood within the borders that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had before the partitions. And the slogan “For our and your freedom” practically lost its previous meaning and was now more associated with the hope that other peoples of the empire would rise, and then it would inevitably collapse. On the other hand, when assessing such aspirations, we must not forget that the Russian Narodnaya Volya and anarchists hatched no less destructive plans.

The close but somewhat squeamish neighborhood of the two peoples in the 19th century gave rise to mainly negative stereotypes. During the St. Petersburg fires of 1862, there was even a belief among the people that “students and Poles” were to blame for everything. This was a consequence of the circumstances under which the peoples met. A considerable part of the Poles with whom the Russians dealt were political exiles, often rebels. Their fate in Russia is constant wandering, need, outcast, the need to adapt. Hence the ideas about Polish thievery, cunning, flattery and painful arrogance. The latter is also understandable - these people tried to preserve human dignity in difficult conditions. On the Polish side, an equally unpleasant opinion was formed about the Russians. Rudeness, cruelty, uncouthness, servility to the authorities - that’s what these Russians are.

Among the rebels there were many representatives of the gentry, usually well educated. Their exile to Siberia and the Urals, willy-nilly, had a positive cultural significance for remote regions. In Perm, for example, the architect Alexander Turchevich and the founder of the first bookstore, Jozef Piotrovsky, are still remembered.

After the uprising of 1863-1864, policy regarding Polish lands changed seriously. The authorities sought at all costs to avoid a repetition of the rebellion. However, what is striking is a complete lack of understanding of the national psychology of the Poles. Russian gendarmes supported the type of behavior of the population of the Kingdom of Poland that best corresponded to their own myth about the inflexibility of the Polish spirit. Public executions and persecution of Catholic priests only contributed to the formation of the cult of martyrs. Attempts at Russification, in particular in the education system, were extremely unsuccessful.

Even before the uprising of 1863, the opinion had become established in Polish society that it would still be impossible to “divorce” with its eastern neighbor, and through the efforts of the Marquis of Wielopolsky, a policy of consensus was pursued in exchange for reforms. This yielded results - Warsaw became the third most populous city in the Russian Empire, and reforms began in the Kingdom of Poland itself, bringing it to the forefront of the empire. To economically link Polish lands with others Russian provinces, in 1851 a decision was made to build the St. Petersburg - Warsaw railway. This was the fourth Railway Russia (after Tsarskoye Selo, St. Petersburg-Moscow, and Warsaw-Vienna). At the same time, the policy of the Russian authorities was aimed at eliminating autonomy and separating the eastern territories, which were once part of the historical Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, from the Kingdom of Poland. In 1866, ten provinces of the Kingdom of Poland were directly annexed to Russian lands, and the following year they introduced a ban on the use Polish language in the administrative field. The logical result of this policy was the abolition of the post of governor in 1874 and the introduction of the post of Warsaw governor-general. The Polish lands themselves were called the Vistula region, which the Poles still remember.

This approach cannot be called fully meaningful, since it actualized the rejection of everything Russian and, moreover, contributed to the migration of the Polish resistance to neighboring Austria-Hungary. Somewhat earlier, Russian Tsar Nicholas I joked bitterly: “The stupidest of the Polish kings was Jan Sobieski, and the stupidest of the Russian emperors was me. Sobieski - because he saved Austria in 1683, and I - because I saved it in 1848.” It was in Austria-Hungary at the beginning of the 20th century that Polish extremists, including the future national leader of Poland, Jozef Pilsudski, received refuge.

On the fronts of World War I, Poles fought on both sides in the hope that the conflict would weaken the Great Powers and Poland would eventually gain independence. At the same time, Krakow conservatives were considering the option of a triune monarchy of Austria-Hungary-Poland, and pro-Russian nationalists such as Roman Dmowski saw the greatest threat to the Polish national spirit in Germanism.

The end of the First World War did not mean for the Poles, unlike other peoples of Eastern Europe, the end of the vicissitudes of state building. In 1918, the Poles suppressed the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, in 1919 they annexed Vilna (Vilnius), and in 1920 they carried out the Kiev Campaign. In Soviet textbooks, Pilsudski’s soldiers were called White Poles, but this is not entirely true. During the most difficult battles between the Red Army soldiers and Denikin’s army, Polish troops not only stopped advancing east, but also made it clear to the Bolsheviks that they were suspending active operations, thereby allowing the Reds to complete the defeat of the Volunteer Army. Among the Russian emigration, for a long time this was perceived as a betrayal. Next is Mikhail Tukhachevsky’s campaign against Warsaw and the “miracle on the Vistula,” the author of which was Marshal Jozef Pilsudski himself. Defeat Soviet troops and the huge number of prisoners (according to the estimates of the prominent Slavist G.F. Matveev, about 157 thousand people), their inhuman suffering in Polish concentration camps - all this became the source of almost inexhaustible Russian hostility towards the Poles. In turn, the Poles have similar feelings towards the Russians after Katyn.

What cannot be taken away from our neighbors is the ability to preserve the memory of their suffering. Almost every Polish city has a street named after the victims of the Katyn massacre. And no solution to problematic issues will lead to their renaming, acceptance of historical data and amendments to textbooks. In the same way, in Poland the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Warsaw Uprising will be remembered for a long time. Few people know that the old corners of the Polish capital are actually rebuilt from paintings and photographs. After the Nazis suppressed the Warsaw Uprising, the city was completely destroyed and looked approximately the same as Soviet Stalingrad. Any rational arguments explaining the impossibility of supporting the rebels Soviet army, will not be taken into account. This is part of the national tradition, which is more important than the dry fact of losing about 20 percent of the population in World War II. In turn, in Russia they will think with sadness about the ingratitude of the Poles, like all other Slavs, for whom we have stood up for the last three centuries.

The reason for the mutual misunderstanding between Russia and Poland is that we have different destinies. We measure with different measures and reason using different categories. The powerful Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth turned into a “toy of God”, and Muscovy, which was once on the outskirts, became great empire. Even having escaped from the embrace of “big brother,” Poland will never find another destiny than to be a satellite of other powers. But for Russia there is no other destiny than to be an empire or not to be at all.

In the history of our country, the 17th century is a very significant milestone, since at that time many events took place that influenced the entire subsequent development of the state. Was especially important foreign policy Russia in the 17th century, since at that time it was very difficult to fight off numerous enemies, while at the same time maintaining strength for domestic work.

Firstly, it was urgent to return all the lands that were lost as a result of the Troubles. Secondly, the country’s rulers were faced with the task of annexing back all those territories that were once part of Kievan Rus. Of course, they were largely guided not only by the ideas of reuniting once divided peoples, but also by the desire to increase the share of arable land and the number of taxpayers. Simply put, Russian foreign policy in the 17th century was aimed at restoring the country's integrity. The Troubles had an extremely difficult impact on the country: the treasury was empty, many peasants became so impoverished that it was simply impossible to collect taxes from them. Obtaining new lands that were not plundered by the Poles would not only restore Russia's political prestige, but also replenish its treasury. In general, this was the main foreign policy of Russia in the 17th century.

At the beginning of the 16th century. At the Dnieper rapids, a free Cossack republic emerged - the Zaporozhye Sich. There was no feudal dependence in Zaporozhye. The Cossacks had their own self-government, an elected hetman and a “kosh chieftain”.

The Polish government is trying to take control of the Ukrainian Cossacks and recruit them into service. From the 16th century begin Cossack uprisings against the Poles. Strengthening religious, national and social oppression leads to the outbreak of a liberation war.

In 1648 it was headed by Bogdan Khmelnytsky. He expels the Polish garrison from the Sich, is elected hetman and appeals to the Cossacks for an uprising. Having concluded a military alliance with Crimean Tatars, Khmelnitsky inflicted defeats on the Poles at Zheltye Vody, Korsun and Pilyavtsy.

In August 1649, the Cossack-Tatar army won a victory near Zborov. A peace treaty was concluded, according to which Poland recognized the autonomy of Right-Bank Ukraine.

In 1650, Polish troops began a new campaign against Khmelnytsky and in 1651, as a result of the betrayal of the Crimean Khan Islam-Girey (who withdrew his troops from the battlefield), they managed to win a victory near Berestechko. The Poles restored their power over Ukraine, limiting the number of Cossacks to 20 thousand.

B. Khmelnitsky, realizing the impossibility of confronting Poland alone, repeatedly raised the question of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia before Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. On October 1, 1653, the Zemsky Sobor decided to accept Ukraine into Russian citizenship. The royal ambassadors went to Hetman Khmelnitsky. January 8, 1654 Pereyaslavl Rada decided to accept citizenship and took the oath of allegiance to the Tsar, confirming her consent to Ukraine’s entry into Russia.

This caused the war of 1654-1667. between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia. The war was protracted and ended with the Truce of Andrusovo in 1667. The Smolensk region, Left Bank Ukraine and Kyiv went to Russia. In 1686, an “eternal peace” was concluded with Poland, which consolidated the terms of the Attdrus truce. Belarus remained part of Poland.

The reunification of Ukraine and Russia economically, politically and militarily strengthened the Russian state, preventing the destruction of Ukraine as a result of Polish or Turkish intervention.

At the same time, Russia was at war with Sweden. In 1661, according to the Treaty of Kardis, Russia was forced to return its lands in Livonia to Sweden, and found itself without access to the sea.

In 1677, a war began with Turkey over Ukraine. Turkish troops planned to capture Kyiv and the entire Left Bank Ukraine. But, faced with the heroic resistance of the Russian-Ukrainian army during the defense of the Chigerin fortress, the exhausted Turks signed an agreement in Bakhchisarai (1681) on a truce for 20 years. Türkiye recognized Russia's left bank and Kyiv. The lands between the Dnieper and Kyiv remained neutral.

Many Poles do not like Russia and Russians. Today is a national holiday - National Unity Day. It is connected with the Polish intervention. But the attitude of Russians towards Poles is traditionally positive. I decided that it would be useful to know everything about Russian-Polish relations.

In the XVI-XVII centuries. Russia and Poland fought numerous wars among themselves. Livonian War(1558-1583) was fought by Muscovite Russia against Livonian Order, Polish-Lithuanian state, Sweden and Denmark for hegemony in the Baltic states. In addition to Livonia, the Russian Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible hoped to conquer the East Slavic lands that were part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The unification of Lithuania and Poland during the war became important for Russian-Polish relations. single state– Rzeczpospolita (Union of Lublin 1569).

The confrontation between Russia and Lithuania gave way to the confrontation between Russia and Poland. King Stefan Batory inflicted a number of defeats on the Russian army and was stopped only under the walls of Pskov. According to Yam Zapolsky's (1582) peace treaty with Poland, Russia renounced its conquests in Lithuania and lost access to the Baltic.

During the Time of Troubles, the Poles invaded Russia three times.

The first time was under the pretext of providing assistance to the supposedly legitimate Tsar Dmitry - False Dmitry I. In 1610, the Moscow government, the so-called Seven Boyars, itself called the Polish prince Vladislav IV to the Russian throne and allowed Polish troops into the city. In 1612 the Poles were expelled from Moscow people's militia under the command of Minin and Pozharsky. In 1617, Prince Vladislav made a campaign against Moscow. After an unsuccessful assault, he entered into negotiations and signed the Deulin Truce. Smolensk, Chernigov and Seversk lands were given to the Poles.

In June 1632, after the Deulin truce, Russia tried to recapture Smolensk from Poland, but was defeated (Smolensk War, 1632-1634). The Poles failed to build on their success; the borders remained unchanged. However, for the Russian government the most an important condition was the official renunciation of the Polish king Wladyslaw IV of his claims to the Russian throne.

The new Russian-Polish war (1654-1667) began after the hetmanate of Bohdan Khmelnitsky was accepted into Russia under the Pereyaslav agreements. According to the peace treaty of Andrusov, Smolensk and Chernigov lands and Left Bank Ukraine, and Zaporozhye was declared to be under a joint Russian-Polish protectorate. Kyiv was declared a temporary possession of Russia, but according to the “Eternal Peace” on May 16, 1686 it finally passed to it.

Ukrainian and Belarusian lands became an “apple of discord” for Poland and Russia until the middle of the 20th century.

The cessation of the Russian-Polish wars was facilitated by the threat to both states from Turkey and its vassal Crimean Khanate.

IN Northern War against Sweden 1700-1721 Poland was an ally of Russia.

In the 2nd half of the 18th century. The Polish-Lithuanian gentry, torn apart by internal contradictions, was in a state of deep crisis and decline, which made it possible for Prussia and Russia to interfere in its affairs. Russia took part in the War of the Polish Succession of 1733-1735.
Sections of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772-1795. between Russia, Prussia and Austria took place without big wars, because the state, weakened due to internal turmoil, could no longer provide serious resistance to its more powerful neighbors.

As a result of the three sections of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the redistribution at the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815. Tsarist Russia Most of the Duchy of Warsaw was transferred (the Kingdom of Poland was formed). Polish national liberation uprisings of 1794 (led by Tadeusz Kościuszko), 1830-1831, 1846, 1848, 1863-1864. were depressed.

In 1918, the Soviet government annulled all agreements of the tsarist government on the division of the country.

After Germany's defeat in World War I, Poland became an independent state. Its leadership made plans to restore the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772. The Soviet government, on the contrary, intended to establish control over the entire territory of the former Russian Empire, making it, as it was officially declared, a springboard for the world revolution.

The Soviet-Polish War of 1920 began successfully for Russia, Tukhachevsky’s troops stood near Warsaw, but then defeat followed. According to various estimates, from 80 to 165 thousand Red Army soldiers were captured. Polish researchers consider the death of 16 thousand of them to be documented. Russian and Soviet historians put the figure at 80 thousand. According to the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus went to Poland.

On August 23, 1939, the USSR and Germany signed a Non-Aggression Pact, better known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Attached to the treaty was a secret additional protocol that defined the delimitation of the Soviet and German spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. On August 28, an explanation was signed to the “secret additional protocol”, which delimited the spheres of influence “in the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions included in Polish State"The zone of influence of the USSR included the territory of Poland east of the line of the Pissa, Narev, Bug, Vistula, and San rivers. This line roughly corresponded to the so-called “Curzon Line,” along which it was supposed to establish the eastern border of Poland after the First World War.

September 1, 1939 attack on Poland fascist Germany unleashed the Second world war. After defeating the Polish army within a few weeks, it occupied most of the country. On September 17, 1939, in accordance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Red Army crossed the eastern border of Poland.

Soviet troops captured 240 thousand Polish troops. More than 14 thousand officers of the Polish army were interned in the fall of 1939 on the territory of the USSR. In 1943, two years after the occupation by German troops western regions USSR, reports appeared that NKVD officers shot Polish officers in the Katyn Forest, located 14 kilometers west of Smolensk.
In May 1945, the territory of Poland was completely liberated by units of the Red Army and the Polish Army. More than 600 thousand died in the battles for the liberation of Poland. Soviet soldiers and officers.

By the decisions of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of 1945, its western lands were returned to Poland, and the Oder-Neisse border was established. After the war, the construction of a socialist society under the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) was proclaimed in Poland. In restoration and development national economy provided great help Soviet Union. In 1945-1993. the Soviet Northern Group of Forces was stationed in Poland; in 1955-1991 Poland was a member of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

By the manifesto of the Polish Committee of National Liberation of July 22, 1944, Poland was proclaimed the Polish Republic. From July 22, 1952 to December 29, 1989 – Polish People's Republic. Since December 29, 1989 – Republic of Poland.

Diplomatic relations between the RSFSR and Poland were established in 1921, between the USSR and Poland - from January 5, 1945, the legal successor is the Russian Federation.

On May 22, 1992, the Treaty on Friendly and Good-Neighborly Relations was signed between Russia and Poland.

The legal foundation of relations is formed by an array of documents concluded between former USSR and Poland, as well as over 40 interstate and intergovernmental treaties and agreements signed over the past 18 years.

In the period 2000-2005. political ties between Russia and Poland were maintained quite intensively. 10 meetings of the President took place Russian Federation Vladimir Putin with the President of the Republic of Poland Alexander Kwasniewski. There were regular contacts between heads of government and foreign ministers through the parliamentary line. There was a bilateral Committee on the Strategy of Russian-Polish Cooperation, and regular meetings of the Russia-Poland Public Dialogue Forum were held.

After 2005, the intensity and level of political contacts decreased significantly. This was influenced by the confrontational line of the Polish leadership, expressed in maintaining a socio-political atmosphere unfriendly towards our country.

The new government of Poland, formed in November 2007, headed by Donald Tusk, declares an interest in normalizing Russian-Polish relations and a readiness for open dialogue in order to find solutions to the accumulated problems in bilateral relations.

On August 6, 2010, the inauguration of the elected President of Poland, Bronislaw Komorowski, took place. In his solemn speech, Komorowski stated that he would support the ongoing process of rapprochement with Russia: “I will contribute to the ongoing process of rapprochement and Polish-Russian reconciliation. This is an important challenge facing both Poland and Russia.”

It seems to me that we should not forget both the bad and the good. It is very important to remember that Poland in history was both an ally of Russia and part Russian Empire a whole century. History teaches us that friends may turn out to be traitors, but there are no enemies forever.