Our failures and defeats at the beginning of the war were due to a number of factors. First of all, the power of a country overprepared for war was brought down on the USSR. The fascist regime that came to power directed all its efforts to the development of military production. During the period from 1934 to 1940, it increased 22 times, and the strength of the German armed forces increased 35 times. In 1941, the industry of almost all of Europe worked for Nazi Germany, it was supplied with raw materials by neutral countries. By the spring of 1941, almost 5,000 enterprises in the occupied territories served the German armed forces. Its industrial potential was 1.5-2 times greater than Soviet industry.

The Germans outnumbered the manpower. Using the population of the satellite countries to work in the military industry, the Nazis put a large part of the German population under arms. In 1941, Hitler threw the main forces against the USSR, leaving in Western Europe only occupying troops. In June 1941, the invading army numbered 5.5 million against 3 million. Soviet troops western border districts.

Fascist Germany had rich combat experience accumulated over two years of warfare in Europe. The high technical equipment of the German army made it mobile.

Unlike the Wehrmacht, the Red Army on the eve of the war was in the process of reorganization and rearmament, which was not completed. The Red Army lacked modern types of weapons, which made the troops inactive and reduced their combat capability. Nevertheless, by the summer of 1941, the Red Army as a whole even had a numerical superiority over the Wehrmacht in tanks and aircraft. She was not inferior in artillery either. Based on this, the reasons for the defeat of our army in the initial period of the war should be sought not so much in the balance of forces and means, but in the ability to disguise themselves with them.

The combat effectiveness of the army was significantly reduced Stalinist repressions. According to estimates made by General A.I. Todorsky, Stalinist repressions carried away: out of five marshals - three (A.I. Egorov, M.N. Tukhachevsky, V.K. Blucher); out of five commanders - three; out of ten commanders of the 2nd rank - all; out of 57 commanders - 50; out of 186 division commanders - 154; out of 456 colonels - 401. Such a large loss of senior and senior commanders and in such a short time our army did not carry even during the war. By the beginning of the war, only 7% of commanders had higher education. Most of the repressed knew the art of war and German military organization. In fact, the command staff of the Red Army in their training was thrown back to the level of the end of the civil war. It is difficult to find a precedent in world history when one of the parties on the eve of a deadly fight would have weakened itself so much. By the summer of 1941, about 75% of the commanders had been in their positions for less than one year. In total, 70,000 commanders were repressed before the war, of which 37,000 were in the army and 3,000 in the navy. Meanwhile, it takes 10-12 years to train a major, and 20 years for a commander. Even G.K. Zhukov at the beginning of the war in his training was in no way equal to Tukhachevsky or Yegorov.

The commanders, who had no time to gain experience, immediately found themselves in difficult situation start of the war. Confusion, inability to organize the interaction of troops, loss of control - these are not uncommon phenomena in the first battles. The initiative actions of the commanders were fettered by the situation of general fear and suspicion, by the unlimited regime of Stalin's personal power.

In connection with the repressions on the eve of the war, the development of military theory was suspended. The theoretical developments of M.N. Tukhachevsky, who back in 1936 reasonably warned of a possible war in 1939-1940. in Europe and the possibility of a sudden German attack on the USSR. On the contrary, K.E. Voroshilov was a champion of an outdated military doctrine. The military doctrine formulated in the 1920s with the active participation of M.V. Frunze was practically not revised. Only the theses were put forward that we would wage war with "little bloodshed", transferring it to the territory of the enemy, and turning it into a war between the world proletariat and the world bourgeoisie. Such installations did not allow the possibility of breaking through large enemy forces to great depths, so the army mastered offensive tactics, and meanwhile, in the first months of the war, we were forced to retreat and fight defensive battles. Marshal I.Kh.Bagramyan admitted: “Before the war, we mainly learned to attack. And such an important maneuver as a retreat was not given due importance. Now we are paying for it." Due to the fact that it was supposed to repel the attack of the enemy with a powerful blow and transfer fighting on its territory, more than half of our ammunition, equipment, fuel was stored near the border and in the first week was largely either destroyed or captured by the enemy. The repressive policy caused great harm to Soviet military science. Many leading designers of military equipment (A.N. Tupolev, P.O. Sukhoi and others) developed samples of new equipment while in prison.

One of the factors of our failures is, to a certain extent, the suddenness for the Soviet people of the German attack on the USSR. The people's consciousness was deformed by the attitude towards friendship with fascist Germany. The Soviet press and propaganda presented Germany as a "great peace-loving power." Until June 22, 1941, in accordance with the Soviet-German economic agreement signed in 1940, trains with grain and raw materials were sent to Germany. And although many clearly realized that war with Germany could not be avoided, nevertheless, in the eyes of the Soviet people, the German attack on June 22 was both treacherous and sudden. However, in strategic and tactical terms, this attack was not sudden. Another thing is that the Soviet troops of the border regions, who were not put on alert, who did not manage to take all the countermeasures stretched along the entire border under the blows of the Wehrmacht, were taken by surprise.

Information about the impending attack on the USSR came from a variety of sources, ranging from intelligence officers to some statesmen. Already 11 days after Hitler approved the Barbarossa plan, information was received in Moscow about the beginning of Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR. In the spring of 1941, the intelligence department reported to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, K.E. Voroshilov, S.K. Timoshenko data on the build-up and distribution of the German armed forces among the theaters of military operations. Stalin was warned about the impending attack Soviet intelligence officers(R. Sorge, L. Trepper and others). Information came from ambassadors in England and Germany. W. Churchill warned about the movement of German troops, and even the German ambassador to the USSR Schulenberg hinted at the imminent start of the war. However, Stalin erroneously assessed the current situation, apparently hoping to delay, through diplomatic negotiations, a clash with Germany of a country not prepared for war. He refused to believe the facts. Thus, accurate and reliable intelligence was rendered useless in the wake of an ineffective policy. For the mistakes and miscalculations made by the leadership, the soldiers paid with their lives, holding back the strongest enemy army with heroic efforts.

Answer posted by: Guest

in france, in the suburbs of paris

Answer posted by: Guest

cattail grows along the banks of reservoirs - this is such a swamp grass reeds

Answer posted by: Guest

n.i. Vavilov, a brilliant scientist of the 20th century. Vavilov showed himself as an evolutionist and plant protection specialist.

father Ivan Ilyich Vavilov (1863-1928) - merchant of the second guild and public figure, was from a peasant family of the Volokolamsk district. before the revolution, he was the director of the manufacturing company "Udalov and Vavilov". mother Alexandra Mikhailovna Vavilova (1868-1938), nee Postnikova, is the daughter of an artist-carver who worked in the Prokhorovka manufactory.

Interesting Facts

To the beginning of the great patriotic war The Institute of Plant Growing, founded by Vavilov in Tsarskoye Selo, owned the largest collection of seeds in the world. during the siege, the institute staff preserved the collection in the absence of electricity and interruptions in heating.

In the winter of 1941-1942, five employees of the institute died of starvation, refusing to consider the stocks of cereals as food. in the summer, the scientists planted the seeds under artillery fire.

Answer posted by: Guest

on the banks of the rapid mountain rivers of the Far East, you can meet the mandarin duck. this is an interesting bird with bright multi-colored plumage, as if descended from some kind of drawing. the color of male mandarins is replete with orange, sand, blue, green and other colors. a large painted head is complemented by a neat bright red beak. females are not as beautifully dressed up as their gentlemen - most of their feathers are brown, and their belly is covered with mottled.

tangerines have chosen the taiga of the Khabarovsk and Primorsky Territories - the eastern lands of our country. they are migratory, therefore, with the advent of cold weather, they shift south, to the territories of China and Japan. in connection with their love for trees, ducks prefer rivers and reservoirs, overgrown with forest along the banks. Mandarins are especially comfortable in windbreaks, where there are many shelters and it is easy to hide in case of danger.

on the banks of the swift mountain streams of the Far East, you can meet the mandarin duck. this is an interesting bird with bright multi-colored plumage, as if descended from some kind of drawing. the color of male mandarins is replete with orange, sand, blue, green and other colors. a large painted head is complemented by a neat bright red beak. females are not as beautifully dressed up as their gentlemen - most of their feathers are brown, and their belly is covered with mottled.

unlike most other ducks, mandarin ducks often like to sit on tree branches, and deftly hold on to them, despite their flippers. nests they also have high above the ground - in the hollows of trees growing along the rivers. because of this, barely hatched ducklings are forced to jump out of the hollow with high altitude to follow your mom to the water. tangerines fly quickly, swiftly and like to make sharp turns, which, of course, they can escape from predators. they are also good on the water - tangerines swim well with their tail up, but do not like to dive.

tangerines are monogamous, that is, having met and met once, they are a couple for the whole season (which happens not so often among ducks). the male charms the female with his bright wedding dress, fighting with other males for the right to leave offspring. after the mating season, males molt and lose almost all their beauty, becoming like females. but by the following spring they are again dressed in colorful attire.

in Chinese culture, a pair of tangerines (yuan yang) is a symbol of fidelity and is often found in fine arts as well as in folklore. There is a Chinese proverb about a loving couple: "two tangerines playing in the water." for a wedding, the premises are decorated with figurines of these birds, so that there is fidelity and happiness between the newlyweds. images of bright ducks can be found on the paintings of Chinese vases and other vessels.

The nutrition of these ducks is typical for the family: small amphibians and fish, insects, snails. on the trees, birds can get no less nutritious acorns and seeds, and people got the opportunity to eat in the rice fields. also sometimes tangerines feast on fish caviar and worms.

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany, treacherously violating the non-aggression pact, suddenly, without declaring war, dealt a powerful blow to the Soviet Union. This day entered the history of our country as a tragic date, became the day of the beginning of the incredibly difficult war of the Soviet people against fascism, rightly called the Great Patriotic War.

The military-political leadership of Germany, having concentrated the main armed forces against the USSR, planned to defeat the Soviet Armed Forces and achieve victory within 4-5 months by delivering crushing blows on a wide front and in great depth.

Before the attack on the USSR, the armed forces of Germany numbered 8.5 million people. The ground forces had 179 infantry and cavalry divisions, 35 motorized and tank divisions and brigades, a total of 5.2 million people. Of these, 119 infantry and cavalry (66.5% of all available), 33 motorized and tank (94.3%) divisions and 2 brigades were deployed against the Soviet Union. In addition, 29 divisions and 16 brigades of Germany's allies - Finland, Hungary and Romania - were put on alert near the borders of the USSR. In total, in this grouping of troops of Germany and its allies, there were 5.5 million people, 47.2 thousand guns and mortars, 4.3 thousand tanks and about 5 thousand combat aircraft.

By the beginning of the German aggression, the Red Army had 303 divisions, including 198 rifle divisions, 13 cavalry divisions, 31 motorized divisions, and 61 tank divisions. Mechanized and tank divisions were part of 29 mechanized corps. There were up to 4,826,907 servicemen in the Red Army and Navy. In addition, 74,940 people were kept in the formations of other departments that were on allowance in the People's Commissariat of Defense, including 64,900 military personnel.

The troops of the five western border districts and the forces of three fleets (Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets) had 2,900,000 servicemen. The ground grouping had 170 divisions (103 rifle, 40 tank, 20 mechanized, 7 cavalry) and two brigades. They were armed with 32.9 thousand guns and mortars (without 50 mm), 14.2 thousand tanks, 9.2 thousand combat aircraft, which is much more than half of the entire combat and numerical strength of the Red Army and the Naval fleet.

Attack Nazi Germany found the Soviet Armed Forces in the period of strategic deployment, when its activities were launched, but not a single one was completed by the beginning of the war. The Northwestern, Western and Southwestern fronts, deployed on the basis of the Baltic, Western and Kyiv military districts, found themselves in the most difficult situation. The troops of these fronts took upon themselves the blows of the main groupings of the enemy's wars.

In the first months of the war, the Red Army suffered heavy defeats and heavy losses. Already by the end of the first day of the German attack, enemy tank groups in many sectors of the front had penetrated deep into Soviet territory from 25 to 35, and in some places up to 50 km. By July 10, enemy troops advanced in decisive directions from 380 to 600 km. The Red Army suffered heavy losses. The enemy managed to defeat 28 Soviet divisions and more than 72 divisions suffered losses in personnel and military equipment of 50% or more. “The total losses of the Red Army,” writes G.A. Kumanev, “only in divisions, excluding reinforcement and combat support units, during this time amounted to about 850 thousand people, up to 6 thousand tanks, at least 6.5 thousand guns of caliber 76 mm and above, more than 3 thousand anti-tank guns, about 12 thousand mortars, as well as about 3.5 thousand aircraft.

What is the reason for these heavy defeats of the Red Army. In our opinion, there is a whole complex of objective and subjective factors that determined the difficult course of hostilities for the Red Army in the initial period of the war. “In the historical literature published in the country and abroad,” writes G.A. Kumanev, “there are many works containing the answer to this question. Usually they refer to the huge military and economic potential of the fascist Reich, which in June 1941 relied on the resources of Europe that it had enslaved. Readers' attention is also drawn to the fact that the fascist German army had two years of war experience, was well trained and equipped with the latest technology. The failures of the Red Army are also explained by the pre-war repressions against military personnel, the erroneous assessment of Stalin and his inner circle of the military-strategic situation, the incorrect determination of the direction of the main attack of the aggressor, our insufficient preparation for war in economic terms, the too short peacetime framework that did not allow us to fulfill all outlined plans, etc.”

Among these and other factors that led to extremely difficult consequences for the Soviet troops, the main one, we believe, was that the German army in June 1941 was stronger, more combat-ready, better armed than the Red Army. She gained combat experience in modern warfare. The German army was the best army at that time in Europe. Suffice it to recall that it took the Wehrmacht only about a month for France to be brought to its knees. At the same time, German troops lost only 29 thousand killed. The entire campaign in Poland took only 14 days for the Wehrmacht.

As a result of the occupation of European countries, the Wehrmacht received a large amount of military equipment and supplies. In France alone, 3,000 aircraft and over 3,500 tanks were captured. In total, military equipment for 150 divisions was taken from the occupied countries. After campaigns in Western Europe and Poland, a number of measures were taken in Germany to improve the quality of weapons. The troops were left with samples of weapons and equipment that showed the best efficiency in combat operations. At the same time, a number of manufactured types and models of weapons were modernized, and all the equipment available to the troops was repaired and its resource was brought to the required level.

Note that when evaluating the capabilities of the German army before the attack on the USSR, many researchers pay attention to high level its commanding staff, who in the second half of the 30s received the practice of command and control of troops, the organization of their support in combat conditions. On the training of non-commissioned officers, former Wehrmacht General K. Tippelskirch wrote that the German army "had ... such non-commissioned officers as no other army in the world had - numerous, exceptionally well trained and trained."

In addition, the grouping of enemy forces concentrated near the border of the USSR surpassed the Soviet troops of the Western military districts in terms of the number of personnel by 1.9 times, in heavy and medium tanks - by 1.5 times, in combat aircraft of new types - 3.2 times. times. Despite the large number of aircraft and tanks available in the Red Army, the overall superiority (taking into account all the above indicators) was in favor of Germany by 1.2 times.

The size of the Red Army, as already noted, from 1939 to 1941 increased two and a half times and amounted to more than five million people. As a result, the Red Army mostly consisted of newly drafted youth aged 18-21. Almost half of the Red Army soldiers of the first year of service were recruits in 1941. A significant part of those called up from the reserve during the winter and spring of 1941 did not have time to complete a full course in combat training.

On May 17, 1941, a directive was issued, signed by Zhdanov, Timoshenko and Zhukov, criticizing the shortcomings identified during inspections of Red Army units and formations in early 1941. It was noted that the training, especially of battalions and divisions, is poor in almost all military districts. The middle and junior command staff of many units and formations also received low marks. All military districts inspected for firearms training received a poor rating.

Not all was well with the tank troops. In 1941, a decision was made to create 9 mechanized corps, in March 1941 another 20. A paradoxical situation arose: with almost 19 thousand tanks in the Red Army, only one corps out of 29 mechanized corps could be fully equipped with them. There were few new tanks. Even in the western districts, on June 22, 1941, out of 12,782 tanks, there were 1,301 new tanks (469 KV tanks and 832 T-34s). Of the old tanks in the armed forces of the USSR on June 15, 1941, 29% needed major repairs, on average - 44%, serviceable was no more than 27%.

There were serious problems with the combat training of tankers. The training of the personnel of tank units left much to be desired. Many drivers had only 1.5-2 hours of practice driving tanks. Secrecy forced to master the machine in the dark.

The head of the armored department, Ya.N. Fedorenko, speaking at the December 1940 meeting of the top command staff of the Red Army, said that for last year the tankers were able to work out only shooting from a place, and did not start shooting at all as part of a platoon and company. “Fire training,” he noted, “remained unfinished this year... In tactical training, issues of interaction remained unfinished this year...” , what they did not manage to do in 1940, could not be completed in the next.

It was necessary to replace obsolete aircraft with new ones, since most of the Soviet aircraft were inferior to the German ones in many respects. technical specifications. Of the 6,379 combat aircraft at the disposal of the five border districts, only 1,540 were new designs. Plus, there is a shortage and low qualification of the flight crew, since these new types of aircraft accounted for only 208 crews. Even in the Western Special Military District, with all 1909 combat aircraft, there were 1343 combat crews and 1086 combat vehicles. 64 crews were able to perform combat missions on 242 new aircraft, and 4 crews in difficult weather conditions.

In the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense dated May 17, 1941(underlined - ed.) the following was noted, in particular: “... the low performance in the combat training of the aviation units of the Red Army was accompanied by an extremely large number of disasters and accidents ... The operation of the new material unit by the flight crew was poorly mastered ... The flight personnel for combat use - bombing, aerial firing, high-altitude and cross-country flights - were trained completely unsatisfactorily ... OVO (Odessa Military District. - Author) - two hours and fifteen minutes ... "

The order of the head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force dated the same date indicated that as a result of an inspection of the Air Force of the Western Special Military District, whose troops were stationed in Belarus, in the direction where the German command planned to deliver the main blow, low fire training of pilots was revealed, even on the ground they fired machine guns unsatisfactorily. In July 1941, due to the lack of fuel in the Western Special Military District, flights were stopped in a number of aviation regiments. The Chief Military Council, at its meeting on May 5, 1941, recognized the combat training of the Red Army Air Force as unsatisfactory.

It is worth emphasizing that in the summer of 1939 the Luftwaffe troops numbered 8,000 pilots of a higher rank, who had the right to day and night driving of any type of military aircraft. 25% of pilots mastered the skill of blind piloting. There is no doubt that during the two years of the war they significantly improved their skills and gained valuable combat experience.

This, one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, was aggravated by a number of mistakes, miscalculations, and wrong decisions in preparing the army and the country for fascist aggression.

We note, first of all, the problems of surprise. In determining its role in the defeat of the Red Army, as it seems to the author, an extreme is allowed that does not correspond to reality. Until now, there is an assertion that Stalin, the country's intelligence agencies knew about the German attack, and therefore any supposed suddenness of it is excluded. However, the documents show that, despite the reports of intelligence agencies, reports of diplomats about the imminent danger, Stalin was afraid to give Germany a reason to attack. Only on the night of June 22, when the signals of the impending attack became extremely alarming, did Stalin allow People's Commissar for Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. However, this measure was too late.

The formations, formations and units of the Red Army of the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts (the former Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts) were to fully implement operational deployment, take their starting position to repel enemy attacks. However, this was not done. Of the 75 rifle divisions of these fronts, more than a third was on the move, making marches to a new location or to concentration areas, 20 divisions required understaffing from 25 to 50%.

These and other facts allow us to conclude that there was no strategic surprise, the country, the people, the army knew that sooner or later aggression from Germany was possible. However, there was a clear operational-tactical surprise in the beginning of hostilities, which had an extremely negative impact on the course of the war.

On June 22, 1941, General F. Halder wrote in his diary: “... All the armies, except for the 11th, went on the offensive according to the plan. The offensive of our troops, apparently, was a complete tactical surprise for the enemy ... The complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy is evidenced by the facts that the units were taken by surprise at the barracks, the planes stood at the airfields, covered with tarpaulin, and the advanced units were suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command about what to do ... We can expect an even greater influence of the element of surprise on the future course of events ... "

In discussions about the events of the first days of the war, a special place is occupied by the discussion of the impact of repressions in relation to the command cadres of the Red Army in the prewar years. With a certain degree of conditionality, three points of view expressed in the course of consideration of this problem can be distinguished.

The essence of the first lies in the assertion that it was as a result of repression that the army was beheaded and could not withstand the blow of the German Wehrmacht. Supporters of this point of view refer to the fact that from 1937 until the start of the Great Patriotic War, 40 thousand commanders of all levels were repressed, which, in their opinion, left the army without command personnel.

The second point of view is almost the opposite. Its essence: supporters of the first version exaggerate the damage caused by Stalin's repressions. In total, 36,898 commanders of various ranks were dismissed and repressed. This is less than 7% of the entire command staff of the Red Army. In addition, some of the repressed commanders, about 15 thousand, were rehabilitated before the war or at the beginning of the war. Consequently, they believe, repression did not have such a detrimental effect attributed to them on the course of hostilities.

And the third point of view, which is close to us, comes from the fact that the training of command personnel did not keep pace with the rapid numerical growth of the army, despite the wide network of high and medium military personnel deployed in the country. educational institutions, the opening of military faculties in civilian universities, the creation of numerous courses for junior lieutenants. By 1941, the ground forces alone lacked 66,900 commanding officers (more than all those dismissed and repressed). The shortfall in the flight and technical staff of the Air Force reached 32.3%. It was simply impossible to eliminate such a situation in a short time. In addition, more than 75% of military personnel had no experience in command and control in combat conditions. Their rapid promotion without acquiring the necessary experience adversely affected the quality of military personnel. More than 55% of command personnel before the start of the Great Patriotic War were in their positions for less than half a year, and only a quarter of them can be considered experienced, since they held positions for more than one year.

At the same time, these researchers believe that repressions against the command staff and various kinds of purges had a negative impact on the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. All commanders of the military districts, 90% of their deputies, heads of military branches and services were replaced. 80% of the leadership of the corps and divisional units, 91% of the regimental commanders and their deputies. That is, the trained link of commanders suffered, which was extremely difficult to restore in a short time. The repressions to a large extent caused the insufficient quality level of the commanding staff. At a meeting of the leadership of the Red Army in December 1940, V.N. Kurdyumov said: “The last check carried out by the infantry inspector showed that out of 225 regiment commanders involved in the training, only 25 people were graduates of a military school, the remaining two hundred people are people who graduated from junior lieutenant courses and came from the reserve. In general, by the beginning of the war, only 7% of commanders had a higher education, up to 37% did not pass full course training even in secondary military schools.

The psychological consequences of the repressions were quite tangible, which gave rise to the uncertainty of the commanding staff, the fear of making responsible decisions on their own.

The course of the battles of the first days of the war in a certain way was affected by the erroneous view of the outbreak of war by fascist Germany. “A sudden transition to the offensive on such a scale, moreover, at once by all the forces that were available and deployed in advance in the most important strategic directions,” wrote G.K. Zhukov, “that is, the nature of the strike itself, we did not foresee in its entirety. Neither the People's Commissar, nor I, nor my predecessors B.M. Shaposhnikov, K.A. Meretskov and the leadership of the General Staff expected that the enemy would concentrate such a mass of armored and motorized troops and throw them on the very first day in powerful compact groupings on all strategic directions in order to inflict crushing cutting blows.

“It should be emphasized,” write the authors of the book “The Great Patriotic War without the stamp of secrecy,” that Germany has already used a similar method of unleashing a war when attacking the countries of Western Europe and Poland. There was time to analyze it, take it into account in the training of our troops and military personnel. Unfortunately, this has not been fully done. And part of the military personnel of the Red Army turned out to be unprepared for command and control in a difficult situation. This is one of the reasons for the heavy losses of the Red Army in the first months of the war.

Among other versions of the tragic events of the beginning of the war, there is one openly mocking from the position of blind hatred for the Russian people, Russians, participants in the war. It is difficult not to regard it as a slander on the defenders of the Fatherland. Supporters of this version (I. Bunich, M. Solonin and others) argue that at the beginning of the war in the Red Army there was a "spontaneous, uncontrolled uprising, the army did not want to fight in defense of the Stalinist regime." On a thousand-kilometer front, "... millions of officers and soldiers gave a substantive lesson to the criminal regime, starting to go over to the side of the enemy" (Bunich).

How is this monstrous slander against Soviet soldiers "proved"? The basis for this malice for them was big number fighters and commanders who were captured in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. According to official data for July-December 1941, the Red Army and Navy lost 802,191 people killed and 2,335,482 missing and captured. One cannot but agree that a large number of Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner. But let's pay attention to what this ratio was in other campaigns carried out by the Wehrmacht in Europe during the Second World War. The Polish army, for example, in battles with the Wehrmacht lost 66.3 thousand killed, and 420 thousand missing and captured. That is, for every killed Polish soldier, there were 6.3 captured. The defeated French army lost 84 thousand soldiers and officers, and 1,547,000 prisoners, that is, 18 prisoners for one killed.

A.I. Burlakov quite rightly raises the question: whose army fought more courageously: the French, in which 18 surrendered for one killed, or the Soviet, which lost 2.9 prisoners per one killed? And he emphasizes the obviousness of the answer - the Soviet soldiers defended their socialist Fatherland more courageously than the soldiers of the French army defended their Motherland, which was considered a model of democracy.

But the main refutation of the version of M. Solonin, I. Bunich and others like them lies in reality itself, in the real facts of the Red Army’s military operations against German troops at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. From the very first days of the war, the fighters and commanders of the Red Army selflessly fought the enemy in exceptionally difficult conditions, and put up stubborn resistance to him. In support of this, we can cite evidence of the resilience of the border outposts, the heroic defense of the Brest Fortress, Mogilev, the fierce defensive battle of Smolensk, the defense of the Luga line in July-August 1941, the heroic defense of Odessa.

The troops of Nazi Germany and its allies had never met such fierce resistance anywhere before and did not suffer such heavy losses in manpower and military equipment.

This is evidenced by former generals of the Wehrmacht, German researchers of the Second World War, based on archival documents, reports of the commanders of formations and units of the German army.

On June 24, 1941, General Halder made an entry in his diary: “The stubbornness of the Russian formations in battle should be noted. There were cases when the garrisons of pillboxes blew themselves up along with the pillboxes, not wanting to surrender. A little later, on June 29, he writes: “Information from the front confirms that the Russians are fighting everywhere to the last bullet ... The stubborn resistance of the Russians forces us to fight according to all the rules of our combat regulations. In Poland and in the West we could afford certain liberties. Now this is unacceptable."

General Blumentritt, who served as a lieutenant for two years in Eastern Front during the First World War, said to the English historian Liddell Hart: “Already the battles of June 1941 showed us what the new Soviet Army is like. We lost up to fifty percent of our personnel in battles. Red Army 1941-1945. was a much stronger opponent than royal army because she selflessly fought for the idea.

Here are the statements of the authors of Germany. “Despite the unsatisfactory armament and supply,” writes P. Gostoni in his book “The Red Army,” the Red Army fought for its Motherland, as a rule, stubbornly and fiercely. There was no case for entire sections of the front to stop resisting, outbreaks of panic almost always managed to be extinguished. I.Dek called one of the chapters of his book "The Road Through a Thousand Deaths" "Only dead Russians do not shoot." He writes about the "extreme resistance of the Soviet troops in the Smolensk region", "a city in front of which all the conquerors on their way to Moscow were forced to stop."

It is probably not superfluous to recall W. Churchill's statement. In his memoirs, listing the factors that allowed the Soviet Union to survive in the first months of the war, he called the resilience of the Russian people. He writes: “President Roosevelt was considered a very brave man when he announced in September 1941 that the Russians would hold the front and that Moscow would not be taken. The remarkable courage and patriotism of the Russian people confirmed the correctness of this opinion. Note that these statements refer to facts and events that took place long before the introduction of penal battalions and barrage detachments.

The population rose to fight the aggressors, regardless of class, social status in society, nationality and religion. National spiritual values ​​came to the fore. The war showed the patriotism of the people, who exalted the duty of serving the Fatherland above their own needs, suffering, and losses. Thus, the highest and enduring value of the Fatherland was affirmed.

Despite the heavy defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, the aggressor failed to achieve the implementation of the "Barbarossa plan", the deadlines for the "blitzkrieg" were frustrated. Thanks to the ever-increasing resistance of the Soviet troops, the enemy suffered heavy losses, he was unable to capture a number of the most important strategic centers of the Soviet Union, provided for by the plan, and in the battle for Moscow, the plan " lightning war' was finally buried.

Mikhail Ivanovich Frolov , Veteran of the Great Patriotic War, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Vice-President of the Academy of Military Historical Sciences, Professor

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Comments

28. S. Shvetsov: Reply to 26., Alejandro:
2012-06-27 at 01:11

PS. In that photo - Brodsky. His well-known accusation of parasitism and the exile that followed is, in general, a well-known fact, but one can not know. No reputation impact.

27. S. Shvetsov: Reply to 26., Alejandro:
2012-06-27 at 01:10

You and I were talking about Khrushchev houses, which began to be built - I remind you - from the year 59. What does "after the war" have to do with it?

How to fight the Germans? As in the 43rd, for example. And further. Why were the Germans able in the 41st, but we were not, although there was no less military experience? What kind of lessons could be drawn from the Polish and French campaigns that could not be learned at Halchingol and Finnish? Moreover, we had a brilliant leader, and they had a possessed one, right?

26. Alejandro : Answer to 25., S. Shvetsov:
2012-06-26 at 23:16

"Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side." I hope, Shvetsov, this time you will lay out all your cards and tell us HOW you had to fight against the Germans. For the new tactics of which, it turned out, no one was ready at all. Neither the French, nor the proud Poles. But Shvetsov knows HOW. I kept waiting for you to tell me HOW it was necessary to immediately provide everyone with elite housing after the war, but I didn’t wait. Well, I hope you're a better military strategist than a builder.

25. S. Shvetsov: Answer to 23., Ivan:
2012-06-26 at 21:42

Germany by that time had perfected this organization throughout Europe

And which particular Europe offered more resistance to the Germans than the Japanese (Halkhingol) and the Finns of the Red Army? Or have you already lowered that historical version into the closet, according to which Europe unanimously fell under Hitler, and then fell upon the USSR with the whole European world?

24. : Myth No. 37. Stalin planned to surrender Moscow to the Nazis and escape from the capital in October 1941.
2012-06-26 at 20:14

“One of the most insidious anti-Stalinist myths. Unlike other myths, it was launched into circulation gradually, without direct accusations of Stalin. Start
Khrushchev laid the myth. Very often he was personally exploited by Zhukov, but only in the form of either very transparent allusions to the supposedly "homemade truth of history" or in private conversations. Often used in our time.
In reality, everything was different. Zhukov offered to surrender Moscow directly! Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov, in a conversation with the writer F. Chuev (02/01/1975, see Chuev’s book “Soldiers of the Empire”) said: “Zhukov wrote that on October 6, 1941, Stalin asked him if we would defend Moscow, and Zhukov answered firmly: "Let's stop!" But it happened that he sent General Sokolovsky to Vasilevsky (Alexander Mikhailovich should remember this) so that he in the General Staff would receive a communications center for Western front. Vasilevsky, bewildered, called Stalin about this, and he gave a scolding to Zhukov. Zhukov offered to surrender Moscow, and so it would have been if not for Stalin.
- But this must be documented, - I said (ie F. Chuev. - A. M.).
- How can you confirm? Golovanov answered. - Most of the documents showing the true role of Stalin in the war were burned under Khrushchev. So three volumes of my correspondence with Stalin were destroyed. Vasilevsky will die, Golovanov will die, Shtemenko will die, and no one will know the true truth. But this fact does not in the least belittle the role of Zhukov, but shows how many doubts there were, and with what efforts of the Soviet people the victory near Moscow was achieved. But it is also impossible to compare Zhukov with Kutuzov in this matter, because the surrender of Moscow in 1941 meant much more to us than in 1812, when it was not the capital. Zhukov might not have known what Stalin knew and what became known to all of us much later: with the fall of Moscow, Japan opposed us in the East, and at that time we would have to fight on two fronts at once.
Golovanov's story is confirmed by the speech to the readers of Army General SM. Shtemenko. Here is an excerpt from the transcript: “During the period of the threatening situation, Zhukov's command post was closer to the line of defense. Zhukov turned to Stalin with a request for permission to transfer his command post away from the line of defense, to the Belorussky railway station. Stalin replied that if Zhukov moved to the Belorussky railway station, he would take his place.
The former commander of the Moscow Military District and the Moscow Defense Zone, Colonel General Pavel Artemyevich Artemyev, recalled in 1975 that in response to Zhukov’s request, Stalin replied as follows: “If you move back to the Belorussky railway station, then I will take your place in Perkhushkovo.”
In the first part of Golovanov's story cited above, published by F. Chuev under the title "Shovels" in the book "Unlisted Marshal" (M., 1995), the following is said: "In October 1941, on one of the most intense days of the Moscow defense, in The Headquarters discussed the use of the 81st Aviation Division, commanded by Golovanov. suddenly resounded phone call. Stalin, without hurrying, approached the apparatus. When talking, he never put the receiver to his ear, but kept it at a distance - the volume was such that a person nearby could hear everything. Corps Commissar Stepanov, a member of the Military Council of the Air Force, called. He reported that he was in Perkhushkovo, a little west of Moscow, at the headquarters of the Western Front.
- How are you doing? Stalin asked.
- The command is concerned that the headquarters of the front is very close to the front line of defense. It is necessary to bring it to the east, beyond Moscow, approximately to the Arzamas region (and this, by the way, is already the Gorky region. - A. M.). And organize a command post on the eastern outskirts of Moscow.
There was a rather long silence.
- Comrade Stepanov, ask at the headquarters, do they have shovels? - without raising his voice, said Stalin.
- Now. - And again silence. - And what kind of shovels, Comrade Stalin?
- No matter what.
- Now ... There are shovels, Comrade Stalin.
- Tell your comrades, let them take shovels and dig their own graves. The front headquarters will remain in Perkhushkovo, and I will remain in Moscow. Goodbye.
He said all this calmly, without raising his voice, without a trace of irritation, and slowly hung up. He didn’t even ask who exactly raises such questions, although it was clear that without the knowledge of the front commander Zhukov, Stepanov would not call Stalin.
In the memoirs of one of Stalin's leading guards, Lieutenant General V. Rumyantsev, the ending of the same episode looks like this: “Comrade Stepanov, give each of your comrades a shovel in their hands, let them dig a mass grave for themselves. You will stay in Perkhushkovo, and I will stay in Moscow. There will be no retreat. Only forward. Such was Stalin's reaction.
Firstly, it is obvious that Zhukov made such attempts at least twice - through some corps commissar who had nothing to do with such issues, the second time - through General Sokolovsky. What is called, not washing, so skating with the front line, although he gave others, and in the most rude forms, orders to stand to the death ... Secondly, in both cases, Zhukov, in fact, turned the heads of others, although he was obliged to personally report on this Supreme Commander. Thirdly, the question of the defense of Moscow was then extremely acute, and only exceptional adherence to principles, awareness of one’s special responsibility for the fate of the Motherland, personal courage, as well as purely strategic considerations, which together guided Stalin at that moment, prevented the panic flight of the commander of the Western front and the actual collapse of the front.
According to Stalin's personal driver, A. Krivchenko, it was in those days that Stalin said: "I am staying in Moscow, with the Russian people!" Moreover. In the same days, Stalin clearly said that if the Germans entered Moscow, it would be only through his corpse!
The late publicist Felix Chuev was also a good poet. He wrote a poignant poem related precisely to these events:
Already the ambassadors live in the rear deep,
Already in Moscow, people's commissars can not be seen,
And armored armies of von Bock
They continue to attack Khimki.
They decide at the headquarters of the Western Front -
Set up headquarters east of Moscow,
And the sun is a wound of the Russian people
Burning in the autumn blue...
Already in Moscow responsible persons
They don't understand only one thing:
When will Sam leave the capital -
But how do you ask yourself?
Yes, how can I ask? The question is extremely important
Something you can't put off until later:
- When to send your guard regiment
To Kuibyshev? The composition of the regiment is already ready.
The glass trembled in the roar of the air,
Sparkling in the Alexander Garden...
He said calmly: - If necessary,
I will lead this regiment on the attack.
As for the fact that Stalin allegedly planned to escape from Moscow in October 1941, the myth about this was launched by Goebbels. Why is clear. But that's why Soviet writers repeated this nonsense (M. Padzhev in the book "Through the whole war" and after him P. Proskurin in the novel "Your Name"), the question, of course, is interesting. Because they lied from three boxes. Why did Stalin come to the Rogozhsko-Simonovsky cul-de-sac, where a special train was standing, and in heavy thoughts walked along the platform for two hours, thinking whether he should go to Kuibyshev or stay in Moscow? Soviet writers fantasized great. But what is it really?
But in reality it was the following. According to Stalin's bodyguards (A. Rybin, P. Lozgachev, A. Belekhov, P. Shitokh, V. Krutashev, S. Kashevarov, V. Tukov, and others), the special train was in fact prepared in advance. There is nothing supernatural in this. The security measures of the head of state must be comprehensive and taken in advance. However, Stalin did not come there, he did not see this train and did not walk along the platform, especially since it was not there. Moreover. Accidentally noticing that the commandant of the dacha in Semenovsky - S. Solovov - was transporting things from the dacha somewhere, Stalin gave him a scolding and said: "There will be no evacuation, we will remain here until the victory."
In addition, a special Douglas passenger plane and a flight of fighters were prepared for Stalin as well. The planes were under special protection of the NKVD at the Frunze airfield. However, Stalin never came there either.”
(Martirosyan A. B. Stalin and the Great Patriotic War. M., 2007. S. 361-365).

23. Ivan: 15. Andrew: The same old chewing gum...
2012-06-26 at 17:57

//dear professor and veteran cannot (or does not want to) get rid of that sea of ​​endless LIES..//
Father Ilya rightly drew attention to the rudeness of your comment in relation to the veteran, which (comment) you habitually call "spiritual". Of course, mentioning repression is a guarantee of "spirituality", and the phrase "there is a spiritual answer to this question in circulation" betrays your "spirituality" with your head.
I will pay attention to the incompetence worthy of Father Nikolai Savchenko, mechanically adding up the number of abortions with the amount of profit. The mechanical comparison of the number of tanks is INCORRECT at all. On the battlefields, not crowds of tanks lined up in squares are fighting, but organizational structures scattered in space (motorized infantry, artillery, and much more). Organizational structures, is that clear? Germany by that time had perfected this organization throughout Europe. We didn't even have time to arm ourselves properly. Two wars and three revolutions half a century before and an attack by the most powerful army in the world, to which France, for example, surrendered a month.
And why did older people have "less fear of reprisals"? Obviously the opposite is true. The young always underestimate the danger, the older ones always have more fear and caution. And those young people who died in the first battles were replaced by the same young ones who had reached military age (there my grandfather went to the front in 42).
Bottom line - your post is just a meaningless set of sentences, the main purpose of which is to insult the veteran to whom you should bow at the feet.
p.s. And why should someone (especially a priest) refute your figures, have you proved them? It is with you - unsubstantiated accusations, and not with Father Ilya.

22. Andrey : Swearing is not proof
2012-06-26 at 14:56

Dear father Ilya! Unlike your post, which accused a number of participants in the discussion of rudeness, nothing of the kind was contained in my speech. An unsubstantiated accusation does not paint anyone, especially a priest, and yet not a single one of the figures I have cited has been refuted by you. Sorry.

21. Scribe: 18. Antony.
2012-06-25 at 19:19

SW. Antony.

I know perfectly well what secular science does.
You already said it.
The existence of God is a matter of Faith, first of all, but not of speculative knowledge.

As for the game of "wise thoughts", according to the ESSENCE of the war with Hitler, this was a war with the army of the Antichrist, whether you like it or not, at least W. Churchill stated in his speech in 1940.

And so far, not a single person has been found who has taken Churchill's words into question.
You are the first, not counting the truth of those who are simply silent about this speech, because you are well aware that Churchill said not just the truth, but the Truth.
Absolute.

20. Scribe: 17. Antony.
2012-06-25 at 19:01

SW. Antony.

Absolutely fair.
Science goes about its business - it describes historical events-facts that took place, so let it describe itself, since no one has charged secular historical science with the duty to "invent hypotheses", including on the subject of the essence of war, without saying already on the subject of whether there is a God or not.
Yes, science suffers from this, if we are talking about science, of course ...
It has been that way since the time of Newton.
... like the "equal responsibility" of Stalin and Hitler for unleashing the Second World War.
If you have anything to say, in essence, the Patriotic wars, including number - ready to listen.

It's one thing to describe an object, it's another thing to unfairly point to its ESSENCE.
The last thing is the matter of Theology, but not secular historical science.
A very simple idea.

So, the ESSENCE of the past War is that it was a War with the army of the Antichrist, where in relation to Hitler there are weighty, irrefutable, THEOLOGICAL, i.e. SCIENTIFIC, evidence and not just evidence, but ABSOLUTE TRUTH.
And here a conflict arises - for someone who is trying to distort the essence of the war or does it at all - puts an equal sign between Stalin and Hitler, this rubbish, sorry, "hypothesis", about the "equal honesty" of Stalin and Giler, will have to be confirmed scientifically, i.e. theologically , and this, alas, cannot be done, even by substituting and manipulating concepts.

To the one who, on principle, if I understood you correctly, Antony, holds the conviction that God is in Himself, and earthly affairs are in themselves, I recommend W. Churchill's speech, dated 1940, where Churchill directly points to the anti-Christian nature of Nazism and the war unleashed by them, Nazism.

18. Anthony: Answer to 14., Bondarev Igor:
2012-06-25 at 18:02

So, the theory of evolution justifies sin (consequences and provision of struggle) as a way of survival

The theory of evolution is not even a hypothesis, but a false, anti-scientific myth, composed by interested parties on the basis of scientific facts for the purpose of denying God

"Evolutionism does not explain the observed fact of the unity of the laws of the world, and does not even explain why it is cognizable at all.

Evolutionism directly contradicts the second law of thermodynamics. (Isaac Asimov defines it this way without the help of mathematical formulas: “In another way, the second law can be formulated as follows: “The universe is constantly becoming more and more disordered!” Considering the second law from this point of view, we see that it is said about us. We have to work hard to put the room in order, but it comes to disorder itself, and much faster and easier. Even if we do not go there, it will become dirty and dusty. How difficult it is to keep a house in order, even our own bodies, how quickly everything falls into decay. Even if nothing is done at all, everything will fall into decay, break down, wear out by itself - that's what the second law means). If the theory of evolution is correct, then neither are our daily observations and the calculations of engineers. Moreover, evolutionists need to sue the Russian Academy of Sciences for not considering projects for perpetual motion machines with 100% efficiency.

All constructions of evolutionism are completely unbelievable from a mathematical point of view. So the random occurrence of our set of world constants is 1 in 103,000; the accidental appearance of a simple bacterium - 1 chance in 1,040,000; random change in the desired direction of 5 proteins - 1 chance in 10275, etc.

Evolutionism has no predictive ability, does not allow itself to be refuted experimental method and therefore, even with a stretch, cannot be attributed to the realm of science.

Darwinism (as a special case of evolutionism) is based on a logical fallacy called tautology. The statement: “survival of the fittest” does not carry any information.

Evolutionists' arguments make extensive use of the vicious circle principle. (The breed is dated by fossils. The latter are dated by evolutionary theory, which in turn confirms their age by referring to the geological formation in which they were found).

Evolutionism cannot explain a number of facts related to its “field” of explaining the origin of species (the bombardier beetle, echolocation in bats, the birth of a whale under water, the sundew, etc.), and therefore cannot be considered a scientific theory.
about Daniil Syoyev

17. Anthony: Answer to 9., Pisar:
2012-06-25 at 17:33

Uv.Antony. Here are your words. "Physics does not deny God." Physics-denies. Isaac Newton-no.

I repeat again, but in other words, to make it clearer. The subject area of ​​the natural and human sciences is the created world, the tasks of the sciences are its description and research. The denial or proof of the existence of God is carried out by interested scientists who can put forward appropriate theories and hypotheses.
In fact, in the comments to this article, it is appropriate to simply thank the veteran, patriot, scientist for a wonderful article.
And playing the game "In the world of wise thoughts" is not bad somewhere else.

16. Priest Ilya Motyka :
2012-06-25 at 01:34

I thought the matter would be limited to the old guard Shakhmatov, Slava Tambov and Fr. Nikolay Savchenko. No. New eagles appeared: Artemy and Andrey. Absolutely stupidly and unceremoniously insulting the respected Mikhail Frolov. Comrades, unfortunate historians, what new documents have you introduced into circulation. to draw such phenomenal conclusions. Or you just misread liberal propaganda. The Soviet agiprop was more talented and not particularly slanderous.

15. Andrey : Same old chewing gum...
2012-06-24 at 22:44

It is painful and embarrassing to read on the pages of the respected same old chewing gum, which Soviet agitprop treated us for half a century - perhaps the respected professor and veteran cannot (or does not want) to get rid of that sea of ​​endless LIES, which most of all offends the memory of the heroes of 1941, without feats of which, undoubtedly, there would not have been even 1945 .... Over the past 20 years, many worthy and competent authors have answered the question about the tragedy of 1941 and now it is no longer possible to hide the fact that the Red Army units deployed in the border districts, not only quantitatively, but often and qualitatively surpassed the enemy - only the T-34 and KV tanks, which the Germans did not have at all until 1943, we had about 1500, the number of new aircraft (fighters, attack aircraft) was in the hundreds, not to mention thousands of automatic rifles, which the Germans did not have at all then ... There is a spiritual answer to this question, which can be summarized briefly as the fact that the cadre army, which was largely atheistic (youth and commanders who underwent purges) , in its mass died heroically already by the beginning of the battle of Moscow, and the army that was formed from older people under the leadership of commanders, who had less fear of repression, and responsibility (at least moral) to by his subordinates - much more than before the war - it was to SUCH an army that the Lord granted the Great Victory!

14. Bondarev Igor: Reply to 8., Anthony:
2012-06-24 at 11:50

More precisely, you need both. Otherwise, we won’t understand anything. I’ll explain in simpler words. If you write to your employer, instead of a resume, the history of your relationship with God, he will put you out the door, because he doesn’t need it from you. If you come to the confessor and tell your story career development, he will also be in a state of bewilderment. Science and religion have different subject areas and different tasks. History does not deny God. Physiology does not deny it, like her father, Academician Pavlov. Physics does not deny God, Isaac Newton was of the same opinion. Specific physiologists, physicists, historians can be atheists or believers ... But if the historian starts to argue who was the Antichrist in 1170 in the battle of Novgorodians with Suzdalians - St. Andrey Bogolyubsky, or Novgorodians with the icon of the Mother of God of the Sign, then you can fall not only into insanity, but also into blasphemy.

Science correctly describes the world, but evaluates it incorrectly, since it proceeds from what it has proved in the description of the world.
That is, science is based on itself.
So, the theory of evolution justifies sin (the consequences and ensuring the struggle) as a way of survival. Instead of saying that the struggle for survival is not an entelechy life, and the consequence for its violation (when Adam violated the settings (entelechy) of Life).
In the same way, History contains the same "struggle" for survival. But how should one look at it? Either with the Spirit, or contrary to it. But, the Holy Spirit is one and the same same, but a person- in the image and likeness of God. God, man, Spirit - "elements"
history is not subject to cancellation. And in ancient times and today, these elements are unchanged. But, changes in history are made by the spirit of struggle against the Holy Spirit.
The Spirit is infinite, therefore the History is finite, and in its end sums up the assessment of the beginning of the creation of man and the drama of his fall.
The meaning of History may well comprehend the consciousness of one person. Hence the morality of History.

13. Alexander Vaskin, Russian priest, officer of the Soviet Army : Appeal of Mr. Sergius (Stragorodsky)
2012-06-23 at 17:28

"June 22, 1941
Moscow
To the pastors and flock of Christ's Orthodox Church.
In recent years, we, the inhabitants of Russia, have consoled ourselves with the hope that the military fire that has engulfed almost the entire world will not touch our country. But fascism, which recognizes only naked force as law and is accustomed to mocking the high demands of honor and morality, turned out to be true to itself this time as well. Fascist robbers attacked our homeland. Trampling all sorts of treaties and promises, they suddenly fell upon us, and now the blood of peaceful citizens is already irrigating their native land. The times of Batu, German knights, Charles of Sweden, Napoleon are repeated. The pitiful descendants of the enemies of Orthodox Christianity want once again to try to bring our people to their knees before untruth, to force them to sacrifice the good and integrity of their homeland, the blood covenants of love for their fatherland by sheer force.
But this is not the first time the Russian people have had to endure such trials. With God's help, this time too, he will scatter the fascist enemy force into dust. Our ancestors did not lose heart even in a worse situation, because they remembered not about personal dangers and benefits, but about their sacred duty to their homeland and faith, and emerged victorious. Let us not disgrace their glorious name, and we are Orthodox, kindred to them both in the flesh and in faith. The fatherland is defended by weapons and by a common national feat, by a common readiness to serve the fatherland in a difficult hour of trial with everything that everyone can. This is the case for workers, peasants, scientists, women and men, young men and old people. Everyone can and must contribute his share of labor, care and art to the common feat.
Let us remember the holy leaders of the Russian people, for example, Alexander Nevsky, Dimitry Donskoy, who sacrificed their souls for the people and their homeland. And not only the leaders did it. Let us recall the innumerable thousands of ordinary Orthodox warriors, whose unknown names the Russian people immortalized in their glorious legend about the heroes Ilya Muromets, Dobrynya Nikitich and Alyosha Popovich, who utterly defeated the Nightingale the Robber.
Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of the people. Together with him, she carried trials, and consoled herself with his successes. She will not leave her people even now. She blesses with a heavenly blessing and the forthcoming nationwide feat.
If anyone, then it is we who need to remember the commandment of Christ: "No one has more sowing love, but who will lay down his life for his friends." Not only the one who will be killed on the battlefield for his people and its good, but also anyone who sacrifices himself, his health or profit for the sake of the motherland, believes his soul. We, the pastors of the Church, at a time when the fatherland calls everyone to a feat, it would be unworthy to only silently look at what is happening around us, not to encourage the faint-hearted, not to console the afflicted, not to remind the hesitant about the duty and the will of God. And if, moreover, the pastor’s silence, his indifference to what his flock is experiencing, is also explained by crafty considerations about possible benefits on the other side of the border, then this will be a direct betrayal of the homeland and his pastoral duty, since the Church needs a shepherd who truly carries out his service “for the sake of Jesus , and not for the sake of kusa bread, ”as St. Demetrius of Rostov put it. Let us put our souls together with our flock. Countless thousands of our Orthodox warriors walked the path of selflessness, laying down their lives for their homeland and faith at all times when enemies invaded our homeland. They died without thinking about glory, they thought only that their homeland needed a sacrifice on their part, and humbly sacrificed everything and their very lives.
The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox for the defense of the sacred borders of our homeland.
The Lord will give us victory.
Patriarchal Locum Tenens
humble Sergius, Metropolitan of Moscow and Kolomna"
(Russian Orthodox Church during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Collection of documents / Comp. O. Yu. Vasilyeva et al. M., 2009. S. 38-40).

12. Scribe: "Either the 21st century will return to God, or the 21st century will not exist at all"
2012-06-23 at 13:43

The question of the Essence of the Historical Process is, first of all, everything is a question philosophy of history.
What is the engine of history, what drives history as a dynamic process.

This is how human thought answers this question.

"Ideas rule the world" (Hegel).
"Ideas then become a material force when they take possession of the masses." (K. Marx).
I hope no one will deny that this is so.
However, neither Hegel nor Marx could say anything about the Essence of these "ideas" that rule "this world", moreover, it took nineteen centuries to reach this thought and the twentieth to be convinced in their own skin that that's exactly the way it is.

So, as many as nineteen centuries to think of it and the twentieth to state the fact.

But here is what St. Apostle Paul wrote, two thousand years ago, both in form and in essence, of these most unfortunate ideas that rule this world ...

"Our struggle is not against flesh and blood (against people), but against principalities, against authorities, against the world rulers of the darkness of this age (demons), against spirits (thoughts that this public throws up about their own exclusivity, genius, destined to dominate the World etc. rubbish) of malice (false teachings - "ideologies") of the under heaven ("air" - the sphere of abstract, essenceless ideas - banal demagogy on the subject of universal freedom of equality and brotherhood).
Eph. 6:12.

So, it took a man two whole millennia to reach with his mind what little children who listen to the Words of the Apostle know.

So why do I need this Human Science, which is developing at such a snail's pace, and on blood, and even posing as God knows what wisdom, when the Lord gives me everything and at once, just to accept, not in the sense of containing, but as the Absolute Truth and more did not doubt that.
Do not doubt God, but yourself.
Starting to study history at school, at the university, in the archive, dealing with any specific problem.

In other words, history, as Science, and not only history, can FURTHER develop and must, exclusively as Divine-human creativity, then bear unfalse and worthy fruits.
Knowledge of the Truth is salvation.
Here and now, in this age and in the future.
To the extent due and necessary, for every person and according to the age in which a person happened to be born.

11. Scribe: 8. Antony.
2012-06-23 at 12:59

"If the historian begins to argue who was the Antichrist in the battle in 1170 between Novgorodians and Suzdalians, St. Andrei Bogolyubsky or Novgorodians with the icon of the Mother of God of the Sign ...".

SW. Antony.

The essence of the Historical Process comes down to the relationship of Man with God.
With God, but not with the "antichrist".
The coming of the Antichrist is their relationship, the result.
The case of the Free Will of Man.
A very simple idea.
And the assessment, according to the essence of the event, is not given by a human historian.
Lord.
Head of the Orthodox Church, through the mouth of Her Primate.
And the score is always the same.
Moral or not.
According to Conscience, people acted or not.
Fratricidal war is always immoral.
If a historian goes into this kind of "reasoning", then, in fact, this is an attempt to speak out in essence, however, in your case, an unsuccessful attempt - "from the wind of your head."
From reason.
This is no longer a historian-"thinker", but a "manufacturer of thought" (St. Patriarch Pimen) - a charlatan.
This is the same "mysticism and priesthood".
This is no longer a historian, but a "pathfinder", equal to the current one, busy searching for "seals of the Antichrist" in markets and supermarkets.
Wider-in history...
Such, for example, was Merezhkovsky.
What is the purpose?
This is a matter of judgment, not judgment.
... Thus, he puts in the place of God, making the enemy of the human race equal to God, recognizing, in fact, the enemy of the human race is capable.
The ability to create.
This is what blasphemy is.

As for the inadmissibility of the substitution of mathematics (history) for the Psalter and the Psalter-mathematics (history) and the need for both, for a person, as a Personality and for science, as a result of this Personality of work, these are not my words.
Mikhail Lomonosov, founder of Russian Science.
On what Russian Science stood and will stand.
On the Stone of Faith.
As an objectively existing reality.
And now and forever and forever and ever.
Amen.
Do not doubt.

10. Sergiy Agapov: "... And, denying the Lord who redeemed them, they will bring swift destruction upon themselves."
2012-06-23 at 12:09

In general, when you read about all these shortcomings, miscalculations, mistakes of our command, one gets the impression that in the military leadership of that time there were only former furniture makers or half-educated seminarians. Therefore, I agree with the main idea of ​​the respected Pisar:

Strategic.
Deadly blindness.
Both in this age and in the future.

The only thing I would like to add to the comments of a respected colleague is that after saying "A", he did not finish the following. It is not enough to see in the causes of the war and in the reasons for its bitter failures an underestimation of the diabolical cunning and ingenuity of the forces of Antichrist, we must admit that this terrible tragedy was allowed to us by the Lord. Here, of course, in my opinion, the assessment of these events given by Igor Bondarev is more correct: “It is characteristic that under the conditions of the Antichrist, the West, represented by Germany, had a strong machine of fascism. And the USSR (Russia) is a huge mass of idols and idols…”. We must admit that demonism was rampant on our side too. Otherwise, how can you explain the punishment of the Lord sent to our country? Even until recently. A generation is already growing up in our country, which, perhaps, does not even suspect that quite recently their fathers and mothers had to dismantle the toilet bowls in the altars, from where the priests now take out bowls with the Holy Gifts for them. Let's get rid of "deadly blindness" together and tell our children the whole truth. And here again I agree with the respected Pisar: "This rule knows no exceptions."

9. Scribe: 8. Antony.
2012-06-23 at 11:24

SW. Antony.
Here are your words.
"Physics does not deny God."

Physics-denies.
Isaac Newton no.
Science, as a field of human knowledge, denies.
Man, as a Person, no.
Don't confuse one with the other, they are two different things.
Science denies the Existence of God in Fact.
METHODOLOGICALLY.
It's a matter of worldview.
How science looks at the world and how the One Who created it, the World, science, including.
Who is the reason for everything.
The emergence of science, including.
Your reasoning is superfluous confirmation of this.
The real picture of the World, as it really is, is only partially accessible to science or distorted.

It's not about EXPLAINING the history of the relationship between HUMANITY and God, as you think.
This is not required - every time and on every occasion to expound the Scriptures.
If a person, when applying for a job, begins to expound the Scripture-the history of the relationship of Mankind with God, instead of his own, or starts to figure out who was the Antichrist in the time of A. Bogolyubsky, this person is definitely crazy.

It's one thing - your own ideas about what a person's relationship with God is, in their Essence - another, what it really is.
And what to do with it.

What is the "history of man's relationship with God" in relation to a resume and a job application?
In what way does it manifest itself?
In relation to your neighbor.
In the business with which a person is busy and with the people with whom, together, he does one thing.

No one will ever indicate this in its entirety in a resume, but this is what always and first of all needs to be clarified.

The relationship between man and God is primarily a moral category.
This is a question of whether a person has a Conscience, or lack thereof.
What is Conscience?
It is the Voice of God in the Heart of Man.
The conscience of people is One for All-Christ.

If the employer argues following your logic, not showing interest in WHAT IS THE PERSON whom he hires, he risks hiring a scoundrel or that very "holy simplicity that is worse than theft."
In both cases, he will hire people who do not have a Heart, which means there is no mind.
One "mind".
Not crazy, no, crazy.
Graduates, the employer, in any case -
Badly.

uv.Anthony.
Spiritual side-Moral side of any act is the subject of the presence of Conscience in a person, or lack thereof.

You should not mix the categories of Rational and Moral, all the more so replace one with the other, otherwise you can fall into oblivion, into mysticism, into madness, or simply do stupid things or at best case-write.

Rational, in relation to hiring, is the degree of mastery of the craft.
Accounting, for example.
The moral is a matter of purpose.
Why, the accountant submits a petition for employment.
For what?
This question is always asked and I have seen few people who are able to clearly and concisely formulate the answer to this question, so as not to cause mistrust or confusion.

Why do you want to work in our company?
A rationally thinking person, strictly following the logic of rationalism, must say what he thinks, well, for example ...
"Drink tea from the belly and steal your tablecloth ...".

The answer to this question - "What is the PURPOSE" will depend on whether a person will be accepted for a position or not.
And above all, no matter what anyone says, first of all he will be interested in the Moral Purpose or Not?
Bastards, brawlers, rogues and swindlers, no one needs them anywhere, even if they are "seven spans in the forehead."
Not even professional bank robbers.

Yes, this never happens.
A man without conscience is always professionally short, everyone will be convinced, one has only to dig, which means he is unreliable.
While everything is going more or less stably, you can still put up with the level of his preparation, but as soon as an emergency situation arises, he will let you down.
Do not doubt.

8. Anthony: Reply to 7., Scribe:
2012-06-23 at 05:32

More precisely, both are necessary. Otherwise, we will not understand anything

Let me explain in simpler terms.
If you write to your employer, instead of a resume, the history of your relationship with God, he will put you out the door, because he does not need it from you.
If you come to a confessor and begin to tell the story of your career growth, he will also be in a state of bewilderment.
Science and religion have different subject areas and different tasks.
History does not deny God. Physiology does not deny it, like her father, Academician Pavlov. Physics does not deny God, Isaac Newton was of the same opinion.
Atheists or believers can be specific physiologists, physicists, historians ...
But if the historian begins to argue who was the Antichrist in 1170 in the battle of Novgorodians with Suzdalians - St. Andrey Bogolyubsky, or Novgorodians with the icon of the Mother of God of the Sign, then you can fall not only into insanity, but also into blasphemy.

7. Scribe: 3. Antony.
2012-06-23 at 01:33

SW. Antony.

You see, history is not astrology and does not suffer from providentialism.
In addition, history, as a science, has never set itself the goal of testing the Ways of God.
We are talking about what history as a science understands by the essence of the historical process.

Anything, except for what actually exists, since it denies the Existence of God as an Objective Reality.
This is what it means to be methodologically atheistic, although at the same time a historian, personally, can be a believer.
It is bad both for history and for the historian, since there is no completeness of perception of the historical process, which is possible for a person.
Thus, objective conditions are created for the transformation of history into myth.
Usually destructive.
It is true both for the individual and for the whole society.

P.S.
History, in its ESSENCE, comes down to the history of Man's relationship with God.
Particularly Russian.
Which does not at all eliminate the need to know Russian history well, replacing it with the knowledge of the Psalter, rather the opposite.
More precisely, both are necessary.
Otherwise, we won't understand anything.
In History, and in the Psalms too.
In the XIII century, the Agarians did not attack Rus'.
The Mongols were pagans.

6. Ivan: Thanks to the author for the article!
2012-06-23 at 00:20

Many thanks, dear Mikhail Ivanovich! Everything is written to the point and the way it SHOULD be written about the war, the way those who KNOW write. In such a short journalistic article there are 40 (!) References to sources and what! We have scientific treatises and they write more lightly.
Health and long life to you!

5. Bondarev Igor: Addition.
2012-06-23 at 00:01

It is characteristic that under the conditions of the Antichrist, the West, represented by Germany, had a strong machine of fascism. And the USSR (Russia) had a huge mass of idols and idols in which the Orthodox spirit of society materialized.
That is, the Western idea under the conditions of the Antichrist is fascism. And in Russia - pagan idols, all sorts of ideological cults, but firmly united in a false spirit.
That is, the West deviated into the idea of ​​matter, and Russia into pride. Germany - into the materialization of empiricism, and Russia into a stronghold of the spirit (but false), into deception.
The war changed everything.

4. Bondarev Igor: Cause.
2012-06-22 at 23:44

June 22, 1941 - All Saints' Day.
Indeed, opposite them is the Antichrist.
I agree with the respected Pisar, with one "but".
The Antichrist is not only Nazi Germany, but also the USSR itself. More precisely, the spirit from materialism in the world. Including the USA.
The Antichrist is the common spirit of mankind.
And June 22, 1941 - its apogee.
Liberation from this spirit is Victory 1945.
And we see the alignment of forces. The USSR was freed by the spirit of will, mainly from below, because in this case the command is an attachment to the troops, and governments to the people.
And, accordingly, the countries of the world. In the United States, the people did not fight. But, Germany received the most bitter lesson. She should act most nobly in the matter of the expected spiritual flowering of the mind in Russia.

3. Anthony: Reply to 2., Pisar:
2012-06-22 at 23:27

Strategic. Deadly blindness. And in this century and in the future. This rule knows no exceptions. The trouble, historical science, is that being, METHODOLOGICALLY! atheistic ...

The knowledge that in the 13th century Rus' was attacked by the godless Agarians did not prevent the defeat.
Historical science cannot methodologically take into account the providential factor simply because the ways of the Lord are inscrutable.
Science deals exclusively with facts of a material nature, but this circumstance cannot be the basis for a conclusion about the fundamental atheism and uselessness of science as such.

2. Scribe:
2012-06-22 at 18:48

"Ignorance of God is the blindness of the soul."
Strategic.
Deadly blindness.
Both in this age and in the future.
This rule knows no exceptions.

The trouble with historical science is that being, METHODOLOGICALLY! atheistic, that is, being able to describe, and for the most part, reliably, the factual side of the matter, is not able to transform the "sum of facts" into knowledge.
In other words, it cannot reveal the essence of the war against Nazism, thereby providing the widest opportunities for all kinds of manipulations of facts.

Historical science, in general, by and large, has nothing to oppose to manipulators.
Except faith.
Faith in science and faith in it.
And this, as the practice of the last twenty years has shown, is not enough.
There is nothing to oppose lies, since there is no access to Truth - some guesses, partly true, partly not very.

Of course, neither the Soviet leadership nor the people were ready for the war that befell the Fatherland.
They were not ready precisely STRATEGICALLY.
And they couldn’t be ready, they were spiritually blind, that’s why they didn’t imagine WHO ATTACKED.
And attacked by none other than the "Antichrist".
Just imagine, I.V. Stalin collects, the Politburo and says ...
"Comrades, the Antichrist has attacked us.
What are we going to do, comrades?"

Every Orthodox person knows, and not falsely, the traits inherent in the Antichrist.
First of all, a tendency to pathological lies.
If anyone is interested, they can open Mein Kampf - there are several pages devoted to lies.
It's a whole anthem.
Anthem of Lies...
...and the First Epistle of the Holy Apostle Paul to the Corinthians.
Chapter 13
Anthem of Love.

In other words, a Russian person cannot even imagine that one can lie like that.

Perhaps there is one more thing that needs to be overlooked.
"At equal strength opponents, the spirit of the troops, correlates as three to one.
Napoleon.

So let's multiply 5,5 million, who have two years of invaluable modern combat experience behind them, by three.
We'll get 16.5 million.

So, the 4.5 million army, brought up in the spirit of proletarian friendship for the unfortunate oppressed German working class and not only the European working class in general, was attacked not by "proletarians of all countries", only waiting, as it were, to fraternize, but by the hordes of Antichrist, who does not know mercy.
Not for children, not for women, not for the elderly.
This is already after the war came with whom, and they began to write about the "lair of the beast" in the newspapers, etc.

Stalin, thank God, was, after all, a spiritually educated person.
Russian Orthodox Church, in On the very first day of the war, on the face of Her Primate, the future St. Patriarch Sergius, she gave an unfalse assessment of the essence of events and, I believe, conveyed this essence, in its entirety, to the leadership.
With whom we are dealing, without this, no Victory would be possible.
And thank God for everything.

1. Anthony: Re: Reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War
2012-06-22 at 10:16

During all 70 years that have passed since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, public consciousness has been looking for an answer to an outwardly very simple question: how did it happen that the Soviet leadership, having seemingly irrefutable evidence of Germany's preparation of aggression against the USSR, so completely in its possibility did not believe and was taken by surprise? What is the reason that Stalin, even having received on the night of June 22 from the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District the news that the German units were already occupying the initial areas for an offensive along the border line, told People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov: do not rush to conclusions, maybe everything will be settled peacefully.
One of the answers is that the leader became the victim of a large-scale disinformation operation carried out by the German special services.
From May 22, 1941, as part of final stage operational deployment of the Wehrmacht, the transfer of 47 divisions to the border with the USSR began, including 28 tank and motorized.
Summarized, all versions of the purpose for which such a mass of troops is concentrated near the Soviet border boiled down to two main ones:
- to prepare for the invasion of British Isles in order to protect them here, in the distance, from British air strikes;
- to ensure by force a favorable course of negotiations with the Soviet Union, which, according to hints from Berlin, were about to begin.
In agreement with Hitler, Goebbels published in the evening edition of the newspaper "Völkischer Beobachter" dated June 12, 1941 an article "Crete as an example", in which he made a transparent allusion to the landing of the Wehrmacht soon on the British Isles. In order to create the impression that the Reich Minister of Propaganda had made a gross mistake and issued a secret plan, an issue of the newspaper was confiscated "on Hitler's personal order", and a rumor spread throughout Berlin about the inevitable resignation of the minister, who had fallen out of favor with the Fuhrer. Indeed, they did not let the retail newspaper through (so as not to misinform their own military and the population), but foreign embassies received a number.

“My article about Crete,” Goebbels wrote in his diary the next day, “is a real sensation in the country and abroad ... Our production was a great success ... From those heard telephone conversations foreign journalists working in Berlin, we can conclude that they all fell for the bait"
Read more in the article on the website of the Foundation for Strategic Culture “I look forward to seeing you in July. Yours sincerely, Adolf Hitler
http://www.fondsk.ru...sh-adolf-gitler.html

ABSTRACT

Reasons for the military failures of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War (in the period 1941-1942)

Introduction

The Great Patriotic War lasted from June 22, 1941 to May 9, 1945 and became the bloodiest in the history of our country. Colossal human losses were suffered (about 27 million people), 70 thousand cities, towns and villages were destroyed, huge damage was done to agriculture, transport and industry in the European part of the Soviet Union.

The war ended with the unconditional surrender of Germany (and even earlier - of its satellites), but the path to victory was very long and difficult. But to this day it often remains incomprehensible how it could happen that at first the German troops reached Leningrad and Moscow, later - to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus. Figures of losses of the Red Army in 1941-1942. often terrifying in their size.

There are several reasons for the defeats of the initial period of the war, each of which played its own negative role. Of course, there are many views on aspects of that war, different sources name different numbers of enemy troops, their losses, the reasons for victories and defeats.

The purpose of this work is to understand the reasons for the military failures of the Red Army in 1941-1942.

We will study the first stage of the war (June 22, 1941 - November 18, 1942), find out why the Red Army suffered many defeats, suffered huge losses and retreated inland

1. The initial period of the Great Patriotic War

1.1 Armed forces USSR and Germany before the war

war red army strategic

By the summer of 1941, the German army (the so-called "Wehrmacht") had vast combat experience: the war in Spain (1936-39), the Polish campaign (1939), the capture of Denmark and Norway (April-June 1940 .), French campaign (May-June 1940), Balkan campaign (April-May 1940) In all these campaigns, the German army adhered to the theory of "blitzkrieg" ("lightning war"). Blitzkrieg is based on the close interaction of infantry and tank formations with the support of aviation.

According to the blitzkrieg strategy, tank units, supported by infantry, break through behind enemy lines, bypassing and surrounding heavily fortified positions. Encircled enemy formations experiencing difficulties with the supply of ammunition, equipment and food, are easily achieved by the advancing or surrendered. And this strategy paid off completely. Poland was defeated by the Wehrmacht and conquered in 36 days, Denmark - in a day, Norway - in 2 months, the Netherlands - in 5 days, Belgium - in 18 days, France - in 44 days, Yugoslavia - in 6 days, Greece (after the intervention of Germany in the Italo-Greek war) - in 2 weeks.

The Wehrmacht had at its disposal excellent military equipment, repeatedly tested on the battlefields. After capture European states their production facilities began to work for Germany, further strengthening it.

In addition, during the Second World War, Germany was supported by its allies and satellites: Italy, Japan, Hungary, Romania, Finland, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia. Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Argentina were in good relations with the Third Reich.

Due to the presence of a large number of manpower, many factories for the production of military equipment, the accumulation of resources of the captured countries, Germany was able to deploy the following forces on the border with the Soviet Union by June 22, 1941: about 4 million people, more than 4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more 4 thousand aircraft, about 40 thousand guns and mortars, 600 thousand vehicles.

Soviet troops (Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army - RKKA) also had combat experience recent years: civil war in Spain (1936-1939), battles on Lake Khasan (1938), battle on the Khalkhin-Gol River (1939), annexation of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine (1939), Winter War with Finland (1939-1940). But combat experience in these conflicts was received by a rather small proportion of officers and soldiers of the Red Army. In addition, these small wars revealed serious shortcomings in the system of combat training and command of the Red Army. For example, the Soviet-Finnish war cost very large losses in people and equipment, and territorial gains were very insignificant.

September 1939 in the USSR was introduced universal military service. This made it possible by the middle of 1941 to increase the size of the army from 2 to 5.7 million people, most of whom were in the western regions of the USSR. The production of small arms, artillery, tanks, aircraft, and ships steadily increased.

The share of military expenditures in the budget of the Soviet Union steadily increased: 1938 - 21.3% of expenditures, 1939 - 26.3%, 1940 - 32.2%. The promotion of the army and sports throughout the country expanded (the Vseobuch system, TRP standards, Voroshilov shooter badges). Development proceeded at a rapid pace airborne troops- Troops initially focused on offensive operations, and not on defensive ones.

All this allowed the command of the Red Army to have the following forces in the western military districts as of June 22, 1941: about 3.1 million people, from 45 thousand to 55 thousand guns and mortars, about 13 thousand tanks (of which about 1.5 new T-34 and KV), about 9 thousand aircraft (together with the aviation of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets).

1.2 Brief chronology of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War

On June 22, German troops attacked the USSR from the Baltic to the Black Sea. More than a thousand Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground, many divisions were immediately defeated, and bases and depots with fuel and ammunition were destroyed or captured. Thanks to this, the German troops moved very quickly through the territory of the Soviet Union.

June, Minsk fell, 330 thousand soldiers of the Red Army were captured. Then the German troops captured almost the entire Baltic, all of Belarus and were already close to Kiev. In August, the defense of Odessa began.

From July to September, the Battle of Smolensk lasted, ending with the loss of the city and the capture of about 180,000 Red Army soldiers. In early September, the defense of Leningrad began, and on September 19, the Germans took Kyiv, capturing more than 600 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army.

September began the first stage of the battle for Moscow, in October the Germans captured the entire Crimea and blockaded Sevastopol. The defense of Odessa was stopped, its defenders were thrown into the defense of Sevastopol.

In October, near Vyazma and Bryansk, Soviet troops were defeated, losing more than 600 thousand prisoners. The Wehrmacht rushed to Moscow, but the advance of the Germans was hampered by considerable losses, the heroic resistance of the Red Army and the difficulties of supplying troops on such extensive communications.

In November, the German offensive began to run out of steam. The Red Army was pulling up reserves from the Urals, Siberia, the Far East and preparing a counteroffensive near Moscow.

On December 6, the counteroffensive began. Soviet troops advanced 100-250 km, liberated Kalinin, Kaluga and many other cities, defeated dozens of German infantry and tank divisions.

The counteroffensive was also supported in other sectors of the front. During the Tikhvin offensive operation Soviet troops liberated Tikhvin and reduced pressure on Leningrad; during the Kerch-Feodosia operation, the Kerch Peninsula and the city of Kerch were liberated. Rostov-on-Don was liberated on November 29, 1941.

In the areas of the cities of Demyansk and Kholm, German troops were surrounded by Soviet units, but subsequently released.

However, although the German troops were defeated and driven back in many places, they were not decisively defeated.

At the beginning of 1942, Soviet troops tried to continue to advance (Rzhev-Sychevskaya, Lyubanskaya, Barvenkovo-Lozovskaya operations), but the offensives were almost unsuccessful and led to heavy losses.

And the Germans responded with strong blows in the south of the USSR. In May, the Crimean Front was defeated, and Sevastopol fell in July. The German offensive began on the Don. By August, the Germans reached Voronezh, took Voroshilovgrad, Rostov-on-Don, Kotelnikov, Izyum. On July 17, the defensive period began Battle of Stalingrad, and on July 25 - the defense of the Caucasus.

In August 1942, fierce battles broke out in Stalingrad itself, in the Caucasus the Germans captured Stavropol, Maykop, Krasnodar, Elista, Mozdok, and hoisted the German flag on Elbrus.

In September-October, fierce fighting continued in Stalingrad and the Caucasus. However, the Germans failed to completely capture Stalingrad and Novorossiysk, and they also failed to break through to Baku oil.

The command of the Red Army began to prepare a counteroffensive near Stalingrad, which began on November 19, 1942 and marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the war.

Thus, during the first stage of the war, the Red Army suffered many defeats, several million Red Army soldiers were captured, a significant part of the territory with the main centers of industry and Agriculture. And only from the end of 1942 did the situation begin to improve.

2. Reasons for the military failures of the Red Army in 1941-1942.

2.1 Unpreparedness of the Red Army for war

Preparations for a major war that began in 1939, a sharp increase in the Armed Forces of the USSR, the production of a large amount of military equipment, combat experience gained in Spain, at Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, in the Winter War - all this, it would seem, should have become tangible the advantages of the Red Army in battles with the Wehrmacht.

However, in general, the country was not yet ready for such a total war. Many divisions formed in 1939-1941 had an incomplete strength and were poorly provided with military equipment, moreover, they also had poor command of it. The repressions of the late 30s also had an effect, when a significant part of the experienced command personnel was destroyed, and less competent or inexperienced commanders took their place, in contrast to the German army, in which all generals and most of the officers had combat experience since the First World War , as well as the experience of all campaigns 1939-1941.

The transport capabilities of Germany were an order of magnitude higher than those of the Soviet Union. The Germans could move reinforcements much faster, regroup troops, organize their supply. The USSR had significant human resources, but these resources were much less mobile than the German ones. By the beginning of hostilities, the Wehrmacht outnumbered the Red Army in terms of the number of trucks by about half, i.e. was more mobile. There are also samples that simply did not have an analogue in the Soviet armed forces. These are high-speed heavy artillery tractors and armored personnel carriers.

In general, the German army was much better prepared for war than the Red Army. If in the USSR this preparation lasted less than two years before the war, then Germany began to intensively develop the armed forces and the military industry immediately after Hitler came to power. For example, in Germany, universal military service was restored on March 16, 1935, and in the USSR - only on September 1, 1939.

2.2 Strategic miscalculations of the Red Army command

But, if the unpreparedness of the Red Army for war became one of the reasons for the defeat of 1941, then in 1942 the Soviet troops were already experienced, they had behind them not only defeats and retreats, but also victories (the Battle of Moscow, the liberation of Rostov, the Kerch-Feodosia operation , continuation of the defense of Sevastopol). But, nevertheless, it was in 1942 that the Wehrmacht reached its maximum advance on the territory of the Soviet Union. German troops reached Stalingrad, Voronezh, Novorossiysk, Mount Elbrus.

The reason for these defeats was the reassessment by the command (and primarily by Stalin) of the successes of the Soviet troops during the winter counteroffensive of 1941-1942. German troops were driven back from Moscow and Rostov-on-Don, and also left the Kerch Peninsula and reduced pressure on Sevastopol. But they were not completely defeated, especially in a southerly direction. German active operations in 1942 were also logical in the southern direction - these Wehrmacht forces suffered the least.

The next failure of the Red Army in 1942 was the Kharkov operation, which cost the irretrievable loss of 171 thousand soldiers of the Red Army. Again, as in 1941, the generals - this time A.M. Vasilevsky - they asked for permission to withdraw troops, and again Stalin did not give such permission.

An important aspect of the failures of the Red Army during the winter counter-offensive of 1941-1942. there was a lack of the required number of tank formations, which seriously affected the mobility of Soviet troops. Infantry and cavalry broke through the defenses of the Germans, but this often ended - there was almost no one and nothing to surround the enemy, since the superiority in manpower was minimal. As a result, both "cauldrons" (Demyansky and Kholmsky) were rescued by the Germans without any problems after the arrival of reinforcements. In addition, the encircled German troops in these boilers were supported by transport aircraft, which was difficult to fight due to huge losses. Soviet aviation during the first months of the war.

A common mistake was the incorrect determination of the directions of the main attacks of the enemy. So, in Ukraine the command Southwestern Front led by General Kirponos, they were constantly afraid of turning the 1st Panzer Group to the south, to the rear of the Lvov salient. This led to unnecessary throwing of mechanized corps, and, as a result, to large losses (in the battle near Dubno-Lutsk-Brody - more than 2.5 thousand tanks, during the Lepel counterattack - about 830 tanks, near Uman - more than 200 tanks, under Kiev - more than 400 tanks.)

2.3 Repression in the pre-war period

According to various sources, during the repressions of 1937-1941. were shot, arrested or dismissed from the armed forces from 25 to 50 thousand officers. The highest commanding staff suffered the most significant losses - from brigade commanders (major generals) to marshals. This greatly affected the actions of the Soviet troops in the first period of the war.

The fact is that old, experienced commanders who went through the school of the First World War, the Soviet-Polish, Civil Wars (Primakov, Putna, Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Blucher, Yegorov and many others) were subjected to repressions, and young officers came in their place, often had no experience in commanding large formations, and even in a war against the best army in the world.

Thus, by the beginning of the war, approximately 70-75% of commanders and political officers had been in their positions for no more than one year. By the summer of 1941, among the commanders of the Red Army ground forces, only 4.3% of officers had a higher education, 36.5% had a specialized secondary education, 15.9% had no military education at all, and the remaining 43.3% completed only short-term courses junior lieutenants or were drafted into the army from the reserve.

But even solid military experience could not always help to win. For example, General D.T. Kozlov had been fighting since 1915, but could not oppose anything to the superiority of the Wehrmacht during the fighting in the Crimea in the spring of 1942. The same happened with V.N. Gordova - a long military experience, command of the front (Stalingrad), a series of failures that would have happened under any other commander, and, as a result, removal from office.

Thus, the already indicated reasons for the defeats of the Red Army were superimposed by the lack of a good experienced command, which together led to the horrific defeats of 1941 and, to a lesser extent, 1942. And only by 1943, the commanders of the Red Army were able to adequately master the art of mechanized warfare, encirclement and destruction large enemy forces, powerful front-line offensives (similar to the German summer of 1941).

Conclusion

We found out the main reasons for the defeats of the Soviet troops:

the unpreparedness of the Red Army for war (this includes errors in the deployment of troops, poor mechanization, a large number of obsolete equipment and weapons, stretched communications, lack of such combat experience as the Wehrmacht, etc.);

strategic miscalculations of the command of the Red Army, and, above all, of Joseph Stalin as the head of state (mistakes in determining the date and likelihood of war, constant orders to hold cities to the last soldier with subsequent thousands of victims, incorrect definition of the main attacks of the Germans (both in 1941 and and in 1942), untimely and slow response to dangers and threats);

repressions in the Red Army in the pre-war period, and during the war too (for example, the execution of General D.G. Pavlov and many other generals in 1941) - not only weakened the Red Army, but also became not the last reason in Hitler's determination to start war with the Soviet Union.

But, nevertheless, by the end of 1942, the Red Army was able not only to hold Stalingrad and the Caucasus, but also to defeat the German and allied troops and launch a powerful counteroffensive. Of course, during the war, the Soviet troops still often had setbacks, but such defeats as near Kiev and Vyazma in 1941, in the Battle of Kharkov and in Crimean operation was gone in 1942. Taught by bitter experience, the Red Army marched steadily towards victory. Germany's strategic miscalculations turned out to be more sad in terms of consequences. The Germans underestimated not only the military power of the USSR, but also the readiness of the Soviet people to resist, and also greatly overestimated their capabilities. The strategy and tactics that brought them success in Europe in 1939-1940 did not work in the conditions of our country.

List of used literature

1.Isaev A.V. "Offensive of Marshal Shaposhnikov. The history of the Second World War, which we did not know. - M.: Publishing house "Yauza", 2005 - 384 p.

2.A.I. Balashov, G.P. Rudakov "History of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)". - St. Petersburg: Peter, 2005 - 464 p.

.Lubchenkov Yu.N. "100 Great Generals of World War II". - M.: Veche, 2005. - 480 p.

.Zolotarev V.A., Saxonov O.V., Tyushkevich S.A. military history Russia. Zhukovsky. - M.: Kuchkovo Pole, 2002. - 736 p.

.Shishov A.V. Military conflicts of the twentieth century. From South Africa to Chechnya" - Moscow: Veche, 2006. - 576 p.

.Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Encyclopedia. - .ch. ed. MM. Kozlov. - M .: " Soviet Encyclopedia", 1985. - 832 p. from ill.

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Historians and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War are almost unanimous in their opinion that the most significant miscalculation that predetermined the tragedy of 1941 was the outdated doctrine of warfare, which the Red Army adhered to.
Historians and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War are almost unanimous in their opinion that the most significant miscalculation that predetermined the tragedy of 1941 was the outdated doctrine of warfare, which the Red Army adhered to.

The researchers V. Solovyov and Y. Kirshin, laying the responsibility on Stalin, Voroshilov, Timoshenko and Zhukov, note that they "did not understand the content of the initial period of the war, made mistakes in planning, in strategic deployment, in determining the direction of the main attack of the German troops."

An unexpected blitzkrieg

Despite the fact that the blitzkrieg strategy was successfully tested by the Wehrmacht troops in the European campaign, the Soviet command ignored it and counted on a completely different beginning of a possible war between Germany and the USSR.

“The People's Commissar for Defense and the General Staff believed that a war between such major powers as Germany and Soviet Union should begin according to the previously existing scheme: the main forces enter the battle a few days after the border battles, ”recalled Zhukov.

The command of the Red Army assumed that the Germans would launch an offensive with limited forces, and only after the border battles would the concentration and deployment of the main troops be completed. The General Staff expected that while the covering army would conduct an active defense, exhausting and bleeding the Nazis, the country would be able to carry out a full-scale mobilization.

However, an analysis of the strategy of warfare in Europe by the German troops shows that the success of the Wehrmacht was primarily due to the powerful strikes of the armored forces, supported by aircraft, which quickly cut through the enemy defenses.

The main task of the first days of the war was not the seizure of territory, but the destruction of the defense capability of the invaded country.
The miscalculation of the command of the USSR led to the fact that German aviation on the very first day of the war destroyed more than 1,200 combat aircraft and actually secured air supremacy for itself. As a result of the surprise attack, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers were killed, wounded or taken prisoner. The German command achieved its goal: the control of the Red Army troops was violated for some time.

Unfortunate disposition of troops

As many researchers note, the nature of the location of the Soviet troops was very convenient for striking at German territory, but detrimental to a defensive operation. The deployment that took shape at the beginning of the war was formed earlier in accordance with the plan of the General Staff to deliver preventive strikes on German territory. According to the September 1940 version of the Fundamentals of Deployment, such a deployment of troops was abandoned, but only on paper.

At the time of the attack by the German army, the military formations of the Red Army were not with deployed rears, but were divided into three echelons out of operational communication with each other. Such miscalculations of the General Staff allowed the Wehrmacht army to easily achieve a numerical superiority and destroy the Soviet troops in parts.

The situation was especially alarming on the "Bialystok ledge", which went for many kilometers towards the enemy. This arrangement of troops created a threat of deep coverage and encirclement of the 3rd, 4th, and 10th armies. Western District. Fears were confirmed: literally in a matter of days, three armies were surrounded and defeated, and on June 28 the Germans entered Minsk.

Reckless counteroffensives

On June 22, at 7 o'clock in the morning, Stalin's directive was issued, which stated: "troops to attack the enemy forces with all their strength and means and destroy them in the area where they violated the Soviet border."

Such an order testified to a misunderstanding by the USSR high command of the scale of the invasion.
Six months later, when the German troops were driven back from Moscow, Stalin demanded a counteroffensive on other fronts as well. Few could object to him. Despite the unpreparedness of the Soviet army to conduct full-scale military operations, a counteroffensive was launched along the entire length of the front - from Tikhvin to the Kerch Peninsula.

Moreover, the troops were ordered to dismember and destroy the main forces of Army Group Center. The headquarters overestimated its capabilities: the Red Army at this stage of the war was unable to concentrate sufficient forces in the main direction, could not massively use tanks and artillery.
On May 2, 1942, one of the planned operations began in the Kharkov region, which, according to historians, was carried out while ignoring the capabilities of the enemy and neglecting the complications that an unfortified bridgehead could lead to. On May 17, the Germans attacked from two sides and a week later turned the bridgehead into a "boiler". About 240 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were captured as a result of this operation.

Unavailability of inventories

The General Staff believed that in the conditions of the impending war, the material and technical means needed to be pulled closer to the troops. 340 out of 887 stationary warehouses and bases of the Red Army were located in the border districts, including more than 30 million shells and mines. Only in the area of ​​the Brest Fortress, 34 wagons of ammunition were stored. In addition, most of the artillery of the corps and divisions was not in the frontline zone, but in training camps.
The course of hostilities showed the recklessness of such a decision. It was no longer possible to withdraw military equipment, ammunition, fuel and lubricants in a short time. As a result, they were either destroyed or captured by the Germans.
Another mistake of the General Staff was a large accumulation of aircraft at airfields, while camouflage and air defense cover were weak. If the forward units of the army aviation were based too close to the border - 10-30 km., Then the front-line and long-range aviation units were located too far - from 500 to 900 km.

Main forces towards Moscow

In mid-July 1941, Army Group Center rushed into a gap in the Soviet defenses between the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. Now the way to Moscow was open. Predictably for the German command, the Headquarters placed the main forces in the Moscow direction. According to some reports, up to 40% of the personnel of the Red Army, the same amount of artillery and about 35% of the total number of aircraft and tanks were concentrated on the path of Army Group Center.
The tactics of the Soviet command remained the same: to meet the enemy head-on, wear him down, and then go on the counteroffensive with all available forces. The main task - to keep Moscow at any cost - was completed, however, most of the armies concentrated in the Moscow direction fell into the "cauldrons" near Vyazma and Bryansk. In two "cauldrons" were 7 field directorates of the armies out of 15, 64 divisions out of 95, 11 tank regiments out of 13 and 50 artillery brigades out of 62.
The General Staff was aware of the possibility of an offensive by German troops in the south, but most of the reserves were concentrated not in the direction of Stalingrad and the Caucasus, but near Moscow. This strategy led to the success of the German army in the southern direction.

On the same topic:

The main reasons why the Red Army failed in 1941 How the Red Army defended the Brest Fortress in 1941

Alarming reports of an impending German attack came from everywhere:

In March 1941, intelligence officer Richard Sorge (who worked in Japan as a German journalist) reported on the possible timing of the attack.

Radiograms from Soviet ships from foreign ports.

Pro-Soviet citizens of Poland, Hungary, Romania reported.

Information from diplomats and ambassadors.

Messages from border districts.

from other scouts.

But Stalin ignored these messages, because he was afraid of provocations from England, sought to maintain an alliance with Hitler, believed that Germany would not fight the USSR on 2 fronts and first defeat England. June 14, 1941 - A special TASS report appeared stating that all rumors about a war with Germany were lies. The troops were not put on alert, although Zhukov, in January 1941, appointed chief General Staff insisted on it.

The Great Patriotic War has begun June 22, 1941 year at 4 o'clock in the morning. The German attack was sudden. This provided an advantage. German aviation dominated the air - bombing attacks were carried out to a depth of 400 kilometers, 60 airfields were bombed, 1200 aircraft were destroyed on the first day (800 on the ground). The Soviet command did not have a clear idea of ​​the scale of the invasion, conflicting directives were issued.

The Germans developed the offensive in accordance with the Barbarossa plan in three directions:

Army Group North advanced on the Baltic states and Leningrad - by July 10 it had advanced 500 kilometers.

Army Group "Center" advanced on Moscow, advanced 600 kilometers.

Army Group "South" - to Kyiv, advanced 300 kilometers.

Our army suffered huge losses, the ratio of losses was 1: 8, about 3 million were captured, out of 170 divisions, 28 were completely defeated, 70 lost up to half of their composition. The situation was catastrophic. But everywhere the Germans met with desperate resistance. The frontier outposts were the first to take the blow of the enemy - the outpost of Lieutenant Lopatin fought for 11 days, the Brest Fortress, rams in the air, an oncoming tank battle near Rovno for 1 month.

When the situation cleared up, strategic defense plan.

Major defensive battles unfolded in all three directions:

June - August - the defense of Tallinn - the main base of the Baltic Fleet.

Mogilev defended for 23 days.

July 10 - September 10 - the defense of Smolensk (on September 5, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe city of Yelnya, Zhukov managed to organize a counteroffensive, the Soviet guard was born).

Kyiv defended for 2 months.

Odessa defended for 73 days.

250 days - the defense of Sevastopol (the losses of the Germans are greater than during the capture of Europe).

Thus, despite huge losses, the Red Army is waging stubborn defensive battles. Hitler focuses his main forces on the central direction.

Urgent measures are being taken to organize a rebuff to the enemy:

1. A general military mobilization of men born in 1905-1918 has been announced. This allowed 5.5 million people to be drafted into the army by July 1.

2. Martial law has been introduced in western regions countries.

3. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was formed (Stalin, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Shaposhnikov, Timoshenko, Zhukov).

4. June 24 - a special council for evacuation was created (headed by Shvernik, 1.5 thousand enterprises and 10 million people were evacuated in 6 months).

5. On August 8, Stalin was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief and People's Commissar of Defense (+ from May 5 he headed the government + head of the party).

6. GKO was created - to manage the activities of all government departments and institutions in a war.

7. Detachments of the people's militia are being formed.

8. The mobilization national economic plan for the 4th quarter of 1941 was approved, according to which:

Enterprises were transferred to the production of military products.

Enterprises from threatening areas were evacuated to the east, to the Urals and Central Asia.

The population was involved in the construction of defensive lines.

An 11-hour working day was introduced, holidays were canceled, and mandatory overtime work was introduced.

9. The call of the country's leadership to deploy various forms socialist competition, to raise funds for the defense fund, to donate.

The war becomes domestic, the enthusiasm of the people in organizing a rebuff to the enemy is clearly manifested: participation in the construction of defensive structures, joining the destruction battalions to fight saboteurs, in civil uprising, volunteers in the ranks of the Red Army, duty to help air defense, fundraising and things for the defense fund.

Results of the initial period of the war:

A loss vast territory(Baltic states, part of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, a number of regions of Russia).

Huge casualties in the army and among the civilian population.

Economic problems - the loss of areas with large enterprises of various industries and agricultural production, the process of evacuation of enterprises.

Urgent measures are being taken to organize a rebuff to the enemy.

The mood of the German soldiers has changed (the war in Russia is not a walk around Europe).

Causes of failures in the initial period of the war:

1. The suddenness of the attack for the army, not brought to full combat readiness, and for the population, confident that in the near future there will be no war with Germany.

2. The superiority of the German army (in terms of numbers, in technology, in combat experience, in the quality of officer cadres, there were plans, allies, a huge economic potential was involved, intelligence work).

3. The miscalculations of the high command and Stalin personally:

Incorrect timing of the attack,

Ignored intelligence data and reports of a possible outbreak of war,

Mistaken military doctrine

The direction of the main blow is incorrectly determined.

4. Low professional level officer cadres (due to repression).

5. The incompleteness of the process of reorganizing the army and re-equipping the army, building defensive fortifications on the western borders.

6. The need to keep large armed forces in the Far East (against Japan), in the south (against Turkey and Iran), in the northwest (against Finland) and in the Gulag (to protect prisoners).

Thus, in the initial period, the war is developing extremely unsuccessfully for the USSR, it is difficult to turn the tide, but everything possible is being done for this.

Synopsis on the history of Russia

June 22, 1941. Nazi Germany and its allies launched a carefully prepared blow against the Soviet Union. The peaceful work of the Soviet people was interrupted. Has come new period in life Soviet state- the period of the Great Patriotic War.

Goals and nature of the Great Patriotic War.

Germany in this war pursued the following goals:

Class - the destruction of the USSR as a state, and communism as an ideology;

Imperialist - the achievement of world domination;

Economic - robbery of the national wealth of the USSR;

Racist, misanthropic - the destruction of most of the Soviet people and the transformation of the remaining into slaves.

The goals of the Great Patriotic War of the USSR were:

Defense of the Fatherland, freedom and independence of the Motherland;

Assistance to the peoples of the world in liberation from the fascist yoke;

The elimination of fascism and the creation of conditions that exclude the possibility of aggression from German soil in the future.

Its nature followed naturally from the aims of the war. On the part of Germany, it was an unjust, predatory and criminal war. On the part of the USSR - liberation and fair.

Periodization of the Great Patriotic War.

June 1941 - November 1942 - the period of mobilization of all forces and means to repulse the enemy.

November 1942 - December 1943 - the period of a radical turning point in the war.

January 1944 - May 1945 - the period of the victorious conclusion of the war in Europe.

Causes of the defeats of the Red Army in the first period of the war:

Gross miscalculations of the country's leadership in assessing the real military situation;

Insufficient professional training a significant part of the command cadres of the Red Army;

Weakening of the country's defense capability and the combat capability of the Red Army by unjustified repressions against the leading cadres of the country's armed forces;

miscalculations of a military-strategic nature;

The advantage of Germany over the USSR in economic potential;

Significant superiority of Germany in the actual military. Its army was fully mobilized and deployed, equipped with modern means of combat, and had two years of experience in combat operations. However, in Soviet army work on its technical equipment has not ended. The balance of power on the eve of the war.

Germany and its allies: 190 divisions (153 + 37) = 5.5 million people, 4300 tanks, 4500 aircraft, 47 thousand guns and mortars and 192 ships of the main classes. Allies of Germany: Hungary, Romania, Finland, Italy, Slovakia. USSR: 179 divisions = 3 million people, 8800 tanks, 8700 aircraft, 38 thousand guns and mortars. The fleets of the Soviet armed forces consisted of 182 ships of the main classes and 1400 combat aircraft.

And although the Soviet troops had superiority in tanks and aviation, they were still inferior to the enemy in terms of quality.

German offensive strategy.

In accordance with the strategy of "blitzkrieg" it was planned to invade powerful groupings of tank formations and aviation, in cooperation with the ground forces, advancing in the direction of Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev, to surround and destroy the main forces of the Soviet troops of the border districts, within 3-5 months to reach line Arkhangelsk - r. Volga - Astrakhan. To solve this problem, several army groups were created. Army Group "North" was advancing in the direction of the Baltic, Pskov and Leningrad. Commander - Field Marshal W. von Leeb. Army Group Center operated along the lines of Bialystok, Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow. Commander - Field Marshal F. von Bock. Army Group "South" strikes at Western Ukraine, captures Kyiv, then advances on Kharkov, Donbass, Crimea. Commander - Field Marshal G. von Runstedt. The German army of Norway acted in the direction of Murmansk. Two Romanian armies and a Hungarian army corps also joined the fighting.

mobilization activities.

A) Creation supreme bodies national defense control.

June 23, 1941 - the Headquarters of the High Command was created, which on August 8 is transformed into the Headquarters of the High Command. It included People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko (chairman), Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Kuznetsov. General mobilization was declared in the country, and martial law was introduced throughout the European part.

June 30, 1941 - the State Defense Committee (GKO) was formed, endowed with full state, military and party power. It included Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Beria, Kaganovich, later Voznesensky, Mikoyan, Bulganin were introduced. Stalin became the chairman of the GKO. In addition, on July 19, he took the post of People's Commissar of Defense, and on August 8, he accepted the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army and the Navy.

B) A directive letter from the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions dated June 29, 1941. The letter prescribed the following order:

Ensuring the work of the rear for the front;

Organization of resistance in the occupied territory.

July 3, 1941 - Stalin's address to the people on the radio, where for the first time it was openly declared about the mortal threat hanging over the country, and contained an appeal to all citizens of the country to save the Fatherland.

Detailed solution paragraph § 26–27 on history for students in grade 11, authors Danilov D.D., Petrovich V.G., Belichenko D.Yu., Selinov P.I., Antonov V.M., Kuznetsov A.V. Basic and advanced level 2016

GENERAL EDUCATIONAL MATERIAL

These points of view differ from each other in the following: the reasons for the defeats of the Red Army

Formulate the problem and compare your version with the authors' version.

What are the reasons for the defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War?

REPEATING THE REQUIRED KNOWLEDGE

List the main events that led humanity to the beginning of a global conflict in the late 1930s.

Versailles-Washington System of International Relations

The economic crisis contributed to the radicalization (the use of tough drastic measures) of many political regimes

Aggressive plans and distrust of each other between "Western democracies", fascist dictatorships and the communist Soviet Union.

Immediate events that led to the war:

1936 entry of German troops into the Rhine demilitarized zone

Treaty of Union between Germany and Italy (Berlin-Rome Axis); "Anti-Comintern Pact" of Germany and Japan

1937 - the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).

1938 - victory of Franco's fascists in civil war in Spain.

Accession ("Anschluss") of Austria to Germany.

summer - Germany's demand to Czechoslovakia to transfer the border territories inhabited by Germans.

September - Munich agreement of England, France and Germany on the transfer of the last part of Czechoslovakia. The USSR is ready to defend Czechoslovakia, but Poland does not allow troops to pass through its territory. The Czechoslovaks allow the Germans to occupy the border areas.

March 10 - Stalin at the Congress of the CPSU (b) accuses England and France of provoking the war, says that the USSR is ready to "continue to pursue a policy of peace and strengthening business ties with all countries." Ribbentrop in Germany takes this as an invitation to negotiate.

March 15 - German occupation of all of Czechoslovakia (violation of the Munich agreements without the reaction of England and France).

March 21 - Germany demands from Poland to transfer the lands inhabited by the Germans and "pursue a joint anti-Soviet policy."

May 17-22 - the beginning of the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict on the river Khalkhin Gol in Mongolia (until August 1939)

August 23 - signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact (Molotov-Ribbentrop pact) and secret protocols to it on the division of spheres of influence in Europe.

What are the main measures to prepare the USSR for entry into the war in 1939–1941?

Army modernization

Industrialization of the economy

Conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact between the USSR and Germany

Accession of the territories of Belarus, the Baltic states, Poland in order to push the western borders of the USSR

Large-scale redeployment of troops to the western borders

1. By May-June 1941, fascist Germany, with the help of its allies (Italy, Hungary, Romania, Finland), concentrated 190 divisions on the borders of the USSR - 5.5 million soldiers and officers. The USSR had 170 divisions - 2.9 million fighters - in five military districts bordering Germany. But yielding to the Germans in strategic directions in manpower by almost 2 times, the divisions of the Red Army significantly surpassed the invading army in the quantity and quality of tanks, aircraft, were not inferior in artillery, the provision of troops with other equipment.

2. A feature of the administrative-command system with a totalitarian basis that existed at that time was its rigid pyramidal structure. In other words, all fateful decisions were made by one person - I.V. Stalin. For a long time, he did not respond to conflicting intelligence reports, considering them to be English disinformation or provocations by German generals. According to the most common version explaining this behavior, Stalin tried by any means to delay the start of hostilities.

3. Only in June 1941 did the Soviet leadership (primarily in the military) realize that a German attack was inevitable. Secretly, under the guise of military training, the conscription of reservists (previously trained fighters) into the army began. A large-scale redeployment of troops to the western borders was launched. On June 21, in the evening, a directive was sent to the places on bringing the personnel of the units on combat readiness and possible provocations from the German side. But not all military units even managed to receive this directive: German sabotage units "Brandenburg-800", dressed in Soviet military uniform, penetrated the territory of military camps, cut telephone lines. In the early morning of June 22, 1941, an air raid began on border towns, fortified areas, and communication facilities.

4. The German invasion took many Soviet military units by surprise; in the very first days, the control of units, communication between them, the supply of ammunition, fuel, etc. was disrupted. Evidence of both courageous resistance and panic, confusion of commanders and fighters has been preserved. Contradictory orders forced tank and motorized rifle divisions to make grueling marches. The equipment that malfunctioned and stalled was simply abandoned, in some parts up to 80% of the losses were non-combat. In the first days of the fighting, the Germans managed to ensure complete air supremacy.

5. Middle-level commanders acted ineptly and without initiative, trying with all their might not to take responsibility; mass surrender became the norm (the German command spoke of more than 3 million prisoners of war in 1941).

Make a conclusion: why at the initial stage of the war (1941–1942) did the USSR suffer terrible defeats and suffered huge losses?

Conclusion: at the initial stage of the war (1941-1942), the USSR suffered terrible defeats and suffered huge losses because the country's leadership did not believe in the German attack, the German army had a numerical superiority, the attack caught the border troops by surprise, inexperience and lack of professionalism officers The Red Army, silence until July 3, Stalin, who gave the main orders. Nevertheless, fascist Germany did not succeed in the blitzkrieg plan, the Soviet society retained and increased the possibilities for resistance.

Analyze the events of 1942 and draw a conclusion: why did the USSR suffer terrible defeats and huge losses at the initial stage of the war (1941-1942)?

Conclusion: at the initial stage of the war (1941–1942), the USSR suffered terrible defeats and suffered huge losses because the country's leadership did not believe in the German attack, the German army had a numerical superiority, the attack caught the border troops by surprise, the inexperience and lack of professionalism of the Red Army officers army, silence until July 3, Stalin, who gave the main orders. Nevertheless, fascist Germany did not succeed in the blitzkrieg plan, the Soviet society retained and increased the possibilities for resistance.

PROFILE MATERIAL

Analyze the texts of the sources and, based on them, draw a conclusion about the reasons for the failures of the Soviet troops in the initial period of the war.

F. Halder, Chief of the German General Staff: ... The complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy is evidenced by the fact that the units were taken by surprise in the barracks, the planes were at the airfields, covered with tarpaulin, and the advanced units, suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command about about what to do.

Order of a member of the Military Council of the 16th Army: ... I have information that individual servicemen of the division entrusted to you express negative sentiments, show cowardice and there are cases of drunkenness

... The Russian soldier surpasses our opponent in the West with his contempt for death. Patience and fanaticism keep him going until he is killed in a trench or falls dead in hand-to-hand combat.

….If (by the Germans) an alternative Russian government is nevertheless created, many Russians may believe that the Germans are really fighting only against the Bolshevik system, and not against Russia. Maybe, like me, other generals also think; I know some of them who really dislike communism; but today they can do nothing else but support it.

Major General K.D. Golubev. Report of the commander of the 43rd Army I.V. Stalin. November 8, 1941

This document testifies to the existence of disagreements and the struggle for leadership among the top leadership of the army, which is also the cause of defeats and losses.

Memoirs of veterans N. Makarenko about the battles for Moscow and V.V. Karpov about the battles in 1942, N.M. Yaganova.

This document testifies to the courage and heroism of ordinary soldiers.

This order is called "Not a step back!" It tightened discipline in the Red Army, forbade the withdrawal of troops without an order, introduced penal companies and battalions, as well as detachments. Published after the defeat of the Red Army near Kharkov (Kharkov Cauldron, 1942). In classical historiography, it is generally accepted that this order was necessary in the current situation, but also caused huge losses.

V.A. Nevezhin, Russian historian, on various versions of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

Despite the obvious disagreements between the participants in the controversy in assessing the activities of I.V. Stalin in preparation for an armed confrontation with Germany on the eve of June 22, 1941, this controversy showed the following. Stalin and the Soviet leadership undoubtedly had their own "scenario" for the coming war. They imagined this war as all-destroying, offensive.

P.N. Bobylev about the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

... The existence of the May plan of the General Staff and the beginning of its implementation does not change anything in the assessment of the German attack on the USSR as aggression. Hitler's preventive attack is out of the question here, because it has already been proven that the German leadership, neither earlier nor in June 1941, had any data on the preparation of the Red Army for offensive operations. In this regard, the very version of a preventive war in Germany looks like sheer absurdity: it turns out that Hitler thwarted the Soviet attack, about the preparation of which he knew nothing. Any discussions about what would have happened if Hitler had postponed the attack on the USSR for two months already belong to the realm of fortune-telling. In reality, from June 22, 1941, the Red Army had to repel German aggression.

A.I. Utkin, a modern Russian historian, on the reasons for the defeats and heroic resistance of the Red Army.

I tried to look at this war through the eyes of the Germans. The first week of the war, it's hot, the month of July, the Germans are moving very quickly, already on the outskirts of Minsk. And here in the notebook of the German Oberleutnant: on the left, the neighbors have already moved 100 km ahead, on the right, the neighbors are also moving forward, and we stopped, it’s not clear what’s the matter. We are trying to bypass the positions of the Russians on the left - a minefield, we go to the right - an ambush, and we stand for a whole week, we delay the whole front. All this was revealed quite unexpectedly, because the cook decided to get into a Russian tank. A Soviet tank was hit on a hillock as it was rising, a blow was made directly into it, the armor was broken, and the cook decided to take something: a watch, some things, souvenirs, nothing special. And when he opened the hatch, everything became clear. Down in the tank, a dead Russian captain was kneeling, he had a walkie-talkie in his hand, and he was in the blinds, that's the name of the hole in the tank, he saw the whole position, he stood at the top, and everything was visible, and he coordinated the actions of the Russians throughout the hot weeks. The corpses of his comrades decomposed nearby, he died, being wounded and in this stench, but he survived to the end. This struck the Germans, and it seemed to them that this war would not be like the one that was in Poland and France. And the German chief lieutenant writes that he felt cold in his legs, he felt that this time it would not be so easy.

A. Filippov, on the readiness of the Red Army for war in June 1941 (1992)

.... The Soviet military leadership, preparing for the war with Germany, strenuously achieved quantitative superiority over the Wehrmacht by 1941, especially in tanks and aircraft, but it remained a secret for him that the Red Army lagged behind the German army many times in terms of troops, headquarters, command staff ...

The troops were poorly trained in methods modern war, poorly cohesive, insufficiently organized. At a low level were radio communications, management, interaction, intelligence, tactics.

The main reason for the defeat of our troops in the summer of 1941 was the unpreparedness of the Red Army to conduct a modern mobile war against an enemy perfectly prepared for just such a war.

A. Smirnov, a modern Russian historian, on the publication of the memoirs of General Illarion Tolkonyuk. 2005

Tolkonyuk's memoirs once again confirm that the numerous cases of voluntary (not because of the lack of the ability to resist the enemy, but because of the unwillingness to fight) the surrender of the Red Army in 1941, described in German literature, are by no means propaganda fiction.<.>

He paints a picture of an extremely inflexible, overly centralized command and control of troops, which does not allow lower-level commanders to influence the development of events in time, and forcing higher-ranking commanders to replace lower-ranking ones.

Alarming reports of an impending German attack came from everywhere:

In March 1941, intelligence officer Richard Sorge (who worked in Japan as a German journalist) reported on the possible timing of the attack.

Radiograms from Soviet ships from foreign ports.

Pro-Soviet citizens of Poland, Hungary, Romania reported.

Information from diplomats and ambassadors.

Messages from border districts.

from other scouts.

But Stalin ignored these messages, because he was afraid of provocations from England, sought to maintain an alliance with Hitler, believed that Germany would not fight the USSR on 2 fronts and first defeat England. June 14, 1941 - A special TASS report appeared stating that all rumors about a war with Germany were lies. The troops were not put on alert, although Zhukov, appointed chief of the General Staff in January 1941, insisted on this.

The Great Patriotic War has begun June 22, 1941 year at 4 o'clock in the morning. The German attack was sudden. This provided an advantage. German aviation dominated the air - bombing attacks were carried out to a depth of 400 kilometers, 60 airfields were bombed, 1200 aircraft were destroyed on the first day (800 on the ground). The Soviet command did not have a clear idea of ​​the scale of the invasion, conflicting directives were issued.

The Germans developed the offensive in accordance with the Barbarossa plan in three directions:

Army Group North advanced on the Baltic states and Leningrad - by July 10 it had advanced 500 kilometers.

Army Group "Center" advanced on Moscow, advanced 600 kilometers.

Army Group "South" - to Kyiv, advanced 300 kilometers.

Our army suffered huge losses, the ratio of losses was 1: 8, about 3 million were captured, out of 170 divisions, 28 were completely defeated, 70 lost up to half of their composition. The situation was catastrophic. But everywhere the Germans met with desperate resistance. The frontier outposts were the first to take the blow of the enemy - the outpost of Lieutenant Lopatin fought for 11 days, the Brest Fortress, rams in the air, an oncoming tank battle near Rovno for 1 month.

When the situation cleared up, strategic defense plan.

Major defensive battles unfolded in all three directions:

June - August - the defense of Tallinn - the main base of the Baltic Fleet.

Mogilev defended for 23 days.

July 10 - September 10 - the defense of Smolensk (on September 5, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe city of Yelnya, Zhukov managed to organize a counteroffensive, the Soviet guard was born).

Kyiv defended for 2 months.

Odessa defended for 73 days.

250 days - the defense of Sevastopol (the losses of the Germans are greater than during the capture of Europe).

Thus, despite huge losses, the Red Army is waging stubborn defensive battles. Hitler focuses his main forces on the central direction.

Urgent measures are being taken to organize a rebuff to the enemy:

1. A general military mobilization of men born in 1905-1918 has been announced. This allowed 5.5 million people to be drafted into the army by July 1.

2. Martial law has been introduced in the western regions of the country.

3. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was formed (Stalin, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Shaposhnikov, Timoshenko, Zhukov).

4. June 24 - a special council for evacuation was created (headed by Shvernik, 1.5 thousand enterprises and 10 million people were evacuated in 6 months).

5. On August 8, Stalin was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief and People's Commissar of Defense (+ from May 5 he headed the government + head of the party).

6. GKO was created - to manage the activities of all government departments and institutions in a war.

7. Detachments of the people's militia are being formed.

8. The mobilization national economic plan for the 4th quarter of 1941 was approved, according to which:

Enterprises were transferred to the production of military products.

Enterprises from threatening areas were evacuated to the east, to the Urals and Central Asia.

The population was involved in the construction of defensive lines.

An 11-hour working day was introduced, holidays were canceled, and mandatory overtime work was introduced.

9. The call of the country's leadership to the deployment of various forms of socialist competition, to raise funds for the defense fund, donations.

The war becomes domestic, the enthusiasm of the people in organizing a rebuff to the enemy is clearly manifested: participation in the construction of defensive structures, joining the fighter battalions to fight saboteurs, the people's militia, volunteers for the Red Army, duty to help air defense, raising funds and things for the defense fund .

Results of the initial period of the war:

Loss of a huge territory (the Baltic States, part of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, a number of regions of Russia).

Huge casualties in the army and among the civilian population.

Economic problems - the loss of areas with large enterprises of various industries and agricultural production, the process of evacuation of enterprises.

Urgent measures are being taken to organize a rebuff to the enemy.

The mood of the German soldiers has changed (the war in Russia is not a walk around Europe).

Causes of failures in the initial period of the war:

1. The suddenness of the attack for the army, not brought to full combat readiness, and for the population, confident that in the near future there will be no war with Germany.

2. The superiority of the German army (in terms of numbers, in technology, in combat experience, in the quality of officer cadres, there were plans, allies, a huge economic potential was involved, intelligence work).

3. The miscalculations of the high command and Stalin personally:

Incorrect timing of the attack,

Ignored intelligence data and reports of a possible outbreak of war,

Mistaken military doctrine

The direction of the main blow is incorrectly determined.

4. Low professional level of officers (due to repressions).

5. The incompleteness of the process of reorganizing the army and re-equipping the army, building defensive fortifications on the western borders.

6. The need to keep large armed forces in the Far East (against Japan), in the south (against Turkey and Iran), in the northwest (against Finland) and in the Gulag (to protect prisoners).

Thus, in the initial period, the war is developing extremely unsuccessfully for the USSR, it is difficult to turn the tide, but everything possible is being done for this.