Our failures and defeats at the beginning of the war were due to a number of factors. First of all, the power of a country overprepared for war was unleashed on the USSR. The fascist regime that came to power focused all its efforts on developing military production. During the period from 1934 to 1940 it increased 22 times, and the size of the German armed forces increased 35 times. In 1941, the industry of almost all of Europe worked for Nazi Germany; neutral countries supplied it with raw materials. By the spring of 1941, the German armed forces served almost 5,000 enterprises in the occupied territories. Its industrial potential was 1.5-2 times greater than Soviet industry.

The Germans were outnumbered in manpower. Using the population of satellite countries to work in the military industry, the Nazis put most of the German population under arms. In 1941, Hitler sent his main forces against the USSR, leaving Western Europe only occupation troops. In June 1941, the invading army numbered 5.5 million people versus 3 million. Soviet troops western border districts.

Nazi Germany had a wealth of combat experience accumulated over two years of war in Europe. The high technical equipment of the German army made it mobile.

Unlike the Wehrmacht, on the eve of the war the Red Army was in the process of reorganization and rearmament, which was not completed. The Red Army lacked modern types of weapons, which made the troops inactive and reduced their combat effectiveness. Nevertheless, by the summer of 1941, the Red Army as a whole even had a numerical superiority over the Wehrmacht in tanks and aircraft. She was not inferior in artillery either. Based on this, the reasons for the defeat of our army in the initial period of the war should be sought not so much in the balance of forces and means, but in the ability to dress them up.

The combat effectiveness of the army was significantly reduced Stalin's repressions. According to calculations carried out by General A.I. Todorsky, Stalin's repressions took away: out of five marshals - three (A.I. Egorov, M.N. Tukhachevsky, V.K. Blucher); out of five army commanders - three; out of ten commanders of the 2nd rank - all; out of 57 corps commanders - 50; out of 186 division commanders - 154; out of 456 colonels - 401. Such large losses of the highest and senior command staff and in such a short time our army did not bear even during the war. By the beginning of the war, only 7% of commanders had higher education. Most of the repressed knew the art of war and German military organization. In fact, the command staff of the Red Army in its training was thrown back to the level of the end of the civil war. It is difficult to find a precedent in world history when one of the parties, on the eve of a mortal battle, weakened itself in such a way. By the summer of 1941, about 75% of commanders had been in their posts for less than one year. In total, 70 thousand commanders were repressed before the war, of which 37 thousand in the army and 3 thousand in the navy. Meanwhile, it takes 10-12 years to train a major, and 20 years for an army commander. Even G.K. Zhukov at the beginning of the war was in no way equal to Tukhachevsky or Egorov in his training.

The commanders, who did not have time to gain experience, immediately found themselves in difficult situation the beginning of the war. Confusion, inability to organize the interaction of troops, loss of control are not uncommon phenomena in the first battles. The initiative actions of the commanders were constrained by the atmosphere of general fear and suspicion, the unlimited regime of Stalin’s personal power.

Due to repressions on the eve of the war, the development of military theory was suspended. Stalin and People's Commissar K.E. Voroshilov did not understand the theoretical developments of M.N. Tukhachevsky, who back in 1936 reasonably warned about a likely war in 1939-1940. in Europe and the possibility of a surprise attack by Germany on the USSR. On the contrary, K.E. Voroshilov was a champion of outdated military doctrine. The military doctrine formulated in the 20s with the active participation of M.V. Frunze was practically not revised. The only theses that were put forward were that we would wage the war with “little loss”, transferring it to enemy territory, and turn it into a war between the world proletariat and the world bourgeoisie. Such installations did not allow for the possibility of large enemy forces breaking through to great depths, so the army mastered offensive tactics, and meanwhile in the first months of the war we were forced to retreat and conduct defensive battles. Marshal I.Kh. Bagramyan admitted: “Before the war, we mainly learned to attack. But such an important maneuver as retreat was not given due importance. Now we are paying for it." Due to the fact that it was supposed to repel the enemy’s attack with a powerful blow and transfer fighting into its territory, more than half of our ammunition, equipment, and fuel were stored near the border and in the first week were largely either destroyed or captured by the enemy. Repressive policies caused enormous harm to Soviet military science. Many leading designers of military equipment (A.N. Tupolev, P.O. Sukhoi, etc.) developed samples of new equipment while in prison.

One of the factors of our failures is, to a certain extent, the surprise for the Soviet people of Germany's attack on the USSR. The people's consciousness was deformed by the attitude towards friendship with fascist Germany. The Soviet press and propaganda presented Germany as a “great peace-loving power.” Until June 22, 1941, trains with bread and raw materials were sent to Germany, according to the Soviet-German economic agreement signed in 1940. And although many were clearly aware that war with Germany could not be avoided, nevertheless, in the eyes of the Soviet people, the German attack on June 22 was both treacherous and sudden. However, in strategic and tactical terms, this attack was not sudden. Another thing is that the Soviet troops of the border regions, not brought into combat readiness, who did not have time to take all countermeasures stretched along the entire border under the attacks of the Wehrmacht, were taken by surprise.

Information about the impending attack on the USSR came from a variety of sources, ranging from intelligence officers to some statesmen. Already 11 days after Hitler approved the Barbarossa plan, information was received in Moscow about the beginning of Germany’s preparations for war against the USSR. In the spring of 1941, the intelligence department reported to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, K.E. Voroshilov, S.K. Timoshenko data on the build-up and distribution of the German armed forces across theaters of military operations. Stalin was warned about the impending attack Soviet intelligence officers(R. Sorge, L. Trepper, etc.). Information came from ambassadors in England and Germany. W. Churchill warned about the movement of German troops, and even the German ambassador to the USSR Schulenberg hinted at the imminent start of war. However, Stalin mistakenly assessed the current situation, apparently hoping to delay, through diplomatic negotiations, a clash with Germany for a country not prepared for war. He refused to believe the facts. Thus, accurate and reliable intelligence was rendered useless by ineffective policies. For the mistakes and miscalculations made by the leadership, the soldiers paid with their lives, holding back the strongest enemy army with heroic efforts.

Reply posted by: Guest

in France, in the suburbs of Paris

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Cattails grow along the banks of reservoirs - this is a kind of marsh grass, reeds

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n.i. Vavilov is a brilliant scientist of the 20th century. Vavilov distinguished himself as an evolutionist and plant protection specialist.

father Ivan Ilyich Vavilov (1863-1928) - merchant of the second guild and public figure, was from a peasant family in the Volokolamsk district. Before the revolution, he was the director of the Udal and Vavilov manufacturing company. mother Alexandra Mikhailovna Vavilova (1868-1938), née Postnikova, was the daughter of an artist-carver who worked in the Prokhorov manufactory.

Interesting Facts

To the beginning of the great Patriotic War The Institute of Plant Growing, founded by Vavilov in Tsarskoye Selo, owned the world's largest collection of seeds. During the blockade, the institute's staff preserved the collection in the absence of electricity and interruptions in heating.

In the winter of 1941-1942, five institute employees died of starvation because they refused to consider grain reserves as food. In the summer, scientists planted seeds under artillery fire.

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On the banks of the rapid mountain rivers of the Far East you can find the Mandarin duck. This is an interesting bird with bright multi-colored plumage, as if it came out of some drawing. The color of male mandarin ducks is replete with orange, sand, blue, green and other colors. The large painted head is complemented by a neat bright red beak. the females are not as beautifully dressed as their gentlemen - most of their feathers are brown, and their bellies are covered with speckles.

Mandarin ducks have chosen the taiga of the Khabarovsk and Primorsky Territories - the eastern lands of our country. They are migratory, so with the arrival of cold weather they move south, to the territories of China and Japan. Due to their love for trees, ducks prefer rivers and reservoirs with forested banks. Mandarin ducks are especially comfortable in windbreaks, where there is a lot of cover and it’s easy to hide in case of danger.

On the banks of the rapid mountain rivers of the Far East you can find the Mandarin duck. This is an interesting bird with bright multi-colored plumage, as if it came out of some drawing. The color of male mandarin ducks is replete with orange, sand, blue, green and other colors. The large painted head is complemented by a neat bright red beak. the females are not as beautifully dressed as their gentlemen - most of their feathers are brown, and their bellies are covered with speckles.

Unlike most other ducks, mandarin ducks often like to perch on tree branches and deftly stay on them, despite their flipper-like paws. They also place their nests high above the ground - in the hollows of trees growing along rivers. because of this, barely hatched ducklings are forced to jump out of the hollow with high altitude to follow his mother to the water. Mandarin ducks fly quickly, swiftly and like to make sharp turns, which, of course, helps them escape from predators. They are also good on the water - mandarin ducks swim well with their tails up, but do not like to dive.

Mandarin ducks are monogamous, that is, having met and mated once, they pair for the entire season (which does not happen very often among ducks). the male captivates the female with his bright nuptial plumage, fighting with other males for the right to leave offspring. after the mating season, males molt and lose almost all their beauty, becoming similar to females. but by next spring they are again dressed in colorful attire.

in Chinese culture, a pair of mandarin ducks (yuanyang) is a symbol of fidelity and is often found in fine arts, as well as in folklore. There is a Chinese proverb about a loving couple: “two mandarin ducks playing in the water.” At weddings, the premises are decorated with figurines of these birds so that there is fidelity and happiness between the newlyweds. images of bright ducks can be found on the paintings of Chinese vases and other vessels.

The diet of these ducks is typical for the family: small amphibians and fish, insects, snails. in the trees, birds can get equally nutritious acorns and seeds, and humans have the opportunity to eat in the rice fields. also sometimes tangerines feast on fish eggs and worms.

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany, treacherously violating the non-aggression treaty, suddenly, without declaring war, dealt a powerful blow to the Soviet Union. This day went down in the history of our country as a tragic date, it became the day of the beginning of the incredibly difficult war of the Soviet people against fascism, rightly called the Great Patriotic War.

The military-political leadership of Germany, having concentrated the main armed forces against the USSR, planned to defeat the Soviet Armed Forces and achieve victory within 4-5 months by delivering crushing blows on a wide front and to great depth.

Before the attack on the USSR, the German armed forces numbered 8.5 million people. The ground forces had 179 infantry and cavalry divisions, 35 motorized and tank divisions and brigades, a total of 5.2 million people. Of these, 119 infantry and cavalry (66.5% of all available), 33 motorized and tank (94.3%) divisions and 2 brigades were deployed against the Soviet Union. In addition, 29 divisions and 16 brigades of Germany's allies - Finland, Hungary and Romania - were put on combat readiness near the borders of the USSR. In total, this grouping of troops of Germany and its allies numbered 5.5 million people, 47.2 thousand guns and mortars, 4.3 thousand tanks and about 5 thousand combat aircraft.

At the beginning of the German aggression, the Red Army had 303 divisions, including 198 rifle, 13 cavalry, 31 motorized, 61 tank. Mechanized and tank divisions were part of 29 mechanized corps. There were up to 4,826,907 military personnel in the Red Army and Navy. In addition, in the formations of other departments, which were on the payroll of the People's Commissariat of Defense, there were 74,940 people, including 64,900 military personnel.

There were 2 million 900 thousand military personnel in the troops of the five western border districts and the forces of three fleets (Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets). The ground group had 170 divisions (103 rifle, 40 tank, 20 mechanized, 7 cavalry) and two brigades. They were armed with 32.9 thousand guns and mortars (without 50 mm), 14.2 thousand tanks, 9.2 thousand combat aircraft, which is much more than half of the entire combat and numerical strength of the Red Army and Navy fleet.

Attack fascist Germany caught the Soviet Armed Forces during a period of strategic deployment, when its activities were started, but not a single one was completed by the beginning of the war. The North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts, deployed on the basis of the Baltic, Western and Kyiv military districts, found themselves in the most difficult situation. The troops of these fronts took on the blows of the main groups of enemy wars.

In the first months of the war, the Red Army suffered heavy defeats and suffered heavy losses. By the end of the first day of the German attack, enemy tank groups in many sectors of the front had wedged themselves deep into Soviet territory from 25 to 35, and in some places up to 50 km. By July 10, enemy troops had advanced in decisive directions from 380 to 600 km. The Red Army suffered heavy losses. The enemy managed to defeat 28 Soviet divisions and more than 72 divisions suffered losses in personnel and military equipment of 50% or more. “The total losses of the Red Army,” writes G.A. Kumanev, “in divisions alone, excluding reinforcement units and combat support during this time, amounted to about 850 thousand people, up to 6 thousand tanks, at least 6.5 thousand caliber guns 76 mm and above, more than 3 thousand anti-tank guns, about 12 thousand mortars, as well as about 3.5 thousand aircraft.”

What is the reason for these severe defeats of the Red Army. In our opinion, there is a whole complex of objective and subjective factors that determined the difficult course of hostilities for the Red Army in the initial period of the war. “In the historical literature published in the country and abroad,” writes G.A. Kumanev, “there are many works that contain the answer to this question. They usually refer to the enormous military-economic potential of the Nazi Reich, which in June 1941 relied on the resources of the Europe it enslaved. Readers' attention is also drawn to the fact that the Nazi army had two years of war experience, was well trained and equipped with the latest technology. The failures of the Red Army are also explained by pre-war repressions against military personnel, an erroneous assessment of the military-strategic situation by Stalin and his inner circle, an incorrect determination of the direction of the aggressor’s main attack, our insufficient preparedness for war in economic terms, and too short a peacetime framework, which did not allow us to accomplish everything. outlined plans, etc.”

Among these and other factors that led to extremely dire consequences for the Soviet troops, the main one, we believe, was that the German army in June 1941 was stronger, more combat-ready, and better armed than the Red Army. She gained experience fighting in modern warfare. The German army was the best army at that time in Europe. Suffice it to remember that it only took about a month for the Wehrmacht to bring France to its knees. At the same time, German troops lost only 29 thousand killed. The entire campaign in Poland took the Wehrmacht only 14 days.

As a result of the occupation of European countries, the Wehrmacht received a large amount of military equipment and supplies. In France alone, 3 thousand aircraft and over 3.5 thousand tanks were captured. In total, military equipment for 150 divisions was taken from the occupied countries. After the campaigns in Western Europe and Poland, a number of measures were taken in Germany to improve the quality of weapons. Samples of weapons and equipment that showed the best effectiveness in combat operations were left with the troops. At the same time, modernization of a number of produced types and types of weapons was carried out, and all equipment available to the troops was repaired and its service life was brought to the required level.

Note that when assessing the capabilities of the German army before an attack on the USSR, many researchers pay attention to high level its command staff, who in the second half of the 30s received practice in command and control of troops and organizing their support in combat conditions. Regarding the training of non-commissioned officers, former Wehrmacht General K. Tippelskirch wrote that the German army “had... such non-commissioned officers as no other army in the world had - numerous, exceptionally well prepared and trained.”

In addition, the group of enemy troops concentrated near the border of the USSR outnumbered the Soviet troops of the western military districts in the number of personnel by 1.9 times, in heavy and medium tanks - by 1.5 times, in combat aircraft of new types - 3.2 times. Despite the large number of aircraft and tanks available in the Red Army, the overall superiority (taking into account all the given indicators) was in favor of Germany by 1.2 times.

The size of the Red Army, as already noted, from 1939 to 1941 increased two and a half times and amounted to more than five million people. As a result, the Red Army was largely composed of recently conscripted youth aged 18-21. Almost half of the Red Army soldiers in the first year of service were conscripts of 1941. A significant part of those called up from the reserve during the winter and spring of 1941 did not have time to complete the full course of combat training.

On May 17, 1941, a directive was issued, signed by Zhdanov, Timoshenko and Zhukov, criticizing the shortcomings identified during inspections of Red Army units and formations in early 1941. It was noted that training, especially of battalions and divisions, in almost all military districts is poor. The middle and junior command staff of many units and formations also received low ratings. All military districts tested for fire training received a poor rating.

Not all was well with the tank forces. In 1941, a decision was made to create 9 mechanized corps, and in March 1941, 20 more. A paradoxical situation was created: with almost 19 thousand tanks in the Red Army, only one corps out of 29 mechanized corps could be fully equipped with them. There were few new tanks. Even in the western districts, on June 22, 1941, out of 12,782 tanks, there were 1,301 new (469 KV tanks and 832 T-34). Of the old tanks in the armed forces of the USSR as of June 15, 1941, 29% needed major repairs, on average - 44%, no more than 27% were serviceable.

There were serious problems with the combat training of tank crews. The training of tank unit personnel left much to be desired. Many driver mechanics had only 1.5-2 hours of practice driving tanks. Secrecy forced us to master the machines in the dark.

The head of the armored department, Ya.N. Fedorenko, speaking at the December 1940 meeting of the senior command staff of the Red Army, said that last year The tankers were only able to practice shooting from a standstill, and did not start shooting as part of a platoon and company at all. “Fire training,” he noted, “remained unfinished this year... In tactical training, issues of interaction remained unfinished this year...” “Unfortunately, note the authors of the first book of the four-volume book “The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.” , what they did not manage to do in 1940, could not be completed in the next year either.”

It was necessary to replace outdated aircraft with new ones, since most of the Soviet aircraft were inferior to the German ones in many respects technical specifications. Of the 6,379 combat aircraft available to the five border districts, only 1,540 were new designs. Plus there is a shortage and low qualifications of flight personnel, since these new types of aircraft accounted for only 208 crews. Even in the Western Special Military District, with all 1909 combat aircraft, there were 1343 combat crews and 1086 combat vehicles. On 242 new aircraft, 64 crews were able to carry out combat missions, and 4 in difficult weather conditions.

In the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense from May 17, 1941(underlined - author) the following was noted, in particular: “... the low performance in the combat training of the aviation units of the Red Army was accompanied by an extremely large number of disasters and accidents... The operation of the new equipment by the flight personnel has been poorly mastered... The flight personnel for combat use - bombing, aerial shooting, high-altitude and route flights - were trained completely unsatisfactorily... The average flight time per pilot for the entire winter period was six hours in the KOVO Air Force (Kiev Special Military District - author). OVO (Odessa Military District - author) - two hours and fifteen minutes..."

The order of the head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force dated the same date indicated that as a result of an inspection of the Air Force of the Western Special Military District, whose troops were stationed in Belarus, in the direction where the German command planned to deliver the main attack, low fire training of the pilots was revealed, even on the ground they fired the machine gun unsatisfactorily. In July 1941, due to a lack of fuel in the Western Special Military District, flights in a number of aviation regiments were stopped. At its meeting on May 5, 1941, the Main Military Council recognized the combat training of the Red Army Air Force as unsatisfactory.

It is worth emphasizing that in the summer of 1939, the Luftwaffe troops had 8 thousand high-ranking pilots who had the right to fly any type of military aircraft day and night. 25% of pilots were proficient in blind piloting. Of course, during the two years of war they significantly improved their skills and acquired valuable combat experience.

This, one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, was aggravated by a number of mistakes, miscalculations, and wrong decisions in preparing the army and the country for fascist aggression.

Let us note, first of all, the problems of surprise. When determining its role in the defeat of the Red Army, as it seems to the author, an extreme is allowed that does not correspond to reality. There is still an assertion that Stalin and the country's intelligence agencies knew about the German attack, and therefore any supposed surprise is excluded. However, documents show that, despite reports from intelligence agencies and diplomats about the impending danger, Stalin was afraid to give Germany a reason to attack. Only on the night of June 22, when signals about an impending attack became extremely alarming, Stalin allowed the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov to transmit a directive to bring troops to combat readiness. However, this measure came too late.

The formations, formations and units of the Red Army of the North-Western, Western and South-Western Fronts (formerly the Baltic, Western and Kiev Special Military Districts) had to fully implement operational deployment and take their starting position to repel enemy attacks. However, this was not done. Of the 75 rifle divisions of these fronts, more than a third were on the move, making marches to a new location or to concentration areas, 20 divisions required additional strength from 25 to 50%.

These and other facts allow us to conclude that there was no strategic surprise; the country, the people, the army knew that sooner or later aggression from Germany was possible. However, there was a clear operational-tactical surprise of the start of hostilities, which had an extremely negative impact on the course of the war.

On June 22, 1941, General F. Halder wrote in his diary: “... All armies except the 11th went on the offensive according to plan. The offensive of our troops, apparently, came as a complete tactical surprise for the enemy... The complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy is evidenced by the facts that the units were taken by surprise at the barracks, the planes stood at the airfields, covered with tarpaulin, and the advanced units were suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command about what to do... One can expect an even greater influence of the element of surprise on the further course of events...”

In discussions about the events of the first days of the war, a special place is occupied by the discussion of the influence of repressions against the command cadres of the Red Army in the pre-war years. With a certain degree of convention, three points of view can be distinguished when considering this problem.

The essence of the first is the assertion that it was as a result of the repressions that the army was beheaded and could not withstand the blow of the German Wehrmacht. Supporters of this point of view refer to the fact that from 1937 until the start of the Great Patriotic War, 40 thousand commanders of all levels were repressed, which, in their opinion, left the army without command personnel.

The second point of view is almost the opposite. Its essence: supporters of the first version exaggerate the damage caused by Stalin's repressions. In total, 36,898 commanders of various ranks were dismissed and repressed. This is less than 7% of the total number of command personnel of the Red Army. In addition, some of the repressed commanders, about 15 thousand, were rehabilitated before the war or at the beginning of the war. Consequently, they believe, the repressions did not have such a detrimental effect on the course of hostilities attributed to them.

And the third point of view, which is close to us, proceeds from the fact that the training of command personnel did not keep pace with the rapid numerical growth of the army, despite the wide network of senior and middle military personnel deployed in the country educational institutions, the opening of military faculties in civilian universities, the creation of numerous courses for junior lieutenants. By 1941, the ground forces alone were short of 66,900 command personnel (more than all those dismissed and repressed). The shortage of flight technical personnel of the Air Force reached 32.3%. It was simply impossible to eliminate such a situation in a short period of time. In addition, more than 75% of military personnel did not have experience in commanding troops in combat conditions. Their rapid promotion without acquiring the necessary experience adversely affected the quality of military personnel. More than 55% of the command personnel before the start of the Great Patriotic War were in their positions for less than six months and only a quarter of them can be considered to have experience, since they held positions for more than one year.

At the same time, these researchers believe that repressions against command personnel and various types of purges had a negative impact on the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. All military district commanders, 90% of their deputies, and heads of military branches and services were replaced. 80% of the leadership of corps and division units, 91% of regiment commanders and their deputies. That is, the trained level of commanders suffered, which was extremely difficult to restore in a short time. The repressions to a large extent determined the insufficient quality level of the command staff. At a meeting of the leadership of the Red Army in December 1940, V.N. Kurdyumov said: “The last check carried out by the infantry inspector showed that of the 225 regiment commanders involved in the training, only 25 people were graduates of a military school, the remaining two hundred people were people who graduated from junior lieutenant courses and came from the reserves.” In general, by the beginning of the war, only 7% of commanders had higher education, up to 37% had not completed full course training even in secondary military educational institutions.

The psychological consequences of repression were also quite noticeable, which gave rise to uncertainty among the command staff and fear of making responsible decisions on their own.

The course of the battles of the first days of the war was in a certain way affected by the erroneous view of the outbreak of the war by Nazi Germany. “A sudden transition to an offensive on such a scale, moreover, immediately with all available and pre-deployed forces in the most important strategic directions,” wrote G.K. Zhukov, “that is, the nature of the attack itself, was not foreseen by us in its entirety. Neither the People's Commissar, nor I, nor my predecessors B.M. Shaposhnikov, K.A. Meretskov and the leadership of the General Staff expected that the enemy would concentrate such a mass of armored and motorized troops and throw them on the very first day in powerful compact groups at all strategic directions with the aim of delivering crushing cutting blows.”

“It should be emphasized,” write the authors of the book “The Great Patriotic War without the Classification of Secrecy,” “that Germany has already used a similar method of starting a war when attacking the countries of Western Europe and Poland. There was time to analyze it and take it into account in the training of our troops and military personnel. Unfortunately, this was not fully done. And some of the military personnel of the Red Army turned out to be unprepared for command and control of troops in a difficult situation. This is one of the reasons for the large losses of the Red Army in the first months of the war.”

Among other versions of the tragic events of the beginning of the war, there is one that openly mocks from the position of blind hatred of the Russian people, Russians, and participants in the war. It is difficult not to regard it as slander against the defenders of the Fatherland. Supporters of this version (I. Bunich, M. Solonin and others) argue that at the beginning of the war, a “spontaneous, uncontrolled uprising arose in the Red Army; the army did not want to fight in defense of the Stalinist regime.” On a thousand-kilometer front, “... millions of officers and soldiers gave an objective lesson to the criminal regime, starting to switch to the enemy’s side” (Bunich).

How is this monstrous slander against Soviet soldiers “proven”? The basis for this malice for them was big number soldiers and commanders who were captured in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. According to official data for July-December 1941, the Red Army and Navy lost 802,191 people killed and 2,335,482 missing and captured. One cannot but agree that a large number of Soviet soldiers were captured. But let us pay attention to what this ratio was like in other campaigns conducted by the Wehrmacht in Europe during the Second World War. The Polish army, for example, in battles with the Wehrmacht lost 66.3 thousand killed, and 420 thousand missing and captured. That is, for every Polish soldier killed, 6.3 were captured. The defeated French army lost 84 thousand soldiers and officers, and 1,547,000 prisoners, that is, for every one killed - 18 prisoners.

A.I. Burlakov quite rightly poses the question: whose army fought more courageously: the French, in which 18 per one killed surrendered, or the Soviet army, which lost 2.9 prisoners per killed? And he emphasizes the obviousness of the answer - Soviet soldiers defended their socialist Fatherland more courageously than the soldiers of the French army defended their Motherland, which was considered a model of democracy.

But the main refutation of the version of M. Solonin, I. Bunich and others like them lies in reality itself, in the real facts of the military operations of the Red Army against German troops at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. From the very first days of the war, the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army selflessly fought the enemy in extremely difficult conditions and offered him stubborn resistance. To confirm this, one can cite evidence of the resilience of border outposts, the heroic defense of the Brest Fortress, Mogilev, the fierce defensive Battle of Smolensk, the defense of the Luga line in July-August 1941, the heroic defense of Odessa.

The troops of Nazi Germany and its allies had never encountered such fierce resistance anywhere before and had not suffered such heavy losses in manpower and military equipment.

This is evidenced by former Wehrmacht generals and German researchers of the Second World War, based on archival documents, reports of commanders of formations and units of the German army.

On June 24, 1941, General Halder wrote in his diary: “The tenacity of Russian formations in battle should be noted. There have been cases when garrisons of pillboxes blew themselves up along with the pillboxes, not wanting to surrender.” A little later, on June 29, he writes: “Information from the front confirms that the Russians are fighting everywhere to the last bullet... The stubborn resistance of the Russians forces us to fight according to all the rules of our combat regulations. In Poland and in the West we could take certain liberties. Now this is no longer acceptable."

General Blumentritt, who fought with the rank of lieutenant for two years in Eastern Front during the First World War, said to the English historian Liddell Hart: “Already the battles of June 1941 showed us what the new Soviet Army was like. We lost up to fifty percent of our personnel in battles.. Red Army 1941-1945. was a much stronger opponent than tsarist army, because she selflessly fought for the idea.”

Here are the statements of the authors of the Federal Republic of Germany. “Despite unsatisfactory weapons and supplies,” writes P. Gostoni in his book “The Red Army,” “the Red Army fought for its Motherland, as a rule, stubbornly and fiercely. There was no case when entire sections of the front stopped resisting; outbreaks of panic almost always managed to be extinguished.” I. Dec titled one of the chapters of his book “The Road Through a Thousand Deaths” “Only dead Russians don’t shoot.” He writes about the “extraordinary resistance of Soviet troops in the region of Smolensk,” “a city before which all conquerors on their way to Moscow were forced to stop.”

It is probably worth recalling the statement of W. Churchill. In his memoirs, listing the factors that allowed the Soviet Union to survive in the first months of the war, he named the resilience of the Russian people. He writes: “President Roosevelt was considered a very brave man when he declared in September 1941 that the Russians would hold the front and that Moscow would not be taken. The remarkable courage and patriotism of the Russian people confirmed the correctness of this opinion.” Note that these statements refer to facts and events that occurred long before the introduction of penal battalions and barrage detachments.

The population rose up to fight the aggressors, regardless of class, social status in society, nationality and religion. National spiritual values ​​came to the fore. The war revealed the patriotism of the people, who elevated the duty of serving the Fatherland above their own needs, suffering, and losses. Thus, the highest and enduring value of the Fatherland was affirmed.

Despite the heavy defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, the aggressor failed to achieve the implementation of the “Barbarossa Plan”, and the deadlines for the “blitzkrieg” were missed. Thanks to the ever-increasing resistance of the Soviet troops, the enemy suffered heavy losses; he was unable to capture a number of the most important strategic centers of the Soviet Union, provided for by the plan, and in the battle for Moscow the plan “ lightning war"was finally buried.

Mikhail Ivanovich Frolov , veteran of the Great Patriotic War, Doctor of Historical Sciences, vice-president of the Academy of Military Historical Sciences, professor

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28. S. Shvetsov: Reply to 26., Alejandro:
2012-06-27 at 01:11

PS. In that photo is Brodsky. His well-known accusation of parasitism and the subsequent exile is a fact, in general, known, but it is possible not to know. No reputational consequences.

27. S. Shvetsov: Reply to 26., Alejandro:
2012-06-27 at 01:10

You and I were talking about Khrushchev buildings, which began to be built - let me remind you - in 1959. What does “after the war” have to do with it?

How to fight the Germans? Like in 1943, for example. And further. Why did the Germans know how to do it in 1941, but we didn’t, even though we had no less military experience? What lessons were possible to learn from the Polish and French campaigns that could not be learned at Khalkingol and the Finnish campaign? Moreover, we had a brilliant leader, and they had a demoniac one, right?

26. Alejandro: Reply to 25., S. Shvetsov:
2012-06-26 at 23:16

“Everyone fancies himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the outside.” I hope, Shvetsov, this time you will lay out all your cards and tell us HOW it was necessary to fight against the Germans. It turned out that no one was ready for the new tactics. Neither the French nor the arrogant Poles. But Shvetsov knows HOW. I kept waiting for you to tell me HOW it was necessary to immediately provide everyone with elite housing after the war, but I didn’t get it. Well, I hope you are a better military strategist than a builder.

25. S. Shvetsov: Reply to 23., Ivan:
2012-06-26 at 21:42

Germany had by that time perfected this organization throughout Europe.

And which particular Europe offered greater resistance to the Germans than the Japanese (Khalkhingol) and the Finns of the Red Army? Or have you already thrown into the closet the historical version according to which Europe fell together under Hitler, and then the entire European world fell on the USSR?

24. : Myth No. 37. Stalin planned to surrender Moscow to the Nazis and escape from the capital in October 1941.
2012-06-26 at 20:14

“One of the most insidious anti-Stalin myths. Unlike other myths, it was put into circulation gradually, without direct accusations of Stalin. Start
Khrushchev put an end to the myth. Very often he was personally exploited by Zhukov, but only in the form of either very transparent hints about the supposed “homespun truth of history”, or in private conversations. Often used nowadays.
In reality, everything was different. It was Zhukov who proposed to surrender Moscow directly! Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov, in a conversation with the writer F. Chuev (02/01/1975, see Chuev’s book “Soldiers of the Empire”) said: “Zhukov wrote that on October 6, 1941, Stalin asked him whether we would defend Moscow, and Zhukov firmly answered: "We'll defend it!" But it happened that he sent General Sokolovsky to Vasilevsky (Alexander Mikhailovich should remember this) so that he would receive a communications center for the General Staff Western Front. Vasilevsky, in bewilderment, called Stalin about this, and he scolded Zhukov. Zhukov proposed surrendering Moscow, and this would have been the case if not for Stalin.
“But this needs to be documented,” I said (i.e. F. Chuev. - A.M.).
- How can you confirm? – answered Golovanov. - Most of the documents showing Stalin's true role in the war were burned under Khrushchev. Thus, three volumes of my correspondence with Stalin were destroyed. Vasilevsky will die, Golovanov will die, Shtemenko will die, and no one will know the true truth. But this fact in no way belittles the role of Zhukov, but shows how much doubt there was, and by what efforts the Soviet people achieved victory near Moscow. But it is also impossible to compare Zhukov with Kutuzov in this matter, because the surrender of Moscow in 1941 meant much more to us than in 1812, when it was not the capital. Zhukov might not have known what Stalin knew and what we all knew much later: with the fall of Moscow, Japan came out against us in the East, and at that time we would have had to fight on two fronts at once.”
What Golovanov said is confirmed by the speech given to the readers by Army General SM. Shtemenko. Here is an excerpt from the transcript: “During the period of a threatening situation, Zhukov’s command post was closer to the defense line. Zhukov turned to Stalin with a request for permission to move his command post away from the defense line, to the Belorussky railway station. Stalin replied that if Zhukov moved to the Belorussky railway station, he would take his place.”
The former commander of the Moscow Military District and the Moscow Defense Zone, Colonel General Pavel Artemyevich Artemyev, recalled in 1975 that in response to this request from Zhukov, Stalin responded as follows: “If you back away to the Belorussky Station, then I will take your place in Perkhushkovo.”
In the first part of Golovanov’s story quoted above, published by F. Chuev under the title “Shovels” in the book “Unlisted Marshal” (M., 1995), the following is said: “In October 1941, on one of the most intense days of the Moscow defense, in The headquarters discussed the use of the 81st aviation division, commanded by Golovanov. Suddenly it rang out phone call. Stalin, slowly, approached the apparatus. When talking, he never put the receiver to his ear, but kept it at a distance - the volume was such that a person nearby could hear everything. Corps Commissar Stepanov, a member of the Air Force Military Council, called. He reported that he was in Perkhushkovo, a little west of Moscow, at the headquarters of the Western Front.
- How are you doing? - asked Stalin.
- The command is concerned that the front headquarters is very close to the front line of defense. It is necessary to take him east, beyond Moscow, approximately to the Arzamas region (and this, by the way, is already the Gorky region. - A.M.). And set up a command post on the eastern outskirts of Moscow.
There was quite a long silence.
- Comrade Stepanov, ask the headquarters, do they have shovels? - Stalin said without raising his voice.
- Now. - And again silence. - What kind of shovels, Comrade Stalin?
- It doesn’t matter which ones.
- Now... There are shovels, Comrade Stalin.
- Tell your comrades, let them take shovels and dig their own graves. The front headquarters will remain in Perkhushkovo, and I will remain in Moscow. Goodbye.
He said all this calmly, without raising his voice, without a hint of irritation, and slowly hung up. He didn’t even ask who exactly was asking such questions, although it was clear that without the knowledge of front commander Zhukov, Stepanov would not have called Stalin.”
In the memoirs of one of the leading members of Stalin’s guard, Lieutenant General V. Rumyantsev, the ending of the same episode looks like this: “Comrade Stepanov, give each of your comrades a shovel in their hands, let them dig a mass grave for themselves.” You will stay in Perkhushkovo, and I will stay in Moscow. There will be no retreat. Just forward.” This was Stalin's reaction.
Firstly, it is obvious that Zhukov made such attempts at least twice - through some corps commissar who had nothing to do with such issues, and the second time - through General Sokolovsky. What is called, not by washing, but by riding from the front line, although he gave others, and in the crudest forms, orders to stand to death... Secondly, in both cases, Zhukov, in fact, substituted the heads of others, although he was obliged to personally report this Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Thirdly, the question of the defense of Moscow was extremely acute at that time, and only exceptional adherence to principles, awareness of his special responsibility for the fate of the Motherland, personal courage, as well as purely strategic considerations, which collectively guided Stalin at that moment, prevented the stampede of the commander of the Western front and the actual collapse of the front.
According to the testimony of Stalin’s personal driver, A. Krivchenko, it was in those days that Stalin said: “I’m staying in Moscow, with the Russian people!” Moreover. In those same days, Stalin clearly said that if the Germans entered Moscow, it would only be through his corpse!
The late publicist Felix Chuev was also a good poet. He wrote a poignant poem related specifically to these events:
Already the ambassadors live deep in the rear,
People's Commissars are no longer to be seen in Moscow,
And von Bock's armored armies
They continue to attack Khimki.
They decide at the headquarters of the Western Front -
Set up a headquarters east of Moscow,
And the sun is a wound to the Russian people
Burning among the autumn blue...
Already in Moscow the responsible persons
There's only one thing they don't understand:
When will He himself leave the capital -
But how can you ask yourself about this?
Yes, how can I ask? The question is extremely important
Something you won’t put off until later:
- When to send your guard regiment
To Kuibyshev? The composition of the regiment is already ready.
The glass trembled in the roar of the air,
Sparkled in the Alexander Garden...
He said calmly: - If necessary,
I will lead this regiment into the attack.
As for the fact that Stalin allegedly planned to escape from Moscow in October 1941, the myth about this was started by Goebbels. Why - it’s clear. But why did Soviet writers repeat this nonsense (M. Pajev in the book “Through the Whole War” and after him P. Proskurin in the novel “Your Name”), the question is, of course, an interesting one. Because they lied like crazy. What if Stalin arrived at the Rogozhsko-Simonovsky dead end, where a special train stood, and in heavy thoughts walked along the platform for two hours, wondering whether he should go to Kuibyshev or stay in Moscow? Soviet writers dreamed up a great idea. But what in reality?
But in reality it was the following. According to the testimony of members of Stalin’s personal guard (A. Rybin, P. Lozgachev, A. Belekhov, P. Shitokh, V. Krutashev, S. Kashevarov, V. Tukov and others), the special train was in fact prepared in advance. There is nothing supernatural about this. Security measures for the head of state must be comprehensive and taken in advance. However, Stalin did not come there, did not see the train and did not walk along the platform, especially since it was not there. Moreover. Having accidentally noticed that the commandant of the dacha in Semenovsky, S. Solovov, was transporting things from the dacha somewhere, Stalin scolded him and said: “There will be no evacuation, we will remain here until victory.”
In addition, a special Douglas passenger plane and a flight of fighter jets for in-flight security were also prepared for Stalin. The planes were under special protection of the NKVD at the Frunze airfield. However, Stalin never came there either.”
(Martirosyan A. B. Stalin and the Great Patriotic War. M., 2007. P. 361-365).

23. Ivan: 15. Andrey: The same old chewing gum...
2012-06-26 at 17:57

//respected professor and veteran cannot (or does not want) to free himself from that sea of ​​endless LIES..//
Father Ilya rightly drew attention to the rudeness of your comment in relation to the veteran, which (comment) you habitually call “spiritual.” Of course, mentioning repression is a guarantee of “spirituality,” and the phrase “there is a spiritual answer to this question in circulation” betrays your “spirituality” headlong.
I will draw attention to the incompetence worthy of Father Nikolai Savchenko, who mechanically add up the number of abortions with the amount of profit. The mechanical comparison of the number of tanks is INCORRECT in general. On the battlefields, it is not crowds of tanks lined up in squares that fight, but organizational structures scattered in space (motorized infantry, artillery and much more). Organizational structures, is this clear? Germany had by that time perfected this organization throughout Europe. We didn’t even have time to arm ourselves properly. Two wars and three revolutions half a century earlier and an attack by the most powerful army in the world, to which France, for example, surrendered in a month.
And why is it that among older people “the fear of reprisals was less”? Obviously it's the other way around. Young people always underestimate the danger; older people are always more afraid and cautious. And those young people who died in the first battles were replaced by the same young people who reached military age (my grandfather went to the front there in 42).
Bottom line - your post is simply a meaningless set of sentences, the main purpose of which is to insult the veteran at whose feet you should bow.
p.s. Why should someone (especially a priest) refute your figures, have you proven them? These are your unsubstantiated accusations, not Father Ilya’s.

22. Andrey : Swearing is not proof
2012-06-26 at 14:56

Dear Father Ilya! Unlike your post, which accused a number of discussion participants of rudeness, my speech did not contain anything of the kind. An unsubstantiated accusation does not make anyone look good, especially a priest, and yet not a single one of the figures I cited was refuted by you. Sorry.

21. Clerk: 18.Antony.
2012-06-25 at 19:19

UV.Antony.

I know very well what secular science does.
You've already said this.
The existence of God is a matter of Faith, first of all, but not of speculative knowledge.

As for the game of “wise thoughts,” according to the ESSENCE of the war with Hitler, it was a war with the army of the Antichrist, whether you like it or not, at least that’s what W. Churchill asserted in his speech in 1940.

And so far, not a single person has been found who took Churchill’s words into question.
You are the first, not counting the truth of those who simply remain silent about this speech, because you are well aware that Churchill said not just the truth, but the Truth.
Absolute.

20. Clerk: 17.Antony.
2012-06-25 at 19:01

UV.Antony.

Quite fair.
Science is doing its job - describing historical events - facts that took place, so let it describe to itself, since no one has charged secular historical science with the duty - to “invent hypotheses”, including on the essence of war, not to mention already on the subject of whether there is a God or not.
Yes, this is what science suffers from, if we are talking about science, of course...
This has been the case since the time of Newton.
...like the “equal responsibility” of Stalin and Hitler for the outbreak of the Second World War.
If you have anything to say, in essence, Patriotic Wars, including number - ready to listen.

It’s one thing to describe an object; it’s another thing to accurately point out its ESSENCE.
The last thing is a matter of Theology, but not secular historical science.
A very simple idea.

So, the ESSENCE of the past War is that it was a War with the army of the Antichrist, where in relation to Hitler there is strong, irrefutable, THEOLOGICAL, i.e. SCIENTIFIC, evidence and not just evidence, but the ABSOLUTE TRUTH.
And here a conflict arises - anyone who tries to distort the essence of the war or even equates Stalin and Hitler will have to confirm this nonsense, sorry, “hypothesis” about the “equality of honor” of Stalin and Giler scientifically, i.e. theologically , and this, alas, cannot be done, even through substitution and manipulation of concepts.

For those who, on principle, if I understand you correctly, Mr. Anthony, adhere to the conviction that God is in Himself, and earthly affairs are in themselves, I recommend W. Churchill’s speech from 1940, where Churchill directly points out the anti-Christian nature of Nazism and the war they, Nazism, unleashed.

18. Anthony: Reply to 14., Bondarev Igor:
2012-06-25 at 18:02

Thus, the theory of evolution justifies sin (consequences and ensuring struggle) as a way of survival

The theory of evolution is not even a hypothesis, but a false, anti-scientific myth, composed by interested people on the basis scientific facts for the purpose of denying God

“Evolutionism does not provide an explanation for the observed fact of the unity of the laws of the world, and does not even explain why it is generally knowable.

Evolutionism directly contradicts the second law of thermodynamics. (Isaac Asimov defines it this way without the help of mathematical formulas: “Another way to formulate the second law is: “The universe is constantly becoming more disordered!” Considering the second law from this point of view, we see that it is said about us. We have to work hard to get our room in order, but it gets messy on its own, and much faster and easier. Even if we don’t go in there, it will become dirty and dusty. How difficult it is to keep a house in order, even our own bodies; how quickly everything decays. Even if you do nothing at all, everything will decay, break, wear out on its own - that’s what the second law means.” If the theory of evolution is correct, then our everyday observations and the calculations of engineers are also incorrect. Moreover, evolutionists need to go to court against the Russian Academy of Sciences for not considering projects of perpetual motion machines with 100% efficiency.

All the constructions of evolutionism are completely incredible from a mathematical point of view. So the random occurrence of our set of world constants is 1 in 103,000; random appearance of a protozoan bacterium - 1 chance in 1,040,000; random change in the desired direction of 5 proteins - 1 chance in 10275, etc.

Evolutionism has no predictive ability, does not allow itself to be refuted experimental method and therefore, even with a stretch, cannot be classified as science.

Darwinism (as a special case of evolutionism) is based on logical error, called a tautology. The statement: “survival of the fittest” does not convey any information.

The vicious circle principle is widely used in evolutionist arguments. (The rock is dated by fossils. The latter are dated by evolutionary theory, which in turn confirms their age by reference to the geological formation in which they were found).

Evolutionism cannot explain a number of facts related to its “sphere” of explaining the origin of species (the bombardier beetle, echolocation in bats, the birth of a whale under water, sundews, etc.), and therefore cannot be considered a scientific theory."
about Daniil Syoyev

17. Anthony: Reply to 9., Clerk:
2012-06-25 at 17:33

St. Anthony. Here are your words. “Physics does not deny God.” Physics does. Isaac Newton does not.

I repeat again, but in other words to make it clearer. The subject area of ​​the natural and human sciences is the created world, the tasks of the sciences are its description and research. Denial or proof of the existence of God is carried out by scientists interested in this, who can put forward appropriate theories and hypotheses.
In fact, in the comments to this article it is appropriate to simply thank the veteran, patriot, scientist for the wonderful article.
It would be nice to play the game “In the World of Wise Thoughts” somewhere else.

16. Priest Ilya Motyka :
2012-06-25 at 01:34

I thought it would be limited to the old guard Shakhmatov, Slava Tambov and Fr. Nikolay Savchenko. No. New eagles have appeared: Artemy and Andrey. Completely stupid and unceremoniously rude to the respected Mikhail Frolov. Comrades would-be historians, what new documents have you introduced into circulation? to draw such phenomenal conclusions. Or you just read liberal propaganda wrong. The Soviet agiprop was more talented and not particularly deceitful.

15. Andrey : Same old chewing gum...
2012-06-24 at 22:44

It is painful and shameful to read on the pages of a respected person the same old chewing gum that Soviet agitprop has been regaling us with for half a century - perhaps a respected professor and veteran cannot (or does not want) to free himself from that sea of ​​endless LIES, which most of all insults the memory of the heroes of 1941, without feats of which, undoubtedly, would not have happened even in 1945.... Over the past 20 years, many worthy and competent authors have answered the question about the tragedy of 1941 and now it is no longer possible to hide the fact that the Red Army formations deployed in the border districts, not only quantitatively, but often qualitatively superior to the enemy - T-34 and KV tanks alone, to which the Germans had NO equals AT ALL before 1943, we had about 1500, the number of new aircraft (fighters, attack aircraft) was in the hundreds, not to mention the thousands of automatic rifles that the Germans did not have at all at that time... There is a spiritual answer to this question, which can be briefly summarized by the fact that the cadre army, which was largely atheistic (youth and commanders who had undergone purges) , for the most part, died heroically by the beginning of the battle of Moscow, and what broke the back of the best army in the world at that time was the army that was formed from people of older ages under the leadership of commanders who had less fear of reprisals, and responsibility (at least moral) to with its subordinates - much more than before the war - it was SUCH an army that the Lord granted the Great Victory!

14. Bondarev Igor: Reply to 8., Anthony:
2012-06-24 at 11:50

More precisely, both are necessary. Otherwise, we won’t understand anything. I’ll explain it in simpler words. If you write to your employer, instead of a resume, the story of your relationship with God, he will throw you out the door, because that’s not what he needs from you. If you come to your confessor and you will tell the story of your career growth, he will also be in a state of bewilderment. Science and religion have different subject areas and different tasks. History does not deny God. Physiology does not deny it, just like her father, Academician Pavlov. Physics does not deny God, Isaac Newton was of the same opinion. Specific physiologists, physicists, historians can be atheists or believers... But if a historian begins to argue who was the Antichrist in 1170 in the battle of the Novgorodians with the Suzdalians - St. Andrei Bogolyubsky, or the Novgorodians with the icon of the Mother of God of the Sign, then you can fall not only into insanity, but also into blasphemy.

Science correctly describes the world, but evaluates it incorrectly, since it proceeds from what it has proven in its description of the world.
That is, science is based on itself.
Thus, the theory of evolution justifies sin (the consequences and ensuring the struggle) as a way of survival. Instead of saying that the struggle for survival is not entelechy life, but the consequence for its violation (when Adam violated the principles (entelechy) of Life).
Likewise, History contains the same “struggle” for survival. But how should you look at it? Either with the Spirit, or in spite of it. But the Holy Spirit is one and the same same, but a person- in the image and likeness of God. God, man, Spirit - “elements”
history is not subject to cancellation. Both in ancient times and today, these elements are unchanged. But changes in history are brought about by the spirit of struggle against the Holy Spirit.
The Spirit is infinite, therefore History is finite, and in its ending it sums up the beginning of the creation of man and the drama of his fall.
The meaning of History may well be comprehended by the consciousness of one person. This means the morality of History.

13. Alexander Vaskin, Russian priest, Soviet Army officer : Address by Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky)
2012-06-23 at 17:28

"June 22, 1941
Moscow
To the pastors and flocks of Christ's Orthodox Church.
In recent years, we, the inhabitants of Russia, have consoled ourselves with the hope that the military fire that has engulfed almost the entire world will not affect our country. But fascism, which recognizes only naked force as law and is accustomed to mocking the high demands of honor and morality, turned out to be true to itself this time too. Fascist robbers attacked our homeland. Trampling all sorts of treaties and promises, they suddenly fell upon us, and now the blood of civilians is already irrigating our native land. The times of Batu, the German knights, Charles of Sweden, and Napoleon are repeated. The pitiful descendants of the enemies of Orthodox Christianity want to once again try to bring our people to their knees before untruth, to force them through naked violence to sacrifice the good and integrity of their homeland, their blood covenants of love for their fatherland.
But this is not the first time that the Russian people have had to endure such tests. With God's help, this time too he will scatter the fascist enemy force into dust. Our ancestors did not lose heart even in worse situations, because they remembered not about personal dangers and benefits, but about their sacred duty to their homeland and faith, and emerged victorious. Let us not disgrace their glorious name, and we, the Orthodox, are relatives to them both in flesh and in faith. The Fatherland is defended by weapons and a common national feat, a common readiness to serve the Fatherland in a difficult hour of testing with everything that everyone can. This is a matter for workers, peasants, scientists, women and men, young people and old people. Everyone can and should contribute their share of labor, care and art to the common feat.
Let us remember the holy leaders of the Russian people, for example, Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, who laid down their souls for the people and homeland. And it wasn’t only the leaders who did this. Let us remember the countless thousands of simple Orthodox warriors, whose unknown names the Russian people immortalized in their glorious legend about the heroes Ilya Muromets, Dobrynya Nikitich and Alyosha Popovich, who utterly defeated the Nightingale the Robber.
Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of the people. She endured trials with him and was consoled by his successes. She will not leave her people even now. She blesses with heavenly blessing the upcoming national feat.
If anyone, then it is we who need to remember the commandment of Christ: “No one has greater love than he who lays down his life for his friends.” Not only the one who is killed on the battlefield for his people and their good lays down his soul, but also everyone who sacrifices himself, his health or profit for the sake of his homeland. For us, the shepherds of the Church, at a time when the fatherland calls everyone to heroic deeds, it would be unworthy to just silently look at what is happening around us, not to encourage the faint-hearted, not to console the saddened, not to remind the hesitant of duty and the will of God. And if, moreover, the pastor’s silence, his lack of concern for what his flock is experiencing is also explained by crafty considerations about possible benefits on the other side of the border, then this will be a direct betrayal of his homeland and his pastoral duty, since the Church needs a shepherd who carries out his service truly “for the sake of Jesus.” , and not for the sake of the bread,” as St. Demetrius of Rostov put it. Let us lay down our souls together with our flock. Countless thousands of our Orthodox soldiers walked the path of selflessness, laying down their lives for their homeland and faith in all times of enemy invasions of our homeland. They died without thinking about glory, they only thought that their homeland needed a sacrifice on their part, and they humbly sacrificed everything and their very lives.
The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox Christians for the defense of the sacred borders of our homeland.
The Lord will grant us victory.
Patriarchal Locum Tenens
humble Sergius, Metropolitan of Moscow and Kolomna"
(Russian Orthodox Church during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Collection of documents / Comp. O. Yu. Vasilyeva et al. M., 2009. P. 38-40).

12. Clerk: "Either the 21st century will return to God, or there will be no 21st century at all"
2012-06-23 at 13:43

The question of the Essence of the Historical Process is, first of all, everything, - question philosophy of history.
What is the engine of history, what drives history as a dynamic process.

This is how human thought answers this question.

“Ideas rule the world” (Hegel).
“Ideas then become material force when they take possession of the masses.” (K. Marx).
I hope no one will deny that this is so.
However, neither Hegel nor Marx were able to say anything about the Essence of these “ideas” that rule “this world”; moreover, it took nineteen centuries to reach this thought and the twentieth to be convinced in one’s own skin that that's exactly how it is.

So, it takes nineteen centuries to figure it out and the twentieth to state a fact.

But this is what St. Apostle Paul wrote two thousand years ago, both in form and in essence, of these most ill-fated ideas that rule this world...

“Our struggle is not against flesh and blood (against people), but against the rulers, against the powers, against the world rulers of the darkness of this age (demons), against the spirits (thoughts that this public throws up - about their own exclusivity, genius, predestination for dominion over the World and other rubbish) malice (false teachings - "ideologies") under heaven ("air" is the sphere of abstract, meaningless ideas - banal demagoguery on the subject of universal freedom, equality and fraternity).
Eph.6:12.

So, it took man two whole millennia to reach with his mind what little children who listen to the Words of the Apostle know.

So why do I need this Human science, developing at such a snail’s pace, and on blood, and even posing as God knows what wisdom, when the Lord gives me everything and immediately just accepted it, not in the sense of containing it, but as the Absolute Truth and more I had no doubt about it.
I didn’t doubt God, but I doubted myself.
When starting to study history at school, at university, in the archives, dealing with any specific problem.

In other words, history, like Science, and not only history, can and should FURTHER develop, exclusively as Divine-human creativity, then it will bring true and worthy fruits.
Knowledge of the Truth is Salvation.
Here and now, in this century and in the future.
To the extent due and necessary, for every person and in accordance with the age in which the person happened to be born.

11. Clerk: 8.Antony.
2012-06-23 at 12:59

“If a historian begins to speculate who was the Antichrist in the battle in 1170 between the Novgorodians and Suzdalians - St. Andrei Bogolyubsky or the Novgorodians with the icon of the Mother of God of the Sign...”.

UV.Antony.

The essence of the Historical Process comes down to the relationship between Man and God.
With God, but not with the "Antichrist".
The coming of the Antichrist is their result, this relationship.
The Matter of Human Free Will.
A very simple idea.
And the assessment of the essence of the event is not given by a historian.
Lord.
The head of the Orthodox Church, through the mouth of Her Primate.
And the assessment is always the same.
Moral or not.
Whether people acted according to their conscience or not.
Fratricidal war is always an immoral matter.
If a historian goes into this kind of “reasoning”, then, in fact, this is an attempt to speak out on the ESSENCE, however, in your case, the attempt is unsuccessful - “from the wind of your head.”
From reason.
This is no longer a historian-“thinker”, but an “industrialist of thought” (St. Patriarch Pimen) - a charlatan.
This is the same “mysticism and priesthood”.
This is no longer a historian, but a “pathfinder” equal to those of today, busy searching for “seals of the Antichrist” in markets and supermarkets.
More in history...
This, for example, was Merezhkovsky.
What is the goal?
This is a matter of judgment, not judgment.
...Thus he puts God in the place, making the enemy of the human race equal to God, recognizing, in fact, the enemy of the human race as having legal capacity.
The ability to create.
This is what Blasphemy is.

As for the inadmissibility of replacing the Psalter with mathematics (history) and the Psalter with mathematics (history) and the necessity of both, for man as a Person and for science, as the result of this Person’s work, these are not my words.
Mikhail Lomonosov, founder of Russian Science.
On what Russian Science has stood and will stand.
On the Stone of Faith.
As an objectively existing reality.
And now and ever and unto ages of ages.
Amen.
Do not doubt.

10. Sergiy Agapov: "...And, denying the Lord who bought them, they will bring upon themselves speedy destruction."
2012-06-23 at 12:09

In general, when you read about all these shortcomings, miscalculations, and mistakes of our command, you get the impression that the military leadership of that time consisted only of former furniture makers or half-educated seminarians. Therefore, I agree with the main idea of ​​the respected Clerk:

Strategic.
Fatal blindness.
Both in this century and in the future.

The only thing I would like to add to the comments of my respected colleague is that after saying “A”, he did not finish the following. It is not enough to see in the causes of the war and in the reasons for its bitter failures an underestimation of the devilish cunning and ingenuity of the forces of Antichrist; we must also admit that this terrible tragedy was allowed to us by the Lord. Here, of course, in my opinion, the assessment of these events given by Igor Bondarev is more correct: “It is characteristic that in the conditions of the Antichrist, the West, in the person of Germany, had a strong machine of fascism. And the USSR (Russia) has a huge mass of idols and idols...” We must admit that demonism is rampant on our side. Otherwise, how can you explain the punishment the Lord sent to our country? Even until recently. We already have a generation growing up that, perhaps, does not even suspect that just recently their fathers and mothers had to dismantle the toilets in the altars, from where priests now take out the cups with the Holy Gifts for them. Let's all get rid of “fatal blindness” together and tell our children the whole truth. And here I again agree with the respected Clerk: “This rule knows no exceptions.”

9. Clerk: 8.Antony.
2012-06-23 at 11:24

UV.Antony.
Here are your words.
"Physics does not deny God."

Physics denies.
Isaac Newton - no.
Science, as a field of human knowledge, denies.
A person as a Personality is not.
Don't confuse one with the other - different things.
Science denies the Existence of God in Fact.
METHODOLOGICALLY.
This is a question of worldview.
How science looks at the world and how He Who Created It, the World, including science.
Who is the Cause of Everything.
The emergence of science, among other things.
Your reasoning is further confirmation of this.
The real picture of the World as it really is is only partially accessible to science or is distorted.

This is not about EXPOSING the history of HUMANITY’s relationship with God, as you believe.
This is not required - to expound Scripture every time and for every reason.
If a person, when applying for a job, begins to expound Scripture - the history of Mankind’s relationship with God, instead of his own, or begins to calculate who was the Antichrist during the time of A. Bogolyubsky, this person is definitely crazy.

It’s one thing - your own ideas about what a person’s relationship with God is in their Essence; another thing is that it really is.
And what to do with it.

What is a “history of a person’s relationship with God” as applied to a resume and job application?
How does it manifest itself?
In relation to your neighbor.
In the business with which a person is busy and the people with whom, together, he does the same thing.

Not a single person will ever indicate this in its entirety in a resume, but this is what always and first of all needs to be clarified.

A person’s relationship with God is primarily a moral category.
This is a question of whether a person has Conscience or lack thereof.
What is Conscience?
This is the Voice of God in the Heart of Man.
People have one conscience for all - Christ.

If the employer reasons according to your logic, without showing interest in WHAT IS THE PERSON he is hiring, he risks hiring a scoundrel or that very “holy simplicity that is worse than theft.”
In both cases it will take people's work which does not have a Heart, means there is no mind.
One "reason".
Not crazy, no, crazy.
The employer will graduate in any case -
Badly.

uv.Antony.
The spiritual side - the moral side of any action - is a matter of whether a person has Conscience or lack thereof.

You should not mix the categories of Rational and Moral, much less replace one with the other, otherwise you can end up in unconsciousness, mysticism, insanity, or simply do something stupid. or at best case-write.

Rational, in relation to hiring, is the degree of proficiency in the craft.
Accounting, for example.
Moral is a matter of purpose.
Why does an accountant apply for employment?
For what?
This question is always asked and I have seen few people who are able to clearly and briefly formulate the answer to this question so as not to cause mistrust or confusion.

Why do you want to work in our company?
A rationally thinking person, strictly following the logic of rationalism, must say what he thinks - well, for example...
“Drink tea from your belly and steal your tablecloth...”

The answer to this question, “What is the GOAL,” will determine whether the person will be accepted for the position or not.
And first of all, no matter what anyone says, they will be primarily interested in whether the Goal is Moral or Not?
Bastards, brawlers, scoundrels and swindlers are not needed by anyone anywhere, even if they are “seven spans in the forehead.”
Even professional bank robbers.

Yes, this never happens.
A person who is unscrupulous always falls short professionally, anyone can see that if they look at it, it means they are unreliable.
While everything is going more or less stable, you can still put up with his level of preparation, but as soon as an emergency situation arises, he will let you down.
Do not doubt.

8. Anthony: Reply to 7., Clerk:
2012-06-23 at 05:32

More precisely, both are necessary. Otherwise we won’t understand anything.

I'll explain in simpler terms.
If you write to your employer, instead of a resume, the story of your relationship with God, he will throw you out the door, because that is not what he needs from you.
If you come to your confessor and begin to outline the story of your career growth, he will also find himself in a state of bewilderment.
Science and religion have different subject areas and different tasks.
History does not deny God. Physiology does not deny it, just like her father, Academician Pavlov. Physics does not deny God; Isaac Newton was of the same opinion.
Specific physiologists, physicists, historians can be atheists or believers...
But if the historian begins to speculate about who was the Antichrist in 1170 in the battle of the Novgorodians with the Suzdalians - St. Andrei Bogolyubsky, or the Novgorodians with the icon of the Mother of God of the Sign, then you can fall not only into insanity, but also into blasphemy.

7. Clerk: 3.Antony.
2012-06-23 at 01:33

UV.Antony.

You see, history is not astrology and does not suffer from providentialism.
In addition, history, as a science, has never set itself the goal of testing the Ways of God.
The point is that history as a science understands the essence of the historical process.

Anything other than what actually exists, since it denies the Existence of God as an Objective Reality.
This means being methodologically atheistic, although a historian may personally be a believer.
It is bad both for history and for the historian, since there is no completeness of perception of the historical process possible for a person.
In this way, objective conditions are created for the transformation of history into myth.
Typically destructive.
This is true both for the individual and for the whole society.

P.S.
History, in its ESSENCE, comes down to the history of the relationship between Man and God.
In particular, Russian.
Which does not at all negate the need to know Russian history well, replacing it with knowledge of the Psalter - rather, on the contrary.
More precisely, both are necessary.
Otherwise we won't understand anything.
In History, and in the Psalter too.
In the 13th century, the Hagarians did not attack Rus'.
The Mongols were pagans.

6. Ivan: Thanks to the author for the article!
2012-06-23 at 00:20

Thank you very much, dear Mikhail Ivanovich! Everything is written to the point and the way one SHOULD write about the war, the way those who KNOW write. In such a short journalistic article there are 40(!) links to sources and which ones! Our scientific treatises are written more easily.
Health and long life to you!

5. Bondarev Igor: Addition.
2012-06-23 at 00:01

It is characteristic that in the conditions of the Antichrist, the West, represented by Germany, had a strong machine of fascism. And the USSR (Russia) had a huge mass of idols and idols in which the Orthodox spirit of society materialized.
That is, the Western idea in the conditions of the Antichrist is fascism. And in Russia - pagan idols, all sorts of ideological cults, but firmly united in a false spirit.
That is, the West has deviated into the idea of ​​matter, and Russia into pride. Germany into the materialization of empiricism, and Russia into a stronghold of the spirit (but false), into deception.
The war changed everything the other way around.

4. Bondarev Igor: Cause.
2012-06-22 at 23:44

June 22, 1941 - All Saints' Day.
Indeed, opposite them is the Antichrist.
I agree with the respected Clerk, with one “but”.
The Antichrist is not only Nazi Germany, but also the USSR itself. More precisely, the spirit of materialism in the world, including the USA.
Antichrist is the common spirit of humanity.
And June 22, 1941 is its apogee.
Liberation from this spirit is the Victory of 1945.
And we see the balance of power. The USSR was liberated by the spirit of will, mainly from below, because in this case the command is an attachment to the troops, and the government to the people.
And, accordingly, the countries of the world. The people did not fight in the USA. But Germany received the most bitter lesson. It is she who must act most nobly in the matter of the expected spiritual flowering of the mind in Russia.

3. Anthony: Reply to 2., Clerk:
2012-06-22 at 23:27

Strategic. Disastrous blindness. Both in this century and in the future. This rule knows no exceptions. The trouble with historical science is that being, METHODOLOGICALLY! atheistic...

The knowledge that in the 13th century Rus' was attacked by the godless Hagarians did not prevent defeat.
Historical science cannot methodologically take into account the providential factor simply because the ways of the Lord are inscrutable.
Science deals exclusively with facts of a material nature, but this circumstance cannot be the basis for the conclusion that science as such is fundamentally atheistic and useless.

2. Clerk:
2012-06-22 at 18:48

"Ignorance of God is blindness of the soul."
Strategic.
Fatal blindness.
Both in this century and in the future.
This rule knows no exceptions.

The trouble with historical science is that, being METHODOLOGICALLY atheistic, that is, being able to describe, and for the most part, reliably, the factual side of the matter, it is not able to transform the “sum of facts” into knowledge.
In other words, it cannot reveal the essence of the war against Nazism, thereby providing the widest opportunities for all kinds of manipulation of facts.

Historical science, in general, by and large, has nothing to oppose to manipulators.
Except faith.
Faith in science and faith in it.
And this, as the practice of the last twenty years has shown, is not enough.
There is nothing to oppose to lies, since there is no access to the Truth - only guesses, partly true, partly not so much.

Of course, neither the Soviet leadership nor the people were ready for the war that befell the Fatherland.
We were not ready STRATEGICALLY.
And they couldn’t be prepared; they were spiritually blind, which is why they had no idea WHO ATTACKED.
And it was none other than the “Antichrist” who attacked.
Just imagine, J.V. Stalin gathers the Politburo and says...
“Comrades, we have been attacked by the Antichrist.
What shall we do, comrades?"...

Every Orthodox person knows, and it is true, the traits inherent in the Antichrist.
First of all, a tendency to pathological lies.
If anyone is interested, they can open Mein Kampf - there are several pages dedicated to lies.
This is a whole anthem.
Anthem of lies...
...and the First Epistle of St. Apostle Paul to the Corinthians.
Chapter 13.
Hymn of Love.

In other words, a Russian person cannot even imagine that it is possible to lie like that.

Perhaps we should pay attention to one more point that is being overlooked.
"At equal strength opponents, the spirit of the troops, correlates like three to one."
Napoleon.

So let’s multiply 5.5 million, who have two years of invaluable modern combat experience behind them, by three.
We get 16.5 million.

So, the 4.5 million army, brought up in the spirit of proletarian friendship towards the unfortunate oppressed German working class and not only the European one in general, was attacked not by the “proletarians of all countries”, just waiting to fraternize, as it were, but by the hordes of the Antichrist, who does not know mercy.
Not to children, not to women, not to old people.
This was after it came to war with whom, and they began to write about the “lair of the beast” in the newspapers, etc.

Stalin, thank God, was, after all, a spiritually educated person.
The Russian Orthodox Church, in the person of Its Primate, the future St. Patriarch Sergius, on the very first day of the war, gave a correct assessment of the essence of the events and, I believe, conveyed this essence, in its entirety, to the leadership.
Who we are dealing with - without this, no Victory would be possible.
And thank God for everything.

1. Anthony: Re: Reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War
2012-06-22 at 10:16

Throughout the 70 years that have passed since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the public consciousness has been searching for an answer to an apparently very simple question: how did it happen that the Soviet leadership, having seemingly irrefutable evidence of Germany’s preparation of aggression against the USSR, was completely convinced of its possibility? didn’t believe it and was taken by surprise? What is the reason that Stalin, even having received the news from the headquarters of the Kyiv Special Military District on the night of June 22 that German units were already occupying the starting areas for the offensive along the border line, told People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov: there is no need to rush to conclusions; maybe everything will be settled peacefully.
One answer is that the leader was the victim of a large-scale disinformation operation carried out by German intelligence services.
From May 22, 1941, within the framework final stage operational deployment of the Wehrmacht, the transfer of 47 divisions began to the border with the USSR, including 28 tank and motorized divisions.
In general, all versions of the purposes for which such a mass of troops are concentrated near the Soviet border boiled down to two main ones:
- to prepare for the invasion of British Isles, in order to protect them here, in the distance, from attacks by British aircraft;
- to forcefully ensure a favorable course of negotiations with the Soviet Union, which, according to hints from Berlin, were about to begin.
In agreement with Hitler, Goebbels published an article “Crete as an example” in the evening edition of the newspaper “Völkischer Beobachter” dated June 12, 1941, in which he made a transparent hint about the Wehrmacht landing on the British Isles soon. To create the impression that the Reich Minister of Propaganda had made a grave mistake and revealed a secret plan, the newspaper was confiscated “by Hitler’s personal order,” and a rumor spread throughout Berlin about the imminent resignation of the minister, who had fallen out of favor with the Fuhrer. Indeed, they did not release the newspaper at retail (so as not to misinform their own military and the population), but foreign embassies received the issue.

“My article about Crete,” Goebbels wrote in his diary the next day, “is a real sensation in the country and abroad... Our production was a great success... From those heard telephone conversations foreign journalists working in Berlin, one can conclude that they all fell for the bait."
Read more in the article on the website of the Strategic Culture Foundation “I look forward to meeting in July. Sincerely yours, Adolf Hitler"
http://www.fondsk.ru...sh-adolf-gitler.html

ABSTRACT

Reasons for the military failures of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War (during the period 1941-1942)

Introduction

The Great Patriotic War lasted from June 22, 1941 to May 9, 1945 and became the bloodiest in the history of our country. Enormous human losses were suffered (about 27 million people), 70 thousand cities, towns and villages were destroyed, and enormous damage was caused to agriculture, transport and industry in the European part of the Soviet Union.

The war ended with the unconditional surrender of Germany (and even earlier - its satellites), but the path to victory was very long and difficult. But to this day it often remains unclear how it could have happened that at first German troops reached Leningrad and Moscow, and subsequently to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus. Figures of losses of the Red Army in 1941-1942. often terrifying in their size.

The defeats of the initial period of the war had several reasons, each of which played its own negative role. Of course, there are many views on aspects of that war; different sources name different numbers of enemy troops, their losses, and the reasons for victories and defeats.

The purpose of this work is to understand the reasons for the military failures of the Red Army in 1941-1942.

We will study the first stage of the war (June 22, 1941 - November 18, 1942), find out why the Red Army suffered many defeats, suffered huge losses and retreated deeper into the country

1. The initial period of the Great Patriotic War

1.1 Armed forces USSR and Germany before the war

war red army strategic

By the summer of 1941, the German army (the so-called “Wehrmacht”) had enormous combat experience: the war in Spain (1936-39), the Polish campaign (1939), the capture of Denmark and Norway (April-June 1940) .), French Campaign (May-June 1940), Balkan Campaign (April-May 1940) In all these campaigns, the German army adhered to the theory of “blitzkrieg” (“lightning war”). Blitzkrieg is based on close cooperation between infantry and tank formations with air support.

According to the blitzkrieg strategy, tank units, supported by infantry, break through into enemy rear lines, bypassing and encircling heavily fortified positions. Encircled enemy formations, experiencing difficulties with the supply of ammunition, equipment and food, are easily achieved by the attackers or surrendered. And this strategy was completely justified. Poland was defeated by the Wehrmacht and conquered in 36 days, Denmark - in 24 hours, Norway - in 2 months, the Netherlands - in 5 days, Belgium - in 18 days, France - in 44 days, Yugoslavia - in 6 days, Greece (after German intervention in the Italo-Greek War) - in 2 weeks.

The Wehrmacht had excellent military equipment at its disposal, tested many times on the battlefield. After capture European countries their production capacities began to work for Germany, strengthening it even more.

In addition, during the Second World War, Germany was supported by its allies and satellites: Italy, Japan, Hungary, Romania, Finland, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia. Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, and Argentina were on good terms with the Third Reich.

Thanks to the presence of a large number of manpower, many factories for the production of military equipment, the accumulation of resources of the captured countries, Germany was able to position the following forces on the border with the Soviet Union by June 22, 1941: about 4 million people, more than 4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more 4 thousand aircraft, about 40 thousand guns and mortars, 600 thousand cars.

Soviet troops (Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army - Red Army) also had combat experience recent years: civil war in Spain (1936-1939), battles on Lake Khasan (1938), battle on the Khalkhin Gol River (1939), annexation of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine (1939), Winter War with Finland (1939-1940). But a rather small proportion of officers and soldiers of the Red Army received combat experience in these conflicts. In addition, these small wars revealed serious shortcomings in the system of combat training and command of the Red Army. For example, the Soviet-Finnish war cost very large losses in people and equipment, and territorial gains were very insignificant.

In September 1939, universal conscription was introduced in the USSR. This made it possible by mid-1941 to increase the size of the army from 2 to 5.7 million people, most of whom were in the western regions of the USSR. The production of small arms, artillery, tanks, aircraft, and ships increased steadily.

The share of military expenditures in the budget of the Soviet Union grew steadily: 1938 - 21.3% of expenditures, 1939 - 26.3%, 1940 - 32.2%. Propaganda of the army and sports expanded throughout the country (the Universal Education system, GTO standards, “Voroshilov Shooter” badges). Development progressed at a rapid pace airborne troops- troops initially focused on offensive operations rather than defensive ones.

All this allowed the command of the Red Army to have the following forces in the western military districts as of June 22, 1941: about 3.1 million people, from 45 thousand to 55 thousand guns and mortars, about 13 thousand tanks (of which about 1.5 new T-34 and KV), about 9 thousand aircraft (together with aviation of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets).

1.2 Brief chronology of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War

On June 22, German troops attacked the USSR from the Baltic to the Black Sea. More than a thousand Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground, many divisions were immediately defeated, and bases and warehouses with fuel and ammunition were destroyed or captured. Thanks to this, German troops advanced very quickly across the territory of the Soviet Union.

June Minsk fell, 330 thousand soldiers of the Red Army were captured. Then German troops captured almost the entire Baltic region, all of Belarus and were already close to Kiev. In August, the defense of Odessa began.

The Battle of Smolensk lasted from July to September, ending with the loss of the city and the capture of about 180 thousand Red Army soldiers. At the beginning of September, the defense of Leningrad began, and on September 19, the Germans took Kyiv, capturing more than 600 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army.

In September, the first stage of the battle for Moscow began; in October, the Germans captured the entire Crimea and blocked Sevastopol. The defense of Odessa was stopped, its defenders were thrown into the defense of Sevastopol.

In October, near Vyazma and Bryansk, Soviet troops were defeated, losing more than 600 thousand people as prisoners. The Wehrmacht was eager to reach Moscow, but the Germans' advance was hampered by considerable losses, heroic resistance by the Red Army and difficulties in supplying troops along such extensive communications.

In November the German offensive began to run out of steam. The Red Army brought up reserves from the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East and prepared a counteroffensive near Moscow.

On December 6, the counteroffensive began. Soviet troops advanced 100-250 km, liberated Kalinin, Kaluga and many other cities, and defeated dozens of German infantry and tank divisions.

The counteroffensive was also supported on other sectors of the front. During the Tikhvin offensive operation Soviet troops liberated Tikhvin and reduced pressure on Leningrad; during the Kerch-Feodosia operation, the Kerch Peninsula and the city of Kerch were liberated. Rostov-on-Don was liberated on November 29, 1941.

In the areas of the cities of Demyansk and Kholm, German troops were surrounded by Soviet units, but were subsequently released.

However, although the German troops were defeated and driven back in many places, they were not decisively defeated.

At the beginning of 1942, Soviet troops tried to continue to advance (Rzhev-Sychevskaya, Lyubanskaya, Barvenkovo-Lozovskaya operations), but the offensives had almost no success and led to heavy losses.

And the Germans responded with strong blows in the south of the USSR. In May the Crimean Front was defeated, and Sevastopol fell in July. The German offensive on the Don began. By August, the Germans reached Voronezh and took Voroshilovgrad, Rostov-on-Don, Kotelnikov, and Izyum. The defensive period began on July 17 Battle of Stalingrad, and July 25 - defense of the Caucasus.

In August 1942, fierce battles began in Stalingrad itself; in the Caucasus, the Germans captured Stavropol, Maikop, Krasnodar, Elista, Mozdok, and hoisted the German flag on Elbrus.

In September-October, fierce fighting continued in Stalingrad and the Caucasus. However, the Germans failed to completely capture Stalingrad and Novorossiysk, and they also failed to break through to Baku oil.

The command of the Red Army began to prepare a counteroffensive near Stalingrad, which began on November 19, 1942 and marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the war.

Thus, during the first stage of the war, the Red Army suffered many defeats, several million Red Army soldiers were captured, a significant part of the territory with the main centers of industry and Agriculture. And only from the end of 1942 the situation began to improve.

2. Reasons for the military failures of the Red Army in 1941-1942.

2.1 The Red Army was unprepared for war

Preparations for a big war, which began in 1939, a sharp increase in the Armed Forces of the USSR, the production of a large amount of military equipment, combat experience gained in Spain, in Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, in the Winter War - all this, it would seem, should have become tangible advantages of the Red Army in battles with the Wehrmacht.

However, in general the country was not yet ready for such a total war. Many divisions formed in 1939-1941 were undermanned and poorly equipped with military equipment, and also had poor command of it. The repressions of the late 30s also had an impact, when a significant part of the experienced command personnel was destroyed, and their place was taken by less competent or inexperienced commanders, in contrast to the German army, in which all the generals and most of the officers had combat experience dating back to the First World War. , as well as the experience of all campaigns of 1939-1941.

Germany's transport capabilities were an order of magnitude higher than those of the Soviet Union. The Germans could move reinforcements much faster, regroup troops, and organize their supplies. The USSR had significant human resources, but these resources were much less mobile than German ones. By the beginning of hostilities, the Wehrmacht outnumbered the Red Army in the number of trucks by approximately two to one, i.e. was more mobile. There are also samples that simply did not have an analogue in the Soviet armed forces. These are high-speed heavy artillery tractors and armored personnel carriers.

In general, the German army was much better prepared for war than the Red Army. If in the USSR this preparation lasted less than two years before the war, then Germany began to intensively develop its armed forces and military industry immediately after Hitler came to power. For example, in Germany, universal conscription was restored on March 16, 1935, and in the USSR - only on September 1, 1939.

2.2 Strategic miscalculations of the Red Army command

But, if the unpreparedness of the Red Army for war was one of the reasons for the defeat of 1941, then in 1942 the Soviet troops were already experienced, had behind them not only defeats and retreats, but also victories (Battle of Moscow, liberation of Rostov, Kerch-Feodosia operation , continuation of the defense of Sevastopol). But, nevertheless, it was in 1942 that the Wehrmacht achieved its maximum advance on the territory of the Soviet Union. German troops reached Stalingrad, Voronezh, Novorossiysk, and Mount Elbrus.

The reason for these defeats was the overestimation by the command (and primarily Stalin) of the successes of the Soviet troops during the winter counter-offensive of 1941-1942. German troops were driven back from Moscow and Rostov-on-Don, and also abandoned the Kerch Peninsula and reduced pressure on Sevastopol. But they were not completely defeated, especially in the southern direction. The German active actions in 1942 in the southern direction were also logical - these Wehrmacht forces suffered the least.

Another failure of the Red Army in 1942 was the Kharkov operation, which cost the irretrievable loss of 171 thousand Red Army soldiers. Again, as in 1941, the generals - this time A.M. Vasilevsky - they asked for permission to withdraw troops, and again Stalin did not give such permission.

An important aspect of the failures of the Red Army during the winter counteroffensive of 1941-1942. there was a lack of the required number of tank formations, which seriously affected the mobility of Soviet troops. Infantry and cavalry broke through the German defenses, but that was often where it all ended - there was almost no one or nothing to surround the enemy, since the superiority in manpower was minimal. As a result, both “cauldrons” (Demyansky and Kholmsky) were rescued by the Germans without any problems after reinforcements arrived. In addition, the encircled German troops in these pockets were supported by transport aircraft, which were difficult to fight due to huge losses Soviet aviation in the first months of the war.

A common mistake was incorrectly determining the directions of the enemy's main attacks. So, in Ukraine the command Southwestern Front led by General Kirponos was constantly afraid of the 1st Tank Group turning south, to the rear of the Lvov ledge. This led to unnecessary throwing of mechanized corps, and, as a result, to large losses (in the battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody - more than 2.5 thousand tanks, during the Lepel counterattack - about 830 tanks, near Uman - more than 200 tanks, under Kiev - more than 400 tanks.)

2.3 Repressions in the pre-war period

According to various sources, during the repressions of 1937-1941. From 25 to 50 thousand officers were shot, arrested or dismissed from the armed forces. The most significant losses were suffered by the senior command staff - from brigade commanders (major generals) to marshals. This greatly affected the actions of Soviet troops during the first period of the war.

The fact is that old, experienced commanders who went through the school of the First World War, the Soviet-Polish, and the Civil War (Primakov, Putna, Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Blyukher, Egorov and many others) were subjected to repression, and young officers came to their place, often had no experience in commanding large formations, and even in a war against the best army in the world.

Thus, by the beginning of the war, approximately 70-75% of commanders and political instructors had been in their positions for no more than one year. By the summer of 1941, among the command staff of the Red Army ground forces, only 4.3% of officers had a higher education, 36.5% had a secondary specialized education, 15.9% had no military education at all, and the remaining 43.3% completed only short-term courses junior lieutenants or were drafted into the army from the reserve.

But even solid military experience could not always help to win a victory. For example, General D.T. Kozlov fought since 1915, but was unable to oppose the superiority of the Wehrmacht during the battles in Crimea in the spring of 1942. The same thing happened with V.N. Gordova - long military experience, command of the front (Stalingrad), a number of failures that would have happened under any other commander, and, as a result, removal from office.

Thus, the already indicated reasons for the defeats of the Red Army were superimposed on the lack of good experienced command, which together led to the terrifying defeats of 1941 and, to a lesser extent, 1942. And only by 1943 were the military leaders of the Red Army able to adequately master the art of mechanized warfare, encirclement and destruction large enemy forces, powerful all-front offensives (similar to the German one in the summer of 1941).

Conclusion

We found out the main reasons for the defeats of the Soviet troops:

unpreparedness of the Red Army for war (this includes errors in the deployment of troops, poor mechanization, a large number of outdated equipment and weapons, stretched communications, lack of such combat experience as the Wehrmacht, etc.);

strategic miscalculations of the command of the Red Army, and, above all, Joseph Stalin as the head of state (errors in determining the date and likelihood of war, constant orders to hold cities to the last soldier with subsequent thousands of casualties, incorrect determination of the main attacks of the Germans (both in 1941 and and in 1942), untimely and slow response to dangers and threats);

repressions in the Red Army in the pre-war period, and during the war too (for example, the execution of General D.G. Pavlov and many other generals in 1941) - not only weakened the Red Army, but were not the last reason in Hitler’s determination to start war with the Soviet Union.

But, nevertheless, by the end of 1942, the Red Army was able not only to hold Stalingrad and the Caucasus, but also to defeat the German and allied troops and launch a powerful counteroffensive. Of course, during the war, the Soviet troops often had setbacks, but such defeats as near Kiev and Vyazma in 1941, in the Battle of Kharkov and in Crimean operation in 1942 it was no longer there. Taught by bitter experience, the Red Army faithfully marched towards victory. Germany's strategic miscalculations turned out to have more tragic consequences. The Germans underestimated not only the military power of the USSR, but also the readiness of the Soviet people to resist, and also greatly overestimated their capabilities. The strategy and tactics that brought them success in Europe in 1939-1940 did not work in the conditions of our country.

List of used literature

1.Isaev A.V. “The offensive of Marshal Shaposhnikov. The history of the Second World War that we did not know.” - M.: Yauza Publishing House, 2005 - 384 p.

2.A.I. Balashov, G.P. Rudakov “History of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945).” - St. Petersburg: Peter, 2005 - 464 p.

.Lubchenkov Yu.N. "100 Great Commanders of World War II." - M.: Veche, 2005. - 480 p.

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.The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Encyclopedia. - .ch. ed. MM. Kozlov. - M.: “ Soviet encyclopedia", 1985. - 832 p. from illus.

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Historians and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War are almost unanimous in the opinion that the most significant miscalculation that predetermined the tragedy of 1941 was the outdated doctrine of warfare adhered to by the Red Army.
Historians and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War are almost unanimous in the opinion that the most significant miscalculation that predetermined the tragedy of 1941 was the outdated doctrine of warfare adhered to by the Red Army.

Researchers V. Solovyov and Y. Kirshin, placing responsibility on Stalin, Voroshilov, Timoshenko and Zhukov, note that they “did not understand the content of the initial period of the war, made mistakes in planning, in strategic deployment, in determining the direction of the main attack of German troops.”

Unexpected blitzkrieg

Despite the fact that the blitzkrieg strategy was successfully tested by Wehrmacht troops in the European campaign, the Soviet command ignored it and counted on a completely different beginning of a possible war between Germany and the USSR.

“The People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff believed that a war between such major powers as Germany and Soviet Union should begin according to the previously existing pattern: the main forces enter the battle a few days after the border battles,” Zhukov recalled.

The command of the Red Army assumed that the Germans would launch an offensive with limited forces, and only after the border battles would the concentration and deployment of the main troops be completed. The General Staff hoped that while the covering army would conduct an active defense, exhausting and bleeding the fascists, the country would be able to carry out a full-scale mobilization.

However, an analysis of the strategy of warfare in Europe by German troops shows that the success of the Wehrmacht was primarily associated with powerful attacks by armored forces, supported by aviation, which quickly cut through the enemy’s defenses.

The main task of the first days of the war was not the seizure of territory, but the destruction of the defenses of the invaded country.
A miscalculation by the USSR command led to the fact that German aviation destroyed more than 1,200 combat aircraft on the very first day of the war and actually secured air supremacy. As a result of the surprise attack, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers were killed, wounded or captured. The German command achieved its goal: control of the Red Army troops was disrupted for some time.

Poor deployment of troops

As many researchers note, the nature of the location of Soviet troops was very convenient for striking German territory, but detrimental for carrying out a defensive operation. The dislocation that emerged at the beginning of the war was formed earlier in accordance with the General Staff plan to launch preventive strikes on German territory. According to the September 1940 version of the “Fundamentals of Deployment”, such deployment of troops was abandoned, but only on paper.

At the time of the attack by the German army, the military formations of the Red Army were not with their rear deployed, but were divided into three echelons without operational communication with each other. Such miscalculations of the General Staff allowed the Wehrmacht army to quite easily achieve a numerical superiority and destroy Soviet troops piecemeal.

The situation was especially alarming at the Bialystok Ledge, which stretched for many kilometers towards the enemy. This disposition of troops created a threat of deep envelopment and encirclement of the 3rd, 4th, and 10th armies Western District. The fears were confirmed: literally in a matter of days, three armies were surrounded and defeated, and on June 28 the Germans entered Minsk.

Reckless counter-offensives

On June 22 at 7 o'clock in the morning, Stalin issued a directive, which said: “troops with all forces and means should attack enemy forces and destroy them in the area where they violated the Soviet border.”

Such an order indicated a lack of understanding by the USSR high command of the scale of the invasion.
Six months later, when German troops were driven back from Moscow, Stalin demanded a counteroffensive on other fronts. Few could object to him. Despite the unwillingness of the Soviet army to conduct full-scale military operations, a counteroffensive was launched along the entire front - from Tikhvin to the Kerch Peninsula.

Moreover, the troops received orders to dismember and destroy the main forces of Army Group Center. The headquarters overestimated its capabilities: the Red Army at this stage of the war was unable to concentrate sufficient forces in the main direction and could not massively use tanks and artillery.
On May 2, 1942, one of the planned operations began in the Kharkov area, which, according to historians, was carried out while ignoring the enemy’s capabilities and neglecting the complications that an unfortified bridgehead could lead to. On May 17, the Germans attacked from two sides and a week later turned the bridgehead into a “cauldron.” About 240 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were captured as a result of this operation.

Unavailability of inventories

The General Staff believed that in the conditions of an impending war, material and technical means needed to be brought closer to the troops. 340 of the 887 stationary warehouses and bases of the Red Army were located in border districts, including more than 30 million shells and mines. In the area of ​​the Brest Fortress alone, 34 wagons of ammunition were stored. In addition, most of the artillery of the corps and divisions was not in the front-line zone, but in training camps.
The course of military operations showed the recklessness of such a decision. In a short time it was no longer possible to remove military equipment, ammunition and fuel and lubricants. As a result, they were either destroyed or captured by the Germans.
Another mistake of the General Staff was the large concentration of aircraft at airfields, while camouflage and air defense cover were weak. If the advanced units of army aviation were based too close to the border - 10-30 km, then the units of front-line and long-range aviation were located too far - from 500 to 900 km.

Main forces to Moscow

In mid-July 1941, Army Group Center rushed into the gap in Soviet defense between the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. Now the way to Moscow was open. Predictably for the German command, Headquarters placed its main forces in the Moscow direction. According to some reports, up to 40% of the Red Army personnel, the same amount of artillery and about 35% of the total number of aircraft and tanks were concentrated on the path of Army Group Center
The tactics of the Soviet command remained the same: meet the enemy head-on, wear him down, and then launch a counter-offensive with all available forces. The main task - to hold Moscow at any cost - was completed, but most of the armies concentrated in the Moscow direction fell into the “cauldrons” near Vyazma and Bryansk. In two “cauldrons” there were 7 field army departments out of 15, 64 divisions out of 95, 11 tank regiments out of 13 and 50 artillery brigades out of 62.
The General Staff was aware of the possibility of an offensive by German troops in the south, but concentrated most of the reserves not in the direction of Stalingrad and the Caucasus, but near Moscow. This strategy led to the success of the German army in the Southern direction.

On the same topic:

The main reasons why the Red Army failed in 1941 How the Red Army defended the Brest Fortress in 1941

Alarming messages about an impending German attack came from everywhere:

In March 1941, intelligence officer Richard Sorge (who worked as a German journalist in Japan) reported on the possible timing of the attack.

Radiograms from Soviet ships from foreign ports.

Pro-Soviet citizens of Poland, Hungary, and Romania reported.

Information from diplomats and ambassadors.

Messages from border districts.

From other scouts.

But Stalin ignored these messages, because he feared provocations from England, sought to maintain an alliance with Hitler, and believed that Germany would not fight the USSR on 2 fronts and would first defeat England. June 14, 1941 - a special TASS message appeared, saying that all rumors about the war with Germany are lies. The troops were not put on combat readiness, although Zhukov, who was appointed chief in January 1941 General Staff, insisted on this.

The Great Patriotic War began June 22, 1941 year at 4 o'clock in the morning. The German attack was sudden. This provided advantages. German aviation dominated the air - bombing strikes were carried out to a depth of 400 kilometers, 60 airfields were bombed, and 1,200 aircraft were destroyed on the first day (800 on the ground). The Soviet command did not have a clear idea of ​​the scale of the invasion, and conflicting directives were issued.

The Germans developed their offensive in accordance with the Barbarossa plan in three directions:

Army Group North was advancing on the Baltic states and Leningrad - by July 10 it had advanced 500 kilometers.

Army Group Center was advancing on Moscow and advanced 600 kilometers.

Army Group "South" - to Kyiv, advanced 300 kilometers.

Our army suffered huge losses, the loss ratio was 1:8, about 3 million were captured, out of 170 divisions, 28 were completely destroyed, 70 lost up to half of their strength. The situation was catastrophic. But everywhere the Germans met desperate resistance. The border outposts were the first to take the enemy's blow - Lieutenant Lopatin's outpost fought for 11 days, 1 month - Brest Fortress, rams in the air, oncoming tank battle near Rivne.

When the situation became clear, it was accepted strategic defense plan.

Major defensive battles took place in all three directions:

June - August - defense of Tallinn - the main base of the Baltic Fleet.

Mogilev defended itself for 23 days.

July 10 - September 10 - defense of Smolensk (September 5, near the city of Yelnya, Zhukov managed to organize a counter-offensive, the Soviet Guard was born).

Kyiv defended itself for 2 months.

Odessa defended itself for 73 days.

250 days - defense of Sevastopol (German losses were greater than during the capture of Europe).

Thus, despite huge losses, the Red Army is fighting stubborn defensive battles. Hitler concentrates his main forces in the central direction.

Urgent measures are being taken to organize resistance to the enemy:

1. General military mobilization of men born in 1905 - 1918 was announced. This allowed 5.5 million people to be drafted into the army by July 1.

2. Martial law was introduced in western regions countries.

3. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was formed (Stalin, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Shaposhnikov, Timoshenko, Zhukov).

4. June 24 - a special evacuation council was created (headed by Shvernik, 1.5 thousand enterprises and 10 million people were evacuated in 6 months).

5. On August 8, Stalin was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief and People's Commissar of Defense (+ since May 5 headed the government + head of the party).

6. The State Defense Committee was created to guide the activities of all government departments and institutions in war conditions.

7. Militia units are formed.

8. A mobilization economic plan for the 4th quarter of 1941 was approved, according to which:

Enterprises were transferred to the production of military products.

Enterprises from threatening areas were evacuated to the east, to the Urals and Central Asia.

The population was involved in the construction of defensive lines.

An 11-hour working day was introduced, vacations were canceled, and mandatory overtime was introduced.

9. The country's leadership calls for deployment various forms socialist competition, fundraising for the defense fund, donation.

The war becomes domestic, the enthusiasm of the people in organizing resistance to the enemy is clearly manifested: participation in the construction of defensive structures, joining fighter battalions to fight saboteurs, civil uprising, volunteers for the Red Army, duty to help air defense, collecting funds and things for the defense fund.

Results of the initial period of the war:

A loss huge territory(Baltic states, part of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, a number of regions of Russia).

Huge casualties in the army and among the civilian population.

Economic problems - loss of areas with large enterprises in various industries and agricultural production, the process of evacuation of enterprises.

Urgent measures are being taken to organize resistance to the enemy.

The mood has changed German soldiers(the war in Russia is not a stroll through Europe).

Reasons for failures in the initial period of the war:

1. The surprise of the attack for the army, which was not in full combat readiness, and for the population, who were confident that there would be no war with Germany in the near future.

2. The superiority of the German army (in numbers, in technology, in combat experience, in the quality of officer personnel, there were plans, allies, huge economic potential was involved, intelligence work).

3. Miscalculations of the high command and Stalin personally:

The timing of the attack was incorrectly determined,

Intelligence data and reports about the possible outbreak of war were ignored,

Flawed military doctrine

The direction of the main strike is incorrectly determined.

4. Low professional level officer cadres (due to repression).

5. The incompleteness of the process of reorganizing the army and rearmament of the army, the construction of defensive fortifications on the western borders.

6. The need to maintain large armed forces in the Far East (against Japan), in the south (against Turkey and Iran), in the northwest (against Finland) and in the Gulag (to guard prisoners).

Thus, in the initial period the war turned out extremely unsuccessfully for the USSR, it is difficult to turn the situation around, but everything possible is being done to achieve this.

Abstract on the history of Russia

June 22, 1941. Nazi Germany and its allies unleashed a carefully prepared blow on the Soviet Union. The peaceful work of the Soviet people was interrupted. Arrived new period in life Soviet state- the period of the Great Patriotic War.

Goals and nature of the Great Patriotic War.

Germany pursued the following goals in this war:

Class - the destruction of the USSR as a state, and communism as an ideology;

Imperialist - achieving world domination;

Economic - robbery of the national wealth of the USSR;

Racist, misanthropic - the destruction of most of the Soviet people and the transformation of those who remained into slaves.

The goals of the Great Patriotic War of the USSR were:

Defense of the Fatherland, freedom and independence of the Motherland;

Providing assistance to the peoples of the world in liberation from the fascist yoke;

Elimination of fascism and creation of conditions excluding the possibility of aggression from German soil in the future.

The nature of the war naturally followed from the goals of the war. On the part of Germany it was an unjust, aggressive and criminal war. From the USSR side - liberation and fair.

Periodization of the Great Patriotic War.

June 1941 - November 1942 - the period of mobilization of all forces and means to repel the enemy.

November 1942 - December 1943 was the period of a radical turning point in the war.

January 1944 - May 1945 - the period of the victorious end of the war in Europe.

Reasons for the defeats of the Red Army in the first period of the war:

Gross miscalculations of the country's leadership in assessing the real military situation;

Insufficient professional training a significant part of the command cadres of the Red Army;

Weakening the country's defense capability and the combat capability of the Red Army through unjustified repressions against the leading personnel of the country's armed forces;

Miscalculations of a military-strategic nature;

Germany's advantage over the USSR in economic potential;

Germany's significant superiority in military terms. Its army was fully mobilized and deployed, equipped with modern means of combat, and had two years of experience in combat operations. At the same time, in Soviet army work on its technical equipment has not yet been completed. The balance of forces on the eve of the war.

Germany and its allies: 190 divisions (153+37) = 5.5 million people, 4300 tanks, 4500 aircraft, 47 thousand guns and mortars and 192 ships of the main classes. Germany's allies: Hungary, Romania, Finland, Italy, Slovakia. USSR: 179 divisions = 3 million people, 8800 tanks, 8700 aircraft, 38 thousand guns and mortars. The fleets of the Soviet armed forces consisted of 182 ships of the main classes and 1,400 combat aircraft.

And although the Soviet troops had superiority in tanks and aircraft, in terms of quality they were still inferior to the enemy.

German offensive strategy.

In accordance with the strategy of the “blitzkrieg” war, it was envisaged that powerful groups of tank formations and aviation would invade, in cooperation with ground forces, advancing in the direction of Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev, encircle and destroy the main forces of the Soviet troops of the border districts, and within 3-5 months reach line Arkhangelsk - r. Volga - Astrakhan. To solve this problem, several army groups were created. Army Group North advanced in the direction of the Baltic states, Pskov and Leningrad. Commander - Field Marshal W. von Leeb. Army Group Center operated along the lines of Bialystok, Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow. Commander - Field Marshal F. von Bock. Army Group South strikes Western Ukraine, captures Kyiv, then advances on Kharkov, Donbass, Crimea. Commander - Field Marshal G. von Runstedt. The German Army of Norway operated in the direction of Murmansk. Two Romanian armies and a Hungarian army corps also took part in the fighting.

Mobilization activities.

A) Creation higher authorities management of the country's defense.

June 23, 1941 - the Headquarters of the Main Command was created, which on August 8 was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command. Its members included People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko (chairman), Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Kuznetsov. General mobilization was declared in the country, and martial law was introduced throughout the European part.

June 30, 1941 - the State Defense Committee (GKO) was formed, endowed with full state, military and party power. It included Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Beria, Kaganovich, and later Voznesensky, Mikoyan, and Bulganin were introduced. Stalin became the chairman of the State Defense Committee. In addition, on July 19, he took the post of People's Commissar of Defense, and on August 8, he accepted the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army and the Navy.

B) Directive letter from the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to party and Soviet organizations front-line areas dated June 29, 1941. The letter prescribed the procedure:

Ensuring the work of the rear for the front;

Organization of resistance in occupied territory.

July 3, 1941 - Stalin’s address to the people on the radio, where for the first time the mortal threat looming over the country was openly announced and an appeal was made to all citizens of the country to save the Fatherland.

Detailed solution paragraph § 26–27 on history for 11th grade students, authors D.D. Danilov, V.G. Petrovich, D.Yu. Belichenko, P.I. Selinov, V.M. Antonov, A.V. Kuznetsov. Basic and advanced level 2016

GENERAL EDUCATION MATERIAL

These points of view differ from each other in the following: the reasons for the defeats of the Red Army

State the problem and compare your version with the authors’ version.

What were the reasons for the defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War?

REPEATING THE NECESSARY KNOWLEDGE

List the main events that led humanity to the outbreak of global conflict in the late 1930s.

Versailles-Washington system of international relations

The economic crisis contributed to the radicalization (application of harsh drastic measures) of many political regimes

Aggressive plans and mistrust of each other between "Western democracies", fascist dictatorships and the communist Soviet Union.

Immediate events that led to the war:

1936 German troops enter the Rhineland demilitarized zone

Treaty of Alliance between Germany and Italy (Berlin-Rome Axis); "Anti-Comintern Pact" of Germany and Japan

1937 – the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).

1938 - victory of Franco's fascists in civil war in Spain.

Annexation (“Anschluss”) of Austria to Germany.

summer - Germany's demand to Czechoslovakia to transfer border territories inhabited by Germans.

September - Munich agreement between England, France and Germany on the transfer of the last part of Czechoslovakia. The USSR is ready to defend Czechoslovakia, but Poland does not allow troops to pass through its territory. The Czechoslovaks allow the Germans to occupy the border areas.

March 10 - Stalin at the congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) accuses England and France of provoking war, says that the USSR is ready to “continue to pursue a policy of peace and strengthening business ties with all countries.” Ribbentrop in Germany takes this as an invitation to negotiations.

March 15 - German occupation of all of Czechoslovakia (violation of the Munich Agreements without reaction from England and France).

March 21 - Germany demands that Poland hand over lands inhabited by Germans and “carry out a joint anti-Soviet policy.”

May 17-22 - the beginning of the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict on the river Khalkhin Gol in Mongolia (until August 1939)

August 23 - signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) and secret protocols to it on the division of spheres of influence in Europe.

Name the main measures to prepare the USSR for entry into the war in 1939–1941.

Army modernization

Industrialization of the economy

Conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact between the USSR and Germany

Annexation of the territories of Belarus, the Baltic states, and Poland in order to push back the western borders of the USSR

Large-scale redeployment of troops to the western borders

1. By May-June 1941, Nazi Germany, with the help of its allies (Italy, Hungary, Romania, Finland), concentrated 190 divisions - 5.5 million soldiers and officers - on the borders of the USSR. The USSR had 170 divisions - 2.9 million soldiers - in the five military districts bordering Germany. But being inferior to the Germans in strategic directions in manpower by almost 2 times, the Red Army divisions were significantly superior to the invading army in the quantity and quality of tanks and aircraft, and were not inferior in artillery and provision of troops with other equipment.

2. A feature of the administrative-command system with a totalitarian basis that existed at that time was its rigid pyramidal structure. In other words, all fateful decisions were made by one person - I.V. Stalin. For a long time he did not react to contradictory intelligence reports, considering them to be British disinformation or provocations of German generals. According to the most common version explaining this behavior, Stalin tried to delay the start of hostilities by any means.

3. Only in June 1941 did the Soviet leadership (primarily the military) understand that a German attack was inevitable. Secretly, under the guise of military training, the recruitment of reservists (previously trained soldiers) into the army began. A large-scale redeployment of troops to the western borders began. On the evening of June 21, a directive was sent to the localities to put the personnel of the units on combat readiness and possible provocations from the German side. But not all military units even managed to receive this directive: German sabotage units “Brandenburg-800”, dressed in Soviet military uniform, penetrated the territory of military camps, cut telephone lines. In the early morning of June 22, 1941, an air raid began on border towns, fortified areas, and communication facilities.

4. The German invasion took many Soviet military units by surprise; in the very first days, the control of units, communication between them, the supply of ammunition, fuel, etc. were disrupted. Evidence of both courageous resistance and panic and confusion of commanders and soldiers has been preserved. Conflicting orders forced tank and motorized rifle divisions to undertake grueling marches. Equipment that had become faulty and stalled was simply abandoned; in some units, up to 80% of the losses were non-combat. In the first days of the fighting, the Germans managed to ensure complete air supremacy.

5. Middle-level commanders acted ineptly and without initiative, trying with all their might not to take responsibility; mass surrender became the norm (the German command spoke of more than 3 million prisoners of war in 1941).

Draw a conclusion: why at the initial stage of the war (1941–1942) did the USSR suffer terrible defeats and suffer huge losses?

Conclusion: at the initial stage of the war (1941-1942), the USSR suffered terrible defeats and suffered huge losses because the country's leadership did not believe in the German attack, the German army had numerical superiority, the attack took the border troops by surprise, inexperience and lack of professionalism officers The Red Army, silence until July 3, Stalin, who gave the main orders. Nevertheless, Nazi Germany did not succeed in the plan for a lightning war; Soviet society retained and increased its capabilities for resistance.

Analyze the events of 1942 and draw a conclusion: why did the USSR suffer terrible defeats and suffer huge losses at the initial stage of the war (1941–1942)?

Conclusion: at the initial stage of the war (1941–1942), the USSR suffered terrible defeats and suffered huge losses because the country's leadership did not believe in the German attack, the German army had numerical superiority, the attack took the border troops by surprise, the inexperience and lack of professionalism of the Red Army officers army, silence until July 3 Stalin, who gave the main orders. Nevertheless, Nazi Germany did not succeed in the plan for a lightning war; Soviet society retained and increased its capabilities for resistance.

PROFILE MATERIAL

Analyze the texts of the sources and, based on them, draw a conclusion about the reasons for the failures of the Soviet troops in the initial period of the war.

F. Halder, Chief of the German General Staff: ... The complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy is evidenced by the fact that the units were taken by surprise in a barracks arrangement, the planes stood at airfields, covered with tarpaulin, and the advanced units, suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command about about what they should do.

Order from a member of the Military Council of the 16th Army: ... I have information that individual servicemen of the division entrusted to you express negative sentiments, show cowardice, and there are cases of drunkenness

...The Russian soldier surpasses our enemy in the West with his contempt for death. Endurance and fanaticism make him hold on until he is killed in a trench or falls dead in hand-to-hand combat.

….If (by the Germans) an alternative Russian government is nevertheless created, many Russians may believe that the Germans are really fighting only against the Bolshevik system, and not against Russia. Perhaps other generals also think the same way as I do; I know some of them who really dislike communism; but today they cannot do anything else but support it.

Major General K.D. Golubev. Report from the commander of the 43rd Army I.V. Stalin. November 8, 1941

This document indicates the existence of disagreements and struggle for leadership among the top leadership of the army, which is also the cause of defeats and losses.

Memoirs of veterans N. Makarenko about the battles for Moscow and V.V. Karpov about the battles in 1942, N.M. Yaganova.

This document testifies to the courage and heroism of ordinary soldiers.

This order was called “Not a step back!”, tightened discipline in the Red Army, prohibited the withdrawal of troops without an order, introduced penal companies and battalions, as well as detachments. Published after the defeat of the Red Army near Kharkov (Kharkov Cauldron, 1942). In classical historiography it is generally accepted that this order was necessary in the current situation, but also caused huge losses.

V.A. Nevezhin, Russian historian, about different versions of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

Despite the obvious disagreements between the participants in the controversy in assessing the activities of I.V. Stalin on preparations for armed confrontation with Germany on the eve of June 22, 1941, this polemic showed the following. Stalin and the Soviet leadership undoubtedly had their own “scenario” for the coming war. They imagined this war as all-destructive, offensive.

P.N. Bobylev about the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

...The existence of the May plan of the General Staff and the beginning of its implementation does not change anything in the assessment of the German attack on the USSR as aggression. There can be no talk of a preventive attack by Hitler here, since it has already been proven that the German leadership, neither earlier nor in June 1941, had information about the preparation of the Red Army for offensive actions. In this regard, the very version of a preventive war in Germany looks completely absurd: it turns out that Hitler thwarted a Soviet attack, about the preparation of which he knew nothing. Any speculation about what would have happened if Hitler had postponed the attack on the USSR for two months already belongs to the realm of fortune-telling. In reality, from June 22, 1941, the Red Army had to repel German aggression.

A.I. Utkin, a modern Russian historian, about the reasons for the defeats and heroic resistance of the Red Army.

I tried to look at this war through the eyes of the Germans. The first week of the war, it’s hot, the month of July, the Germans are moving very quickly, already on the outskirts of Minsk. And here in the notebook of a German lieutenant: on the left the neighbors have already moved 100 km ahead, on the right the neighbors are also moving forward, but we stopped, it’s not clear what’s going on. We try to bypass the Russian positions on the left - a minefield, go to the right - an ambush, and we stand for a whole week, holding up the entire front. All this opened up completely unexpectedly, because the cook decided to climb into a Russian tank. The Soviet tank was hit on a hill, when it was rising, a blow was made directly at it, the armor was broken, and the cook decided to take something: a watch, some things, souvenirs, nothing special. And when he opened the hatch, everything became clear. Below in the tank there was a dead Russian captain kneeling, he had a walkie-talkie in his hand, and he was in the blinds, that’s what the hole in the tank is called, he saw the entire position, he stood at the top, and everything was visible, and he coordinated the actions of the Russians throughout the hot weeks. The corpses of his comrades were decomposing nearby, he died, wounded and in this stench, but he survived to the end. This amazed the Germans, and it seemed to them that this war would not be like the one in Poland and France. And the German chief lieutenant writes that he felt cold in his legs, he felt that this time it would not be so easy.

A. Filippov, on the readiness of the Red Army for war in June 1941 (1992)

....The Soviet military leadership, preparing for war with Germany, strenuously sought quantitative superiority over the Wehrmacht by 1941, especially in tanks and aircraft, but for them the repeated lag of the Red Army from the German in the quality of troops, headquarters, and command personnel remained a secret...

The troops were poorly trained in methods modern warfare, weakly put together, insufficiently organized. Radio communications, control, interaction, reconnaissance, and tactics were at a low level.

The main reason for the defeat of our troops in the summer of 1941 was the Red Army’s unwillingness to wage a modern maneuver war against an enemy who was well prepared for just such a war.

A. Smirnov, modern Russian historian, on the publication of the memoirs of General Illarion Tolkonyuk. 2005

Tolkonyuk’s memoirs once again confirm that numerous cases of voluntary (not due to lack of ability to resist the enemy, but due to unwillingness to fight) surrender of Red Army soldiers in 1941, described in German literature, are by no means a propaganda fiction.<.>

He paints a picture of extremely inflexible, overly centralized command and control of troops, which does not allow lower-level commanders to influence the development of events in a timely manner, and forces those above them to replace those below them.

Alarming messages about an impending German attack came from everywhere:

In March 1941, intelligence officer Richard Sorge (who worked as a German journalist in Japan) reported on the possible timing of the attack.

Radiograms from Soviet ships from foreign ports.

Pro-Soviet citizens of Poland, Hungary, and Romania reported.

Information from diplomats and ambassadors.

Messages from border districts.

From other scouts.

But Stalin ignored these messages, because he feared provocations from England, sought to maintain an alliance with Hitler, and believed that Germany would not fight the USSR on 2 fronts and would first defeat England. June 14, 1941 - a special TASS message appeared, saying that all rumors about the war with Germany are lies. The troops were not put on combat readiness, although Zhukov, who was appointed chief of the General Staff in January 1941, insisted on this.

The Great Patriotic War began June 22, 1941 year at 4 o'clock in the morning. The German attack was sudden. This provided advantages. German aviation dominated the air - bombing strikes were carried out to a depth of 400 kilometers, 60 airfields were bombed, and 1,200 aircraft were destroyed on the first day (800 on the ground). The Soviet command did not have a clear idea of ​​the scale of the invasion, and conflicting directives were issued.

The Germans developed their offensive in accordance with the Barbarossa plan in three directions:

Army Group North was advancing on the Baltic states and Leningrad - by July 10 it had advanced 500 kilometers.

Army Group Center was advancing on Moscow and advanced 600 kilometers.

Army Group "South" - to Kyiv, advanced 300 kilometers.

Our army suffered huge losses, the loss ratio was 1:8, about 3 million were captured, out of 170 divisions, 28 were completely destroyed, 70 lost up to half of their strength. The situation was catastrophic. But everywhere the Germans met desperate resistance. The border outposts were the first to take the enemy's blow - the outpost of Lieutenant Lopatin fought for 11 days, the Brest Fortress for 1 month, rams in the air, an oncoming tank battle near Rovno.

When the situation became clear, it was accepted strategic defense plan.

Major defensive battles took place in all three directions:

June - August - defense of Tallinn - the main base of the Baltic Fleet.

Mogilev defended itself for 23 days.

July 10 - September 10 - defense of Smolensk (September 5, near the city of Yelnya, Zhukov managed to organize a counter-offensive, the Soviet Guard was born).

Kyiv defended itself for 2 months.

Odessa defended itself for 73 days.

250 days - defense of Sevastopol (German losses were greater than during the capture of Europe).

Thus, despite huge losses, the Red Army is fighting stubborn defensive battles. Hitler concentrates his main forces in the central direction.

Urgent measures are being taken to organize resistance to the enemy:

1. General military mobilization of men born in 1905 - 1918 was announced. This allowed 5.5 million people to be drafted into the army by July 1.

2. Martial law was introduced in the western regions of the country.

3. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was formed (Stalin, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Shaposhnikov, Timoshenko, Zhukov).

4. June 24 - a special evacuation council was created (headed by Shvernik, 1.5 thousand enterprises and 10 million people were evacuated in 6 months).

5. On August 8, Stalin was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief and People's Commissar of Defense (+ since May 5 headed the government + head of the party).

6. The State Defense Committee was created to guide the activities of all government departments and institutions in war conditions.

7. Militia units are formed.

8. A mobilization economic plan for the 4th quarter of 1941 was approved, according to which:

Enterprises were transferred to the production of military products.

Enterprises from threatening areas were evacuated to the east, to the Urals and Central Asia.

The population was involved in the construction of defensive lines.

An 11-hour working day was introduced, vacations were canceled, and mandatory overtime was introduced.

9. A call by the country's leadership to develop various forms of socialist competition, to raise funds for the defense fund, and to donate.

The war becomes domestic, the enthusiasm of the people in organizing resistance to the enemy is clearly manifested: participation in the construction of defensive structures, joining fighter battalions to fight saboteurs, joining the people's militia, volunteering in the ranks of the Red Army, duty in aid of air defense, collecting funds and things for the defense fund .

Results of the initial period of the war:

Loss of a huge territory (the Baltic states, part of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, a number of regions of Russia).

Huge casualties in the army and among the civilian population.

Economic problems - loss of areas with large enterprises in various industries and agricultural production, the process of evacuation of enterprises.

Urgent measures are being taken to organize resistance to the enemy.

The mood of the German soldiers changed (the war in Russia is not a stroll through Europe).

Reasons for failures in the initial period of the war:

1. The surprise of the attack for the army, which was not in full combat readiness, and for the population, who were confident that there would be no war with Germany in the near future.

2. The superiority of the German army (in numbers, in technology, in combat experience, in the quality of officer personnel, there were plans, allies, huge economic potential was involved, intelligence work).

3. Miscalculations of the high command and Stalin personally:

The timing of the attack was incorrectly determined,

Intelligence data and reports about the possible outbreak of war were ignored,

Flawed military doctrine

The direction of the main strike is incorrectly determined.

4. Low professional level of officers (due to repression).

5. The incompleteness of the process of reorganizing the army and rearmament of the army, the construction of defensive fortifications on the western borders.

6. The need to maintain large armed forces in the Far East (against Japan), in the south (against Turkey and Iran), in the northwest (against Finland) and in the Gulag (to guard prisoners).

Thus, in the initial period the war turned out extremely unsuccessfully for the USSR, it is difficult to turn the situation around, but everything possible is being done to achieve this.