By the end of 1916, the superiority of the Entente was clearly revealed, both in numbers armed forces, and in military equipment, especially in artillery, aviation and tanks. The Entente entered the military campaign of 1917 on all fronts with 425 divisions against 331 enemy divisions. However, differences in the military leadership and the self-interested goals of the Entente participants often paralyzed these advantages, which was clearly manifested in the inconsistency of the Entente command during major operations in 1916. Having switched to strategic defense, the Austro-German coalition, still far from defeated, confronted the world with the fact of a protracted, exhausting war.
And every month, every week of the war entailed new colossal casualties. By the end of 1916, both sides had lost about 6 million people killed and about 10 million people wounded and maimed. Under the influence of enormous human losses and hardships at the front and in the rear, all the warring countries experienced a chauvinistic frenzy in the first months of the war. Every year the anti-war movement grew in the rear and at the fronts.
The prolongation of the war inevitably affected, among other things, the morale of the Russian army. The patriotic upsurge of 1914 was lost long ago, and the exploitation of the idea of “Slavic solidarity” also exhausted itself. Stories about German cruelties also did not have the desired effect. War fatigue was becoming more and more evident. Sitting in the trenches, the immobility of positional warfare, the absence of the simplest human conditions in the positions - all this was the background of the increasing frequency of soldier unrest.
To this we must add a protest against cane discipline, abuses by superiors, and embezzlement of the rear services. Both at the front and in the rear garrisons, cases of non-compliance with orders and expressions of sympathy for striking workers were increasingly observed. In August - September 1915, during a wave of strikes in Petrograd, many soldiers of the capital's garrison expressed solidarity with the workers, and demonstrations took place on a number of ships of the Baltic Fleet. In 1916, there was an uprising of soldiers at the Kremenchug distribution point, and at the same point in Gomel. In the summer of 1916, two Siberian regiments refused to go into battle. Cases of fraternization with enemy soldiers appeared. By the fall of 1916, a significant part of the 10 million army was in a state of ferment.
The main obstacle to victory was now not material shortcomings (weapons and supplies, military equipment), but the internal state of society itself. Deep contradictions spanned layers. The main contradiction was between the tsarist-monarchist camp and the other two - liberal-bourgeois and revolutionary-democratic. The Tsar and the court camarilla grouped around him wanted to retain all their privileges, the liberal bourgeoisie wanted to gain access to government power, and the revolutionary-democratic camp, led by the Bolshevik Party, fought to overthrow the monarchy.
The broad masses of the population of all the warring countries were gripped by ferment. More and more workers demanded immediate peace and condemned chauvinism, protested against merciless exploitation, lack of food, clothing, fuel, and against the enrichment of the elite of society. The refusal of the ruling circles to satisfy these demands and the suppression of protests by force gradually led the masses to the conclusion that it was necessary to fight against the military dictatorship and the entire existing system. Anti-war protests grew into a revolutionary movement.
In such a situation, anxiety grew in the ruling circles of both coalitions. Even the most extreme imperialists could not help but take into account the mood of the masses who yearned for peace. Therefore, maneuvers were undertaken with “peace” proposals in the hope that these proposals would be rejected by the enemy, and in this case all the blame for the continuation of the war could be blamed on him.
So on December 12, 1916, the Kaiser’s government of Germany invited the Entente countries to begin “peace” negotiations. At the same time, the German “peace” proposal was designed to create a split in the Entente camp and to support those layers within the Entente countries that were inclined to achieve peace with Germany without a “crushing blow” to Germany by force of arms. Since Germany’s “peace” proposal did not contain any specific conditions and completely hushed up the question of the fate of the territories of Russia, Belgium, France, Serbia, and Romania occupied by Austro-German troops, this gave the Entente a reason to respond to this and subsequent proposals with specific demands for the liberation of Germany of all occupied territories, as well as the division of Turkey, the “reorganization” of Europe based on the “national principle,” which actually meant the Entente’s refusal to enter into peace negotiations with Germany and its allies.
German propaganda noisily announced to the whole world that the Entente countries were to blame for the continuation of the war and that they were forcing Germany to take “defensive measures” through merciless “unrestricted submarine warfare.”
In February 1917, the bourgeois-democratic revolution won in Russia, and a movement for a revolutionary way out of the imperialist war developed widely in the country.
In response to the unlimited submarine warfare On the German side, the United States broke off diplomatic relations with the latter, and on April 6, declaring war on Germany, entered the war in order to influence its results in its favor.
Even before arrival American soldiers Entente troops launched an offensive on the Western Front on April 16, 1917. But the attacks of the Anglo-French troops, following one after another on April 16-19, were unsuccessful. The French and British lost more than 200 thousand killed in four days of fighting. In this battle, 5 thousand Russian soldiers from the 3rd Russian brigade, sent from Russia to help the allies, died. Almost all 132 British tanks participating in the battle were knocked out or destroyed.
In preparation for this military operation, the Entente command persistently demanded that the Russian Provisional Government launch an attack on Eastern Front. However, preparing such an offensive in revolutionary Russia was not easy. Nevertheless, the head of the Provisional Government, Kerensky, began intensively preparing an offensive, hoping, in case of success, to raise the prestige of the bourgeois Provisional Government, and in case of failure, to blame the Bolsheviks.
The Russian offensive in the Lvov direction, launched on July 1, 1917, initially developed successfully, but soon the German army, which received 11 divisions transferred from Western Front, went on a counter-offensive and threw the Russian troops far beyond their original positions.
Thus, in 1917, on all European fronts, despite the Entente’s superiority in manpower and military equipment, its troops failed to achieve decisive success in any of the offensives undertaken. The revolutionary situation in Russia and the lack of necessary coordination in military operations within the coalition thwarted the implementation of the Entente's strategic plans, designed for the complete defeat of the Austro-German bloc in 1917. And at the beginning of September 1917, the German army launched an offensive on the northern sector of the Eastern Front with the aim of capturing Riga and the Riga coast.
The Germans’ choice of the moment to attack near Riga was not accidental. This was the time when the Russian reactionary military elite, preparing a counter-revolutionary coup in the country, decided to rely on the German military. At a state meeting convened in Moscow in August, General Kornilov expressed his “assumption” about the imminent fall of Riga and the opening of roads to Petrograd, the cradle of the Russian revolution. This served as a signal for the German army to attack Riga. Despite the fact that there were every opportunity to hold Riga, it was surrendered to the Germans by order of the military command. Clearing the way for the Germans to revolutionary Petrograd, Kornilov began his open counter-revolutionary rebellion. Kornilov was defeated by revolutionary workers and soldiers under the leadership of the Bolsheviks.
The 1917 campaign was characterized by further attempts by the warring parties to overcome the positional impasse, this time through the massive use of artillery, tanks and aircraft.
The saturation of troops with technical means of combat significantly complicated the offensive battle; it became in the full sense a combined arms battle, the success of which was achieved by the coordinated actions of all branches of the military.
During the campaign operation, there was a gradual transition from dense rifle chains to group formations of troops. The core of these formations were tanks, escort guns and machine guns. Unlike rifle chains, groups could maneuver on the battlefield, destroy or bypass the firing points and strongholds of the defender, and advance at a faster pace.
The growth of the technical equipment of the troops created the preconditions for breaking through the positional front. In some cases, troops managed to break through enemy defenses to the entire tactical depth. However, in general, the problem of breaking through the positional front was not solved, since the attacker could not develop tactical success to an operational scale.
The development of means and methods of conducting an offensive led to further improvement of defense. The depth of defense of the divisions increased to 10-12 km. In addition to the main positions, they began to build forward, cutoff and rear positions. There has been a transition from rigid defense to maneuver of forces and means to repel the enemy's offensive.
The main event of the 1916 campaign was the Battle of Verdun. It is considered the longest battle of the First World War (lasted from February 21 to December 18, 1916) and was very bloody. Therefore, it received another name: “Verdun meat grinder.”
At Verdun, the German strategic plan collapsed. What was this plan?
In the 1915 campaign, Germany did not achieve significant success on the Eastern Front, so the German command decided in 1916 to withdraw France from the war, delivering the main blow in the west. It was planned to cut off the Verdun ledge with powerful flank attacks, encircle the entire enemy Verdun group, create a gap in the Allied defenses, and through it strike the flank and rear of the central French armies and defeat the entire Allied front.
But after the Verdun operation, as well as after the Battle of the Somme, it became clear that Germany’s military potential began to deplete, and the forces of the Entente began to strengthen.
Battle of Verdun
From the history of the Verdun fortress
After Germany annexed Alsace and part of Lorraine in 1871, Verdun turned into a border military fortress. During the First World War, the Germans failed to capture Verdun, but the city was almost completely destroyed by artillery fire. In the vicinity of the city, where the main battles took place, Germany used a powerful artillery strike using flamethrowers and poisonous gases, as a result of which 9 French villages were wiped off the face of the earth. The battles of Verdun and its environs made the city a household name for senseless slaughter.
Back in the 17th century. The Verdun underground citadel of Suterren was planned. Its construction was completed in 1838. One kilometer of its underground galleries was turned in 1916 into an invulnerable command center housing 10 thousand French soldiers. Now in part of the galleries there is a museum exhibition that, using light and sound, reproduces the Verdun massacre of 1916. Infrared glasses are required to view part of the exhibition. There are exhibits related to the history of these places during the First World War.
The front section was small, only 15 km. But Germany concentrated 6.5 divisions on it against 2 French divisions. There was also a struggle for advantage in the airspace: at first only German bombers and fire spotters operated in it, but by May France was able to deploy a squadron of Nieuport fighters.
Before the First World War, this company produced racing aircraft, but during and after the war it began to produce fighter aircraft. Many Entente pilots flew on the company's fighters, including the French ace Georges Guynemer.
Progress of the battle
After a massive 8-hour artillery preparation, German troops went on the offensive on the right bank of the Meuse River. The German infantry from the strike force was formed in one echelon. The divisions consisted of two regiments in the first line and one regiment in the second. The battalions were formed in echelons deep. Each battalion created three chains, advancing at a distance of 80-100 m. Ahead of the first chain moved scouts and assault groups, consisting of two or three infantry squads, reinforced with grenade launchers, machine guns and flamethrowers.
Despite the powerful performance, German troops met stubborn resistance. During the first day of the offensive, German troops advanced 2 km, occupying the first French position. Then Germany conducted an offensive according to the same pattern: first, during the day, artillery destroyed the next position, and by the evening the infantry occupied it. By February 25, the French had lost almost all of their forts, and the important fort of Douamont was taken. But the French desperately resisted: along the only highway connecting Verdun with the rear, they transported troops from other sectors of the front in 6,000 vehicles, delivering about 190 thousand soldiers and 25 thousand tons of military cargo by March 6. Thus, the French superiority in manpower was formed here by almost one and a half times. France was greatly helped by the actions of Russian troops on the Eastern Front: the Naroch operation eased the position of the French troops.
Naroch operation
After the start of the German offensive near Verdun, the commander-in-chief of the French army, Joffre, turned to the Russian command with a request to deliver a diversionary blow to the Germans. The general offensive of the Entente was planned for May 1916, but the Russian headquarters agreed to the request of its ally and decided to carry out offensive operation on the northern flank of the Western Front in March. On February 24, a meeting at Headquarters decided to deliver a strong blow to the German armies, gathering the largest possible forces for this. The commander-in-chief of the armies of the Western Front at that time was the Russian adjutant general Alexei Ermolaevich Evert.
After artillery preparation, which lasted two days, Russian troops went on the offensive. The 2nd Army south of Lake Naroch wedged itself into the defenses of the 10th German Army at 2-9 km.
The enemy had difficulty holding back the fierce attacks of the Russian troops. But the Germans pulled up significant forces to the offensive area and repulsed the Russian offensive.
During the Naroch operation, 17-year-old Evgenia Vorontsova, a volunteer of the 3rd Siberian Rifle Regiment, accomplished her feat. She inspired the entire regiment with her example and led it, infecting it with her enthusiasm, into the attack. She died during this attack. The Russian and German armies suffered heavy losses.
The German command decided that the Russians had launched a general offensive and were ready to break through German defense, and stopped attacks on Verdun for two weeks. In essence, this operation was a diversionary operation; in the summer, the German command expected the main attack on its front, and the Russian carried out Brusilovsky breakthrough on the Austrian front, which brought enormous success and brought Austria-Hungary to the brink of military defeat.
But first there was the Baranovichi operation, which was also led by A.E. Evert.
1916 Campaign
When developing plans for 1916, the Entente countries took into account the experience of the war and decided to coordinate their efforts. The Russian army received the task of launching an offensive in mid-June in order to divert enemy forces. The Anglo-French armies were supposed to break through the enemy front on the river on July 1. Somme and launch a wide offensive.
Germany again decided to shift its main efforts to the west, break through the front at Verdun, inflict irreparable losses on the French armies and advance on Paris. Given the important role of strategic initiative, German troops launched the attack on Verdun on February 21.
German attacks near Verdun continued until July, but the Germans were unable to break through the enemy’s defenses. In the second half of the year, the initiative in the Verdun area passed to the French, and they pushed German troops back to their original lines. At Verdun, Germany lost 600 thousand, and France over 350 thousand people.
The successful Russian offensive played an important role in the 1916 campaign Southwestern Front(Commander A.A. Brusilov). Careful preparation, the factor of surprise, and the use of a new form of operation of simultaneous strikes in a number of areas within a 450 km zone allowed Russian troops to break through the enemy’s strong positional defenses to the full depth and advance 80-120 km. During the period of the Russian offensive (June-September), the Austro-Hungarian troops lost about 1.5 million people, including over 400 thousand people captured. Russian troops lost about 500 thousand people.
The operation of the Anglo-French troops on the Somme River (July-November) was conducted on the principle of methodically gnawing through enemy defenses in a continuous wide (40 km) breakthrough area, with artillery fire playing a decisive role. Despite the threefold superiority in enemy forces and means, the Allies launched an offensive at a very low pace. Intense battles took place in the area of the river. Somme until late autumn. In September, the British used new means of combat for the first time - tanks. The first tanks were armed with machine guns, had a limited range and a speed of 6 km/h. Therefore, they could not influence the results of the offensive.
The Allies failed to break through the German front. The operation was stopped in November.
In operational and tactical terms, the 1916 campaign was characterized by continued attempts by the warring parties to overcome the positional deadlock. The problem of breaking through the prepared defense was not solved in this campaign. The main reasons were the loss of the moment of surprise of the offensive, as a result of many days of artillery preparations, dense battle formations of troops and, as a consequence, large losses, weak interaction between the military branches, and the inability of artillery to suppress the defense to a significant depth.
Military magazine -
The army retreats to the island of Corfu.
Notes:
* To compare events that took place in Russia and Western Europe, in all chronological tables, starting in 1582 (the year of the introduction of the Gregorian calendar in eight European countries) and ending with 1918 (the year of transition Soviet Russia from the Julian to the Gregorian calendar), the DATE column indicates date only according to the Gregorian calendar , and the Julian date is indicated in parentheses along with a description of the event. In chronological tables describing the periods before the introduction of the new style by Pope Gregory XIII (in the DATES column) Dates are based on the Julian calendar only. . At the same time, no translation is made to the Gregorian calendar, because it did not exist.
Read about the events of the year:
Spiridovich A.I. "The Great War and the February Revolution of 1914-1917" All-Slavic Publishing House, New York. 1-3 books. 1960, 1962
Vel. book Gabriel Konstantinovich. In the marble palace. From the chronicle of our family. NY. 1955:
Chapter thirty-four. Autumn 1915 - winter 1916. Trip to Crimea - Bad things at the front - Nicholas II assumes the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
Chapter thirty-five. Summer-autumn 1916. Arrival of my cousin, Prince Nicholas of Greece, in Russia - I enter the Military Academy and become a colonel at the age of 29 - Housewarming party for Grand Duke Dmitry Pavlovich.
Chapter thirty-six. December 1916. Murder of Rasputin - Our attempts to ease the fate of Dmitry Pavlovich.
Crisis of power structures Russian Empire(late 1916 - early 1917)
On November 1, 1916, the next session of the State Duma began. And what happened that day in the meeting room was called by contemporaries “a storm signal of the revolution.”
On the eve of its speech in the Duma, the opposition developed a scenario for upcoming actions with the participation of a wide range of people of various political orientations. At the end of October, a series of meetings of the Bureau of the Progressive Bloc were held in Petrograd, at which the draft Duma declaration drawn up by P. N. Milyukov and V. V. Shulgin was actively discussed. The Cadets insisted on including in the declaration a provision on the special merits of the Allies and, above all, England in the war. The rightists believed that more attention should be paid not to the external, but to the internal political aspect, and that “the system, not Sturmer,” should be criticized. As a result, a compromise was worked out; the left's demand for a responsible ministry was removed from the project, but its tone was defiant.
On October 25, 1916, in Moscow, at a congress of chairmen of provincial zemstvo councils, a resolution was adopted with an unprecedented demand for the tsar to replace the “reactionary ministry.” Similar decisions were made these days at the party forums of Cadets and Progressives held in Petrograd. Before the opening of the session, the Chairman of the State Duma received an appeal from the head of the Zemstvo Union, Prince G. E. Lvov, in which he reported “ominous rumors, about betrayal and treason, about secret forces working in favor of Germany.” The chairman of the Union of Cities, M.V. Chelnokov, sent a similar letter to the Duma. Direct interference in the internal affairs of Russia was the speech of the British Ambassador J. Buchanan at the ceremonial meeting in Petrograd of the English Flag Society (created with the participation of M. M. Kovalevsky in 1915). In his speech, the ambassador of the allied power called on the opposition to bring the war “to a victorious end,” not only on the European battlefields, but also in Russia itself.
Thus, the upcoming demarche of the opposition was agreed upon both with the deputies and with circles outside the Duma, including allies. Under such conditions, the Duma began work on November 1, 1916, and the opposition immediately launched an open attack on the Stürmer government. Speaking on behalf of the Progressive Bloc, Octobrist S. A. Shidlovsky said that the country needed a government of people's trust, and that the bloc would seek its creation “by all means available to it.” The representative of the left factions, A.F. Kerensky, sharply criticized the tsarist ministers, calling them traitors to the interests of the country. However, the main speech of the opposition was the famous speech of P. N. Milyukov “Stupidity or Treason?”
“We have lost faith that this government can lead us to victory,” said the leader of the cadets, supported by “true” votes from the seats. Without rejecting rumors of betrayal and betrayal of the “court party led by Stürmer and Rasputin,” Miliukov stated that it was “grouped around the young queen.” Operating mainly with quotes from foreign and Russian newspapers, accompanying them with his own comments, Miliukov rhetorically repeated: “What is this: stupidity or treason? Choose any. The consequences are the same."
Miliukov's speech was distributed in thousands of copies throughout the country. Numerous copyists, inserting entire paragraphs on their own behalf, replicated and amplified the most incredible rumors. Meanwhile, the reliability of the facts cited by Miliukov has not been proven. Moreover, later, already in exile, many prominent cadets admitted that Miliukov’s speech was of a purely political nature and did not reflect real events.
Nevertheless, the opposition achieved its goal. Enormous pressure began on the tsar, including from his closest relatives - the grand dukes. On November 10 (23), Stürmer was dismissed. The new chairman of the Council of Ministers was 52-year-old A.F. Trepov, who previously held the post of Minister of Railways and shared much of the program of the Progressive Bloc.
Trepov became the third leader of the government during the war years (after I. Goremykin and B. Sturmer), but headed it for just over a month - on the eve of 1917 he was replaced by N. D. Golitsyn. This premiership (December 27, 1916 - February 27, 1917) turned out to be the last in the Russian Empire and was as short-lived as it was unsuccessful. He enjoyed serious influence on the tsar in the last two government compositions.
A. D. Protopopov, former oppositionist, comrade of the Chairman of the State Duma and member of the Progressive Bloc, appointed in September
1916 to the post of Minister of Internal Affairs, becoming one of the emperor's most trusted persons.
So-called "ministerial leapfrog" was one of the signs of a crisis in power structures. During the war, there were 4 prime ministers, 6 interior ministers, 4 military ministers and 4 justice ministers. The lack of stability as a result of court intrigues and behind-the-scenes struggles had a negative impact on the governance of the country during a period that required the greatest stress and responsibility. Real opportunity The tsar often did not have direct influence on state affairs. Of the 19 months of his tenure as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, 9 months he was at Headquarters, 6 in the capital, 4 traveling between Mogilev, Tsarskoe Selo and Petrograd.
What were the signs of a crisis of power in 1916?
Nicholas II spent the last months of his reign in severe loneliness. The murder of Rasputin, in which the king’s relatives participated, and the reaction of high society to the death of the “elder” plunged the emperor into deep depression. Together with his family, he lived mainly in Tsarskoye Selo, only occasionally communicating with Protopopov. The estrangement between the Romanovs and their subjects became increasingly insurmountable. Even provincial noble meetings, which in the past were the stronghold of monarchical foundations, now adopted resolutions in support of the Duma. On January 6, the tsar signed a rescript to the government (the first document of this kind after October 17, 1905). It spoke of the complete unity of Russia with its allies, and rejected any idea “of concluding peace before the final victory.” The cabinet of ministers was given two tasks: to supply the army and the rear with food, and to organize transport transportation. The hope was also expressed that the legislature, zemstvos and the public would help the government.
Meanwhile, during the two and a half years of Russia's war, society's attitude towards events at the front has changed significantly. For many political forces, the issue of war has become a subject of speculation. Thus, the opposition spread rumors about the tsar’s readiness to conclude a separate peace with Germany, which naturally caused excitement among the allied ambassadors. In addition, the people expressed fatigue from wartime and related problems, such as food difficulties, high prices, interruptions in fuel and transport, etc. The patriotic enthusiasm of the first months gave way to apathy. Fighting occurred hundreds of miles from the center of Russia, and the ordinary population of Russian cities, towns and villages suffered from it. The authorities failed to unite the people in the fight against the aggressor: disagreements between classes regarding the war only intensified.
Since the beginning of the war, over 15 million people were mobilized into the army, losses at the front reached 9 million, including 1.7 million killed. National economy experienced a labor shortage. Over 650 industrial enterprises suspended operations. By the end of 1916, the country's economy entered a period of serious testing.
A massive rise in the strike movement began in industrial centers, in particular in Petrograd. In the fall of 1916 alone, 273 strikes occurred in the country, in which about 300 thousand people took part. It is significant that almost all the actions took place under political slogans. The first months of 1917 were especially characteristic in this regard.
Thus, in January 1917, the factory inspectorate recorded 371 strikes, including 228 with political demands, the number of strikers was 250 thousand people. In February 1917 there were already 959 strikes, of which 912 were political. 450 thousand workers went on strike - the highest number of strike participants during the war years. Despite all efforts, the authorities failed to break the close connection between the labor movement and the socialist parties. Social Democrats, especially the Mensheviks, enjoyed great influence among the workers, who managed to retain their cadres not only in the Duma, but also in legal proletarian organizations - insurance companies, health insurance funds, consumer cooperatives. Working groups under military-industrial committees also played a significant role. They were created in 36 cities and ensured stable contacts between representatives of left-wing socialist parties and radical opposition figures. The Working Group at the Central Military-Industrial Committee (TsVPK) in Petrograd was most active. She began to issue proclamations with a pronounced anti-government orientation. One of them, dated January 26, began with a call for the decisive elimination of the autocratic regime and the complete democratization of the country and ended with an appeal to the workers of the capital to be ready for a general strike in support of the Duma.
The tsarist government tried to seize the initiative and took a number of decisive actions. On the night of January 28, by order of A.D. Protopopov, arrests of members were carried out Working Group TsVPK, who were imprisoned in Peter and Paul Fortress. At the direction of Nicholas II, a draft Manifesto was drawn up on the dissolution of the Duma; elections for its new composition were expected at the end of the year.
These events excited the opposition and forced it to once again turn to plans for a coup. The highest military officials were involved in the conspiracy. Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief M. V. Alekseev, Commander-in-Chief Northwestern Front N.V. Ruzsky, General A.M. Krymov and a number of other military men, involved, according to some sources, in the Masonic community, were privy to the plans of the conspiracy. One of these plans involved intercepting the king's train and demanding that he abdicate in favor of his son. However, the exact timing of the action was not established, since the sovereign was in Tsarskoe Selo, and it was unknown when he was going to return to Headquarters. The capital was uneasy. The workers' protests, which began on January 9, not only did not stop, but, on the contrary, grew in intensity. Under these conditions, an attempt to seize power could turn into a popular explosion. The conspirators spent weeks waiting for the “right hour” for the coup, and meanwhile events occurred that were the prologue to the revolution.
- Speech by I. N. Milyukov, delivered at a meeting of the State Duma on November 1, 1916 // Russian liberals: Cadets and Octobrists (documents, memoirs, journalism) / comp. D. B. Pavlov, V. V. Shslokhasv. M.: ROSSPEN, 1996. P. 177.
- Right there. P. 185.