The war in Afghanistan is one of the main events of the Cold War, which provoked a crisis of the communist system, and after it the collapse of the USSR. The war led to the death of 15 thousand Soviet military personnel, the appearance of several tens of thousands of young military invalids, aggravated the already severe socio-economic crisis in which the Soviet Union found itself in the second half of the 1970s, made the burden of military expenditures exorbitant for the country, led to further international isolation of the USSR.

The true causes of the war lay in the inability of the Soviet leadership to timely and correctly assess the major dynamic changes in the Greater Middle East, the main content of which was the emergence and growth of Islamic fundamentalism, the systematic use of terrorism as a tool to achieve political goals, and the emergence of adventurous regimes that relied on armed conflicts ( Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya), economic polarization, population growth due to the younger generation, dissatisfied with their financial situation.

In the region, from the second half of the 1960s, new centers of influence, alliances and lines of tension began to form, huge financial resources were accumulated from the sale of oil and the arms trade, which in abundance began to spread everywhere. The political divide in the region did not run along the “socialism-capitalism” axis, as Moscow mistakenly imagined, but along religious lines.

The introduction of troops and war could not be the answer to these changes and new problems. However, Moscow still viewed the Middle East region through the prism of its confrontation with the United States, as the arena of some kind of “big” zero-sum superpower game.

The Afghan crisis is an example of Moscow’s lack of understanding of its national interests, an incorrect assessment of the situation in the world, the region and in its own country, ideological narrow-mindedness, and political myopia.

In Afghanistan, the inadequacy of the goals and methods of Soviet foreign policy with the real state of affairs in the world was revealed.

The middle and second half of the 1970s were marked by increased instability in the Middle East, which was a consequence of the anti-colonial revolutions of the 1950s and 60s, a series of Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the awakening of Islam. The year 1979 turned out to be especially turbulent: the leader of the Arab world, Egypt, concludes a separate peace treaty with Israel, which causes a storm of indignation in the region; revolution in Iran brings ayatollahs to power; Saddam Hussein, who led Iraq, is looking for a reason for an armed conflict and finds it in the war with Iran; Syria, led by Assad (the elder), provokes a civil war in Lebanon, into which Iran is drawn; Libya, under the leadership of Gaddafi, sponsors various terrorist groups; The center-left government in Turkey resigns.

The situation in peripheral Afghanistan is also becoming radicalized. In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan came to power here, declaring its desire to build socialism. In the political language of that time, this meant a statement of readiness to become a “client” of the USSR in anticipation of financial, economic and military assistance.

The Soviet Union has had good, even excellent relations with Afghanistan since 1919, when Afghanistan gained independence from England and established friendly ties with Soviet Russia. In all the decades that have passed since then, one cannot find any mention of Afghanistan in a negative context in Soviet history. There were mutually beneficial trade and economic ties. Afghanistan believed that it was in the informal sphere of influence of the USSR. The West tacitly recognized this fact and was never interested in Afghanistan. Even the change from monarchy to republic in 1973 as a result of a palace coup did not change the nature of bilateral relations.

The April “revolution” of 1978 was unexpected for Moscow, but not accidental. The leaders (Taraki, Amin, Karmal) and many of the participants in the coup were well known in Moscow - they often visited the USSR, representatives of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the First Main Directorate of the KGB (now the Foreign Intelligence Service) closely communicated and worked with them.

It seemed that Moscow had lost nothing from the regime change. However, the “socialists” repeated the sad Soviet experience of the 1920s in Central Asia, when the nationalization and redistribution of land, property, and repressive measures caused resistance from the population. Throughout 1978, the social base of the “socialists” steadily narrowed. Neighboring Iran and Pakistan took advantage of the situation and began sending groups of their military personnel in civilian clothes to Afghanistan, as well as supporting the opposition with weapons. China has shown activity. At the same time, the historical and previously existing contradictions between the leaders of the “socialists” intensified.

As a result, just a year later, in the spring of 1979, the situation in Afghanistan became critical for the new government - it was on the verge of collapse. Only the capital and 2 more of the 34 provinces remained under its control.

March 18, 1979 Taraki, in a long telephone conversation with the head of the Soviet government A. Kosygin, explains the current situation and persistently asks to send troops - now only this can save the situation, i.e. pro-Soviet government. In every word of Taraki one can see despair, a consciousness of hopelessness. He returns every question from the Soviet leader to the same urgent request - send in troops.

For Kosygin, this conversation becomes a revelation. Despite the large number of advisers working in Afghanistan through various departments, incl. The KGB and the Ministry of Defense, the Soviet leadership are not aware of what is happening in this country. Kosygin is perplexed as to why you cannot defend yourself. Taraki admits that the regime has no support among the population. In response to Kosygin’s naive, ideologically driven proposals to rely on the “workers,” Taraki says that there are only 1-2 thousand of them. The Soviet prime minister proposes, as it seems to him, a reasonable solution: we will not give troops, but we will supply equipment and weapons in the required quantity. Taraki explains to him that there is no one to control the tanks and planes, there are no trained personnel. When Kosygin recalls the several hundred Afghan officers who were trained in the USSR, Taraki reports that almost all of them went over to the side of the opposition, and mainly for religious reasons.

Shortly before Taraki, Amin called Moscow and told almost the same thing to the USSR Minister of Defense D. Ustinov.

On the same day, Kosygin informs his Politburo colleagues about the conversation that took place at a meeting specially convened for this purpose. Members of the Politburo express seemingly common-sense considerations: they underestimated the religious factor, the regime has a narrow social base, there is interference from Iran and Pakistan (and not the United States), the introduction of troops will mean a war with the population. It seems that there is a reason to review or at least adjust the policy in Afghanistan: start contacts with the opposition, with Iran and Pakistan, find a common basis for reconciliation, form a coalition government, etc. Instead, the Politburo decides to follow the more than strange line that Kosygin proposed to Taraki - they are ready to supply weapons and equipment (which there is no one to control), but we will not send in troops. Then the question had to be answered: what to do in the event of the imminent fall of the regime, which is what the regime itself warns about? But this question remains unanswered, and the entire line of Soviet actions is transferred to the plane of wait-and-see and situational decisions. There is no strategy.

Three groups are gradually being identified in the Politburo: 1) Andropov and Ustinov, who, in the end, insist on the entry of troops, 2) Kosygin, who opposes this decision to the end, 3) Gromyko, Suslov, Chernenko, Kirilenko, who silently or inactively support the entry troops. The sick Leonid Brezhnev rarely participates in Politburo meetings and has difficulty focusing on the problems that need to be solved. These people are members of the Politburo commission on Afghanistan and actually act on behalf of the entire Politburo, making relevant decisions.

Throughout the spring-summer of 1979, Taraki and Amin increased pressure on the Soviet leadership with requests to help with troops. The situation is becoming so dramatic that their requests, despite the position of the Politburo, are already supported by all Soviet representatives in Afghanistan - the ambassador, representatives from the KGB and the Ministry of Defense.

By September, the conflict and struggle for power between the Afghan leaders themselves, Taraki and Amin, was heating up. On September 13-16, an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Amin occurs in Kabul, as a result of which he seizes power and removes Taraki, who is later killed. Apparently, this unsuccessful operation to eliminate Amin was carried out with the knowledge, if not without the participation of Moscow.

Since then, Moscow has set itself the goal of eliminating Amin, whom it does not trust, bringing “its” man, Karmal, to power and stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. Amin gives reasons: realizing that his survival now depends only on himself, he enters into dialogue with some opposition forces, and also tries to establish contact with the Americans. In Moscow, these in themselves reasonable actions, but carried out without coordination and secretly from the Soviet side, are viewed as a blow to Soviet interests, an attempt to remove Afghanistan from the Soviet sphere of influence.

Around October-November, issues of a special operation by Soviet forces against Amin are being worked out, the cover for which should be a second, parallel and subordinate operation to the first operation of introducing a “limited” contingent of Soviet troops, the task of which should be to ensure order in case of another miscalculation with Amin’s support among the Afghan military. At the same time, in Kabul, all the main Soviet representatives, whose activities caused growing displeasure in the Kremlin, were replaced with new ones.

By December 1, the work on the issues is completed, and Andropov gives Brezhnev a note to this effect. On December 8, Brezhnev holds an interim meeting, and on December 12, the final decision of the Politburo on the special operation and the deployment of troops is made.

Before the final decision was made, the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal N. Ogarkov, actively resisted him. It came to the point of his open clashes and wrangling in raised voices with Ustinov and Andropov, but to no avail. Ogarkov pointed out that the army would have to go to war with the population without knowledge of traditions, without knowledge of the terrain, that all this would lead to guerrilla warfare and large losses, that these actions would weaken the position of the USSR in the world. Ogarkov warned about everything that eventually happened.

The operation began on December 25, 1979. On that day alone, 215 transport aircraft (An-12, An-22, Il-76) landed at Kabul airport, delivering the forces of about one division and a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition. There was no movement of ground troops concentrated on the Soviet-Afghan border or crossing the border either on December 25 or in the following days. On December 27, Amin was removed and Babrak Karmal was brought to power. Troops gradually began to be brought in - more and more.

USSR War in Afghanistan 1979-1989

Completed by: Bukov G.E.

Introduction

Afghan war 1979-1989 - an armed conflict between the Afghan government and allied forces of the USSR, who sought to maintain the pro-communist regime in Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the Muslim Afghan resistance, on the other.

Of course, this period is not the most positive in the history of the USSR, but I wanted to open a small curtain in this war, namely, the reasons and main tasks for the USSR to eliminate the military conflict in Afghanistan.

1. Reason for hostilities

The main reason for the war was foreign interference in the Afghan internal political crisis, which was a consequence of the struggle for power between the Afghan government and numerous armed groups of the Afghan Mujahideen (“dushmans”), who enjoy political and financial support from leading NATO states and the Islamic world, on the other hand.

The internal political crisis in Afghanistan was the “April Revolution” - the events in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978, which resulted in the establishment of a Marxist pro-Soviet government in the country.

As a result of the April Revolution, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), whose leader was in 1978, came to power. Nur Mohammad Taraki (killed by order of Hafizullah Amin), and then Hafizullah Amin until December 1979, who proclaimed the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would overcome Afghanistan's lagging behind have encountered resistance from the Islamic opposition. In 1978, even before the introduction of Soviet troops, a civil war began in Afghanistan.

Lacking strong popular support, the new government brutally suppressed internal opposition. Unrest in the country and infighting between supporters of the Khalq and Parcham (the PDPA was divided into these two parts), taking into account geopolitical considerations (preventing the strengthening of US influence in Central Asia and protecting the Central Asian republics) pushed the Soviet leadership to introduce .troops to Afghanistan under the pretext of providing international assistance. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began on the basis of a resolution of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, without a formal decision regarding this by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

In March 1979, during the uprising in the city of Herat, the Afghan leadership made its first request for direct Soviet military intervention. But the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Afghanistan reported to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee about the obvious negative consequences of direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.

However, the Herat rebellion forced the reinforcement of Soviet troops at the Soviet-Afghan border and, by order of Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing of the 105th Guards Airborne Division into Afghanistan. The number of Soviet advisers (including military) in Afghanistan was sharply increased: from 409 people in January to 4,500 by the end of June 1979.

The impetus for the USSR's intervention was US assistance to the Mujahideen. According to the official version of history, CIA assistance to the mujahideen began during 1980, that is, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, kept secret until today, is different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive on secret assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979.

December 1979 began the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in three directions: Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar, Termez - Kunduz - Kabul, Khorog - Faizabad.

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan; the procedure for the use of weapons, even for the purposes of self-defense, was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov’s order appeared to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that Soviet troops would become garrisons and take protection of important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active action against opposition forces, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Air Assault Brigade crossed the pontoon bridge across the border river Amu Darya, which was tasked with capturing the high-mountainous Salang pass on the Termez-Kabul road to ensure the unhindered passage of Soviet troops. On the same day, the transfer of units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram began. The first to land at the Kabul airfield were the paratroopers of the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G.I. Shpaka.

The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar. Sending in troops is not easy; Afghan President Hafizullah Amin was killed during the capture of the presidential palace in Kabul. The Muslim population did not accept the Soviet presence, and an uprising broke out in the northeastern provinces, spreading throughout the country.

Operation STORM-333

The general plan for the operation in Kabul, carried out on December 27, was developed by the dishonest efforts of representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the KGB of the USSR, led by Major Y. Semenov. The plan of the operation, codenamed “Baikal-79,” provided for the seizure of the most important objects in the Afghan capital: the Taj Beg Palace, the buildings of the PDPA Central Committee, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Communications of the DRA, the General Staff, the headquarters of the military air forces and the headquarters of the Central Army Corps, military counterintelligence (KAM), a prison for political prisoners in Puli-Charkhi, a radio and television center, post and telegraph, headquarters of the Air Force and Air Defense... At the same time, it was planned to blockade military units and formations of the Armed Forces located in the Afghan capital DRA forces of paratroopers of motorized rifle troops arriving in Kabul. In total, 17 objects had to be captured. The appropriate forces and means were assigned to each object, and the procedure for interaction and control was determined.

In fact, at the beginning of the operation in Kabul there were special units of the KGB of the USSR (“Thunder” - a little more than 30 people, “Zenit” - 150 people, a company of border guards - 50 people), as well as quite significant forces from the USSR Ministry of Defense: air force airborne division, 154th special forces detachment of the GRU General Staff (“Muslim” battalion), units of the 345th separate parachute regiment, military advisers (in total more than 10 thousand people). They all fulfilled their tasks and worked towards the final result of the operation.

The most difficult and important object to capture was the Taj Beg Palace where the residence of H. Amin was located and he himself was located. Of all the officers and soldiers who took part in the assault on the Taj Beg Palace, almost no one knew the full plan of the operation and did not have control over the overall situation, and each acted in his own narrow area, in fact, in the role of a simple fighter.

Therefore, for most of them, the events in Kabul focused only on their objective, and for many fighters the operation still remains a mystery. For most of them, it was a “baptism of fire” - the first real battle in life. Hence the overflow of emotions in memories, the “thickening” of colors. Finding themselves in an extreme situation, each of them showed what they were worth and what they had achieved. The vast majority completed the combat mission with honor , showing heroism and courage. Many officers and soldiers were wounded, some died.

On the evening of December 25, General Drozdov, based on the results of reconnaissance of objects, held a meeting with the commanders of reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the KGB of the USSR, and determined the place of each in the capture of Taj Beg. Everyone was ready, the situation was missing only the plan of the palace.

“Grom” and “Zenith” officers M. Romanov, Y. Semenov, V. Fedoseev and E. Mazaev conducted reconnaissance of the area and reconnaissance of firing points located nearby. Not far from the palace, on a high-rise building, there was a restaurant (casino), where senior officers of the Afghan army usually gathered. Under the pretext of needing to book places for our officers to celebrate the New Year, the special forces visited there too. From there, the Taj Beck was clearly visible; all the approaches to it and the location of the storage posts were clearly visible. True, this initiative almost ended tragically for them.

By the beginning of Operation Storm-333, special forces from the KGB groups of the USSR thoroughly knew the object of capture of Haj Beg: the most convenient routes of approach; guard mode services; the total number of Amin's security and bodyguards; location of machine gun nests, armored vehicles and tanks; the internal structure of the palace labyrinth rooms; placement of radiotelephone communication equipment.

The signals for the start of the general operation “Baikal-79” should have been a powerful explosion in the center of Kabul. Special group of the KGB of the USSR "Zenith" led by B.A. Pleshkunov was supposed to blow up the so-called “well” - essentially a neutral secret communication center with the most important military and civilian facilities of the DRA.

Assault ladders, equipment, weapons and ammunition were being prepared. Under the leadership of the deputy battalion commander for technical matters, Senior Lieutenant Eduard Ibragimov, Glaznoye's military equipment was carefully checked and prepared - secrecy and secrecy.

The Taj Beg Palace was located on a high, steep hill overgrown with trees and bushes, all approaches to it were mined. There was only one road leading here, guarded around the clock. The palace itself was also a difficult-to-reach structure. Its thick walls are able to withstand artillery attacks. If we add to this that the area around was shelled by tanks and heavy machine guns, then it becomes clear that it was very difficult to take possession of it.

At about six o'clock in the evening, Kolesnik was called by Colonel General Magomedov and said, “Due to unforeseen circumstances, the time of the assault has been postponed, we must begin as soon as possible,” and the operation began earlier than the set time. Literally fifteen to twenty minutes later, the capture group led by Captain M. Sakhatov left in the direction of the height where the tanks were buried. Among them were two officers each from "Grom" and "Zenith", as well as the chief of reconnaissance of the battalion, Senior Lieutenant A. Dzhamolov. The tanks were guarded by sentries, and their crews were in a barracks located at a distance of 150-200 meters from them.

When the car of M. Sakhatov’s group approached the location of the third battalion, shooting was suddenly heard there, which suddenly intensified. Colonel Kolesnik immediately issued the command “Fire!” for the soldiers and officers of the “Muslim” battalion and special groups of the KGB of the USSR. and “Forward!” Red rockets flew into the air. It was 19.15 on the clock. The signal “Storm-333” was sent over the radio networks.

The first to attack the palace, at the command of senior lieutenant Vasily Prout, were two ZSU-23-4 Shilki self-propelled anti-aircraft guns that opened fire at direct fire, bringing down a sea of ​​shells on it. Two other installations hit the infantry battalion, supporting a company of paratroopers. AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers began firing at the location of the tank battalion, preventing the crews from approaching the vehicles.

Units of the “Muslim” battalion began moving to their destination areas. The 3rd company of Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Sharipov was supposed to advance to the Taj Beg Palace; several subgroups of special forces officers from “Grom” were placed on its five infantry fighting vehicles along with the soldiers. Major Y. Semenov with the “Zenit” group on four armored personnel carriers of the platoon The 1st company of Lieutenant Rustam Tursunkulov was supposed to advance to the western part of the hill. Then, rush up the pedestrian stairs to the end of the Taj Beck, and at the facade of the building both groups had to connect and act together. But at the last moment everything got mixed up. As soon as the first armored personnel carrier passed the turn and approached the stairs leading to the end of the Taj Beg, heavy machine guns fired from the building. The armored personnel carrier where Boris Suvorov's subgroup was located was immediately hit and caught fire. The personnel immediately began to parachute, some were injured. The subgroup commander himself was hit in the groin by a ghoul, just below his body armor. It was not possible to save him - he bled to death. Jumping out of the armored personnel carriers, the Zenit fighters and the soldiers of Tursunkulov’s platoon were forced to lie down and shoot at the windows of the palace, and with the help of assault ladders they began to climb up the mountain.

At this time, the Thunder subgroups also began to advance towards Taj Beg.

When the group's machine gunner jumped out onto the platform in front of the Taj Beg, they came under heavy fire from heavy machine guns. It seemed like they were shooting from everywhere. The "Grom" employees rushed to the palace building, and the soldiers of Sharipov's company lay down and began to cover them with fire from machine guns and machine guns, and also repel the attack of the Afghan soldiers located in the guardhouse. Their actions were led by the platoon commander, Lieutenant Abdullaev. Something unimaginable was happening. A picture of hell. “Shilkas” shoot “beautifully”. Everything was mixed up. But everyone acted in one impulse, there was not a single one who tried to evade or sit in cover to wait out the assault. The number of assault groups was melting before our eyes. With incredible efforts, the special forces managed to overcome the resistance of the Afghans and break through to the palace building. The fighters of the “Muslim” battalion provided them with great help in this. All groups and fighters mixed up, and everyone was already acting at their own discretion. There was no single team. The only goal was to run faster to the walls of the palace, somehow hide behind them and complete the task. The special forces were in a foreign country, in a foreign uniform, without documents, without any identification marks, except for white armbands, there was nothing. The density of fire was such that the triplexes on all infantry fighting vehicles were broken, the bulwarks were pierced on every square centimeter, that is, they looked like a colander. The special forces were saved only by the fact that they were all wearing bulletproof vests, although almost all of them were wounded. The soldiers from the “Muslim” battalion were without body armor, since at Koslesnik’s command they handed over their body armor to the fighters of the assault groups. Of the thirty "Zenith" and twenty-two fighters from "Thunder", no more than twenty-five people managed to break through to Taj Beg, and many of them were wounded. These forces were clearly not enough to guarantee the elimination of Amin. According to Alexander Ivashchenko, who was next to Colonel Boyarinov during the battle, when they broke into the palace and met stubborn resistance from the guards, they realized that they could not complete the task with small forces. By the time the special forces entered the palace, the Shilki should have ceased fire, but contact with them was lost. Colonel V. Kolesnik sent a messenger, and “The Shilkas transferred the fire to other objects. Infantry fighting vehicles left the area in front of the palace and blocked the only road. Another company and a platoon of AGS-17 grenade launchers and ATGMs fired at the tank battalion, then the soldiers captured the tanks, simultaneously disarming the tankers. A special group of the “Muslim” battalion took possession of the anti-aircraft regiment’s weapons and captured its personnel. In the palace, the officers and soldiers of Amin's personal guard, his bodyguards (about 100-150 people) resisted steadfastly, without surrendering. What ruined them was that they were all armed mainly with MG-5 submachine guns, and they did not penetrate our body armor.

The Shilkas again shifted their fire, starting to hit the Taj-Bek, the area in front of it. A fire started on the second floor of the palace, which had a severe impact on the defending guards. As the special forces advanced to the second floor, the shooting and explosions intensified. The soldiers from Amin's guard, who mistook the special forces for their own rebel unit, heard Russian speech and surrendered to them. Lights were burning everywhere in the palace. All attempts by Nikolai Shvachko to turn it off ended in vain. The power supply was autonomous. Somewhere in the depths of the building, perhaps in the basement, electric generators were working, but there was no time to look for them. Some fighters shot at the light bulbs in order to somehow take cover, because they were in full view of the palace defenders. By the end of the assault, only a few anti-aircraft devices remained intact, but they were burning. The battle in the palace did not last long (43 minutes). Having received information about Amin’s death, the company commander, Senior Lieutenant V. Sharipov, also began to call Colonel V. Kolesnik on the radio to report on the completion of the task, but there was no communication. He finally managed to contact the battalion chief of staff, Ashurov, and allegorically reported that Amin had been killed. The chief of staff reported this to the battalion commander, Major Khalbaev and Colonel Kolesnik. Major Khalbaev reported on the seizure of the palace and the liquidation of Amin to Lieutenant General N.N. Guskov, and he - to the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov. After Assadul Sarvari, who arrived at the palace (he did not participate in the assault), was convinced and confirmed that Amin was really dead, the corpse of the head of state and leader of the PDPA was wrapped in a carpet... The main task was completed. Success in this operation was ensured not so much by force as by surprise, audacity and swiftness of pressure. Immediately after the capture of Taj-Bek, Drozdov reported to Ivanov on the completion of the task, and then handed over the radio station to Evald Kozlov and ordered the results of the battle to be reported to the leadership. When Kozlov, who had not yet recovered from the battle, began to report to General Ivanov, he interrupted him with the question “What’s wrong?” Oak ? Ewald began to select words to speak veiledly about Amin’s death, but Ivanov again asked: “Is he killed?” Kozlov replied: “Yes, killed.” And the general immediately interrupted the connection. It was necessary to urgently report Yu.V. to Moscow. Andropov about the completion of the main task, and the group of Captain M. Sakhatov arrived at the palace building with two tanks captured from the Afghans. He reported to Kolesnik about the completion of the combat mission and said: when we drove past the third battalion of the security brigade, we saw that an alarm had been declared there. Afghan soldiers received ammunition. The battalion commander and two other officers stood next to the road along which the special forces were passing. The decision came quickly. Jumping out of the car, they captured the Afghan battalion commander and both officers, throwing them into the car, and drove on. Some soldiers who managed to get cartridges opened fire on them. Then the entire battalion rushed in pursuit - to free their commander. Then the special forces dismounted and began firing machine guns and machine guns at the fleeing infantry. The soldiers of Kurban Amangeldyev's company, which was supporting the actions of Sakhatov's group, also opened fire. During the night, special forces guarded the palace because they feared that the divisions stationed in Kabul and a tank brigade would storm it. But this did not happen. Soviet military advisers working in parts of the Afghan army and airborne troops deployed to the capital did not allow them to do this. In addition, the security services paralyzed the control of Afghan forces in advance. Some units of the Afghan security brigade continued to resist. In particular, we had to fight with the remnants of the third battalion for another day, after which the Afghans went into the mountains. Probably, some of their compatriots also suffered from their own: in the dark, the personnel of the “Muslim” battalion and the special group of the KGB of the USSR recognized each other by white armbands, the password “Misha - Yasha” and obscenities. But everyone was dressed in Afghan uniform, and they had to shoot and throw grenades from a decent distance. So try to keep track here in the darkness and confusion - who has a bandage on their sleeve and who doesn’t?! Moreover, when the captured Afghans began to be taken out, they also had white armbands on their sleeves. After the battle, the losses were counted. In total, five people died in the special groups of the KGB of the USSR during the storming of the palace. Almost everyone was wounded, but those who could hold weapons in their hands continued to fight. In the “Muslim” battalion and the 9th parachute company, 14 people were killed and more than 50 were wounded. Moreover, 23 people who were wounded remained in service. The battalion medic took the seriously wounded soldiers in an infantry fighting vehicle, first to the first aid station, and then to various medical institutions deployed at that time in Kabul. In the evening, the seriously wounded were transported to the Soviet embassy, ​​and the next morning they were sent by plane to Tashkent. On the same day, December 27, the airborne units of the 103rd division and units of the 345th regiment, as well as the forces assigned to them from the border guards, the KGB groups of the USSR "Zenit" and "Grom" reached the location of military units and formations , important administrative and special facilities in the capital and established their control over them. The capture of these key objects took place in an organized manner, with minimal losses.

Progress of the war

The Soviet command hoped to entrust the suppression of the uprising to Kabul troops, which, however, were greatly weakened by mass desertion and were unable to cope with this task. For a number of years, a “limited contingent” controlled the situation in the main cities, while the rebels felt relatively free in the countryside. Changing tactics, Soviet troops tried to deal with the rebels using tanks, helicopters and airplanes, but highly mobile groups of Mujahideen easily avoided attacks. The bombing of populated areas and the destruction of crops also did not produce results, but by 1982, about 4 million Afghans had fled to Pakistan and Iran. Supplies of weapons from other countries allowed the partisans to hold out until 1989, when the new Soviet leadership withdrew troops from Afghanistan.

The stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conventionally divided into four stages: stage: December 1979 - February 1980. Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, placing them in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points and various objects. stage: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work on the reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. stage: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active combat operations mainly to supporting the actions of Afghan troops by Soviet aviation, artillery and engineer units. Special forces units fought to suppress the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of 6 Soviet regiments to their homeland took place. Stage: January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.

afghanistan war soviet contingent

5. Withdrawal of Soviet wars from Afghanistan

Changes in the foreign policy of the Soviet leadership during the period of “perestroika” contributed to a political settlement of the situation. The situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Western forecasts that the Kabul regime would fall immediately after the end of the Soviet military presence due to its complete unviability, and that a coalition government of Mujahideen groups would lead the country to peace after the expulsion of the “communist plague” turned out to be unfounded. On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the USSR, USA, Pakistan and Afghanistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a phased peaceful solution to the Afghan problem. The Soviet government pledged to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989. The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. On February 15, 1989, Soviet troops completely withdrew from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. This event did not bring peace, as various mujahideen factions continued to fight for power among themselves.

According to updated official data, the irretrievable losses of Soviet army personnel in the Afghan War amounted to 14,427 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing. During the war, there were 49,984 wounded, 312 prisoners, and 18 internees. St. received wounds and concussions. 53 thousand people. A significant number of people who were admitted to hospitals on the territory of the USSR died from the consequences of severe wounds and injuries. These people who died in hospitals were not included in the number of officially announced losses. The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. Available estimates range from 1 to 2 million people.

Consequences of the war

After the withdrawal of the Soviet army from the territory of Afghanistan, the pro-Soviet regime of Najibullah (1986-1992) lasted another 3 years and, having lost Russian support, was overthrown in April 1992 by a coalition of mujahideen field commanders. During the war years in Afghanistan, the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda appeared and groups of Islamic radicals grew stronger.

Political implications:

In general, Soviet troops did not experience any particular difficulties in conducting military operations in Afghanistan - the main problem was that military victories were not supported by the political and economic actions of the ruling regime. Assessing the consequences of the Afghan war, it can be noted that the benefits from the intervention turned out to be negligible in comparison with the damage caused to the national interests of the USSR and Russia. The intervention of Soviet troops in Afghanistan caused sharp condemnation by most of the international community (including the USA, China, member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, including Pakistan and Iran, and even some socialist countries), weakened the influence of the USSR on the Non-Aligned Movement, and marked the end of the “era of détente.” "The 1970s led to increased economic and technological pressure on the USSR from the West and even, to some extent, aggravated the crisis in the USSR itself.

The war in Afghanistan led to numerous casualties, wasted enormous material resources, destabilized the situation in Central Asia, contributed to the strengthening of Islam in politics, the intensification of Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism. In fact, this war was one of the factors in the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. If we talk about a lesson, then the Afghan people really taught us a lesson of courage and valor in the struggle for their age-old traditions, culture, religion, and Motherland. And all valor should be glorified and admired even in the enemy. The main conclusion drawn from the Afghan war is that fundamentally political problems cannot be solved by military means.

Information sources

1. ru.wikipedia.org - article “Afghan War 1979-1989” on Wikipedia;

History.org.ua - article “Afghan War 1979-1989” in the Encyclopedia of the History of Ukraine (Ukrainian);

Mirslovarei.com - article “Afghan War” in the Historical Dictionary on the “World of Dictionaries” website;

Rian.ru - “War in Afghanistan 1979-1989.” (RIAN reference);

Rian.ru - “The statistics of losses of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan do not include those who died from wounds in hospitals in the USSR” (RIAN report).

Alexander Lyakhovsky - Tragedy and valor of Afghanistan

Psi.ece.jhu.edu - secret documents of the Politburo and the CPSU Central Committee related to the entry of Soviet troops and their stay in Afghanistan;

Ruswar.com - archive of war photographs and video chronicles;

Fergananews.com - “The full truth about the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan has not yet been revealed” (B. Yamshanov).

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| USSR participation in Cold War conflicts. War in Afghanistan (1979-1989)

Brief results of the war in Afghanistan
(1979-1989)

Colonel General B.V. Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army, in his book “Limited Contingent” expressed the following opinion about the results of the actions of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan:

“I am deeply convinced: there is no basis for the assertion that the 40th Army was defeated, nor that we won a military victory in Afghanistan. Soviet troops entered the country unhindered at the end of 1979, fulfilled - in contrast from the Americans in Vietnam - their tasks and returned to their homeland in an organized manner. If we consider the armed opposition units as the main opponent of the Limited Contingent, then the difference between us is that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans did only that what they could."

Before the withdrawal of Soviet troops began in May 1988, the Mujahideen had never managed to carry out a single major operation and had not managed to occupy a single major city. At the same time, Gromov’s opinion that the 40th Army was not tasked with military victory does not agree with the assessments of some other authors. In particular, Major General Yevgeny Nikitenko, who was deputy chief of the operations department of the 40th Army headquarters in 1985-1987, believes that throughout the war the USSR pursued constant goals - suppressing the resistance of the armed opposition and strengthening the power of the Afghan government. Despite all efforts, the number of opposition forces only grew from year to year, and in 1986 (at the peak of the Soviet military presence) the Mujahideen controlled more than 70% of the territory of Afghanistan. According to Colonel General Viktor Merimsky, former deputy. head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Afghan leadership actually lost the fight against the rebels for its people, could not stabilize the situation in the country, although it had 300,000-strong military formations (army, police, state security).

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the situation on the Soviet-Afghan border became significantly more complicated: there were shelling of the territory of the USSR, attempts to penetrate into the territory of the USSR (in 1989 alone there were about 250 attempts to penetrate into the territory of the USSR), armed attacks on Soviet border guards, mining of Soviet territory (before May 9, 1990, border guards removed 17 mines: British Mk.3, American M-19, Italian TS-2.5 and TS-6.0).

Losses of the parties

Afghan casualties

On June 7, 1988, in his speech at a meeting of the UN General Assembly, the President of Afghanistan M. Najibullah said that “from the beginning of hostilities in 1978 to the present” (that is, until June 7, 1988), 243.9 thousand people have died in the country. military personnel of government forces, security agencies, government officials and civilians, including 208.2 thousand men, 35.7 thousand women and 20.7 thousand children under 10 years of age; Another 77 thousand people were injured, including 17.1 thousand women and 900 children under the age of 10 years. According to other sources, 18 thousand military personnel were killed.

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; Available estimates range from 670 thousand civilians to 2 million in total. According to a researcher of the Afghan war from the United States, Professor M. Kramer: “During nine years of war, more than 2.7 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, several million more became refugees, many of whom fled the country.” . There appears to be no precise division of victims into government soldiers, mujahideen and civilians.

Ahmad Shah Massoud, in his letter to the Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan Yu. Vorontsov dated September 2, 1989, wrote that the Soviet Union’s support for the PDPA led to the death of more than 1.5 million Afghans, and 5 million people became refugees.

According to UN statistics on the demographic situation in Afghanistan, between 1980 and 1990, the total mortality rate of the population of Afghanistan was 614,000 people. At the same time, during this period there was a decrease in the mortality rate of the population of Afghanistan compared to previous and subsequent periods.

The result of hostilities from 1978 to 1992 was the flow of Afghan refugees to Iran and Pakistan. Sharbat Gula's photograph, featured on the cover of National Geographic magazine in 1985 under the title "Afghan Girl", has become a symbol of the Afghan conflict and the refugee problem around the world.

The Army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in 1979-1989 suffered losses in military equipment, in particular, 362 tanks, 804 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 120 aircraft, 169 helicopters were lost.

USSR losses

1979 86 people 1980 1484 people 1981 1298 people 1982 1948 people 1983 1448 people 1984 2343 people 1985 1868 people 1986 1333 people 1987 1215 people 1988 759 people 1989 year 53 people

Total - 13,835 people. These data first appeared in the Pravda newspaper on August 17, 1989. Subsequently, the total figure increased slightly. As of January 1, 1999, irretrievable losses in the Afghan war (killed, died from wounds, diseases and accidents, missing) were estimated as follows:

Soviet Army - 14,427
KGB - 576 (including 514 border troops)
Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28

Total - 15,031 people.

Sanitary losses - 53,753 wounded, shell-shocked, injured; 415,932 cases. Of those sick with infectious hepatitis - 115,308 people, typhoid fever - 31,080, other infectious diseases - 140,665 people.

Out of 11,294 people. 10,751 people dismissed from military service due to health reasons remained disabled, of which 1st group - 672, 2nd group - 4216, 3rd group - 5863 people.

According to official statistics, during the fighting in Afghanistan, 417 military personnel were captured and went missing (of which 130 were released before the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan). The Geneva Agreements of 1988 did not stipulate the conditions for the release of Soviet prisoners. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, negotiations for the release of Soviet prisoners continued through the mediation of the DRA and Pakistani governments.

Losses in equipment, according to widespread official data, amounted to 147 tanks, 1,314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD, BRDM-2), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel tankers, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters (helicopter losses only 40th Army, excluding helicopters of the border troops and the Central Asian Military District). At the same time, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, information was not published on the number of combat and non-combat aviation losses, on the losses of airplanes and helicopters by type, etc. It should be noted that the former deputy commander of the 40th Army for armaments, General Lieutenant V.S. Korolev gives other, higher figures for losses in equipment. In particular, according to his data, Soviet troops in 1980-1989 irretrievably lost 385 tanks and 2,530 units of armored personnel carriers, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles (rounded figures).

When Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in December 1979 to support the friendly communist regime, no one could have imagined that the war would stretch out for ten long years and ultimately “drive” the last nail “in the coffin” of the USSR. Today, some are trying to present this war as the villainy of the “Kremlin elders” or the result of a worldwide conspiracy. However, we will try to rely only on the facts.

According to modern data, the losses of the Soviet Army in the Afghan war amounted to 14,427 people killed and missing. In addition, 180 advisers and 584 specialists from other departments were killed. More than 53 thousand people were shell-shocked, wounded or injured.

Cargo "200"

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; Available estimates range from 670 thousand civilians to 2 million in total. According to Harvard professor M. Kramer, an American researcher of the Afghan war: “During the nine years of war, more than 2.7 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, and several million more became refugees, many of whom fled the country.” . There appears to be no clear division of victims into government soldiers, mujahideen and civilians.

The terrible consequences of war

For the courage and heroism shown during the war in Afghanistan, more than 200 thousand military personnel were awarded orders and medals (11 thousand were awarded posthumously), 86 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (28 posthumously). Among the awarded – 110 thousand soldiers and sergeants, about 20 thousand warrant officers, more than 65 thousand officers and generals, more than 2.5 thousand SA employees, including – 1350 women.

A group of Soviet military personnel awarded government awards

During the entire period of hostilities, 417 military personnel were in Afghan captivity, 130 of whom were released during the war and were able to return to their homeland. As of January 1, 1999, 287 people remained among those who had not returned from captivity and had not been found.

Captured Soviet soldier

During nine years of war P The losses of equipment and weapons amounted to: airplaneecomrade - 118 (in the Air Force– 107); helicopters - 333 (in the Air Force – 324); tanks - 147; BMP, armored personnel carrier, BMD, BRDM – 1314; guns and mortars - 433; radio stations and KShM – 1138; engineering vehicles – 510; flatbed vehicles and tank trucks – 11,369.

Burnt Soviet tank

The government in Kabul was dependent throughout the war on the USSR, which provided it with about $40 billion in military aid between 1978 and the early 1990s. Meanwhile, the rebels established contacts with Pakistan and the United States, and also received widespread support from from Saudi Arabia, China and a number of other states, which together provided the Mujahideen with weapons and other military equipment worth about $10 billion.

Afghan Mujahideen

On January 7, 1988, in Afghanistan, at an altitude of 3234 m above the road to the city of Khost in the Afghan-Pakistan border zone, a fierce battle took place. This was one of the most famous military clashes between units of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the armed formations of the Afghan Mujahideen. Based on these events, the film “The Ninth Company” was shot in the Russian Federation in 2005. The height of 3234 m was defended by the 9th parachute company of the 345th Guards separate parachute regiment with a total number of 39 people, supported by regimental artillery. Soviet fighters were attacked by units of Mujahideen numbering from 200 to 400 people who were trained in Pakistan. The battle lasted 12 hours. The Mujahideen never managed to capture the heights. After suffering heavy losses, they retreated. In the ninth company, six paratroopers were killed, 28 were injured, nine of them – heavy. All paratroopers for this battle were awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Red Star. Junior Sergeant V.A. Aleksandrov and Private A.A. Melnikov were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Still from the film “9th Company”

The most famous battle of Soviet border guards during the war in Afghanistan took place on November 22, 1985 near the village of Afrij in the Zardevsky gorge of the Darai-Kalat mountain range in northeastern Afghanistan. A combat group of border guards from the Panfilov outpost of a motorized maneuver group (21 people) was ambushed as a result of an incorrect crossing of the river. During the battle, 19 border guards were killed. These were the most numerous losses of border guards in the Afghan war. According to some reports, the number of Mujahideen participating in the ambush was 150 people.

Border guards after the battle

There is a well-established opinion in the post-Soviet period that the USSR was defeated and expelled from Afghanistan. It is not true. When Soviet troops left Afghanistan in 1989, they did so as a result of a well-planned operation. Moreover, the operation was carried out in several directions at once: diplomatic, economic and military. This made it possible not only to save the lives of Soviet soldiers, but also to preserve the Afghan government. Communist Afghanistan held out even after the fall of the USSR in 1991 and only then, with the loss of support from the USSR and increasing attempts from the Mujahideen and Pakistan, did the DRA begin to slide towards defeat in 1992.

Withdrawal of Soviet troops, February 1989

In November 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR declared an amnesty for all crimes committed by Soviet military personnel in Afghanistan. According to the military prosecutor's office, from December 1979 to February 1989, 4,307 people were brought to criminal responsibility as part of the 40th Army in the DRA; at the time the decision of the USSR Armed Forces on amnesty came into force, more than 420 former soldiers were in prison - internationalists.

We have returned…

The Afghan War (1979-1989) is one of the stages of the civil war in Afghanistan between the armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and the armed opposition (Mujahideen); During this period, by decision of the CPSU Central Committee, a limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) was introduced into the territory of Afghanistan.

According to the official version of the Soviet leadership, the Soviet Army was supposed to prevent the threat of foreign military invasion into the territory of the USSR.
The formal basis for the introduction of the OKSV was repeated requests from the Afghan leadership for help.

The decision was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by a secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee.
The beginning of the Afghan war (introduction of OKSV) - December 25, 1979.
Ended: February 15, 1989.

Irrevocable losses(killed, died from wounds, diseases, accidents, missing) - 15,051 people (as of January 1, 1999).
Sanitary losses - almost 54 thousand wounded, shell-shocked, injured; 416 thousand sick (as of January 1, 1999).
Losses in equipment - 147 tanks, 1314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD, BRDM), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel tankers, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters (as of January 1, 1999).

After the outbreak of the Afghan war, several countries announced a boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games, which were held in Moscow.
During the developing conflict, support for the mujahideen was provided by military specialists from the United States and a number of European NATO member countries, China, as well as Pakistani intelligence services.

Beginning of the Afghan Civil War

In the sixties, a communist party was created in the Kingdom of Afghanistan, which soon split into two factions: "Khalq" ("People", leader - Nur Mohammed Taraki) and "Parcham" ("Banner", leader - the son of the general of the Afghan armed forces, Babrak Karmal) .

In 1973, the king's cousin Mohammed Daoud Khan carried out a coup d'état and a republic was proclaimed in the country. The president tried to carry out a number of reforms, but on April 27, 1978 he was overthrown as a result of a military coup. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power, Nur Mohammed Taraki became president, and Babrak Karmal became vice president.

In April 1979, an uprising against the communist regime began in all provinces, the so-called “Saur (April) Revolution.” As a result, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was proclaimed. Taraki became the head of state, and Hafizullah Amin became the chairman of the Revolutionary Council. The government launched reforms that sparked protests in traditional Afghan society.
The PDPA split into two factions, Amin stormed the presidential palace (September 14, 1979), Taraki was killed.

The Soviet government decided to send troops into Afghanistan to help the communist government cope with the rebels, remove Amin from leadership and return Babrak Karmal to power.

Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

Back in July 1979, a battalion from the 111th Parachute Regiment of the 105th Airborne Division arrived in Bagram. This was the first regular unit of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.

On December 9-12, the first so-called “Muslim battalion”, a special forces unit of the Soviet Army, created in preparation for the entry of troops into Afghanistan and staffed by fighters with a “Central Asian” appearance, arrived in Afghanistan.

On December 14, a separate battalion of the 345th Guards Parachute Regiment (OPDP) arrived in Bagram.
On December 25, 1979, at 15.00, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began across two pontoon bridges across the Amu Darya River near the city of Termez. The scouts crossed first, then the columns of the 40th Army - the 108th Motorized Rifle Division (commanded by General K. Kuzmin).

Military transport aviation, using transport aircraft Il-76, An-22, An-12, began airlifting the main forces of the 105th Airborne Division of a separate parachute regiment to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram.
7,700 paratroopers and 894 units of military equipment were delivered.

At the same time, the 357th and 66th motorized rifle divisions entered Afghanistan through Kushka and other border points, which occupied Herat and Farah in the west of the country.
On December 27, Operation Storm 333 was carried out - Amin's palace was stormed. The operation lasted 43 minutes. Amin, his son and about 200 Afghan guards and military personnel were killed.

1980

In February 1980, the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan reached 58,000 people.
In March, the first major offensive operation of OKSV units against the Mujahideen was carried out, the so-called Kunar offensive.
In the summer, the 16th and 54th motorized rifle divisions were introduced into Afghanistan. In northern Afghanistan, a 100-kilometer security zone was created along the Soviet-Afghan border.

1981

The 357th Division was replaced by the 346th Division and the 5th Motorized Rifle Division was additionally introduced into Afghanistan.
In December, an opposition base in the Darzab region (Jawzjan province) was destroyed.

1982

On November 3, a fuel tanker explosion killed more than 176 people in the Salang Pass in the Hindu Kush Mountains.

1983

On January 2, in Mazar-i-Sharif, the Mujahideen took 16 Soviet civilian specialists hostage. 10 of them were released a month later, but six died.
In April, opposition forces were defeated in the Nijrab gorge (Kapisa province). Losses on the Soviet side: 14 people killed, 63 wounded.
The command of the 40th Soviet Army, located 50 km north of Kabul near the Bagram airbase, was transferred to the outskirts of Kabul.

1984

In 1984, the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan reached 150,000.
Seven Soviet motorized rifle divisions were positioned along the important Afghan ring road and on the road to Kiber Pass.
The 105th Guards Airborne Division was located in the Bagram-Kabul area. One of the five airborne brigades included in this division was stationed in Jalalabad.
The command of the 40th Soviet Army was transferred from the outskirts of Kabul to the Soviet border and to Termez.

The main supply depots were on Soviet territory, in Kushka and Termez, and in Afghanistan - the Shindand air base between Herat and Farah, Bagram near Kabul, Abdalmir-alam near Kunduz and Kelagay on the Salang road. A fuel pipeline runs from the Soviet border to Kelagai. Near Termez, a combined road and railway bridge was built across the Amu Darya.

Su-25 aircraft and helicopters, including MI-24, were used to participate in ground combat operations. On January 16, the Mujahideen shot down a Su-25 aircraft for the first time using the Strela-2M portable anti-aircraft missile system (MANPADS). On October 27, an Il-76 transport plane was shot down over Kabul by a MANPADS.

On April 30, the 1st Battalion of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment was ambushed in the Panjshir Gorge and suffered heavy losses.

1985

On April 21, in the Maravara Gorge (Kunar province), the 1st company of Soviet special forces under the command of Captain Nikolai Tsebruk was surrounded and destroyed.
Irreplaceable losses: 31 people.
On April 26, there was an uprising of Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war in the Badaber prison in Pakistan.
In the fall, the creation of support base areas began in hard-to-reach areas of the country.

1986

At the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev announced the beginning of developing a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops.
In April, the Mujahideen suffered a major defeat as a result of the operation to destroy the Javara base.

On May 4, at the XVIII plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, Muhammad Najibullah was elected to the post of Secretary General instead of Babrak Karmal. The new government proclaims a policy of national reconciliation.

1987

In February and March, operations were carried out: “Strike” in the province of Kunduz, “Squall” in the province of Kandahar, “Thunderstorm” in the province of Ghazni, “Circle” in the provinces of Kabul and Logar.
In May, operations were carried out: "Volley" in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul and "South-87" in the province of Kandahar.
In November, Operation Highway was launched for the Afghan province of Khost on the border with Pakistan.

1988

The most fierce battle of Operation Magistral took place on January 7-8 in the area of ​​the height indicated on maps as 3234.
The 9th parachute company of the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment with a total strength of 39 people, with the support of regimental artillery, defended the heights, which were attacked by special rebel units trained in Pakistan. The battle lasted 12 hours, the Mujahideen retreated.
Irreplaceable losses: six people. For this battle, all paratroopers were awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Red Star; junior sergeant V.A. Alexandrov and private A.A. Melnikov were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On April 14, the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan were signed. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its troops within 9 months, and the United States and Pakistan had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

1989

The last Soviet combat operation in Afghanistan - "Typhoon" - was carried out on January 23-26. On February 4, the last unit of the Soviet Army left Kabul.
On February 15, Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of troops was led by the commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

All-Russian public organization "Russian Union of Afghanistan Veterans":