Formed on October 20, 1943 in the northwestern and western direction of the Soviet-German front based on the order of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 30228 dated October 16, 1943 by renaming the Kalinin Front. The front included the 4th Shock Army, the 39th Army, the 43rd Army and the 3rd Air Army. Subsequently, at different times it included the 2nd, 6th, 11th Guards, 51st, 61st Armies, 5th Guards. tank army.

From November 1 to 21, 1943, the troops of the right wing of the front conducted an offensive in the Vitebsk-Polotsk direction, as a result of which, with the assistance of troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, they wedged to a depth of 45 - 55 km into the enemy’s defenses and deeply captured the town and Vitebsk group German troops.

On December 13-31, 1943, during the Gorodok operation of 1943, front troops defeated the enemy’s Gorodok group and eliminated the Gorodok salient in its defense, taking an even more advantageous enveloping position in relation to Vitebsk.

In February - March 1944, the front troops, in cooperation with the troops of the Western Front, launched an offensive near Vitebsk and, having broken through the enemy’s defenses, improved their position in the Vitebsk direction.

During the Vitebsk-Orsha operation on June 23 - 28, 1944, front troops, in cooperation with the forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front, defeated the troops of the left wing of the German Army Group Center, reached the approaches to Polotsk and, building on their success, carried out 29 June - July 4 Polotsk operation. Having defeated the Polotsk group of German troops, the troops of the left flank of the front advanced 120 - 160 km and created favorable conditions for developing an offensive on Daugavpils and Siauliai.

During the Šiauliai operation (July 5 - 31, 1944), the front troops defeated the enemy's Panevėžys-Šiauliai grouping and, changing the direction of the main attack, launched an attack on Riga with the aim of cutting off the land communications of the German Army Group North with East Prussia, reaching Riga gulf, but in August they retreated 30 km to the south.

In September, front troops took part in the Riga operation (September 14 - October 22, 1944). Then, having regrouped the troops on the left wing in the Siauliai region, in early October his troops launched a surprise attack on Memel (Klaipeda) and, having completed the Memel operation (October 5 - 22, 1944), together with the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, blocked from land the Kurland enemy group; Subsequently, they fought to eliminate this group.

In January - February 1945, part of the front participated in the East Prussian strategic operation (January 13 - April 25, 1945), assisting the 3rd Belorussian Front in the defeat of the enemy's Tilsit group. At the same time, at the end of January, the 4th Shock Army of the Front, in cooperation with units Marine Corps, artillery and aviation of the Baltic Fleet liquidated the enemy’s Memel bridgehead; On January 28, Memel was liberated.

At the beginning of February 1945, the front troops were given the task - together with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, to eliminate the East Prussian enemy group pressed to the sea on the Zemland Peninsula and in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bKonigsberg (Kaliningrad). The armies of the front operating in Courland were transferred to the 2nd Baltic Front. Since February 17, all the efforts of the front were concentrated on eliminating the Zemland enemy group. The front was abolished on February 24, 1945 on the basis of a directive from the Supreme Command headquarters of February 21, 1945, and its troops, transformed into the Zemland operational group of forces, became part of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

Troops of the 1st Baltic Front participated in the following operations:

• Strategic Operations:
• Belarusian strategic offensive operation of 1944;
• East Prussian Strategic Offensive Operation 1945;
• Baltic strategic offensive operation of 1944.
• Front-line and army operations:
• Vitebsk offensive operation of 1944;
• Insterburg-Konigsberg offensive operation of 1945;
• Klaipeda offensive operation 1945;
• Memel offensive operation 1944;
• Minsk offensive operation 1944;
• Polotsk offensive operation 1944;
• Riga offensive operation 1944;
• Siauliai offensive operation in 1944.

1st Baltic Front formed on October 20, 1943 in the northwestern and western direction of the Soviet-German front based on the order of the Supreme High Command Headquarters dated October 16, 1943 by renaming. The front included the 4th shock, 39th, 43rd armies and the 3rd air army. Subsequently, at various times it included the 11th Guards, 2nd, 6th Armies, 5th Guards, 51st, 61st Tank Armies.

From November 1 to November 21, 1943, the troops of the right wing of the front conducted an offensive in the Vitebsk-Polotsk direction, as a result of which, with the assistance of troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, they wedged to a depth of 45-55 km into the enemy’s defenses and deeply captured the town and Vitebsk group of German troops.

On December 13-31, 1943, during the Gorodok operation of 1943, front troops defeated the enemy’s Gorodok group and eliminated the Gorodok salient in its defense, taking an even more advantageous enveloping position in relation to Vitebsk.

In February-March 1944, front troops, in cooperation with troops of the Western Front, launched an offensive near Vitebsk and, having broken through the enemy’s defenses, improved their position in the Vitebsk direction.

During the Vitebsk-Orsha operation on June 23-28, 1944, front troops, in cooperation with the forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front, defeated the troops of the left wing of the German Army Group Center, reached the approaches to Polotsk and, building on their success, carried out June 29 - July 4 Polotsk operation. Having defeated the Polotsk group of German troops, the troops of the left flank of the front advanced 120-160 km and created favorable conditions for developing an offensive on Daugavpils and Siauliai.

During the Šiauliai operation (July 5-31, 1944), the front troops defeated the enemy's Panevėžys-Šiauliai grouping and, changing the direction of the main attack, launched an attack on Riga with the aim of cutting off the land communications of the German Army Group North with East Prussia, reaching Riga gulf, but in August they retreated 30 km to the south.

In September, front troops took part in the Riga operation (September 14-October 22, 1944). Then, having regrouped the troops on the left wing in the Siauliai region, in early October his troops launched a surprise attack on Memel (Klaipeda) and, having completed the Memel operation (October 5-22, 1944), together with the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, blocked from land the Kurland enemy group; Subsequently, they fought to eliminate this group.

In January-February 1945, part of the front participated in the East Prussian strategic operation (January 13-April 25, 1945), assisting the 3rd Belorussian Front in the defeat of the enemy’s Tilsit group. At the same time, at the end of January, the 4th Shock Army of the front, in cooperation with marine units, artillery and aviation of the Baltic Fleet, liquidated the enemy’s Memel bridgehead; On January 28, Memel was liberated.

At the beginning of February 1945, the front troops were given the task - together with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, to eliminate the East Prussian enemy group pressed to the sea on the Zemland Peninsula and in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bKonigsberg (Kaliningrad). The front armies operating in Courland were transferred to the 2nd Baltic Front. Since February 17, all the efforts of the front were concentrated on eliminating the Zemland enemy group. The front was abolished on February 24, 1945 on the basis of a directive from the Supreme Command headquarters of February 21, 1945, and its troops, transformed into the Zemland operational group of forces, became part of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

Front commanders: Army General Eremenko A.I. (October-November 1943); General of the Army Bagramyan I. X. (November 1943 - February 1945)

Members of the Military Council of the Front: Lieutenant General Leonov D.S. (October 1943 - November 1944); Lieutenant General Rudakov M.V. (November 1944 - February 1945)

Chief of Staff of the Front - Lieutenant General, from June 1944 - Colonel General Kurasov V.V. (October 1943 - February 1945)

The First Baltic Front - an operational unification of the Soviet armed forces during the Great Patriotic War, operated in 1943-1945 in the Baltic direction, created on October 20, 1943 as a result of the renaming of the Kalinin Front. Initially, the front included the 4th Shock Army, 39th, 43rd Armies, 3rd Air Army, later included: 2nd, 6th, 11th, 51st, 61st Armies, 5th Guards Tank Army. Army General A.I. became the commander of the front. Eremenko, member of the military council - Lieutenant General D.S. Leonov, chief of staff - Lieutenant General V.V. Kurasov (since June 1944 - Colonel General). In November 1943, Army General I.Kh. became the new front commander. Bagramyan.
From November 1 to November 21, 1943, front troops launched an offensive in the Vitebsk-Polotsk direction. With the support of the Second Baltic Front, it was possible to penetrate the German defenses to a depth of 45-55 km and cover the Gorodok and Vitebsk groups of German troops. As a result of the Gorodok operation (1943), the German group was defeated, a bulge in the enemy’s defense was eliminated, and advantageous positions were taken on the approaches to Vitebsk. In February-March 1944, troops of the Western and First Baltic Fronts carried out the Vitebsk operation, breaking through the enemy’s defenses, but failed to take the city.

In the summer of 1944, the First Baltic Front took part in the Belarusian Strategic Operation. On June 23, in cooperation with the troops of the Third Belorussian Front, during the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the left wing of the German Army Group Center was defeated. Soviet troops liberated Vitebsk and reached the approaches to Polotsk. Building on the success, the Polotsk operation was carried out without an operational pause. As a result, the troops of the First Baltic Front advanced with their left wing 120-160 km into the depth of the enemy’s defense, and conditions were created for the development of an offensive on Daugavpils and Siauliai.

In July, front troops carried out the Siauliai operation, liberated Panevezys and Siauliai, then launched an attack on Riga with the aim of cutting off the land communications of the German Army Group North. The troops of the First Baltic Front managed to reach the Gulf of Riga, but in August German counterattacks forced them to withdraw from the coast 30 km to the south. In September, the front took part in the Riga operation. Early October Soviet troops attacked Memel (Klaipeda). After the completion of the Memel operation, together with the troops of the Second Baltic Front, the First Baltic Front blocked the enemy’s Courland group from land. In November 1944, Lieutenant General M.V. became a new member of the front’s military council. Rudakov.

In January-February 1945, part of the front participated in the East Prussian strategic operation and assisted the Third Belorussian Front in the defeat of the enemy’s Tilsit group. At the end of January, the Memel bridgehead was liquidated, and the city of Memel was liberated on January 28. At the beginning of February 1945, troops of the First Baltic Front, together with the Third Belorussian Front, took part in an operation to eliminate enemy groups on the Zemland Peninsula and in the Konigsberg area. The armies of the First Baltic Front operating in Courland were transferred to the Second Baltic Front and from February 17 all front efforts were concentrated on eliminating the Zemland enemy group. On February 24, 1945, the First Baltic Front was abolished, and its troops, transformed into the Zemland operational group of forces, were included in the Third Belorussian Front.

1st Baltic Front created on October 20, 1943 based on the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of October 16, 1943 by renaming the Kalinin Front. The front included the 4th Shock Army, the 39th, 43rd Combined Arms Armies, and the 3rd Air Army. Subsequently, it included the 2nd, 6th, 11th Guards, 51st, 61st combined arms armies, and the 5th Guards Tank Army.During the offensive in November - December 1943, front troops defeated the enemy's Gorodok group and improved their position in the Vitebsk direction. During further operations in the spring of 1944, front formations improved their position near Vitebsk. During the offensive in Belarus in the summer of 1944, front formations together with troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front defeated the left flank of the army group“Center”, liberated Vitebsk, defeated the enemy’s Polotsk group, and created conditions for an offensive in the Baltic states. During the offensive battles in July 1944, the front troops defeated the Panevezys-Šiauliai grouping of the enemy, changed the direction of the main attack on Riga, went west of it to the Gulf of Riga, thereby cutting off Army Group North from East Prussia, however, in August of the same year they were unable to hold this area and were thrown back 30 km to the south. In the fall of 1944, during offensive operations in the Baltic states, front troops participated in the defeat of enemy groups in Latvia and Lithuania, together with formations of the 2nd Baltic Front, they blocked enemy groups on the territory of the Kurland Peninsula and in the Memel area. In January - February 1945, units of the front supported the offensive of the 3rd Belorussian Front in East Prussia, and at the same time the enemy's bridgehead in the Memel area was eliminated. In February 1945, the formations operating in Courland were transferred to the 2nd Baltic Front. The remaining formations were concentrated to carry out offensive operations in the Zemland Peninsula area.

On February 24, 1945, based on the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of February 21, 1945, it was transformed into the Zemland Group of Forces as part of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

Troops of the 1st Baltic Front participated in the following operations:

Strategic Operations:

• Belarusian strategic offensive operation of 1944;

  East Prussian Strategic Offensive Operation 1945;

  Baltic strategic offensive operation 1944.

Front-line and army operations:

• Vitebsk offensive operation of 1944;

  Insterburg-Konigsberg offensive operation of 1945;

  Klaipeda offensive operation 1945;

  Memel offensive operation 1944;

  Minsk offensive operation 1944;

  Polotsk offensive operation 1944;

  Riga offensive operation 1944;

  Siauliai offensive operation in 1944.

Connections:

• Armies:

  • 11th Guards Army;

    4th Shock Army;

    39th Army;

    43rd Army;

    3rd Air Army;

• • 103rd Rifle Corps:

    • 16th Infantry Division;

  47th Infantry Division;

• 85th Guards Mortar Regiment;

Air Force:

• 13th Corrective Reconnaissance Aviation Squadron;

  36th Corrective Reconnaissance Aviation Squadron;

Engineer Troops:

• 4th assault engineer brigade;

  93rd Pontoon-Bridge Battalion.

• Armies:

  • 6th Guards Army;

    11th Guards Army;

    4th Shock Army;

    43rd Army;

    3rd Air Army;

Front-line formations:

• Rifle, airborne and cavalry formations:

  • 16th Infantry Division;

Artillery and mortar formations:

• 34th Guards Mortar Regiment;

  601st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

  1623rd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

  1625th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

  1714th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

  183rd separate anti-aircraft artillery division;

  622nd separate anti-aircraft artillery division;

• 5th Tank Corps:

  • 24th Tank Brigade;

    41st Tank Brigade;

    70th Tank Brigade;

    5th Motorized Rifle Brigade;

    1261st self-propelled artillery regiment;

    1515th self-propelled artillery regiment;

    92nd Motorcycle Battalion;

    731st separate anti-tank fighter division;

    277th Mortar Regiment;

    1708th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

Air Force:

Engineer Troops:

• 2nd engineer brigade;

  5th Special Purpose Engineer Brigade;

  4th Guards Separate Engineer Battalion;

  37th separate engineer battalion;

  114th separate engineer battalion;

  210th separate engineer battalion;

  249th separate engineer battalion;

  293rd separate engineer battalion;

  10th Guards Battalion of Miners;

  57th Pontoon-Bridge Battalion;

  60th Pontoon-Bridge Battalion;

  67th Pontoon-Bridge Battalion;

  86th Pontoon-Bridge Battalion;

  93rd Pontoon-Bridge Battalion;

  94th Pontoon-Bridge Battalion.

• Armies:

  • 6th Guards Army;

    4th Shock Army;

    39th Army;

    43rd Army;

    51st Army;

    3rd Air Army;

Front-line formations:

• Rifle, airborne and cavalry formations:

  • 22nd Guards Rifle Corps:

    • 90th Guards Rifle Division;

      47th Infantry Division;

      51st Infantry Division;

  14th Rifle Corps:

  • 239th Infantry Division;

    311th Infantry Division;

    378th Infantry Division;

Artillery and mortar formations:

• 64th Cannon Artillery Brigade (from the 21st Breakthrough Artillery Division);

  283rd Howitzer Artillery Regiment;

  376th Howitzer Artillery Regiment;

  45th Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade;

  408th Mortar Regiment;

  601st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

  1623rd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

  1625th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

  183rd separate anti-aircraft artillery division;

Armored and mechanized formations:

• 1st Tank Corps:

  • 89th Tank Brigade;

    117th Tank Brigade;

    159th Tank Brigade;

    44th Motorized Rifle Brigade;

    1437th self-propelled artillery regiment;

    1514th self-propelled artillery regiment;

    108th Mortar Regiment;

    89th Motorcycle Battalion;

    10th Guards Mortar Division;

    1720th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

46th Mechanized Brigade;

15th Guards Separate Tank Regiment;

336th Guards Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment;

346th Guards Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment;

1489th self-propelled artillery regiment;

Air Force:

• 87th Medical Aviation Regiment;

Engineer Troops:

• 5th assault engineer brigade;

  37th separate engineer battalion;

  94th Pontoon-Bridge Battalion;

• Armies:

  • 2nd Guards Army;

    6th Guards Army;

    4th Shock Army;

    43rd Army;

    51st Army;

    5th Guards Tank Army;

    3rd Air Army;

Front-line formations:

• Artillery and mortar formations:

  • 43rd Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade;

    17th Guards Mortar Brigade (from the 2nd Guards Mortar Division);

    46th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division:

    • 609th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

      617th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

      618th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

      717th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

  601st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

  1623rd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

  1625th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

  183rd separate anti-aircraft artillery division;

  221st separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion;

  622nd separate anti-aircraft artillery division;

Armored and mechanized formations:

• 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps:

  • 7th Guards Mechanized Brigade;

    8th Guards Mechanized Brigade;

    9th Guards Mechanized Brigade;

    35th Guards Tank Brigade;

    64th Guards Separate Tank Regiment;

    380th Guards Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment;

    1510th self-propelled artillery regiment;

    1823rd self-propelled artillery regiment;

    1st Guards Motorcycle Battalion;

    743rd separate anti-tank fighter division;

    129th Mortar Regiment;

    334th Guards Mortar Division;

    1705th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

1501st self-propelled artillery regiment;

272nd separate motorized special purpose battalion;

Air Force:

• 206th Correction and Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment;

  87th Medical Aviation Regiment;

Engineer Troops:

• 5th Guards Mine Engineering Brigade;

  9th Pontoon-Bridge Brigade;

  37th separate engineer battalion;

  91st Pontoon-Bridge Battalion;

  106th Pontoon-Bridge Battalion.

• Armies:

  • 6th Guards Army;

    4th Shock Army;

    43rd Army;

    51st Army;

    3rd Air Army;

Front-line formations:

• Artillery and mortar formations:

  • 609th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment (from the 46th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division);

    246th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

    601st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

    1623rd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

    1625th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment;

    183rd separate anti-aircraft artillery division;

    221st separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion;

    622nd separate anti-aircraft artillery division;

Armored and mechanized formations:

• 2nd Guards Separate Tank Regiment;

  64th Guards Tank Regiment (from the 2nd Mechanized Corps);

  377th Guards Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment;

Air Force:

• 353rd Aviation Signal Regiment;

Engineer Troops:

• 5th Guards Mine Engineering Brigade;

  9th Pontoon-Bridge Brigade;

  37th separate engineering battalion of mine detectors.

Home Encyclopedia History of wars Liberation of Belarus More details

I. The offensive of the Kalinin (1st Baltic) Front in the Nevelsk, Gorodok and Vitebsk directions

Having repelled enemy attacks in the Kursk salient area in July 1943, the Soviet Armed Forces launched large-scale offensive operations. In accordance with the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command main blow in the summer-autumn campaign, it was launched in the southwestern direction with the goal of liberating the Donbass and the richest agricultural regions of Left Bank Ukraine, access to the Dnieper and seizing bridgeheads on its right bank. At the same time, an offensive began in the western direction. This created the preconditions for the transfer of military operations to the territory of Belarus and the advance of the Red Army to the borders of East Prussia and Poland.

Assessing the future prospects of the armed struggle, in General Staff The German ground forces, not without reason, believed that an attack by the Soviet fronts in the western direction could lead to serious consequences. In this regard, the Department of Foreign Armies of the Countries of the East, considering the situation in the zone of Army Group Center, emphasized in its conclusions that after the capture of Smolensk, “new operational opportunities...” would open up for the command of the Red Army. Using them, Soviet troops will strive to “break through as far as possible to the west and provide... advantageous starting areas for subsequent operations against the Minsk region...”.

Therefore, even before the end of the summer of 1943, the enemy began preparing numerous echeloned defensive zones and lines. On August 11, A. Hitler gave the order for immediate construction defensive line strategic importance, the so-called Eastern Wall, which was supposed to run from the Kerch Peninsula along the Molochnaya, Dnieper and Sozh rivers to Gomel, then east of Orsha, Vitebsk, Nevel, Pskov and north of Lake Peipsi along the river. Narva. In pursuance of the Fuhrer's instructions, German troops launched intensive work to create long-term and field fortifications, focusing mainly on road junctions and river banks, populated areas and tank-hazardous areas.

In such a situation, the Kalinin, Western and Bryansk fronts, having launched the Smolensk (August 7 - October 2) and Bryansk (August 17 - October 3) offensive operations in August, by the beginning of the third ten days of September overcame the stubborn resistance of Army Group Center and reached the north -eastern and eastern borders of Belarus. At the same time, the armies of the Central Front created favorable conditions for the liberation of the southeastern regions of the republic. The results achieved in the western direction, as well as intelligence reports that the enemy had suffered heavy losses here, was demoralized and had no reserves, prompted the Supreme Command Headquarters to decide to continue the offensive to greater depths in order to capture Riga, Vilna (Vilnius - Note. ed.) and Minsk. But first it was planned to defeat groups of German troops in Eastern Belarus. To do this, the troops of the Kalinin Front had to strike in the Vitebsk-Polotsk direction in order to cover Army Group Center from the north. From the south, moving towards Gomel and Bobruisk, it was supposed to be covered by the Central Front. The Western Front received the task of operating in the Orsha and Mogilev directions.

It should be said that the Headquarters did not have sufficient grounds for optimistic forecasts and setting such decisive tasks for the fronts. They did not have much superiority over the enemy: in terms of people only 1.1 times, tanks - 2 times, guns and mortars - 1.8 times. Only for airplanes it was noticeable - 3.7 times. In addition, during the previous long offensive, formations and units suffered heavy losses and lacked people, equipment, ammunition, fuel, food and other material resources. The situation was aggravated by the wooded and swampy terrain, which made it difficult to maneuver and supply troops, and the onset of the autumn thaw. All this had a negative impact on subsequent military operations of the Kalinin (1st Baltic), Western and Central (Belarusian) fronts.

Back in August 1943, long before the completion of the Smolensk offensive operation, commander of the Kalinin Front troops, Army General A.I. Eremenko received from the Supreme High Command Headquarters the task of developing a preliminary plan for an offensive in the Vitebsk-Polotsk direction. At the same time, it was planned to launch another attack on the right wing of the front with the aim of capturing the city of Nevel. Such actions made it possible to cut off enemy communications on the adjacent wings of Army Groups “North” and “Center”, disrupt interaction between them and thereby isolate German troops in Belarus from the receipt of reserves.

However, the difficult situation that developed at that time in the western direction did not allow these plans to be implemented as soon as possible. The command of the Kalinin Front was able to return to them only at the end of September, when they began preparing the Nevelsk offensive operation (carried out with the transfer of hostilities to the territory of Belarus. - Author's note). In accordance with the plan of Army General A.I. Eremenko, the main role in it was assigned to the 3rd Shock Army of Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky. It was supposed to deliver the main blow in the direction of Nevel, capture the city, and then gain a foothold to the north and west of it in the inter-lake defile. Another blow, in the direction of Gorodok, was delivered by the 4th Shock Army of Major General V.I. Shvetsova.

By October 1943, the 3rd Shock Army operated in a zone 105 km wide. It was opposed by five divisions of the German 2nd Airfield and 43rd Army Corps. Being in a state of defense for six months, they created several echelon defensive lines and lines equipped with trenches, full-profile communication passages, dugouts and wood-earth firing points. The front edge was covered with two strips of minefields, each 40-60 m deep, as well as two rows of wire fences. The total depth of the first strip reached 6-7 km.

The creation of a stable defense with relatively small forces was also facilitated by the wooded, swampy, heavily rugged terrain with an abundance of natural barriers. Nevel itself was bordered on all sides by numerous lakes, separated by several defiles no more than 2 km wide. The enemy dug anti-tank ditches between the lakes, and placed mines and reinforced concrete gouges in 5-8 rows on the roads. He turned the settlements on the outskirts of the city into centers of resistance. The Nevel garrison consisted of the 343rd security battalion, the construction battalion of the 43rd Army Corps, rear units and institutions - in total more than 2 thousand people.

The 3rd Shock Army consisted of five rifle divisions, three rifle brigades, one tank brigade, seven cannon, howitzer and mortar regiments, an anti-tank fighter and anti-aircraft artillery regiment and two field fortified areas. The number of rifle divisions averaged 5-6 thousand, rifle brigades - 3-4 thousand people. It was impossible to carry out an offensive with such limited forces throughout the entire zone. Therefore, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky decided to break through the enemy’s defenses in a narrow area, the width of which was only 4 km. In a short time, in compliance with camouflage measures, essentially all combat-ready formations, as well as all tanks (54 units) and almost all of the army’s artillery (814 guns and mortars out of 886) were concentrated there. In the rest of the zone, two field fortified areas, an army reserve regiment, four barrage detachments and two poorly staffed rifle divisions took up defense.

The operational formation of the army included: the first echelon (28th and 357th rifle divisions); success development echelon (78th Tank Brigade, 21st Guards Rifle Division, one of whose regiments was supposed to operate in vehicles, three artillery regiments); reserve (46th Guards Rifle Division, 31st and 100th Rifle Brigades). Such echeloning of forces and means was determined by the conduct of combat operations in wooded and swampy areas, when maneuver along the line of contact of the parties was extremely difficult, and the need, in connection with this, to continuously increase the force of the strike from the depths.

The transition of the main forces to the offensive was preceded by reconnaissance in force, which began at 5 a.m. on October 6. To carry it out, one rifle company, supported by artillery, was allocated from each of the two divisions of the first echelon. And although the advanced units were unable to capture individual sections of the first trench, their actions made it possible to clarify enemy firing points and identify several mortar and artillery batteries, as well as observation posts. At 8:40 a.m., artillery preparation for the attack began, which lasted 1 hour, 35 minutes and ended with a salvo from two rocket artillery regiments. After this, several groups of 6-8 aircraft of the 211th assault aviation division, Colonel P.M. Kuchma attacked the strongholds of German units at the front line and in the tactical depth.

After artillery and aviation strikes, the 357th and 28th rifle divisions of Major General A.L. Kronik and Colonel M.F. Bukshtynovich went on the attack. Within two hours, units of the 28th Infantry Division penetrated the enemy’s defenses in an area 2.5 km wide and advanced up to 2 km. But the 357th Division did not achieve success: its advanced units were stopped in front of barbed wire barriers by heavy fire from tactical reserves deployed by the enemy command. In order to prevent the strengthening of the group of German troops in the direction of the emerging success and the reduction in the pace of the offensive, the army commander decided to introduce a success development echelon into the battle. At 12 o'clock, the battalions of the 78th Tank Brigade (Colonel Ya.G. Kochergin) with a landing of machine gunners began to be drawn into the narrow neck in two columns, and behind them - the regiment of the 21st Guards Rifle Division, whose units moved in vehicles. In each column, in addition to tanks and vehicles, there were artillery and mortar batteries, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, as well as sappers.

At first, the group's pace of advance was slow due to the presence of wetlands and minefields. In the current situation, a responsible task was assigned to sappers. Under artillery and machine-gun fire, they reconnoitered and cleared the road, moving ahead of the tanks. The battalions of the 59th Guards Rifle Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel N.P. also relentlessly followed the combat vehicles. Chebotareva.

Close interaction between tank crews and sappers, rifle units and artillery, and their decisive joint actions ensured success. By 14:00 on October 6, the mobile group overcame the defenses of the German troops and rushed to Nevel at top speed, destroying retreating convoys and artillery and throwing back the surviving small groups of the enemy to the north and south. The tankers went to the river. Six of them forestalled the 2nd Air Field Division, which was retreating towards it, in occupying an advantageous defensive line, crossed over serviceable bridges across the river and captured artillery pieces abandoned by the enemy at firing positions.

Already at 16:00, tank battalions with a landing of machine gunners, having defeated German units on the approaches to Nevel, entered the city, captured the telegraph, station and bridges. They were followed by the advanced units of the 59th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 21st Guards Rifle Division. By the end of October 6, Nevel was cleared of the enemy. Soviet troops destroyed up to 600 of his soldiers and officers and captured about 400 prisoners.

In fact, the 3rd Shock Army achieved the goal of the operation within one day, moving forward more than 35 km, which was a great success in conditions of well-prepared engineering defense and wooded and swampy terrain. Without giving the enemy the opportunity to restore the position and control of the troops, the army commander brought the 31st Rifle Brigade into the battle. Destroying retreating enemy groups, by the morning of October 7, it expanded the breakthrough to 10-12 km. By the end of the day, the brigade captured the Pechische line, Lake. Yemenets (south of Nevel). To the north of the city, the 46th Guards Rifle Division, brought into battle on the morning of October 8, under Major General S.I., was entrenched. Karapetyan.

In an effort to prevent the further advance of the 3rd Shock Army in the northwestern direction, the German command began hastily transferring reserves from other areas to the threatened direction - the 58th and 122nd infantry divisions from the Volkhov and Staraya Rusa areas, the 281st security division from near Novorzhev. At the same time, large aviation forces were aimed here, which, operating in groups of 20-40 aircraft, began to strike at the battle formations of the Soviet troops.

On the morning of October 8, the enemy brought newly arrived units into the battle with a total strength of at least two divisions. He delivered the strongest blow west of Nevel against the positions of the 69th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 21st Guards Rifle Division. Here up to infantry regiment with twelve tanks supported by aviation. They managed to get closer to the city at one of the sites. However, the further advance of this group was stopped by units of the 47th Guards Artillery Regiment and the 78th Tank Brigade. With their support, the 69th Guards Rifle Regiment regained its lost position. But even after this, the enemy did not give up hope of breaking through to Nevel, continuously attacking for two days, on October 9 and 10.

Having switched part of its forces to the defensive, the army at the same time tried to develop an offensive. On October 9, the 46th Guards Rifle Division liberated ten settlements and expanded the breakthrough to 20-25 km. The next day, her regiments, having crossed the river. Yemenka, occupied the Opukhliki railway station and reached the river line. Balazdyn. The 28th and 357th Infantry Divisions continued to push back the enemy, as well as the 185th Infantry Division and the 153rd Army Reserve Regiment, which carried out an auxiliary attack. However, in all directions, numerical superiority has already passed to the enemy.

This completed the Nevel offensive operation. During its course, the 3rd Shock Army inflicted serious damage on the German 263rd Infantry and 2nd Air Field Divisions, which lost more than 7 thousand people killed and wounded. Soviet troops captured more than 400 prisoners, 150 guns and mortars, over 200 machine guns, up to 40 different warehouses, a large number of small arms, ammunition and other military equipment. At the same time, the army's losses were relatively small - almost 2 thousand people, of which about 500 were irrevocable. In the 78th Tank Brigade, out of 54 tanks, only seven were lost.

At the same time, the successful offensive in the Nevel area could not compensate for the failures of the Kalinin Front in the direction of the main attack, in the center and on its left wing, where the fighting with the aim of conquering Vitebsk. The directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters dated October 16 noted on this matter: “The troops of the Kalinin Front did not fulfill their assigned task - to capture Vitebsk by October 10. One of the reasons for this is the disorganization of the offensive... It is not carried out by all the forces of the front, more or less simultaneously, but by separate armies in separate sectors... which allows the enemy to maneuver with his own forces and create fists for counteraction.” In the October battles, the front lost 56,474 people killed, wounded and missing. Despite this, he was forced to quickly prepare an offensive in two directions at once - Vitebsk and Gorodok.

After the completion of the Nevel offensive operation, the unification of the right wing of the Kalinin Front until the end of October repelled the attacks of the German troops, which they undertook in order to restore the lost position on the adjacent wings of Army Groups “North” and “Center”. Only at the beginning of November did the 1st Baltic Front (created on October 20, 1943 on the basis of the Kalinin Front) resume its offensive. In the middle of the month, his 4th Shock Army, in cooperation with the 3rd Shock Army of the 2nd Baltic Front (created on October 20, 1943 on the basis of the Baltic Front), broke through the enemy’s defenses in a narrow area west of Nevel and wedged into his position at 45- 55 km. However, with formations of the 4th Shock Army reaching the Dretuni area, on the distant approaches to Polotsk, and the 3rd Shock Army reaching Pustoshka, their further advance was stopped, as a result of which both armies, numbering up to fifteen divisions, found themselves in a very difficult situation . They occupied an area stretching for 100 km from north to south and 55 km from west to east, despite the fact that the width of the breakthrough area at the base of the wedge was only 9-10 km. In essence, this group found itself in a huge “sack” and was under threat of encirclement. The configuration of the line of contact between the parties and two years of war experience indicated that the enemy was unlikely to miss such an opportunity. This was also evidenced by intelligence data, according to which he was preparing a strike with the aim of destroying Soviet troops in the resulting ledge.

In such conditions, the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, Colonel General I.Kh. Bagramyan sought to deprive the German command of the initiative in combat operations and forestall it in going on the offensive. To do this, he decided to conduct an offensive operation (received the name “Gorodokskaya”) with the goal of encircling and defeating the enemy group south of Nevel and in the Gorodok area. The headquarters supported the idea of ​​the Front Military Council and transferred the 11th Guards Army to its composition, the commander of which was appointed the former commander of the 3rd Shock Army, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky. According to I.Kh. Bagramyan, this army was supposed to deliver the main blow in the direction of Kudena, Bychikha station, Gorodok, and to meet it from the “bag” - the 4th shock army of Major General V.I. Shvetsova in the direction of Bychikha station. As a result, it was planned to encircle six German divisions occupying defenses in the ledge north of Gorodok and defeat them. Subsequently, the 11th Guards Army was given the task of capturing Gorodok and conducting an attack on Vitebsk, bypassing it from the north-west, and the 4th Shock Army was to assist it, moving towards Shumilino from the north. The 43rd Army was planning to attack from the east towards Vitebsk.

The 11th Guards Army included four rifle corps (eleven rifle divisions), the 1st Tank Corps (97 tanks and self-propelled guns), the 10th Guards Tank Brigade (46 tanks), the 2nd Guards Heavy Tank Regiment (17 tanks) , two breakthrough artillery divisions, two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, three M-31 guards mortar brigades, five M-13 guards mortar regiments, four cannon, howitzer and mortar regiments, an engineer brigade, three separate sapper battalions. In addition, it was supported by two assault aviation divisions and covered by front fighter aircraft.

The army was opposed by an enemy group consisting of units of the 211, 129, 87th Infantry, 2nd and 6th Airfield Divisions. In the operational depths, the German command concentrated the 20th tank and 252nd infantry divisions. According to intelligence data, in the direction of the upcoming offensive of the Soviet troops, the enemy prepared two lines in the main defense line. The first consisted of several echeloned trenches equipped with dugouts, communication passages, wood-earth firing points and engineering obstacles. On the second defensive line there were separate trenches, machine gun platforms, and artillery firing positions. To the east of the Bychikha station, several intermediate lines were created, consisting of separate strongholds located along the highway and railways. A serious advantage of the defending side was the inaccessible terrain, saturated with numerous rivers, streams, and swamps, most of which did not freeze until the end of December.

Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky decided to deliver the main blow in the center of the army with the forces of the 36th and 16th Guards Rifle Corps. In addition, two auxiliary strikes were envisaged on the flanks: on the right - by the 29th and 5th Guards Rifle Divisions, united under the command of Major General A.S. Ksenofontova; on the left - the 83rd Rifle Corps. After breaking through the tactical defense zone, it was planned to introduce a mobile group into the battle - the 1st Tank Corps of Major General V.V. Butkova.

The 4th Shock Army, which occupied the defense in a wide zone, could attract only two rifle corps (five rifle divisions), the 5th Tank Corps (91 tanks and self-propelled guns), the 34th Guards Tank Brigade (24 tanks) and 3 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, although significantly weakened in previous battles and numbering about 12 thousand people. It received eight artillery and mortar regiments for reinforcement, including the M-13 regiment, and three separate sapper battalions. An assault aviation division was allocated to support the army.

In accordance with the plan of Major General V.I. Shvetsov, the main blow was delivered from the isthmus between lakes Bernovo and Chernovo in the direction of Bychikha station by the forces of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps and the 5th Tank Corps. Behind them were the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps and the 166th Rifle Division, intended to build on the success. The 22nd Guards Rifle Corps and the 34th Guards Tank Brigade operated in the direction of another attack.

Due to the onset of mud, the start of the operation was postponed several times. Since dirt roads became impassable, ammunition was delivered to firing positions by horse-drawn vehicles, and often by hand. Every day in the 11th Guards Army, up to 2 thousand soldiers were allocated from each division to carry shells, mines and other cargo. This made it possible to accumulate about 1.5 rounds of ammunition for guns and mortars. However, in the 4th Shock Army the supply of artillery did not exceed 0.6-0.9 rounds of ammunition.

The offensive began on the morning of December 13th. From its first minutes, the weather made adjustments to the developed plan. That day it became warmer, the sky became cloudy, fog fell on the ground, which almost completely eliminated the use of aviation. This greatly complicated artillery operations. In the 11th Guards Army, artillery preparation lasted 2 hours. The fire was quite effective against targets on the front line, but artillery and mortar batteries located in the depths of the defense, as well as strongholds in villages hidden from ground observation, were poorly suppressed. Already 7-10 minutes after the rifle units, supported by tanks, went on the attack, the German artillery opened concentrated and defensive fire. Having captured a number of strong points and trench sections in the first position, the Soviet troops were forced to stop.

We had to organize artillery preparation again and then repeat the attack. This took a long time. In addition, the German command brought up reserves, which put up stubborn resistance. By the end of the day, most divisions and regiments had advanced a small distance. For example, the penetration of the 16th Guards Rifle Division (Major General E.V. Ryzhikov) into the enemy’s defense was only 400-600 m. Only the 84th Guards Rifle Division, Major General G.B. Petersa broke through the first position, covering 2 km in a 1.5 km wide strip.

This development of events required Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky, with the permission of the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, change the plan of operation and begin organizing the entry into battle of the 1st Tank Corps and the 83rd Guards Rifle Division, which was being promoted from the reserve, not where it was foreseen, but in the direction of the emerging success. They received the task of completing the breakthrough of the enemy defense and reaching the Bychikha station area.

The 4th Shock Army operated more successfully on the first day of the operation. After a 1.5-hour artillery preparation of the formation of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps of Major General A.P. Beloborodova, with the support of tanks and under the cover of a smoke screen, attacked the enemy and quickly broke through the first position. By the end of the day, the 47th Infantry Division of Colonel G.I. Chernov with the 24th Tank Brigade of Colonel V.K. Wartkina advanced forward up to 5 km, breaking the main line of defense. At the same time, the 90th Guards Rifle Division of Colonel V.E. Vlasova, wedged to a depth of 3 km, reached the second position. The prerequisites were created for the entry into battle of the 5th Tank Corps of Major General M.G. Sakhno and the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, Lieutenant General P.S. Oslikovsky.

The relatively successful start of the offensive by the strike group of the 1st Baltic Front caused alarm among the German command. At dawn on December 14, it began to carry out counterattacks against units of the 11th Guards Army, attracting up to an infantry battalion with the support of 7-15 tanks from the 20th Guards Army. tank division. Having met their strong opposition, the 16th, 11th and 31st Guards Rifle Divisions, which tried to conduct an offensive in the center and on the left flank, remained at their previous lines. At the same time, they attracted enemy reserves, which made it possible to develop success on the right flank of the army, in the zone of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps under Lieutenant General P.F. Malysheva. Here, two tank and one motorized rifle brigades of the 1st Tank Corps were brought into the battle, which, together with the 84th Guards Rifle Division, by mid-day advanced 4 km and cut the Nevel-Gorodok highway.

The further task of the corps was to strike along the highway to the south, in the direction of Gorodok. While carrying out this task, tank units encountered several enemy strongholds. Trying to get around them combat vehicles fell on swampy soil and got stuck in marshy soil. It took a lot of time to pull them out, and the pace of the offensive slowed sharply. In the afternoon, the army commander brought the 83rd Guards Rifle Division into the battle on the right flank. By 5 p.m., its units reached the rear of the German 211th Infantry Division.

That day, they continued to build on the success achieved the day before by the formation of the 4th Shock Army. Having broken enemy resistance, the 5th Guards Cavalry and 47th Rifle Divisions reached railway Nevel - Town. Units of the 90th Guards and 381st (Colonel I.I. Serebryakov) rifle divisions, in cooperation with the 70th Tank Brigade, surrounded up to an infantry regiment in the large settlement of Vyrovlya. At the same time, the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps of Major General N.B. began an offensive on the left flank of the army. Ibyansky, who covered 1.5 km in difficult conditions of wooded and swampy terrain.

On December 15, both armies, conducting an offensive in converging directions, defeated the 211th Infantry Division. The next morning, the 1st Tank Corps and the advanced detachment of the 1st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N.A. Kropotin) of the 11th Guards Army and the 5th Tank Corps with the advanced units of the 90th Guards Rifle Division of the 4th The shock army united in the Bychikha area. As a result, units of the German 83rd, 87th, 129th, 252nd Infantry and 2nd Air Field Divisions, as well as six separate special and security battalions, were surrounded. During December 16 and 17, after refusing to lay down their arms and accept the ultimatum of the Soviet command, they were destroyed. Only small scattered groups were able to break through to the west.

In general, during the five-day battles, the strike group of the 1st Baltic Front defeated the enemy in the entire northwestern part of the town ledge, successfully completing the task of the first stage of the operation. Thus, the breakthrough throat south of Nevel was expanded to 30-35 km, which, in turn, led to a significant improvement in the operational position of the 3rd Shock Army. At the same time, conditions were created for the development of an offensive in the directions of Gorodok and Vitebsk.

In an effort to prevent the enemy’s Gorodok group from strengthening with reserves, Colonel General I.Kh. Bagramyan already on the morning of December 18 assigned new tasks to the 11th Guards, 4th Shock and 43rd armies. He continued to assign the main role in the second stage of the operation to the 11th Guards Army. She was ordered to take possession of Gorodok, by the end of the next day to reach the border of lakes Losvido and Convenient, and subsequently to liberate Vitebsk.

In accordance with the decision of Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky, the main blow was delivered in the zone of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, to which the 10th Guards Tank Brigade was attached. He had to conduct an offensive along the railway to Bolshoi Prudok (4-5 km north of Gorodok), bypass the latter from the west with the forces of the 83rd and 26th Guards Rifle Divisions and reach the river. Berezhanka. From the east the city was to be bypassed by the 16th Guards Rifle Corps. It was planned that the 5th Guards Rifle Division would attack it from the north.

However, the army spent not one day, as envisaged by the commander of the front troops, but five whole days to complete the task of capturing the Town. The German command attached great importance to holding the city area. Here the defense areas of the 20th Tank, 256th, 129th Infantry and 6th Airfield Divisions were occupied. On the approaches to Gorodok and on its outskirts, the enemy prepared four defensive lines. Skillfully using the rugged terrain, which was replete with commanding heights, lakes and rivers, he offered fierce resistance to the Soviet troops who continued the offensive. Already in the first days, the 1st Tank Corps, which had suffered heavy losses in military equipment, had to be withdrawn from the battle. Only towards the end of December 21, the army’s strike group broke through the first two defensive lines. While the advance of the formations operating in the center of its zone was 35 km, on the right flank it did not exceed 15 km. As a result, it was not possible to carry out the plan to encircle and subsequently encircle the enemy group occupying defenses north of Gorodok.

Fighting to break through the third defensive line, which ran along the southern shore of the lake. Kosho, the Gorozhanka and Palminka rivers and was equipped with full profile trenches, wire barriers and minefields, began on December 23, lasted all day and were extremely fierce, turning into hand-to-hand combat. Unable to withstand the offensive impulse of the Soviet troops, the enemy, under the cover of rearguards, began to retreat.

The commander of the 11th Guards Army planned to resume the offensive at dawn on December 24. However, the Front Military Council decided to carry out a night assault on the Town. The main argument in favor of this decision was that in the dark the main advantage of the enemy - his firepower - was minimized. At approximately two o'clock in the morning, the 83rd, 26th and 11th Guards Rifle Divisions attacked the town from the west and east. German units, after some consternation caused by the suddenness of the attack, put up strong resistance on both directions with fire and counterattacks using tanks and assault guns. After the fighting on the western and eastern outskirts of the city reached its highest intensity, the 5th Guards Rifle Division began its assault from the north. During the night and morning, the enemy garrison was cut into groups isolated from each other. Gradually his resistance began to weaken. By noon, the town was completely cleared of the enemy, who lost up to 2.5 thousand soldiers and officers in battles for it. In addition, Soviet units captured 29 guns, 2 tanks, 48 ​​mortars, 41 vehicles, many small arms and ammunition.

After the liberation of Gorodok, the front troops continued the offensive without pause in order to capture Vitebsk on the move by December 30-31. By the evening of December 25, formations of the 11th Guards Army, having advanced 4-5 km, reached the first (outer) line of defense of Vitebsk, which ran 25 km from it along the line Belodedovo, Sloboda, Borovka, the Zaluchye, Shpaki junction. 6-8 km to the south there was a second line, stretching from Zavya through Gorodishche to lake. Losvido. The third line was installed 5-8 km from the city. German troops especially thoroughly strengthened the roads leading to Vitebsk from Gorodok, Sirotino, and Polotsk. In addition, the enemy command significantly strengthened the Vitebsk direction by transferring units from other sectors here. By December 26, the 3rd and 4th airfield, 256th and 197th infantry divisions, battle groups of the 87th, 211th and 129th infantry divisions, and part of the forces were operating against the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Armies 12th Infantry Division, a separate tank battalion, a division of heavy assault guns, an artillery division of the RGK, a number of other separate units and subunits.

The front had a slight advantage in infantry, but was inferior to the enemy in the number of tanks. In addition, the problem of supplying it with ammunition was never resolved, since the distance between warehouses and artillery firing positions began to be 180 km. The divisions and regiments, having suffered heavy losses in previous battles, were not replenished with people. The combat potential of the front's strike group has significantly decreased, and the enemy's ability to repel its offensive, on the contrary, has increased.

The 11th Guards Army delivered its main blow along the Gorodok-Vitebsk highway, on which the German command concentrated its main defensive efforts. At the same time, in order to mislead the Soviet troops, it deliberately withdrew its units from the northern shore of the lake. Losvido, located west of the highway. After army intelligence established the absence of the enemy in this area, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky decided to bypass its strongest strongholds along the ice of the lake, the length of which from north to south was about 8 km. For this purpose, the 11th and 18th Guards Rifle Divisions, as well as a regiment of the 235th Rifle Division, were allocated.

Without encountering enemy resistance, units of three divisions, moving in columns, crossed almost the entire lake. However, when there were several hundred meters left to the southern shore, they were met by concentrated fire from guns, mortars and machine guns. As a result of shell and mine explosions, the ice on the lake was destroyed, and extensive polynyas and areas of open water formed on its surface. The result of the tragedy that unfolded was the death of virtually the entire group. No more than 30 people were able to escape.

After this, the solution to the problem of capturing Vitebsk by the new year, 1944, was unlikely. And indeed, despite the efforts made, the formations of the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Armies until the end of December 1943 covered only 5 to 7 km in certain directions, after which they went on the defensive. This completed the Gorodok offensive operation. During its course, Soviet troops eliminated the threat of encirclement by the enemy of the 3rd and 4th shock armies, liberated over 1220 settlements, and captured 3.3 thousand. German soldiers and officers, seized a lot of military equipment and military property.

In his memoirs, Marshall Soviet Union THEIR. Bagramyan called this operation “one of the most difficult” among those that were carried out under his leadership during the war. He motivated this by the fact that “firstly, the operation was prepared and carried out in extremely difficult conditions against large enemy forces, which, with purely German scrupulousness, fortified themselves in an area favorable for defense, which dominated the initial position of our troops. Due to bad weather and limited visibility, the operation took place with very little participation from aviation and artillery. Secondly, we did not have a significant superiority over the enemy, especially in the second phase of the operation. The possibilities for maneuvering troops, especially mobile formations, during the entire operation were also extremely meager. Thirdly, the front, having a powerful defensive system in front of it, was extremely poorly supplied with ammunition and fuel. Fourthly, our troops carried out active offensive operations at a time when our neighbors - the 2nd Baltic Front to the north and the Western Front to the south - having failed to achieve success in the offensive, went on the defensive.”

In general, in the last months of 1943, the 1st Baltic Front was forced to conduct an offensive in extremely difficult conditions, essentially at the limit of its strength. As I.Kh. Bagramyan later noted: “The setting of tasks that exceeded the capabilities of the troops in scope was a kind of method, a special technique of the leadership, aimed at achieving maximum activity of our offensive actions in Belarus...”. This caused large losses of people at the front. During October - December they amounted to 168,902 people, including 43,551 people - irrevocably.

Considering further prospects for armed struggle, the Supreme Command Headquarters planned to launch a large-scale offensive in the northwestern and southwestern directions during the winter and spring of 1944. At the same time, the troops operating in the central sector of the Soviet-German front were assigned a supporting role. They were supposed to attract the main forces of Army Group Center and prevent them from maneuvering to strengthen the Wehrmacht group in Right Bank Ukraine. To this end, the 1st Baltic, Western and Belorussian fronts were given the task of continuing the offensive operations begun in the fall of 1943 to liberate the eastern regions of Belarus and reach the line of Polotsk, Lepel, Mogilev, river. Bird. The total depth of the planned advance to the west did not exceed 50-150 km. At the same time, front-line and army formations had to operate in the previous grouping of forces and means, without receiving additional reinforcement from Headquarters, all of whose reserves were deployed near Leningrad, Novgorod and Ukraine.

The immediate task of the 1st Baltic Front was still to capture Vitebsk, which was considered by the command of Army Group Center as the “gateway to the Baltic states.” Attaching great importance to holding the city, it concentrated the 3rd Tank Army on the approaches to it, which included fifteen divisions, including one tank, seventeen separate field artillery divisions of the RGK, six mortar battalions, five brigades of assault guns, two battalions of tanks. Tiger" and two divisions of heavy anti-tank guns.

By the beginning of January 1944, the front united the 4th Shock (Lieutenant General P.F. Malyshev), the 11th Guards (Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky), the 39th (Lieutenant General N. E. Berzarin), 43rd (Lieutenant General K.D. Golubev) and 3rd Air (Lieutenant General of Aviation N.F. Papivin) armies. In accordance with the plan of the new offensive operation, it was planned to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Armies. They were opposed by up to eight to nine enemy divisions. Taking into account the low staffing of formations and units of both armies with people, the Military Council of the Front ordered the creation in all rifle regiments of one assault battalion, reinforced with tanks (eight to ten units), two to three batteries of 45-mm and 76-mm guns, one to two guns 122 mm caliber and a sapper company.

Combat operations in the Vitebsk direction resumed on January 3 with the 4th Shock Army going on the offensive. During the day, its formations broke through the enemy’s defenses to a depth of 5 km and reached the line of the Pestunitsa and Zaronok rivers. Here their advance slowed down, and the next day, as a result of stubborn resistance from parts of the German 9th Army Corps, it was completely stopped. The 84th and 5th Guards Rifle Corps (Major Generals E.V. Dobrovolsky and I.S. Bezugly) from the 39th Army, which carried out an auxiliary attack, also failed to achieve success. Their penetration through the Vitebsk-Orsha highway to the west was eliminated by counterattacks of German units.

Only on January 6, the rifle divisions of the 11th Guards Army together with the brigades of the 1st Tank Corps joined the offensive of the 4th Shock and 39th armies. In some areas they were able to overcome 1-2 km, however, the very next day, as a result of heavy enemy artillery fire, they suffered heavy losses in people and tanks. Thus, in the 89th Tank Brigade, 43 out of 50 combat vehicles were disabled.

The advance of the advancing formations and units was restrained by tank ambushes and individual tanks that frequently changed firing positions, heavy mortars and guns deployed for direct fire, which were widely used by the enemy command. Where Soviet troops achieved success, the enemy immediately launched counterattacks. For example, on January 8, the 29th Infantry Division, Major General Ya.L. Shteiman was liberated by Zapolye, but in the evening German units forced her to leave this settlement.

Until January 18, the divisions of the 4th Shock, 11th Guards, 39th and additionally brought into the battle 43rd armies fought heavy battles. They managed to break through the enemy’s defenses north of Vitebsk, reach the closest approaches to the city, cut a section of the Polotsk-Vitebsk railway and envelop the Vitebsk group of the German 3rd Tank Army from the north-west. But this time the troops of the 1st Baltic Front were unable to capture the city. Army General I.Kh. Bagramyan again had to give the order to temporarily stop the offensive “in order to better prepare and replenish the troops...”.

To carry out the next offensive operation, by decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, troops not only of the 1st Baltic, but also Western fronts. It was planned that their strike groups, concentrated on adjacent wings, would strike in directions converging on Zaozerye (southwest of Vitebsk), surround the enemy in the Vitebsk salient and in a short time complete his defeat. From the 1st Baltic Front, the 4th Shock and 11th Shock Troops were involved in the operation. Guards Army, which were supposed to operate in the previous zones, practically without reinforcement by additional forces and means. Only rifle companies and battalions of the first echelon were slightly replenished with people, and even those were at the expense of the rear and special units of regiments and divisions.

The fighting began on February 3. On that day, formations of the two armies attacked the front line of the enemy’s defense in a zone up to 12 km wide, in some directions they penetrated 5-6 km deep and captured heavily fortified strongholds - Volkovo, Zapolye, Gurki, Toporino, Kislyaki, Mashkino, Bondarevo. On this occasion, the commander of the German 3rd tank army Colonel General G. Reinhardt in his order was forced to admit that “today’s very difficult combat day, unfortunately, brought us a significant loss of territory.” In an effort to make a difference in the situation, he immediately began to move infantry units, tank battalions, heavy anti-tank and mortar divisions, batteries of assault guns, and engineer units to the threatened direction. In the following days, the reserves of Army Group Center also began to arrive here.

After this, the advantage in forces and means passed to the side of the enemy. Real opportunities The 4th Shock and 11th Guards Armies simply did not have the resources to complete the task. Until mid-February, their rifle formations and units repelled numerous counterattacks by German troops, trying to hold the captured lines. Gradually, positional forms of struggle began to dominate in the actions of the parties, and soon the situation in the zone of the 1st Baltic Front stabilized. It remained almost unchanged until the summer of 1944.

Valery Abaturov,
leading Researcher Research
Institute ( military history) Military Academy
General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Candidate of Historical Sciences