The Miracle of Dunkirk On May 21, the Germans reached the English Channel, pinning Allied troops to the strait. The Wehrmacht could have incinerated them, but suddenly (on the 24th) it received an order to stop near the river with the amazing name A. The Allies ended up exactly in the port of Dunkirk. And they started scurrying

A period of fleeting battles began in Belgium, Holland and France, ending with the defeat of the Anglo-French troops at Dunkirk, on the coast of Pas-de-Calais; It took Nazi Germany only 44 days to achieve the surrender of France.

In launching a “blitzkrieg” in the West, the German military command, as in the case of Gleiwitz, resorted to cynical provocation. On the night of May 10, 1940, German planes carried out a terrorist attack on one of the university cities in Germany - Freiburg. High explosive bombs dropped by German bombers destroyed a women's boarding house and hospital. Hundreds of people were killed and maimed. The German military command attributed this provocative raid to the aviation of Belgium and Holland. It served as a pretext for the Wehrmacht to attack neutral countries. Goering's villainous order to bomb Freiburg was carried out by the 51st Luftwaffe Squadron under the command of Joseph Kamhuber.

Did the French and British command know about the preparations for a broad German offensive in the West? Undoubtedly she knew. Information about this came through various political and military channels. On March 10, 1940, Hitler's Minister Ribbentrop spoke about the upcoming offensive in a conversation with Mussolini and his Foreign Minister Ciano. Connected with British and French intelligence, Ciano three days later reported everything he knew to the French ambassador in Rome, François-Poncet, and a few days later to Roosevelt's emissary in Europe, Sumner Welles.

The head of the Abwehr (German military intelligence), Admiral Canaris, who was in opposition to Hitler, also informed the allies about the impending Wehrmacht offensive. Hitler's General Beck informed the allies about this. Abwehr agent Joseph Müller, sent to Rome, informed a Belgian diplomat about the upcoming German attack on Belgium and Holland. On May 9, Canaris's chief of staff, General Oster, transmitted updated information about the offensive to the Dutch military attaché in Berlin.

However, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak, like his Dutch colleagues, did not want to believe the authenticity of this information.

...British intelligence received, on the eve of the war, through the intelligence of a third country, Hitler's encryption machine "Enigma" ("Riddle") and could decipher radiograms from Hitler's headquarters, the High Command of the Wehrmacht ground forces, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Abwehr. Messages transmitted by radio were intercepted and deciphered by the Allies and reported to Churchill and later to Roosevelt, the commanders of the troops in the theaters of war. British intelligence knew about the preparations for a German offensive in the West in early May 1940.

In the last days before the offensive of Hitler's army in the West, French and British intelligence received numerous messages from their agents about the movements of German troops to the borders and the concentration of tanks in the Ardennes, but political and military leaders in England and France viewed these maneuvers as “tactical regroupings,” a war of nerves. They continued to console themselves with the hope of a peaceful outcome to the conflict in the West, still dreaming of turning the front of fascist aggression to the East, against the USSR. Many politicians in England and France in the Munich camp were so blinded by this that they only believed in the reality of war in the West when hundreds of Luftwaffe bombers began bombing The Hague and Rotterdam, Brussels and Liege.

At dawn on May 10, Nazi aviation, after a fierce bombing of The Hague and Rotterdam, dropped about 4 thousand paratroopers in these areas. 22 thousand German soldiers and officers were transported by transport planes and gliders to the airfields captured by the paratroopers. The paratroopers and ground troops of the 18th Army of the Wehrmacht were assisted by the fascist “fifth column” in Holland. With the help of secret agents, German saboteurs dressed in the uniform of Dutch soldiers captured bridges on the Meuse River in the Nijmengen area and two bridges south of Moerdijk and disabled the flooding system in the area in front of the Dutch defense line. On May 11, after massive German bombing attacks, only 12 aircraft remained in the Dutch aviation. Despite the fact that the Dutch army continued to stubbornly resist the invaders, the country's high command on May 14 gave the order to surrender. However, the capitulation did not prevent the barbaric Luftwaffe raid on Rotterdam, during which about 30 thousand inhabitants died.

After Holland it was Belgium's turn, which also failed to provide serious resistance to fascist aggression. As in Holland, the German command dropped paratroopers who sowed panic and captured bridges over the Meuse and crossings across the Albert Canal. The seemingly impregnable fort of Eben-Emal was taken in the same way.

In Belgium, as in other Western countries, Hitler's agents, headed by the leader of the Belgian fascists Degrelle, were active. King Leopold III, from the moment of his accession to the throne after the mysterious death of King Albert, who was a supporter of the alliance with France, pursued a pro-Hitler policy. He was the initiator of the dissolution of the Franco-Belgian alliance. Even before the fighting broke out, Belgium's fate was sealed.

Simultaneously with the fascist German troops crossing the state borders of Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, the Nazi Air Force launched a powerful attack that lasted three hours on French and British headquarters, communications centers, railways and airfields. French aviation was dealt such a severe blow that during further battles it no longer played almost any role.

Nevertheless, from the beginning of active hostilities in the West, the Anglo-French command of General Gamelin put into effect its war plan. The Germans created the impression among the Anglo-French that the attack on France would develop according to a slightly modified “Schlieffen Plan” through Belgium and Holland, that is, in the north, and not through the Ardennes. Perhaps this is why General Gamelin ordered the first group of allied armies under Plan D to enter Belgium in order to advance and occupy the line of the Dyle River. In accordance with the headquarters schedules, the hasty march of the Anglo-French troops began. The mines on the Franco-Belgian border were removed and the barriers were opened. The French army and the British expeditionary force abandoned their well-fortified positions along the Franco-Belgian border and moved to the Antwerp-Louvain-Namur line, where they thought they would meet the enemy. The Anglo-French command fell into a trap set by the Nazis.

Based on the incorrect premise that the Nazis were delivering the main blow in the north with Army Group B, the Anglo-French command left insignificant forces on the front in the Ardennes - it was believed that the terrain here would not allow large mechanized units to pass through. However, the Nazi command dealt the main blow precisely in the Ardennes with the forces of Army Group A, under the command of Rundstedt.

At the very time when the Belgian army was fighting heavy battles with the Germans, and British and French troops were slowly making their way to their aid through thousands of crowds of refugees blocking the roads of Belgium and France, a powerful armored strike group of the Wehrmacht was moving south to the West, which had not yet been attacked. noticed neither at the Chateau de Vincennes, where the main apartment of the French commander-in-chief was located, nor in Paris. Hundreds of German tanks, armored vehicles, trucks and motorcycles burst into the territory of little Luxembourg in a wide stream and poured along the mountain roads into the Ardennes.

Army Group A marched more than 100 kilometers through Luxembourg and southeastern Belgium, encountering virtually no resistance. In the Ardennes, the Allied command was able to trap Kleist's tank group in the mountains, discovered on May 8 by British Spitfires, by sending 300–400 bombers against it. The British air command had specific plans to bomb Kleist's tanks in the Ardennes. However, while the decision was being agreed upon with the British cabinet, three precious days passed. The decision to bomb was never made.

Not a single French or English plane appeared above the stream of German tanks, deprived of the ability to maneuver on the mountain roads. Heroic French cavalry attacks on Kleist's tanks in the valley between Arlon and Florinville were crushed by cannon and machine gun fire.

On May 13, German tank and mechanized troops, having defeated the French divisions opposing them, began crossing the Meuse River on the front from Givet to Sedan. Having broken through the front, General Kleist's tank group rushed into a breakthrough towards the English Channel coast. The allied command was inactive. The military informed the government about the catastrophic situation of the army.

Panic began in French government circles. Early in the morning of May 15, a telephone call disturbed British Prime Minister Churchill. French Prime Minister Reynaud called. He hurriedly said to Churchill:

“We are broken, we are defeated. The road to Paris is open." There was still no basis for such a panicky conclusion, nevertheless, the situation was becoming extremely serious. The withdrawal of Anglo-French troops from Belgium became disorderly. Kleist's tank columns continued to cut off the rear of the main Allied forces in Belgium, continuing their movement towards the English Channel.

On May 16, Churchill, accompanied by Generals Dill and Ismay, urgently flew to Paris. His Flamingo plane, one of three government aircraft, landed at Le Bourget airfield. At 5:30 a.m. the meeting took place. During a meeting held at the Quai d'Orsay with Prime Minister Reynaud, Minister of National Defense and Minister of War Daladier and Commander-in-Chief General Gamelin, it became clear that the French government essentially considered the war lost.

To Churchill’s question: “Where is the strategic reserve?” - Gamelin, shaking his head and shrugging his shoulders, replied: “He is not.”

During a meeting of French and English political and military leaders in the garden of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Quai d'Orsay, where summer receptions usually took place, a giant fire burned. Black clouds of smoke rose into the summer sky. Ashes and scraps of papers flew to the Quai d'Orsay and streets. Churchill gloomily watched from the embassy window as officials drove wheelbarrows to the fire or threw documents from secret archives out of the windows and threw them into the fire. Ministry employees under the leadership of Secretary General Leger were carrying out someone's mysterious order. Neither at that moment nor subsequently was it possible to establish who gave this order.

In Paris, a panicked rumor spread that the Quai d'Orsay was burning, and the building was already occupied by German paratroopers. In the ministry itself, illuminated by the glow of fires, covered with smoke and soot, employees were hastily handed out revolvers to fight the agents of Hitler's “fifth column.”

Yes, representatives of the “fifth column” were active in France, preparing its defeat. But they could also include such figures as Pierre Laval, Georges Bonnet, Senator Thierry-Moulanier, who advocated Hitler’s victory, and many other fascist agents who penetrated the French ministries, the army, and the press.

Reynaud actually submitted to the supporters of the surrender of France. Eighty-five-year-old Marshal Petain, a man with a shuffling old man's gait and watery eyes, was appointed to the post of vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers of France, one of the most sinister figures in France, a like-minded person of Laval, who was closely associated with Nazi Germany. The elderly marshal, even before the German attack on France, which he apparently knew about from German intelligence, admitted to Minister de Monzy: “They will need me in the second half of May.” Petain was the spiritual father of the French capitulators, who strived at any cost to achieve peace with Nazi Germany.

From the headquarters for planning an attack on the USSR, based in Syria, the seventy-three-year-old General Weygand, who at one time helped lordly Poland fight the young Soviet Republic, and later became a Cagular, was urgently summoned and appointed instead of Gamelin to the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Flying from Beirut to Paris, he told his entourage that the war was lost and therefore it was necessary to “agree to reasonable terms of a truce.”

While these movements were taking place, Hitler's troops, without encountering serious resistance, broke through to the mouth of the Somme on the night of May 20, occupied Amiens and Abbeville and reached the English Channel coast. In five days after the breakthrough at Sedan, German tanks covered the whole of France from east to west. The Allied armies were split. In Flanders and Artois, significant groups of troops found themselves cut off from the main forces located south of the Somme River - parts of the 1st, 7th and 9th French armies, the English expeditionary army under the command of General Gort and the Belgian army - in total up to 40 divisions that suffered heavy losses.

By May 21, the gap between the first and second groups of the Allied armies increased from 50 to 90 kilometers. On May 22, a German tank division broke through to Boulogne and the outskirts of Calais. The next day, the Germans occupied Calais, capturing up to 4 thousand British prisoners.

On the day of the occupation of Calais, German tanks found themselves 16 kilometers from Dunkirk, the only major port on the English Channel coast that remained in the hands of the Anglo-French troops. Kleist's tanks were much closer to Dunkirk than the main forces of the British Expeditionary Army, stationed 60 kilometers away (near Lille).

It was here, at the end of May - beginning of June, that “mysterious” events took place, which went down in history as the “Miracle of Dunkirk”. This “miracle” was the suspension of Hitler’s offensive on Dunkirk. This “miracle” was the evacuation of the English Expeditionary Army to the British Isles, carried out under tragic circumstances.

The evacuation of General Gort's army from the continent, when England's ally was left alone in the face of the German army, largely predetermined the defeat and capitulation of France. Nevertheless, the British military portrays Dunkirk and its prelude as an important episode in the military strategy of the English army.

There are no words, in the evacuation near Dunkirk, British soldiers, officers, pilots and tank crews, infantrymen and artillerymen showed examples of perseverance and endurance, bravery and courage. The evacuation by sea of ​​such a mass of troops under the attacks of enemy aircraft, artillery and tanks, which significantly exceeded the combined Anglo-French forces, truly had no precedent in the entire history of military art.

But already during the Second World War, hot on the heels of the events, and especially after the war, heated debates flared up: did a “miracle” happen at Dunkirk, or in reality there was nothing “mysterious” and “miraculous” here, but only a political and military -a strategic miscalculation of the command of the allied Anglo-French armies and a miscalculation of the Wehrmacht high command. In our opinion, it was the latter that happened. The “Miracle of Dunkirk,” apparently, must be explained by a peculiar combination of a number of political and other factors that arose at the time of the fierce battle between the Anglo-French and German armies in a very difficult international situation.

What are these factors that influenced the dramatic events that took place on the sand dunes of Dunkirk? Was it possible for England and France to prevent Dunkirk? Who is to blame for the crushing defeat of the Anglo-French troops, for, no matter how Western military officers, politicians, historians and journalists tried to characterize these events, Dunkirk was still a defeat.

Dunkirk, like the subsequent capitulation of France, was prepared by the gravediggers of England and France - those political and military leaders who pursued the Munich policy, the policy of cooperation with the Nazi aggressor, and sought to direct German aggression to the East, against the USSR. It was they who preferred capitulation to the German fascists to resistance to them. They were more afraid of the political activity of the popular masses of their countries than of the victory of the German fascists. But who were the direct culprits of Dunkirk? Let's try to understand this issue.

Even after Wehrmacht units broke through to the English Channel coast, the position of the Anglo-French armies was difficult, but not catastrophic.

The English expeditionary force in France numbered 400 thousand people. Directly in the Dunkirk area, Gort's army had 10 divisions. The British were armed with over 700 tanks, 2,400 field, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, thousands of anti-tank rifles, machine guns, and machine guns.

The Belgian army operating against the German penetration numbered about half a million. Approximately the same number of French forces were operating north and south of the narrow strip of territory captured by the Germans.

The Allies also had the opportunity to transfer troops from the central regions of France, covered by the Maginot Line, and to transport troops by sea, where the Anglo-French fleet dominated. Undoubtedly, these forces of well-armed British, French and Belgian troops, with clear coordination of attacks with the southern group of Anglo-French armies, could successfully resist the German breakthrough.

General Weygand, who assumed the post of commander-in-chief, hiding his opinion on the need for surrender and taking into account the position of the general public, took certain steps to save the northern group of troops cut off by the Germans.

At a meeting of representatives of the allied armies, held on May 21 in Ypres (General Gort did not attend the meeting), the “Weygand plan” was approved, which provided for a bilateral counterattack from the north and south against the German divisions that had wedged themselves into their positions, defeating them and uniting those cut off from each other. another grouping of allied forces.

“The German divisions,” Weygand declared, “must die in the trap in which they fell.” According to the plan, from the north the English and French armies attacked Bapaume and Cambrai with a force of 30–40 divisions. They had to fight their way to the south and, having defeated the invading German tank units, unite with the French army group of General Frere, made up of the 18th - 20th French divisions, units transferred from Alsace, making their way to their aid through Amiens , from the Maginot Line, from Africa, and from other places.

Allied strikes on the flanks of the German tank breakthrough group would put it between a rock and a hard place. However, the attack on Arras launched on May 21–22 by two British and two French divisions was the height of inconsistency and unpreparedness of the operation. Gort, not expecting a French attack, ordered General Franklin, who was coordinating the actions of the 5th and 50th British infantry divisions, to launch an attack on Arras on May 21. Two French divisions supported the British offensive only later.

But even this poorly organized, local offensive by a small part of the Anglo-French forces plunged the German generals into confusion, who called it the “crisis at Arras.” The English soldiers showed themselves to be selfless and brave fighters in the attack on Arras. They pushed German troops back 20 kilometers and took 400 prisoners. There is every reason to believe that if, instead of a limited offensive by the forces of four British and French divisions, a joint offensive of the entire northern and most of the southern groupings of the Allied armies had been carried out, its military-strategic results would have been immeasurably greater and the breakthrough of the German divisions to the English Channel would have been would be liquidated.

However, instead of building on the success of the offensive at Arras, Gort hastened to give the order, contrary to the general strategic plan agreed with the French, for the retreat of British forces to the area of ​​​​the proposed evacuation - to Dunkirk.

As Churchill recalls, in the twentieth of May, the British cabinet was faced with a dilemma: the British army, at any cost, together with the French, should fight its way to the Somme, or retreat to Dunkirk and carry out a sea evacuation under the bombs of enemy aircraft with the inevitable loss of all artillery and other heavy weapons. The War Cabinet of England, on the initiative of General Gort, decided to evacuate the English expeditionary forces; Thus, London abandoned its ally, France, at the most critical moment of the battle.

Proposals for the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Forces were made by Gort around May 18–19, that is, at the height of the fighting with the Germans rushing to the English Channel coast. The “Gort Plan” coincided with the plan of the British War Cabinet, from the point of view of Prime Minister W. Churchill. True, the chief of the imperial general staff, Ironside, initially did not agree with General Gort’s proposals for the evacuation of the English expeditionary army. He urgently flew to France, where, meeting with Gort, he demanded that he prepare an offensive operation to the south, in the direction of Arras, to unite with French troops. As we have already seen, Gort reluctantly, and even then only with the strength of two divisions, partially carried out this directive, knowing that the British cabinet supported his opinion on the evacuation.

On the morning of May 20, at a secret meeting of the British cabinet, plans for the evacuation of the British expeditionary forces from the continent were discussed. The minutes of the meeting stated: “The Prime Minister believes that, as a precautionary measure, the Ministry of the Navy should assemble a large number of small ships, which should be ready to enter the ports and bays on the French coast.”

In deep secrecy not only from the German command, but also from their French allies, England began urgently preparing an evacuation plan. On May 20, a secret meeting was held in Dover with the participation of all concerned, including representatives of the Ministry of Merchant Marine. The meeting participants discussed the issue of “The urgent evacuation of very large forces across the English Channel” from Calais, Boulogne and Dunkirk. Thirty ferry-type vessels, ten naval drifters and six coasters were allocated to the first phase. Officers of the English Maritime Transport Service from Harwich to Weymouth were ordered to register all suitable vessels of up to a thousand tons. A full inspection of all ships was carried out in all English harbors. This plan for the evacuation of the British expeditionary forces from the continent to England was codenamed Operation Dynamo.

At a time when the French army was fighting bloody battles on the Somme and launching a counterattack in Northern France in the direction of Cambrai, General Gort was withdrawing English divisions to the Gravelines-Saint-Omer line in order to cover the port of Dunkirk, from which the evacuation of the English expeditionary army was planned. Early on the morning of May 22, Churchill flew back to Paris with the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Dill.

A secret meeting took place at the Chateau de Vincennes, the main headquarters of the French army. In addition to Reynaud, who combined the post of Prime Minister and the post of Minister of War, Weygand and Dill were present.

The situation in France was very difficult.

Everywhere in the country: in the army, in government agencies, and even in the Reynaud government itself, the fascist “fifth column” was active. Some French officers abandoned their units. Entire divisions found themselves without weapons and ammunition. The roads were clogged with thousands of cars, bicycles, carts, and baby carriages, on which refugees carried their belongings. Exhausted by hunger, women and children cried, many fell dead.

But Reynaud still hoped for a “miracle” that would save France. “If someone tells me tomorrow,” he exclaimed pathetically, “that a miracle is needed to save France, I will answer: I believe in a miracle, because I believe in France.”

But a “miracle” similar to the “miracle on the Marne” of 1914, when the Russian armies saved Paris, France, with their offensive in East Prussia, did not happen. True, at the meeting in Vincennes, Reynaud spoke in favor of confirming the “Weygand Plan” adopted at the meeting in Ypres - a plan for breaking through and uniting the cut-off Anglo-French armies. But here the hypocrisy of the English prime minister was revealed in full force. On May 23, when Gort's army was already retreating to Dunkirk, Churchill sent an energetic demarche to Reynaud, demanding that he "immediately implement the Weygand plan" in order to "turn defeat into victory." “Time is worth living!” - Churchill exclaimed pathetically. Reynaud Churchill sent a copy of this letter to General Gort. The latter perfectly understood Churchill’s cunning diplomatic game. Having turned to London for clarification, Gort received an answer that left no doubt: the British general staff was not thinking about any counter-offensive.

On May 24, Churchill received an encrypted telegram from Reynaud, which said: “You have telegraphed to me... that you have given General Gort instructions to continue implementing the Weygand plan. Now General Weygand informed me that ... the British army carried out, on its own initiative, a withdrawal of twenty-five miles towards the ports, at a time when our troops, moving from the south, were successfully advancing north, to where they should meet their ally. Such actions by the British army are in direct violation of formal orders, which were confirmed this morning by General Weygand."

Even such a politician as Reynaud was forced to unequivocally accuse England of gross violation of allied obligations.

The retreat of the English army towards Dunkirk thwarted plans to close the gap and restore a continuous front line.

The position of the retreating English expeditionary army was difficult. Moreover, by May 24, the chances of her rescue seemed very slim.

Churchill admitted in his speech in the House of Commons on June 4, when the threat of complete defeat at Dunkirk had passed: “I was afraid that I would have the bitter fate of announcing the greatest military defeat in our entire long history. I thought... that maybe it would be possible to evacuate 20-30 thousand people. It seemed inevitable that the entire French 1st Army and the entire English Expeditionary Army... would be defeated in open battle or be forced to capitulate."

It seemed that the defeat of the British and French troops by the German armies, sandwiched in a small triangle, the base of which was Gravelines - Terneuzen, and the apex at Cambrai, was inevitable. But suddenly the German fist, raised for a decisive blow to the Anglo-French armies, hung in the air.

When on the morning of May 24, Kleist's tank group reached the Gravelines - Saint-Omer - Bethune line and had to make the final push along the coast to cut off the retreating British and French troops from the sea, Hitler gave his mysterious “stop order” (Halt Befehl). In agreement with the commander of Army Group A, Rundstedt, Hitler stopped Kleist and Hoth's tanks aimed at Dunkirk and forbade them to cross the Aa Canal line.

At 11 hours 42 minutes on May 24, the British command intercepted an unencrypted German message about the suspension of the offensive on the Dunkirk-Azebrouck-Merville line.

On the same day, the Wehrmacht High Command issued Directive No. 13, in which the tasks of destroying the enemy group were to be carried out primarily by the infantry divisions of Army Group B.

Directive No. 13 stated: “The immediate object of the operation is the destruction of the French, English and Belgian armed forces surrounded in Artois and Flanders by a concentric advance of the right wing of our armies and the rapid capture of the English Channel coast in this area.”

As can be seen from this directive, Hitler, while suspending the offensive, did not at all intend to stop it. It was only a matter of changing tactical plans. The completion of the attack on the Anglo-French troops was now entrusted not to the tank formations, which until that moment had played the role of the main striking force, but to the infantry divisions and aviation.

In a letter to Mussolini dated May 26, 1940, Hitler outlined the reasons that prompted him to suspend the advance of the tank groups. “Before giving the order for the final breakthrough to the English Channel,” he wrote, “I considered it necessary, even despite the risk that part of the Anglo-French troops would be able to evacuate or leave the encirclement, to temporarily suspend our offensive. In the two days we gained in this way, we managed to put the roads in order... so now we have nothing to fear from any difficulties in supplying the troops. At the same time, infantry divisions... can now again link up with tank and motorized formations..."

This decision of Hitler fundamentally contradicted the order of the main command of the ground forces, given the day before by Brauchitsch, who considered it necessary to continue the offensive on the allied armies in order to cut them off from the coast; Brauchitsch assigned the role of the main striking force to tank formations.

Many World War II scholars believe that the reversal of the Army Commander's order was a major operational miscalculation by Hitler.

What military-tactical considerations (political motives will be discussed later) were the Fuhrer guided by when he canceled Brauchitsch’s order? This is evidenced by Field Marshal Rundstedt, who wrote: “Hitler’s decision was justified by the fact that on the map at his disposal in Berlin, the area around the port was shown as swampy and unsuitable for tank units. Considering that there were few tanks, that the terrain was difficult to pass and that the French armies to the south had not yet been destroyed, Hitler decided to abandon the tank attack, considering it too risky." He, according to Rundstedt, retained forces to deliver the main blow to the south “with the goal of capturing Paris and the final suppression of French resistance.” Apparently, this is why the forces introduced by Hitler at Dunkirk were insufficient to complete the defeat of the Anglo-French armies.

The question arises: how valid are the reasons that prompted the German high command to stop tank formations at the decisive moment of the operation? One can argue whether they were convincing enough, or whether these were mistakes of Hitler and his generals. There are discussions about this. Hitler, Rundstedt and Keitel considered one of the reasons for suspending tanks: “the territory of Flanders is too swampy for tanks to pass through.”

Of course, Hitler's troops had sufficient engineering support to pave the way for tanks through terrain crossed by ditches, numerous obstacles and canals. But at the same time, tank formations would have suffered significant losses, which would have increased immeasurably during the period of possible street battles in Dunkirk. In accordance with the instructions of the German high command, it was strictly forbidden to use tanks for street battles, including for Dunkirk. At that time, Halder also spoke out against the use of tanks in street battles, believing that such battles should have been fought by infantry divisions. The losses of German tanks in the battles near Arras reached 50 percent. Kleist's tank group was even more battered after the Boulogne - Calais - Ypres - Lille operation. The total German losses in tanks from May 10 to May 30 amounted to almost 466 vehicles.

So, swamps are swamps, but after a two-week rapid offensive, German tank formations were in dire need of respite and regrouping.

Hitler's decision was also influenced by the arguments of his closest military advisers: Keitel, Jodl, as well as Goering, who especially persistently sought that the “honor” of the final defeat of the encircled British troops should be entrusted to the air force. Goering was jealous of the victories of army generals to the detriment of his authority, striving for the first laurels of victory to go to him and his entourage.

All these circumstances undoubtedly played a role in Hitler's decision to suspend Kleist's Panzer Group. Hitler wanted to preserve his strength for the decisive stage of the war in France and its defeat.

The already mentioned Directive No. 13 stated: “Air strikes should be followed as quickly as possible by an operation by ground forces (that is, the second, decisive stage of the attack on France. - F.V.), with the goal of destroying… enemy forces.” Halder wrote on May 25 in his diary: “...The political leadership believes that the decisive battle should take place not on the territory of Flanders, but in Northern France.”

Thus, as documents show, at the end of May - beginning of June 1940, the immediate goal of Hitler's strategy was the defeat of France, and not the neutralization of England.

Before talking about Operation Dynamo, it is necessary to mention the myth created by the German generals Rundstedt, Jodl, Blumentritt and picked up by Western European historians and military observers - Liddell Hart, Shulman, Assmann, Gotard and others - the myth of the “golden bridge”, allegedly built by Hitler for the English expeditionary army at Dunkirk, through which it came to salvation, about his “reluctance to conquer England”, “intention to release the English expeditionary forces to their homeland.”

German generals, dressed in the toga of “true friends of England” and trying to rehabilitate Hitler’s policy of aggression and robbery, after the fact invented a simple theory that the Fuhrer supposedly “allowed” the British expeditionary army to evacuate from Dunkirk, made a beautiful gesture, deliberately “released it from the trap “, so as not to humiliate the British, save them from shame and thereby make it easier for proud Albion to conclude peace with Nazi Germany. It can be stated with full responsibility that there is not a single document in the documents available to historians that would confirm these conjectures. On the contrary, the documents speak of Hitler's determination to defeat the British at Dunkirk.

Hitler, if not fully, undoubtedly understood the danger that arose in connection with the departure of the main forces of the British army from the mainland. In the already mentioned letter to Mussolini, sent on May 26, the Fuhrer informed him of the preparations for the final defeat of Gort’s army at Dunkirk. “This morning,” he wrote, “all armies are preparing to resume the offensive against the enemy... The mass of heavy and super-heavy artillery that we have brought to the front, the guarantee of an abundant supply of ammunition, as well as the introduction of fresh infantry divisions into battle will now allow us continue the fierce offensive on this front with all our strength(italics mine. - F.V.). Under the pressure of the beginning offensive, the front will probably collapse in a few days."

Considerations attributed to Hitler about the political expediency of evacuating unarmed, intimidated and confused British soldiers and officers from Dunkirk, which would cause demoralization in the country and lead to the surrender of England to Germany, do not find documentary evidence. These are unsubstantiated allegations.

If Hitler really wanted to “let the British troops escape” from Dunkirk in order to make peace with England, why did he continue the continuous grueling battles rather than stop them? Why did he order the resumption of the tank offensive on May 26 when it turned out that the 18th and 6th armies of Army Group B were advancing extremely slowly?

It would be more correct to assume that it was the military defeat of the British divisions on the continent that could force London to conclude peace with Germany. It is no coincidence that General Guderian wrote: “Only the capture of the British Expeditionary Army could strengthen Great Britain’s inclination to make peace with Germany or increase the chances of success of a possible operation during the landing in England.”

According to Hitler's adjutant Engel, during the Dunkirk period he constantly insisted on the need to destroy the British army in order to “make England more compliant in the matter of making peace.”

Hitler was convinced that, having lost allies on the continent of Europe, without the support of the United States, having lost its army, England would not be able to continue the war against the German Reich alone. He spoke about this very clearly to Mussolini during a meeting held on March 18, 1940 in Brenner.

“When France is finished,” the Fuhrer said, “England will have to make peace.” But this would not be peace, but just a truce for the sake of the Nazis implementing their plans for conquest of world domination.

When examining the “miracle of Dunkirk,” one cannot ignore the fact that the war in the West was considered by Hitler and his entourage to be only a stage on the path to conquest of world domination. The implementation of these plans was hindered by the Soviet Union. It was in the summer of 1940 that Hitler decided to begin accelerated preparations for an attack on the USSR.

In preparation for the war with the Soviet Union, Hitler fought against the Allied forces at Dunkirk with only “one hand,” saving forces, especially tank corps, not only to end the war in the West, the defeat and surrender of France, but also for a future war against the USSR. It should be taken into account that the Wehrmacht experienced a serious shortage of tanks, and the German military industry could not quickly compensate for the losses.

At the beginning of June 1940, the Nazi army had only 2114 tanks. German military factories produced less than 200 tanks and self-propelled guns per month. If aggression against the Soviet Union, according to Berlin’s original plans, was scheduled for approximately September 1940, then the fascist army, taking into account losses during further battles in France, could have 2500–2600 tanks, mainly light and medium. Hitler believed that these forces were not enough. Hence his order to “save tank forces for future operations,” the final battles against France, and most importantly, military operations against the USSR.

Finally, when analyzing the events associated with the “miracle of Dunkirk,” one should not forget another aspect of the issue, namely the strength of resistance of the English and French armies. As indecisive as the British command was in helping its ally France to counterattack the Germans and eliminate the breakthrough in the south, Churchill, Gort, and Alexander were so decisive and persistent during the period of evacuation of the British Expeditionary Army. The English army, which retained significant strength, abandoned its ally at the most difficult moment, but the English soldiers fought selflessly. An English officer, Richard Squires, who took part in the battles for Dunkirk, wrote: “Dunkirk was a flight from the battlefield. Dunkirk was a betrayal of our ally France. Dunkirk was a slap in the face for English soldiers who wanted to fight rather than evacuate under enemy gunfire."

The Nazis failed to achieve a complete military defeat of the British army on the continent. But they are by no means “to blame” for this.

On the evening of May 25, Churchill called the head of the Naval Ministry and gave a brief order: start Dynamo tomorrow. By that time, preparations for the operation to evacuate British troops from Dunkirk, as we noted, had already begun. Under the control of Admiral Ramsay, a concentration of ships and small vessels took place in Dover. The commander-in-chief of the English expeditionary army, Gort, was also preparing for the operation.

Contrary to the “Weygand Plan”, essentially refusing to launch an offensive to the south, General Gort, starting on May 25, in accordance with Churchill’s instructions, began creating a bridgehead at Dunkirk and concentrating the remaining British troops at the port. After the fall of Boulogne and Calais, Dunkirk was the only port for evacuation.

Gort was actively assisted by Generals Brooke, Alexander and Montgomery. Gort was just waiting for the last signal from London. And this signal was given. On the morning of May 26, he received a secret telegram from the War Ministry. It approved Gort's actions and allowed him to "make his way towards the coast in cooperation with French and Belgian troops." Soon they received a second laconic telegram: “Retreat to the coast.” At one o'clock on May 27, in confirmation of previous telegrams, Gort received another instruction from the Minister of War: “evacuate as much of your troops as possible to England.”

On the evening of May 26, Operation Dynamo began. By the night of May 27, a motley flotilla of English ships headed to the coast of France. Dozens of warships took part in the operation, including cruisers, 39 destroyers, 36 minesweepers, as well as non-military ships and vessels: 77 trawlers and drifters, 40 schooners, 25 yachts with naval crews, 45 transport ships, 8 hospital ships, motor boats, tugs. Rescue boats from ocean-going ships docked in London were mobilized. In total, 861 British and foreign ships took part in Operation Dynamo, of which 300 were French, Polish, Dutch, and Norwegian. Throughout England, like a gust of storm, the cry for the salvation of “our boys on the Dunkirk shore” rushed.

Tens of thousands of Englishmen - fishermen, dockers, drivers, machinists, yachtsmen from Dover, Ramsgate, Plymouth, Hull - everyone who could hold oars, steer a sail or motor boat, rushed through the Strait of Dover to save the English army, participating in Operation Dynamo. . The “Mosquito Fleet” of England, under fierce enemy bombing (the Nazis threw up to 300 bombers and 500 fighters into battle) and hurricane artillery fire, scurried from the sandy coast of the sea to large ships and transported soldiers and officers on them.

In a “patch” 50 kilometers wide and 30 kilometers deep, in the burning Dunkirk, on the coast among the sand dunes, tens of thousands of British and French soldiers fought off the advancing enemy and German air strikes. To cover the retreat, all of England's aviation was used, the entire precious reserve that Churchill had previously not wanted to throw to the aid of France - up to 300 sorties were made per day.

The British pilots fought bravely and bravely, flying 4-5 sorties from dawn to dark in Hurricanes and Spitfires from airfields in the British Isles. The extremely calm sea - in stormy weather, even the biggest daredevils would not risk crossing the English Channel on the fragile boats of the “mosquito fleet” - seemed to help the British save “their guys.” The retreat of the British, in turn, was heroically covered by French troops.

The French soldiers of General Blanchard's army fought bravely near Lille and Dunkirk. When Lord Gort informed him on 28 May of the evacuation of British troops, General Blanchard refused to order the retreat of the French divisions. Then Gort began to retreat without the French army. The French command protested against Gort's "selfish position."

The courageous resistance of the five French divisions of the 1st Army near Lille, which were later cut off and captured by the Germans after they had used up all their shells and cartridges, largely ensured the success of the evacuation of British troops from Dunkirk.

Only about half of the 1st French Army broke through to Dunkirk. But those French soldiers and officers who arrived at Dunkirk were evacuated by order of Gort in the second place.

On May 31, Black flew for the third time, accompanied by Attlee and Ismay, to Parshk. At the meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allies, held in Reynaud's office, in the War Ministry on the Rue Saint-Dominique, Petain, Weygand and Darlan were also present.

The main objective of Churchill's trip was to soften the Anglo-French tensions that arose as a result of the uncoordinated retreat of Gort's army, and to get France to continue the war with Germany. He failed to achieve either one or the other.

At a meeting in Paris, it was revealed that Petain and other French political figures were ready to make a separate peace with the Germans. Back on May 25, at a meeting of the French military committee, the government and command decided to seek a truce with Germany. Churchill, in his words, “sang his usual song: we will continue to fight, no matter what happens and no matter who leaves the battle.”

The next morning, Churchill left Paris.

May 31 and June 1 were the climax of Operation Dynamo. In these two days, over 132 thousand people were taken to England - more than in any of the other difficult days of the Dunkirk operation. Of the total number of evacuees to England, one third were taken from the coast on ships of the “mosquito fleet” under artillery fire and fierce air raids. At sea, British ships were pursued by enemy torpedo boats and aircraft. The sea was literally swarming with people begging for help. In the last two days, when the enemy ring had not yet closed completely, evacuation could only be carried out under cover of darkness. On the last night and morning of June 4, when all British troops were removed, 26 thousand French soldiers were evacuated from Dunkirk. At 9.00 Dunkirk fell. At 1423 GMT, the English Navy Ministry announced the completion of Operation Dynamo. A “rearguard tragedy” took place on the shore - about 40 thousand French soldiers and officers who covered the evacuation of their comrades were captured by fascists.

During the nine days of Operation Dynamo, from May 27 to June 4, according to the Navy Ministry, 338 thousand people were evacuated to England, of which 215 thousand were British. The remaining 123 thousand were French, Belgian soldiers and military personnel from other countries allied to England. 50 thousand people were rescued by ships of the French fleet. During the operation, German bombers and torpedo boats sank 224 ships and transport vessels.

The total Allied losses at Dunkirk amounted to 9,290 people killed, and in total, including the wounded and missing, they reached 68 thousand people.

At Dunkirk, almost all the weapons and equipment of the British army were lost - 7 thousand tons of ammunition, 90 thousand rifles, all artillery (2300 guns), 120 thousand vehicles, 8000 machine guns, not to mention tanks and armored cars. True, General Alexander captured a handful of stones from the beaches of Dunkirk, hoping to return to France again.

The French lost a quarter of all artillery, a third of light and heavy tanks, and three quarters of medium tanks.

The numbers of Allied losses at Dunkirk, especially in manpower and equipment, and the ferocity of the battles refute the false legend of the “golden bridge.” The fact that Hitler and his generals failed to destroy the British army at Dunkirk, and they sought to do so, was the result of a number of political and other factors.

If for the German command this was a failure, then for the British and French the loss of the Battle of Dunkirk was a severe military defeat. Assessing the events at Dunkirk in parliament, Churchill was forced to characterize them as “a major military defeat.” He admitted that such “evacuations do not win wars.”

England's position became desperately difficult. Its people paid for the consequences of the Munich course, for the policy of encouraging fascist aggressors. The enemy was at England's doorstep.

W. Churchill sought to encourage his compatriots. “We,” he said in the House of Commons, “will not give up and will not submit. We will go to the end, we will fight in France, we will fight on the seas and oceans, we will fight with increasing confidence and strength in the air, we will defend our island ... "

Thus, the “Miracle of Dunkirk”, in which, as we have seen, there was nothing “miraculous”, was due to a combination of military-strategic, tactical and political factors. The most important of them were Hitler's plans to conquer world domination and prepare a war against the USSR, which stood in the way of the fascist aggressors.

Already in the days of Dunkirk, Hitler was thinking about saving military forces and resources for the sake of fulfilling both the immediate task - the defeat and surrender of France, and the main task - the war against the USSR with the goal of its destruction.

Even without yet participating in the Second World War, the USSR, with its strength and power, most directly influenced the events and course of the war, and in particular the “miracle” at Dunkirk, and thereby helped preserve and evacuate the British expeditionary army.

The legend about the “golden bridge”, about Hitler’s “humanism”, his “concern” for the prestige of the proud Englishmen, supposedly “released” by him from Dunkirk, should be attributed to the realm of generals’ fairy tales. The simple purpose of this legend is to justify the miscalculations of Hitler and the German generals at Dunkirk and to disguise a number of other circumstances.

Hitler, quite likely, sought peace with England, but such a peace that would be “an important link in the preparation of the German campaign in the East, against the USSR.”

The political meaning of the legend about the “golden bridge” at Dunkirk, about the “peacefulness” of Hitler and the German generals is, among other things, to prove, contrary to the facts, that fascist Germany was not an irreconcilable enemy of England and the war between Germany and England was a political mistake. The meaning of the legend of the “Miracle of Dunkirk” also has another side. Bourgeois falsifiers of history, West German generals, British and American strategists are trying to belittle the role of the Soviet Union in saving Europe from the brown plague and the British Isles from Hitler's invasion.

Memoirs. P., 1950, p. 504.

Churchill W. Op. cit., vol. 2, p. 100.

Cm.: Devine D. Quote cit., p. 169–171.

See: World War II. Brief history, p. 60.

Cm.: Devine D. Quote cit., p. 222.

See: History of the Second World War, 1939–1945, vol. 3, p. 102.

Churchill W. Op. cit., vol. 2, p. 103.

Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, 1940, vol. 361, col. 793.

History of the Second World War, 1939–1945, vol. 3, p. 104.